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Abstract 
 
The U.S. newspaper industry’s relationship with online media 1980-2005 
 
Keith Lamar Herndon 
 
Doctor of Philosophy, Internet Studies 
Curtin University of Technology 
Professor Matthew Allen, Supervisor 
 
 
This thesis examines from a historical perspective the issues and forces that shaped 
the U.S. newspaper industry during the formative years of the online era, specifically 
1980 through 2005. The thesis explains this period as one of extreme change and 
transition as it explores the years leading up to the mid-1990s when newspaper 
publishers first confronted the Internet and adopted it as an online distribution 
platform. The thesis also discusses the early 2000s as the time when an Internet-
based media economy emerged to the detriment of newspaper business models.  The 
thesis relies on the tenets of media industries scholarship, and in doing so, provides a 
thorough examination into the business relationships that existed between newspaper 
companies and online media forms during this period. Using numerous examples, the 
thesis details how newspaper companies viewed online media forms, how they 
deployed them, and for what purpose. The analysis of this activity provides insight 
about how the decisions made during this period influenced the newspaper industry’s 
economic condition at the end of the decade. 
 The thesis explains from the perspective of the newspaper industry that the 
Internet arrived as part of a progression of technologies that had influenced the media 
during this period. Beginning with videotext through to proprietary online systems, 
the thesis demonstrates that these earlier platforms had informed newspaper 
companies how online media operates as a communication platform. The thesis 
discusses the importance of interactivity as a practical attribute of online media, but 
recounts how cultural and organizational artefacts kept newspaper companies from 
embracing interactive functions as they developed online products. As interactivity 
increasingly led to user empowerment during the Internet era, the thesis reveals how 
the reluctance of newspaper companies to cede or share content control with their 
audience placed them at a competitive disadvantage and contributed to discrediting 
the newspaper industry’s overall business model. 
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Introduction 
 
A Pittsburgh newspaper published a column in 1903 contemplating what newspapers 
would be like in the year 2000. The author’s forecast was “technologically naïve” 
considering that radio and television were yet to be introduced. He also idealistically 
predicted there would be no wars to cover, but speculated that “all sorts of other 
events will be followed and reported, irrespective of distance.”1 However, the 
column was “uncannily prescient” in suggesting that readers in the twenty-first 
century would have little interest “in what the editor thinks.”2 But the most relevant 
aspect of this column was not something written, but implied. The turn-of-the-
century futurist never questioned the newspaper industry’s survival. He simply took 
for granted that newspapers would be around in that distant future. 
 This proved to be a valid assumption. The newspaper industry has survived 
the more than 100 years since that column appeared. Should such a column be 
written today, however, the author would face the future of the newspaper industry 
with much less confidence. The success of the Internet and the newspaper industry’s 
own missteps have caused industry executives and analysts, journalists and scholars 
to re-examine the position of the printed newspaper within the media landscape. 
Newspaper companies struggled to remain competitive in the online era and faced 
deteriorating financial trends—precarious circumstances made worse by a deep 
economic recession. Newspaper companies—having lost half of their advertising 
revenue since 2000—now search for new business models that will stave off 
extinction. 
 This thesis examines and reports from a historical perspective the issues and 
forces that shaped the U.S. newspaper industry during the formative period of the 
online era, specifically the years 1980 through 2005. The thesis explains this period 
as one of extreme change and transition and will seek to ascertain how the decisions 
made during this period influenced the newspaper industry’s circumstances at the 
end of the decade.  
 Looking back from today, this period can be seen as the time when the 
Information Age transformed from rhetoric into something tangible. Digital 
computer technologies emerged and were married with telecommunications 
                                                    
1. Littlewood, “A View from 88 Year Ago of Newspapers in Year 2000,” 62. [The 1903 article was 
attributed to T. Barron Russell, an editor at The Pittsburgh Gazette.] 
2. Ibid. 
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infrastructure to form information networks. The early closed, proprietary systems 
demonstrated the potential of computer-based communications. However, the open 
architecture of the Internet represented a paradigm shift that altered the balance of 
power between information providers and their consumers. The thesis explores the 
years leading up to the time when newspaper publishers first confronted the Internet, 
the years when the Internet was adopted by newspapers as a distribution platform, 
and the years immediately following that period when an Internet-based media 
economy emerged to the detriment of newspaper business models. 
 The research for this thesis uncovered an ongoing analysis of the newspaper 
industry’s past and speculation about its future. Material from industry and 
mainstream press and scholarly journals provide a constant commentary that reveals 
an industry anxious about what always seemed to be described as a precarious future. 
The industry’s self-doubts, however, were tempered by the equally constant 
successes of a business model that generated large profits even as underlying 
business fundamentals such as the share of the advertising market and circulation 
were declining.  
 The variety of material demonstrated that the newspaper industry in the 
United States of America has a tradition of introspection. From an academic 
perspective, this tradition is manifested within the disciplines of media history and 
media industry studies. The following section of this introduction discusses this 
thesis within the context of those disciplines and is followed by an explanation of the 
supporting methodology. This introduction also includes relevant background 
information regarding the newspaper industry in order to place this thesis in a proper 
historical context. Finally, the introduction explains the organizational structure of 
the thesis and provides an outline of each chapter’s content. 
 
Media History as Research 
McLuhan, sometimes described as the father of media studies, is an essential figure 
in the discussion of media history. He is recalled for inextricably linking human 
history with the development of communication technologies over time. Sparks 
explained that McLuhan “claimed that the invention of print brought about 
cataclysmic change in human culture and that the invention of electronic media 
started a major revolution that we have yet to complete.”3 McLuhan did not live to 
                                                    
3. Sparks, Media Effects Research: A Basic Overview, 243. 
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see the emergence of the Internet, but his observation that “the medium is the 
message”4 is viewed by some as a “prophetic vision” of how the Internet blurred the 
lines between content creation and its distribution.5 McLuhan, as Sparks noted, 
“never did content analyses, surveys or experiments to test his ideas.”6 His 
contribution to media history as a discipline is derived from the concept that great 
insight can be achieved by studying qualitatively what has come before. Hodge 
observed that McLuhan’s “initial object of study was not the revolutionary coming of 
the new electronic media but the previous revolution, the coming of print and its 400 
years of dominance.”7 Hodge noted that “McLuhan’s grand narrative of the history 
of media took place against the background of a conventional history,” which 
provided a framework for his theories.8 McLuhan’s specific influence on this thesis 
is found in Brooke’s observation that “McLuhan routinely criticized our culture for 
forcing new media into doing the work of the old.”9 The inherent tension that arises 
from such activity is explored throughout this thesis as the newspaper industry tried 
to forge a relationship with online media. McLuhan stated: “When faced with a 
totally new situation, we tend always to attach ourselves to the objects, to the flavor 
of the most recent past. We look at the present through a rear-view mirror. We march 
backwards into the future.”10 For media history, McLuhan’s words are a guide for 
not only interpreting the topic of study, but in producing the history itself. His work 
illustrates how to discern and comment on future media developments by rooting 
those observations in what can be gleaned from previous media developments. 
 In this light, media history research can be deployed as a tool for use in 
broader media and new media studies. Peters commented “that the strength of new 
media studies and media history lies in their merger.”11 Media history is not without 
the same shortcomings that are inherent in any history. Kyrish observed that “a major 
difficulty in learning from the past is that we already know how it turned out.”12 She 
cautioned that historical reviews can be limited because “implications of past actions 
can only be confirmed through—and because of—the passage of time,” explaining 
                                                    
4. McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man.   
5. Hodge, “How the Medium is the Message in the Unconscious of ‘America Online,’” 341. 
6. Sparks, Media Effects Research, 237. 
7. Hodge, “How the Medium is the Message,” 341. 
8. Ibid., 345. 
9. Brooke, “Cybercommunities and McLuhan: A Retrospect,” 23-24.  
10. McLuhan, as quoted by Brooke, “Cybercommunities and McLuhan,” 23. 
11. Peters, “And Lead Us Not into Thinking the New is New: A Bibliographic Case for New Media 
History,” 15. 
12. Kyrish, “From Videotext to the Internet: Lessons from Online Services 1981-1996,” 5. 
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further “that knowing about past outcomes makes it extremely difficult not to see 
those outcomes today as inevitable and therefore knowable.”13 The media historian 
must strive to see the period reviewed through the lens of those living the events and 
understand that those participants did not have the benefit of complete foresight.  
 Regarding this point, Stöber discussed the limitations of those living in the 
moment of what is later studied as history. He wrote: “Suppose contemporaries of 
Gutenberg had been asked about the social consequences of Gutenberg’s invention” 
of moveable type. He concluded that “no contemporary of Gutenberg would have 
had any chance to imagine newspapers and magazines.”14 This same concept applies 
to modern inventions as well. People at the start of the personal computer era did not 
grasp the extent to which the device would affect society. Kaletsky noted “that even 
as late as 1980, no one would have put any significant probability on computer sales 
exceeding car sales by a factor of ten to one.”15 These examples—the invention of 
moveable type and the introduction of the personal computer—are two of the most 
significant events in media history. Understanding that the full comprehension of 
those innovations eluded their contemporaries underscores the burden of media 
historians. When examining human reaction to events and circumstances, it becomes 
imperative to account for context. Otherwise, media history research becomes a 
tenuous exercise. 
 Researchers cannot escape the fact that current knowledge serves to bias and 
prejudice history. Researchers must accept the reality that as knowledge changes 
over time so does the understanding and interpretation of history. Peters noted this, 
stating that “the way in which scholars understand history colors and shapes the 
evolving and contingent enterprise of understanding media.”16 Even with that caveat, 
however, Peters believed that media history serves as an important component in 
understanding the development of new media, which makes it an integral part of new 
media studies as a discipline. He wrote: “to study new media is to ride squarely atop 
the ever-unfolding crest between the past and the present.”17 This thesis 
acknowledges the juxtaposition of past versus present, and features new media as an 
essential element of its narrative. However, this thesis is not new media history per 
se; it was approached from the perspective of the newspaper industry. Therefore, the 
                                                    
13. Ibid. 
14. Stöber, “What Media Evolution Is: A Theoretical Approach to the History of New Media,” 484.  
15. Kaletsky, Capitalism 4.0: The Birth of a New Economy in the Aftermath of Crisis, 122. 
16. Peters, “And Lead Us Not into Thinking the New is New,” 14. 
17. Ibid. 
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thesis is a narrative history of the newspaper industry’s reaction to the emergence of 
new media and chronicles the newspaper industry during a period of transition. 
 By approaching its subject as media confronting transition, the thesis aspires 
to fulfil an assumption expressed by Gitelman who wrote that “looking into the 
novelty years, transitional states, and identity crises of different media stands to tell 
us much, both about the course of media history and about the broad conditions by 
which media and communications are and have been shaped.”18 Furthermore, in 
considering the newspaper business collectively as an industry, the thesis identifies 
with emerging scholarship specific to media industry studies. Media industry studies 
can be understood as a subset of the broader cultural industries genre and considers 
history as a significant component of the discipline.19 
As a media history undertaken in the spirit of media industry scholarship, this 
thesis found inspiration in the works of Winseck and Light. Winseck researched the 
early telegraphy era between 1840 and 1910 in Canada, Britain, and the United 
States, while Light explored facsimile as a 20th century medium. Winseck wrote that 
“contemporary discussions of new media, information services and convergence 
proceed if these are entirely new phenomenon” but noted that his research found “a 
similar pattern of events” in telegraph industry’s history.20 Similarly, contemporary 
discussion of the newspaper industry’s relationship with online media often begins 
with the emergence of the Internet, but this thesis examines a much longer and more 
complex history.  
Winseck’s work revealed that “newspaper publishers were among the first 
and most generous investors in setting up telegraph operators, providing the largest 
source of revenue, and establishing organizations … to exploit the potentials of 
electronic communications.”21 Just as Winseck recounted the newspaper industry’s 
efforts in telegraphy, this thesis will do the same for an era that began 70 years later. 
And it will attempt to deliver on the same goal: “If recognizing historical patterns 
provides any guidance for the present, perhaps the history of electronic 
communication presented in this paper can provide some insights into the nature of 
media evolution today.”22 Such work creates a forum for exploring how media 
                                                    
18. Gitelman, Always Already New: Media, History and the Data of Culture, 1. 
19. Holt and Perren, Media Industries: History, Theory, and Method, 2. 
20. Winseck, “Back to the Future: Telecommunications, Online Information Services and 
Convergence from 1840 to 1910,” 137. 
21. Ibid., 140. 
22. Ibid., 153. 
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industries react to forces of change and for understanding how those reactions are 
manifested in product decisions over time.   
Light wrote that the field of “new media studies, with its frequent 
comparative historical focus, opens a door for scholars to revisit and to question the 
historiographical boundaries of the old media studies – what technological systems 
have received disproportionate attention, and what new histories of old media might 
written.”23 Although this thesis is undertaken from the perspective of an old medium, 
it honours Light’s premise by explaining how technologies such as videotext and 
cable television were deployed by newspaper companies in a quest to exploit online 
media. As Light found with the gaps in media history regarding facsimile, the 
discussion of the newspaper industry’s online experience is often limited to the 
Internet era – downplaying the fact that the newspaper industry’s online era had 
begun more than a decade earlier. To provide the level of insight suggested by 
Winseck and Light, media history must draw its perspective of many sources and 
disciplines. The following section of this introduction, explains the methodologies 
deployed in pursuit of the goal. 
 
Methodology 
In discussing how to approach media history, Gitelman suggested that researchers 
first think about several broad questions that “have practical ramifications for the 
ways that media history gets researched and written.”24 Gitelman’s questions 
included: 
Is the history of media first and foremost the history of technological 
methods and devices? Or is the history of media better understood as 
the story of modern ideas of communication? Or is it about modes 
and habits of perception? Or about political choices and structures? 
Should we be looking for a sequence of separate “ages” with 
ruptures, revolutions, or paradigm shifts in between, or should we be 
seeing more of an evolution? A progress?25 
 
When considering these questions as they applied to this thesis, a research 
framework emerged. The thesis examines newspaper companies through the choices 
they made and the structures they created in response to technology developments 
during a defined period of the online era. The actions of one newspaper company can 
                                                    
23. Light, “Facsimile: A Forgotten ‘New Medium’ From the 20th Century,” 371.  
24. Gitleman, Always Already New, 1. 
25. Ibid. 
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be separate and distinct from the actions of another newspaper company, but they, 
nevertheless, are members of the same industry. Therefore, in keeping with the 
media industry construct mentioned previously, the thesis also examines these 
responses collectively as the newspaper industry. 
 This thesis broadly belongs in the genre of historical institutionalism in that 
the newspaper industry is a societal institution.26 It also contains some elements of a 
comparative historical analysis in that it studies “historical sequences and take 
seriously the unfolding processes over time.”27 However, this thesis does not rely 
extensively on a comparative approach in order to minimize recognized 
shortcomings. As Chapman noted, not everyone “will agree with the choice of 
people as influences. Others may see different points of comparison … [and] 
comparative statements can become too simplistic, tenuous or generalized—that is, 
open to intellectual challenge as being inaccurate or misguided.”28 Therefore, this 
thesis addresses the topic as an expository analysis and provides depth to the 
narrative through the liberal use of examples and quotations. It strives to place the 
material in the proper context of the period under review, while reserving the right to 
explain when newspaper industry assumptions or executive observations may have 
been proven wrong at some later time.  
 Holt and Perren recognized that media industries study is interdisciplinary 
drawing from work undertaken in many fields including: “film and television studies, 
communication, law, public policy, business, economics, journalism and sociology.” 
They also promoted the notion that relevant material can be gleaned “far beyond the 
traditional purview of academic study,” noting that “discourses in the trade papers, 
the popular press, and academic publications are supplemented by writing in digital 
communities, online journals and the blogosphere.”29 This thesis follows such an 
interdisciplinary approach and has drawn material from all of these sources. Holt and 
Perren asserted “this range of perspective is both a necessary component and a 
constitutive element of” media industries study.30  
 The thesis has deployed primary sources to provide industry background, 
examples of industry activity and direct insight from participants, while material 
from secondary sources such as academic research is used to provide analysis where 
                                                    
26. Pierson and Skocpol, “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science,” 693-721. 
27. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, 12.  
28. Chapman, Comparative Media History, 2. 
29. Holt and Perren, Media Industries, 1. 
30. Ibid. 
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appropriate. For primary material, the thesis has drawn heavily on articles published 
in Presstime, an industry magazine published by the Newspaper Association of 
America (NAA). Other examples of industry and trade publications include Editor & 
Publisher, News Inc. and Online. The thesis also includes primary material from a 
number of industry reviews such as Columbia Journalism Review, American 
Journalism Review and Nieman Reports. Primary material was also found in a 
variety of newspapers and consumer magazines as well as material published directly 
by companies such as press releases and financial documents. The primary research 
also includes the received wisdom about newspaper and Internet companies that is 
derived from stock market data and market analyst observations.  
 Secondary material was gleaned from numerous scholarly journals and 
books. Examples of the journals consulted include Journalism Quarterly, Newspaper 
Research Journal, Journal of Media Economics and New Media & Society. The 
efforts of dozens of scholars are featured in this thesis; however, the works of Pablo 
J. Boczkowski and Sandy Kyrish were essential to defining its historical framework. 
A bibliography of all sources cited is included at the end of the thesis. 
 Boczkowski’s influence on the methodology deserves a special mention 
given that he observed that a “misunderstanding … quite pervasive in both academic 
and popular discourse” is that the newspaper industry’s move to the Internet “was 
some sort of revolutionary occurrence and without any roots in the past.” He argued 
that “it was a far more evolutionary process influenced by a history of tinkering with 
multiple forms and many facets of consumer-oriented electronic publishing.”31 This 
thesis serves to corroborate this line of reasoning as it will—through an organized 
review of pertinent events—illustrate how deliberate the newspaper industry’s 
approach to online delivery actually was.  
 Within a media industries perspective, it also is essential to the methodology 
to be clear by what is meant when using the phrase “newspaper industry.” Smith 
explained that “one writes ‘the newspaper,’ but of course the newspaper exists in 
three or four quite different varieties.”32 Smith was counting nationally circulated 
newspapers such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal as well as 
metropolitan and small town dailies. There are other types of newspapers such as 
weeklies and those focused on specific topics such a community within a larger city, 
                                                    
31. Boczkowski, Digitizing the News: Innovation in Online Newspapers, 50. 
32. Smith, “Transition to Electronics: From a Bright Past to an Uncertain Future,” 11. 
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entertainment or regional business news. For the purposes of this thesis, however, the 
term “newspaper industry” is used to refer to the collection of companies that publish 
daily newspapers either nationally or regionally. 
 As a media history, it is also necessary to define the period under review. The 
thesis starts in 1980, which is recalled as a symbolic beginning of the “Information 
Age.” This period coincided with the introduction of technologies promising to 
deliver interactive media to the consumer market. Cable television was emerging as a 
wire of connectivity to the home to compete with telephone companies; the personal 
computer was being hailed as a tool that would reshape society. Led by the venerable 
Knight-Ridder Inc., the newspaper industry emerged in the early 1980s as a pioneer 
in early online media. The year 2005 was chosen as the end point for the thesis 
because it is recalled by many as the time when the traditional newspaper business 
model was discredited. Near the end of 2005, Knight-Ridder, the one-time online 
pioneer, announced that it was selling all of its newspapers and closing the company. 
 However, the years 1980 through 2005 only should be considered as an 
organizational rather than definitive framework and should not be mistaken to mean 
explicitly chronological. While the thesis spans an approximate quarter century, it 
does not rigidly follow the happenings according to a prescribed set of years. The 
material would have been unworkable in such a format given that there are few 
precise beginnings and endings. For example, the newspaper industry’s deployment 
of videotext systems overlapped in the early 1980s with the industry’s investments in 
cable television projects. Another example of overlapping can be found when 
partnerships with companies such as Prodigy and America Online were underway as 
experiments with the Internet were launched.    
 While 1980 represents the year that newspaper companies began deploying 
online technologies, the genesis of these projects was in the electronic publishing 
activity of the 1970s. The end point of 2005 reflects the announcement that Knight-
Ridder would be closing the company, but the actual closure did not occur until the 
following year. Also, it is only through a contemporary lens filtered through the 
knowledge of what has transpired in the newspaper industry since 2005 that Knight- 
Ridder’s announcement can be recalled as a capstone event.  
 The unifying thread of the period under study is the emergence of interactive 
technology—first in propriety forms and later through the open network standards of 
the Internet. Therefore, by deploying a systematic review of primary sources and 
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scholarly literature, the thesis examines how the U.S. newspaper industry responded 
to ‘Information Age’ rhetoric and reacted to the emergence of interactive 
technologies throughout this period. 
 Kyrish referenced the work of Fischoff and his concept of “creeping 
determinism,” which she described as “the human tendency to mentally reorganize 
historical outcomes into a linear and seemingly preordained process.”33 A thesis 
deploying an expository style produces a linear narrative by its very nature, but the 
analysis explains that the history of the newspaper industry during this period was 
anything but preordained. 
 To create a foundation for examination and analysis, the thesis explores 
statistics and rhetoric that illustrates the condition of the newspaper industry at the 
beginning of the period being studied (1980) and at the end (2005). This industry and 
market background information is presented in the following section. 
 
Industry Perspective 
The newspaper industry at the beginning of the 1980s was very prosperous with 
overall revenue at an all-time high following several years of double-digit growth. 
Total advertising revenue had climbed from $5.7 billion in 1970 to $14.8 billion in 
1980, which made newspapers the leading advertising medium. The number of 
newspapers had remained essentially flat during the 1970s and total circulation also 
remained flat at around 62.2 million daily copies. Sunday circulation, however, had 
increased from 49.2 million copies in 1970 to 54.7 million in 1980. Newspaper 
industry employment had grown by 47,000 jobs in the 1970s bringing the total in 
1980 to 420,000 workers.34 The industry added another 12,000 workers in the first 
year of the decade providing a strong boasting point for the industry’s lead trade 
group: “With this latest spurt, newspapers passed steel mills, automobile/car body 
plants and auto parts manufacturers to assume the lead among the biggest U.S. 
manufacturing employers.”35 As radio emerged as a national media phenomenon in 
the late 1920s, the Great Depression ravaged the newspaper industry. Between 1929 
                                                    
33. Kyrish, “From Videotext to the Internet,” 5.  
34. Newspaper Association of America (NAA). http://www.naa.org. [NAA was formed on June 1, 
1992, by the merger of seven associations serving the newspaper industry. The associations 
included the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the Newspaper Advertising Bureau, 
the Association of Newspaper Classified Advertising Managers, the International Circulation 
Managers Association, the International Newspapers Advertising and Marketing Executives, the 
Newspaper Advertising Co-op Network, and the Newspaper Research Council.] 
35. Presstime, “Newspaper Jobs now Total 432,000; Most in Nation,” 50. 
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and 1933, newspaper advertising revenue declined 45 percent. Several hundred 
newspapers ceased publication, which forced thousands of employees out of work.36 
Buoyed by the demand for information during the Second World War, the newspaper 
industry recovered from the Depression era. It withstood the introduction of 
commercial radio in the 1930s, the rapid expansion of television in the 1950s and 
1960s and the stagnant economy of the1970s. It entered the 1980s believing and 
acting as a formidable media industry competitor. 
 In January 1980, the chief executive officer of Gannett Inc. and also the 
leader of the industry’s trade association, described the coming decade as one of 
“challenge and opportunity for newspaper people.” He summarized three distinct 
trends:37 
There will be more diversity of news and views than ever, and more 
competition too. There will be more leisure time than ever for our 
audiences, and the interests of those audiences will be more 
specialized. There will be more new technology, which will give us 
the means to better fill the needs of those audiences.38 
 
This thesis is particularly concerned with Neuharth’s third trend, in which he 
anticipated an increased use of technology. The statement demonstrated the 
industry’s early belief that its mission included deploying new technologies—
whatever they may be—in order to serve its readers.  
 Neuharth’s comments also illustrate how newspaper industry leaders were at 
the leading edge of the rhetoric. The basic premise of a technology-driven societal 
revolution became a common theme in popular literature and culture during the early 
1980s. The revolutionary rhetoric is reflected in the works of such authors as Alvin 
Toffler39 and John Naisbitt.40 These works, espousing a coming period of significant 
technological change, became foundational material for later authors such as 
Nicholas Negroponte41 and Esther Dyson.42  
 The industry’s early rhetoric also exhibited an understanding that new 
technology represented potential new competition, but it was expressed in ways that 
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reflected confidence that newspaper companies would accept change and adapt to 
new market conditions. Consider the following excerpt from an essay published in 
early 1980 by the industry’s trade association: 
The new technology we’ve discussed will change our business more 
drastically than the conversion from hot-metal printing or any other 
technological evolution that we’ve experienced. But unlike those 
evolutions, if we don’t take advantage of these new opportunities, 
those outside the newspaper business will. Many people believe that 
the 1980s will deliver society into the ‘The Information Age.’ If 
newspapers are alert, new technology has taken us to the threshold 
of a business limited only by our imaginative and creative 
capacities.43  
 
From this point in time, newspaper companies engaged in a myriad activity as they 
attempted to exploit new technology or defend against it. 
 The thesis explores the newspaper industry throughout this period as its 
companies launched and cancelled videotext projects, entered and abandoned cable 
television partnerships, lobbied to keep the telecommunications industry out of 
online information, partnered (briefly) with proprietary online services, and, finally, 
confronted the emergence of the Internet. Examining these topics as distinct 
milestones in the history of the newspaper industry provides insight and 
understanding about the industry as its underlying business model deteriorated 
throughout the period.  
 The industry’s early efforts with videotext were deemed failures by many 
when they proved expensive relative to the audience they attracted. In search of a 
new online strategy, newspaper companies turned to partnerships with proprietary 
online systems that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But these efforts, too, 
were criticized as limited in scope. Critics contended that newspapers needed to do 
more to secure its future. Maney summarized this perspective: “The newspaper 
industry is a deer frozen in megamedia’s headlights, soon to be creamed if it doesn’t 
get moving.”44 Rather than bold initiatives, however, newspapers companies 
committed to their online alliances with companies such as Prodigy and America 
Online (AOL) until the Internet erupted. 
 As newspaper companies migrated to the Internet as an online platform, they 
confronted many of the same issues that had bedevilled earlier online projects. The 
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thesis examines the newspaper industry’s approach to the open structure of the 
Internet and explores how the Internet led to new investments, partnerships, and 
acquisitions and caused the industry to reconsider fundamental business processes 
and procedures. 
 By 2005, the newspaper industry had undergone significant changes, which 
were at least partly due to its response to the Internet. Advertising revenue peaked in 
2000, and the subsequent years found the industry struggling with recession and 
increasing online competition.45 The industry’s advertising growth had lagged behind 
other media during the 1990s. In the mid-1990s, television—led by a surge in cable 
advertising—supplanted newspapers as the nation’s largest advertising medium. By 
2001, newspapers’ share of the advertising market also had fallen behind direct 
mail.46 The hope that online revenue would offset declines in printed revenue failed 
to materialize.  
 The erosion in advertising market share tracked declining circulation that 
plagued newspaper companies during the second half of the studied period. Similar 
to the 1970s, newspapers had managed to keep circulation stable during the 1980s. 
However, by 2005, total daily newspaper circulation in the U.S. stood at 53.3 million 
copies, a decline of more than 14 percent in 15 years.47 At least 293 daily newspapers 
ceased publication during this period, largely in markets where economics conditions 
did not support more than one daily newspaper.48 As the number of newspapers 
declined, so did the industry’s total employment. The industry had remained a job 
creator throughout the 1980s with employment peaking at nearly 486,000 jobs in 
1991. In the subsequent years, however, the industry lost more than 121,000 jobs due 
to production automation, expense controls and the decreased number of newspapers. 
Employment stood at less than 365,000 at the end of 2005, its lowest employment 
total since the 1960s.49 When Knight-Ridder announced at the end of 2005 that it was 
selling its newspapers and closing the company, industry executives understood that 
their business had fundamentally changed. Newspaper companies had managed some 
success in attracting online audience, but they had no clear strategy for monetizing 
that audience and their business remained inextricably dependent on the printed 
product even though it was losing ground in the marketplace. In looking back to this 
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period, 2005 represents a watershed moment. It was the point in the industry’s 
history where tangible evidence—not only pundit’s prognostications—suggested that 
the newspaper industry’s business cycle had run its course. 
 
Predictions of Demise 
There had long been predictions that computer technology would lead to the 
industry’s demise. Ted Turner, the founder of Turner Broadcasting and its Cable 
News Network (CNN), forecasted in 1980 that the daily newspaper industry would 
not survive the decade. In 1990, Turner admitted that his timing was off, but 
reiterated his basic prophecy: “It may take 10 or 20 more (years). Newspapers will 
eventually go.”50 By the mid-1990s, prominent industry insiders also were 
speculating about the end of printed newspapers. A Knight-Ridder executive working 
with new electronic platforms said print would be replaced with electronic editions 
by 2005, and a former editor turned Internet consultant predicted newspapers “will 
disappear over the next 15 to 20 years.”51  
 Although the timing of these predictions did not come true, the increase in 
negative discourse about the future of printed newspapers underscored how the 
industry’s reputation had shifted from Information Age pioneer in the early 1980s to 
flailing victim by the early 1990s—even before the Internet had emerged as a 
powerful new force in the media marketplace. A popular author described newspaper 
companies as belonging to the “mediasaurus,” the soon-to-be extinct mass media, 
and charged that they were not investing enough money in new technologies to 
deploy them effectively.52 A leading management consultant speaking at a 
newspaper marketing conference said “if this is the age of information, [then] this 
should be the dawning of a great era for newspapers, not their eclipse.” But he 
concluded with an observation that the newspaper industry had a history of acting too 
cautiously, stating “I’m not sure that it’s up to that level of craziness that’s required 
for survival.”53 After decades of success and media industry leadership, newspaper 
executives were unaccustomed to such public criticism. 
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 In a lengthy rebuttal published in the newspaper association’s trade journal, 
an editor wrote of traditional media: “Newspapers and networks may have been slow 
to react to the Information Age,” but “they will ultimately be its architects.”54 This 
comment is illustrative of the newspaper industry’s collective belief throughout 
much of the online era that it would figure out how to succeed. The attitude reflected 
the sensibilities of a profitable mature industry, but it also led to internal tension 
regarding the strategies and tactics that were undertaken in pursuit of online success. 
As the industry attempted to exploit opportunities in the online era, it struggled to 
define the inherent nature of the newspaper industry’s business. 
 This manifested itself into ways. First, newspaper executives were challenged 
with thinking about their business holistically as information, not printed 
newspapers. Second, as negative advertising and circulation trends began to affect 
financial performance, newspaper companies engaged in a series of expense cuts and 
staff layoffs. This erupted into open discord between the industry’s business 
management and many of its editors and journalists. These two topics are addressed 
in the following sections of the introduction. 
 
The Nature of the Business 
As early as 1980, newspaper industry critics were cajoling executives to think about 
a broader market—an information marketplace rather than the specific product called 
a newspaper. It was similar to the horse and buggy analogy used when the car 
industry began. Were horse carriage makers only in the carriage business or were 
they part of a larger transportation industry? Would newspapers suffer the same fate 
as the carriage makers who refused to adapt to the encroachment of Henry Ford and 
the Model T? Compaine framed the industry’s choices in defining its business as a 
series of questions:  
The most important answer here must come to the question, “What 
is a newspaper?” 
• Is it a format called “ink on newsprint?” 
• Is it a delivery method of private carriers and newsstands? 
• Is it a package of information?55  
 
Compaine answered his questions by asserting that newspapers were “essentially an 
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information package, one that just happens to be printed on newsprint for now.” He 
argued that a newspaper company must be viewed as “a collector and disseminator of 
information” and suggested the industry “stop using the phrase ‘newspaper’ and 
think of the business in information terms,” concluding that “it would be myopic to 
lose sight of the less-obvious competitors, which today may be known as banks, 
computer companies and catalog mail-order firms—or other creatures for which 
there is as yet no name.”56 Compaine’s observations turned out to be very prescient 
as the unnamed creates he worried about in 1980 were formidable media competitors 
in 2005 with names such as Amazon, eBay, Yahoo! and Google. 
 In the beginning of the online era, however, the newspaper industry was not 
all that concerned with its identity. There was a widely held belief among executives 
that the industry could draw from its historical experience with earlier electronic 
media—television and radio—as inspiration and guidance. Newspaper companies 
had been deeply involved in the early development of television and radio, especially 
in providing news content for these media. A trade journal wrote that the newspaper 
industry’s contributions to earlier electronic media “belie the parochial view that 
newspapers are modern-day luddites bent on impeding, if not destroying, any 
technology that threatens their ink-on-paper products.”57 A newspaper executive 
recalled the early development of television when newspaper newsrooms had 
television cameras on reporters’ desks and easels for displaying newspaper pages on 
camera. “Nobody knew what television was in 1947,” he said, asserting that the 
online era warranted the same types of experiments. He added that newspaper 
companies had to learn if online media “is so different that it develops into entirely 
independent organizations [as broadcast did], or whether there’s enough similarity 
between newspaper editing that our organizations can evolve internally into 
hybrids.”58 An important aspect of this thesis is in exploring how newspaper 
companies addressed these concerns through organizational structures and other 
business considerations. 
 In doing so, this thesis discusses newsgathering and the presentation of news 
as it relates to how newspaper companies dealt with online content. The advent of 
interactive technologies challenged many of the newspaper industry’s traditions, 
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processes, and procedures. This thesis, however, is focused on the business of 
newspaper companies as commercial enterprises and does not analyse their actions 
during this period from a journalistic perspective. However, understanding the 
newspaper industry requires an appreciation for its journalistic sensibilities, which 
are discussed in the following section. 
 
A Noble Institution 
Bovee said “the function of journalism is to provide people, individually and as 
members of communities, with the knowledge that will help them make good, timely 
decisions about what should or should not be done.”59 No part of that definition ties 
journalism to any particular product form. Newspaper people, however, linked their 
product very closely to the definitions of journalism.   
 The significance of the journalistic mission is fundamental in how the 
industry thinks about itself and how it responds to challenges. Udell maintained that 
newspaper companies occupy a unique position in American industry: they are 
dependent on the free enterprise system for their livelihood, but they are protected by 
the free press provisions of the U.S. Constitution. He wrote: 
It was in this context that the American newspaper developed; 
protected first in its right to seek truth regardless of the path down 
which truth leads; and second—as free private enterprise—
motivated to profit by satisfying the needs of its customers.60  
 
Journalists want their newspaper employers to operate as noble institutions at the 
vanguard of a constitutionally guaranteed free press. Publishers are fine with that 
perspective as long as profit margins are high enough to ensure economic freedom is 
not compromised.  From the perspective of investors, however, the discussion about 
journalistic mission and product quality was much ado about nothing. A prominent 
investor asserted in the early 1980s that product quality may have contributed to a 
newspaper’s local market dominance, but once dominant in a market quality no 
longer was a factor in ongoing profitability. He wrote: 
The economics of a dominant newspaper are excellent, among the 
very best in the business world.  Owners, naturally, would like to 
believe that their wonderful profitability is achieved only because 
they unfailingly turn out a wonderful product.  That comfortable 
theory wilts before an uncomfortable fact.  While first-class 
newspapers make excellent profits, the profits of third-rate papers 
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are as good or better….61  
 
The disassociation of newspapers as a unique societal institutions and newspaper 
companies as profit making businesses became more pronounced as time passed 
during the period under review. 
 As negative industry trends began to accelerate in the online era, publishers 
implemented stringent expense controls to maintain profit margins. The ensuing 
layoffs and budget cuts did not spare the newsrooms, which led to open dissent from 
journalists. Editors and reporters questioned the motives of their business managers, 
expressing deeply seeded beliefs the industry was compromising journalistic 
integrity in favour of profits. A leading industry analyst wrote that the business was 
“under siege,”62 while the ombudsman at The Washington Post, described the 
industry in the mid-1990s this way: 
We have publishers under enormous pressure to produce profits who 
are afraid to tell their newsroom people what the situation is. We 
have editors buffering reporters from the realities even as they bring 
about the cuts needed to protect profits. And we have journalists 
unwilling to hear these business truths and famously allergic to 
change.63 
 
These comments underscored how difficult it was for newspaper companies—the 
business managers as well as the journalists—to adapt to a new marketplace. 
Throughout the period being studied, comments and examples of activities illustrated 
that newspaper companies were complex organizations steeped in tradition and 
conservative business practices.  
 Through its expository approach this thesis allows for the story of the 
newspaper industry during this period to unfold as the trajectory of online media 
increases. Given the long history of newspapers as a media form, this thesis 
examines events that occurred during a relatively short period of time. However, the 
significance of the changes that occurred during this period cannot be understated. 
For example, the investor who was very positive about the industry in the early 
1980s had an entirely different outlook by the late 2000s, stating: “For most 
newspapers in the United states, we would not buy them at any price. They have the 
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possibility of going to just unending losses.” The difference was that newspapers 
“were once essential to the American public” but lost that prominence to a variety of 
competing sources for news content including the Internet.64 Therefore, such changes 
underscore the importance of studying this period to gain better understanding of 
how new technologies challenged the newspaper industry and contributed to the 
collapse of its long established business model.  In the following section, the 
introduction provides explanations about the content that will be included in each 
chapter.   
 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter One provides a discussion of important foundational concepts, while 
Chapters Two through Five explore the newspaper industry’s online experiences 
prior to the Internet. Chapters Six and Seven focus on the emergence of the Internet 
and its immediate aftermath while Chapter Eight and the Conclusion examines the 
state of the newspaper industry at the end of the period and the connections to the 
present day circumstances. 
 In Chapter One, several important concepts that underlie the overall thesis are 
discussed. The phrases “traditional media” and “new media” and words such as 
“interactive” and “convergence” are explored to understand how they have been 
defined by scholars and used in industry. A particular focus is placed on defining 
“interactivity” in the context of interactive media. For example, the chapter addresses 
the attributes that allow a medium to be considered interactive. The meaning of 
“traditional media” as it is used in this thesis is briefly presented followed by the 
more in-depth analysis of interactivity. The chapter explores the broadly used phrase 
“new media” and examines it as a concept now closely identified with the Internet. 
Finally, the chapter explores the conceptual meaning of convergence and the 
implications this concept held for the newspaper industry during this period. The 
purpose for including this terminology review within a media history is to provide a 
foundation and context for the discussions that follow. 
 Chapter Two provides examples from the newspaper industry’s early forays 
into electronic publishing—projects like StarText, Viewtron, and Gateway—and 
explores the expectations and concerns associated with these initiatives. Reviewing 
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the partnerships and the underlying technologies that gave life to these projects as 
well as the attitudes of consumers and industry leaders provides an understanding of 
the gap that developed between the hype surrounding their development and what 
actually happened once they were deployed.  
 Through the exploration of Knight-Ridder’s Viewtron project and others, the 
thesis establishes a historical foundation for the newspaper industry’s early role in 
developing interactive media. Examining the newspaper industry’s decisions to shut 
down much of this high-profile activity provides insight regarding the influence these 
projects had on future industry decision-making. Initially, many leaders viewed the 
closing of these videotext projects as a referendum on the ability of printed 
newspapers to compete with online media. Later, the financial losses incurred by 
these projects were recalled as excessive and contributed to the industry’s reluctance 
to take risks when confronting decisions regarding new technology. 
 Chapter Three also examines activity from the early 1980s, but focuses on the 
newspaper industry’s flirtation with cable television. It is important to examine the 
influence a burgeoning cable television industry had on the decisions made by 
newspaper companies regarding technology and electronic distribution in the early 
1980s considering that newspaper companies spent more of their capital resources on 
cable television ventures than on any other form of emerging technology during this 
period. This chapter explores how the early development of cable television 
resonated with newspaper publishers who adopted the notion that a wire into every 
home could be a way to protect their interests in local markets. 
 As cable television expanded, however, these investments became very 
expensive for the newspaper industry to maintain and cable television operators 
became reluctant to share channel capacity and revenue with newspaper companies. 
When this period of cable investment ended, the newspaper industry’s involvement 
was not cast in the same light as the decision to close videotext projects. With cable, 
newspaper companies were seen as backing away from a distribution platform rather 
than a new full-fledged medium, which made strategic sense to the business and 
investment community. The newspaper industry experience with cable also fostered 
a sense that the competitive effects of cable television had been overstated and it 
bolstered the newspaper industry’s belief in its own competitive position as it 
decided to directly address incursions by the telecommunications industry. 
 Chapter Four examines how the newspaper industry reacted to the possibility 
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of direct electronic competition from the nation’s telecommunications industry. 
Newspaper publishers already viewed the phone companies’ Yellow Pages 
directories as advertising competition, but the prospect of those vast encyclopaedic 
listings ported into an online database seemed like an unfair advantage. This chapter 
explains how the newspaper industry sought to derail that threat, and in doing so, 
provides additional insight into the newspaper industry’s evolving perspective of its 
market and competition in the early years of online media.  
 The newspaper industry committed to an unprecedented political lobbying 
campaign to pass legislation or affect regulation designed to keep the 
telecommunications industry out of the local market information services. The 
industry’s effort is recalled as a successful undertaking from a lobbying perspective, 
but its political victories ended up casting the newspaper business as defensive and 
protectionistic. Moreover, critics contented the newspaper industry was spending to 
wage political warfare when it should have been spending on technology research 
and development to prepare for a next generation of online media. 
 Chapter Five explores the newspaper industry’s relationship with a new breed 
of upstart companies that ushered in the era of proprietary online systems. Prodigy, 
America Online (AOL) and others presented newspapers with the opportunity to 
participate in the online market with relatively little capital investment. Newspaper 
companies could focus on creating content, while the online systems provided the 
platform. Although newspapers had made the phone company giants their public 
enemy, this chapter relates how publishers embraced these proprietary systems 
companies. After a decade of investing in interactive ventures with little return, 
newspaper companies liked the idea of sharing risk with these new companies. As 
the newspaper industry envisioned it, the online marketplace would largely resemble 
its offline world. In this market, large media companies centrally created the content, 
controlled its distribution and relied on advertisers to pay for it all. Newspaper 
companies understood the proprietary online services model because it so closely 
reflected their own.  
 Chapter Six recounts that as the newspaper industry began its major push into 
the online world with its proprietary online service partners, the Internet burst into 
the consumer market. The chapter explores the newspaper industry’s reaction to the 
World Wide Web as it established the Internet as a formidable media distribution 
platform. The chapter examines several of the projects undertaken by the newspaper 
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industry that illustrate its response during the period that led up to the Internet 
industry’s financial bubble collapse in 2000. In explaining how this profound 
transition unfolded, this chapter looks first at the development of Mosaic, which was 
critical to the overall acceptance of the Internet as a mainstream platform. 
 The focus then turns to the newspaper industry’s migration to the Web, and 
highlights the New Century Network (NCN) initiative. The chapter examines the 
decision to close NCN and includes retrospective comments from participants and 
observers about what its failure said about the newspaper industry’s ability to 
navigate the changing marketplace. The chapter also addresses how the industry 
wrestled with numerous issues involving content, structure, and business models, 
with a particular emphasis on the classified advertising component. 
 In Chapter Seven, the Internet’s post-bubble period is explored as a time of 
extreme change for the newspaper industry. The newspaper industry had believed it 
would lead media’s digital transition and influence the process on its own terms. The 
emergence of the Internet challenged those assumptions and the newspaper industry 
was marginalized as new companies transformed the Internet into their own version 
of what an online media platform should be. The chapter begins by discussing the 
AOL deal to acquire Time Warner in the context of other media mergers and how 
such activity led to a new perspective of convergence.  
 The chapter uses the activities of Media General in Tampa, Florida, as an 
example of how convergence became a pragmatic approach undertaken by traditional 
media organizations in response to their new environment. However, convergence 
activities had minimal impact on the financial performance of newspaper companies, 
which came under increasingly harsh investor scrutiny in the early 2000s. At the 
outset of the decade, newspaper companies struggled to understand the valuations 
investors awarded to Internet companies with no record of success. The chapter 
explores the Internet investment bubble for the effects it had on the newspaper 
business and discusses the reaction to the investment collapse. For a brief period, the 
sell-off of Internet investments led to a sense of vindication in the newspaper 
industry.  
 But the wild swings in the stock market, notwithstanding, this period 
represented a turning point for the newspaper industry and its investors. The long-
term economic prospects for newspaper companies were diminished by the 
emergence of Internet competition and many investors wanted newspaper companies 
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to embrace sweeping business reforms and articulate a long-term vision for economic 
viability. The chapter examines the decision of Knight-Ridder’s management to close 
the business. The event serves as the capstone for the thesis as it is recalled as 
signalling the beginning of the end of the newspaper industry’s long-established 
business model. 
 Chapter Eight looks back throughout the entire thesis and presents a 
summation of key themes that emerged from 1980-2005. This chapter recalls the 
industry’s relationship with online media in a systematic way so that it is more 
clearly understood how the industry arrived in its current state. The chapter connects 
the lessons of history by reviewing key themes and revisiting several ideas presented 
in Chapter One regarding new media, interactivity and convergence in light of the 
material discussed throughout the thesis. The overall thesis illustrated how the 
newspaper industry’s approach to online media left it vulnerable as the market shift 
to the Internet accelerated in the 2000s. Unpositioned to substitute revenue losses 
from the printed newspaper with gains in online revenue, the newspaper industry 
found its business model in ruins. The rise of the Internet is often blamed for the 
newspaper industry’s predicament, but as the issues summarized in Chapter Eight 
underscore, this thesis reveals a reality that was much more complicated.  
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Chapter One:  
Interactivity, New Media and Convergence Explored 
 
This chapter explores key concepts central to the overall thesis and examines how 
these concepts have been defined and explained in both scholarly research and 
through industry practice. Reviewing scholarly research and highlighting pertinent 
observations from that research and from within the newspaper industry—based on 
trade journal accounts—provides an understanding of how the newspaper industry 
dealt with changing technology as it attempted to adapt to its marketplace. This 
thesis examines the business relationships that existed between newspaper 
companies and interactive media forms from 1980 until 2005. It details how these 
companies viewed such media forms, how they deployed them, and for what 
purpose. A study such as this cannot be undertaken without first understanding the 
technological dealings, real or imagined, or the conceptual basis on which 
interactive technology was developed and understood—and in some cases 
misunderstood—in the newspaper business. Therefore, it is crucial to explore and 
explain some of the terminology used throughout the thesis. The phrase “interactive 
media,” for example, has usage implications as does the term “new media.” This 
chapter explains why the two phrases are not mutually exclusive. 
 Keyton explained that “a concept represents a number of individual, but 
related things,” adding that concepts provide “an abstract way of thinking that helps 
us group together those things that are similar to one another and, at the same time, 
distinguish them from dissimilar other things.”1 She also observed that “concepts 
become constructs when linked together in meaningful ways.”2 In keeping with this 
definitional model, Chapter One explores several key phrases within their own 
conceptual framework. This approach provides a foundational understanding that is 
useful later in the thesis when each of these concepts come together in the form of 
the larger construct. First, the meaning of “traditional media” as used in this thesis is 
briefly presented followed by a more in-depth analysis of interactivity, which 
includes how that concept relates to what is referred to as “interactive media.” The 
chapter next turns to the more broadly used phrase “new media” and examines it as a 
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concept now closely identified with the emergence of the Internet. Finally, the 
chapter explores the conceptual meaning of convergence and the implications of this 
concept within the media industry.  
 
Traditional Media 
The term “new media’ emerged as a way to illustrate a difference in the media it 
described and “traditional media.” Therefore, before exploring what “new media” 
are, it will be useful to explore what they are not. The term “traditional media” 
applies to those media that predate the era of online networks. They generally 
include books, newspapers, magazines, and television, as well as recorded music and 
radio. Most scholars apparently believe the term is so widely understood that they 
frequently use it without providing a definition. When an explanation is offered, it is 
often presented parenthetically: “Traditional media (e.g., television, radio, and 
newspapers).”3 One succinct definition has been offered as “‘traditional’ media—
[is] all media except the internet.”4 However, this definition is too contemporary to 
be used with clarity as it ignores the 1980s and early 1990s when videotext systems 
and proprietary systems such as Prodigy, America Online, and other electronic 
bulletin board services and CD-ROM compilations were factors in the media 
landscape. These types of media products existed before there was a consumer 
Internet, yet they were different from traditional media.  
How else have scholars understood traditional media? Rice discussed 
traditional media from the perspective of societal acceptance and described them as 
media that operate within expected norms: 
… much of what we feel is natural about traditional media … is in 
fact an artifact of a wide variety of components, such as material 
production, access mechanisms, social conventions, etc., available 
and developed at the time. Over time, and with continued use and 
structuration, this artifact becomes idealized, so that primarily 
positive social aspects are associated with familiar media….5 
 
 Dizard took a mass media approach in defining traditional media, suggesting 
that it included “broadcast TV, film, radio and print.”6 He wrote that traditional 
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media represent the “… mass-media pattern, which consists of one-way products 
delivered from a centralized source.”7 Dizard excluded cable television from his list 
of traditional media, but it could be argued that cable television—in its early 
development—fit Dizard’s definition because cable was a delivery mechanism to 
send a television signal to those households that could not receive reception 
otherwise. However, over the years—especially the past decade—cable television 
companies have deployed technology that allows two-way communication through 
various programming guides and on-demand programming services.  
Given such nuances, explaining the phrase “traditional media” can be 
difficult. Much of the literature assumes, by not offering a definition, that there is a 
near-universal understanding of what is meant by the phrase. Steuer discussed 
traditional media in sensory terms, explaining that it encompassed media “relatively 
low in breadth, relying primarily on the visual and auditory channels.”8 Implicit in 
this description is the idea that traditional media resides lower on the media 
evolutionary scale given that their formats are rigid, thereby limiting the way users 
can engage.  
Jones offered an intriguing delineation of media based on the underlying 
fundamentals of their associated business models. He suggested that printed media 
such as newspapers “sold space,” which he explained as “trading on the attention 
people would pay to the spatial organization of the printed—mediated—word.”9 He 
contrasted that model with “electronic broadcast media,” writing that such media 
“sold time,” or the amounts of it that someone would spend with “the temporal 
organization of radio and TV.”10 He wrote that Internet-based media, “sell attention, 
without regard to space and time,” suggesting that this model values “connection 
and linking.”11 This notion—that traditional media’s model of selling space or time 
could be supplanted by a new model that, in effect, depends on an end user’s level of 
engagement—is important to keep in mind as the definitions of “interactive media” 
and “convergence” are explored. Steuer’s sensory approach and Jones’ business 
model approach downplay the influence of content and place a higher premium on 
interactivity when explaining the differences of “traditional media” and “interactive 
media.” Interactivity will be explored in greater detail in the following section. 
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Interactive Media 
Scholars have found that defining “interactive media” is a more complex task than 
explaining “traditional media.” The phrase “interactive media” is fraught with 
ambiguity because the concept of interactivity is broadly applied, and often in 
incongruous ways. Before tackling how to explain “interactive media,” it is 
necessary to review what the scholarly literature suggests about the concept of 
“interactivity” and how it has been applied to the study of media. As Downes and 
McMillan noted, “scholars have employed the term [interactivity] to refer to 
everything from face-to-face exchanges to computer-mediated communication.”12 
And as was noted above in regards to traditional media, Downes and McMillan 
determined that “much of the literature, both popular and scholarly, uses the term 
‘interactivity’ with few or no attempts to define it.”13 Downes and McMillan 
attempted their own definition, but found that there was no single way of describing 
it, concluding that “varying levels of interactivity exist” and that application of the 
term depends on such factors as user perception, the timing and direction of 
communication, the responsiveness of the communication and the levels of control a 
user is allowed to exert over the process.14  
 
The Emergence of a Buzzword 
Downes and McMillan conducted their work in the field of computer-mediated 
communications, and in an era marked by the advent of the personal computer, the 
concept of interactivity within computing is a prevalent topic in that field’s scholarly 
research. Since the emergence of the Internet, interactivity is now a topic associated 
with research throughout many fields of study in media, information, and 
communications. Nevertheless, increasing usage of the words “interactivity” and 
“interactive”—even in popular literature—diluted their meaning and led some 
researchers to question whether the concept they represent could be defined without 
first explaining the context in which the words are used. Schultz explained: 
Interactivity has almost turned into a dull buzzword. The term is so 
inflated now that one begins to suspect that there is much less to it 
than some people want to make it appear.15 
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Continuing with the same idea, Cover wrote: 
“Interactivity” as a buzzword, a consumer sales motif, an 
intellectual concept and technologically-constituted feature of a new 
media has for some time now been considered a cliché, an overkill 
term, a marketing concept misapplied to products or mediums 
which are not definitively interactive….16 
 
 Such comments are common in scholarly journals. Therefore, it is important 
to explore how the meaning of interactivity evolved from a scholarly concept to a 
phrase ridiculed by its overuse in the popular journals and press. An understanding 
of this evolution will help to apply the concept of interactivity within the context of 
this thesis—especially in terms of how the newspaper industry would come to view 
interactivity as media technologies advanced. 
 
A History of “Interactivity” 
Kiousis wrote, “The academic usage of ‘interactivity’ is marginally inconsistent at 
best.”17 He maintained the inconsistent usage was due to the many academic 
perspectives from which the concept has been studied, including media and 
communication, psychology, sociology, and computer science and information 
design.18 Kiousis was instrumental in establishing a definitional perspective. He 
pointed to a relevant starting point to begin unravelling the concept of interactivity: 
“Any discussion of interactivity inevitably draws from its roots in Cybernetic theory, 
as outlined by Wiener (1948).”19 Wiener is considered one of the founders of 
Cybernetic theory, which he described as “the entire field of control and 
communication” in both machines and animals.20 Central to his work was the 
examination of “feedback mechanisms,” a holistic study of feedback in many 
forms.21 For example, he looked at ship propulsion and rudder systems, describing 
how forward motion is a result of iterative corrective actions based on feedback:22 
He wrote: 
An extremely important factor in voluntary activity is what the 
control engineers term feedback … when we desire a motion to 
follow a given pattern the difference between this pattern and the 
actually performed motion is used as a new input to cause the part 
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regulated to move in such a way as to bring its motion closer to that 
given by the pattern.23 
 
Wiener used the same reasoning when he described a home thermostat as a simple 
mechanical feedback system that regulates temperature by taking “feedback” from a 
thermometer and instructing the furnace when to turn on and off.24 While Wiener 
did not use the words “interactivity” or “interactive,” it is easy to see within his 
construct how new input of data can become part of such a feedback system. When 
someone enters a new temperature setting into the thermostat, thereby providing 
new feedback, the outcome is altered. 
 Wiener’s approach and the general style of language he used allowed his 
work to be translatable to other processes and fields of study. For example, that a 
user can provide “feedback” and alter his media consumption experience is now an 
accepted attribute of interactive media. 
 However, research within this context did not become commonplace until the 
1980s. Media communications research conducted during the 1950s, 1960s, and 
1970s was essentially the study of mass communication, which Heeter noted, “was 
originally modeled as the one-way transmission of a message from source to 
receiver.”25 Such research was based on the work of Shannon and Weaver who 
created a “mathematical theory of communication” that was intended as a model for 
describing the work of a transmitter and receiver.26 According to Heeter, “Although 
[the Shannon and Weaver] model was developed to help engineers describe 
transmission of an electrical signal from one machine to another, it was widely 
adopted by communication researchers as a model for human communication.”27 In 
the 1980s, when computers were beginning to make a difference in the operations of 
communications systems, researchers noted the shift away from strictly studying  
media communications as a rigid one-way construct.28 The changed dynamic 
prompted Williams, Rice, and Rogers to write in 1988 that “… the paradigm of 
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linear, one-way communication may be giving way to a more cybernetic paradigm 
(based on Norbert Weiner’s theory) that better fits the interactivity of the new 
media.”29  
 The study of interactivity also borrowed from decades-old research on 
interpersonal relationships and behaviours. As researchers have considered how 
people interact in online settings, they have turned to studies that describe behaviour 
in personal settings as a starting point. Goffman’s work is especially relevant in 
helping explain how interaction has come to be understood, articulating that “the 
proper study of interaction is not the individual and his psychology, but rather the 
syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one 
another.”30 In other words, rather than discussing interaction from the perspective of 
the individual, he examined how an individual communicated with and reacted to 
other individuals or within groups of people. Goffman’s work with new material was 
republished in 2005, further testimony to a renewed interest in research into all 
aspects of the concept of interactivity.  
 The study of interactivity, therefore, has roots in many disciplines ranging 
from feedback processes and societal engagement to interpersonal communication. 
With the onset of personal computing in the 1980s, research into what became 
known as computer-mediated communications began to bring together many of the 
disparate concepts in this field of study. Contemporary articles that feature 
definitions of interactivity and its relationship to communications and media point to 
a 1988 essay by Rafaeli as an “early benchmark.”31 
 
Interactivity as a Communications Concept 
In building on earlier research that presented a concrete, quantifiable definition for 
interactivity, Rafaeli described interactivity as “quintessentially a communication 
concept.”32 He wrote that interactivity was, “an expression of the extent that, in a 
given series of communication exchanges, any third (or later) transmission (or 
message) is related to the degree to which previous exchanges referred to even 
earlier transmissions.”33 Newhagen argued that Rafaeli’s approach is “important 
because it demands that the information state of at least one agent in the 
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communication exchange has in some way been changed, fulfilling the constraint 
that true interactivity must be dynamic and the content of communication 
mutable.”34 Scholars seemed to be drawn to Rafaeli’s 1988 essay, at least in part 
because of its attempt at defining interactivity with a precise measurement that 
established a minimum of three exchanges as a necessary benchmark for 
interactivity to have occurred. It is important to point out, however, that Rafaeli was 
building on the work of Bretz and Schmidbauer, who in 1983 wrote that “two 
actions are not enough to characterize a system as interactive; there must be three.”35  
Rafaeli, writing about interactivity within traditional media36 presented a 
revised definition in 1997. In this iteration, Rafaeli and a colleague emphasized the 
content of the exchanges rather than quantity. Rafaeli and Sudweeks argued that 
interactivity is determined by “… the extent to which messages in a sequence relate 
to each other, and especially the extent to which later messages recount the 
relatedness of earlier messages.”37 Rafaeli’s early writings placed him in the camp of 
those scholars who view interactivity as, as he put it, a “natural attribute of face-to-
face conversation.”38 With that view, Rafaeli maintained affinity with the field of 
interpersonal communication, in contrast to Bretz and Schmidbauer, who described 
interactivity more in terms of a process exchange between people and computer 
systems.39 However, in his research with Sudweeks, Rafaeli further expanded his 
context of interactivity as he explored its role in computer-mediated communication. 
Rafaeli and Sudweeks claimed, “Interactivity merges speaking with listening. And it 
is a general enough concept to encompass both intimate, person-to-person, face-to-
face communication and other forums and forms.”40 They were attracted to the 
social aspects of interactivity and discussed interactivity in terms of “engagement.” 
They concluded, “Like face-to-face communication, computer-mediated 
communication has the capacity of enabling high interactivity.”41 Rafaeli and 
Sudweeks were adamant that interactivity is a much more involved construct than 
simply chatting online or emailing a friend: 
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We propose that interactivity is associated with those message 
qualities which invite people and make people gravitate to groups 
on the net. Interactivity may be a mechanism through which netting 
occurs on the net.… Interactivity is the condition of communication 
in which simultaneous and continuous exchanges occur, and these 
exchanges carry a social, binding force.42 
 
 Rafaeli and Sudweeks’s explanation places the concept of interactivity at the 
centre of the development of the Internet, or least the development of human 
behaviour on the Internet. Interactivity, as they described it, allows us to understand 
the forces that coalesced to make Internet a place where social networking and user-
generated content took hold. Therefore, it is also important to view interactivity 
from the perspective of the user, one who engages in an interactive experience. 
 
The User Perspective of Interactivity  
Researchers have explored interactivity as a concept of the mind, stating that 
“Interactivity is a complex process that is as much a cognitive event (and therefore 
mostly invisible), as it is a physical act.”43 Sohn and Lee studied the cognitive 
perceptions of interactivity, concluding that, “Human perception of interactivity is 
indispensable in studying the effects of interactive media on individuals: Whether 
people actually perceive a medium/vehicle as interactive is the only valid criterion 
for judging its interactivity.”44 Sohn and Lee pointed to Sundar’s work on cognitive 
issues within the concept of interactivity, linking them to the notion of choice. 
Sundar wrote, “By calling for user action, interactive devices on the interface invite 
users to think about their communication behavior, particularly the courses of action 
they could take or the choices to avail themselves of on screen.”45 He concluded that 
the condition of choice along with control and contingency were all factors in 
defining interactivity. Sundar suggested that how a user exercises choice can affect 
perceptions of interactivity and contribute to an overall interactive experience. 
Nevertheless, he added, “… the experiential aspect of interactivity is not part of its 
definition, but rather its effect, specifically a behavioral effect…. How users interact 
with the system under conditions of high or low interactivity is an effects 
question.”46  
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 This discussion leads to a central question about interactivity when viewed 
from the perspective of a user, a person engaged in an interactive experience. Should 
interactivity be considered only as a process of human-to-human communication, 
human-to-machine communication, or human-to-machine-to-human 
communication? This is not a rhetorical question as it may seem. For many 
researchers, the answer flows strictly from the field of study in which the academic 
research occurs. Stromer-Galley explained: 
On one side are scholars who generally come out of an interpersonal 
and social interaction program of research and who argue that 
interactivity refers to human interaction, whether mediated or not. 
On the other hand are scholars generally from backgrounds other 
than interpersonal communication who argue that interactivity can 
take the form either of human interaction channeled through a 
medium or of interactions with a product or characteristic of a given 
medium.47 
 
Stromer-Galley maintained that while “interactivity” is one word, it can be 
used to describe two “different phenomena,” which she explained were people-to-
people communication and people-to-computer exchanges.48 She offered a way to 
delineate the two by describing the first as “interactivity-as-process” and the second 
as “interactivity-as-product.”49 Sundar, Kalyanaraman and Brown used a study of 
political websites to propose a structure that categorizes interactivity by type and 
ranks it relative to each other.50 Commenting on that research, Stromer-Galley 
wrote, “Their synopsis of prior literature is that interactivity is an ordinal-level 
independent variable. Face-to-face interactivity is the highest form of interactivity, 
and user-to-system interactivity is the lowest.”51  
But she found this approach troubling, arguing that it means “conflating the 
two types [interactivity-as-process and interactivity-as-product] and treating them as 
belonging to the same group or continuum.”52 Whether the conceptual blending as 
Stromer-Galley described will continue or whether her desire for strict adherence to 
a delineated definition takes hold will be determined in part by scholars who write 
about this subject over the coming decades. Nevertheless, the construct that is most 
applicable in the context of this thesis involves how users engage with machines; 
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mostly in this case machines would refer to the computers over which users receive 
online media. 
 
Narrowing the Scope of Interactivity  
As we have seen, the concept of interactivity can mean many things to many people 
depending on their particular perspective and field of study. This thesis, however, is 
most concerned with scholarship that embraces the perspective of “‘interactivity’ 
simply as a communication process,”53 one that is “consistent with a human-
computer interaction (HCI) approach” and “constructs ‘interactivity’ as a product of 
a medium characteristic….”54 This is a straightforward approach that makes it clear 
the type of interactivity under discussion when this thesis later turns specifically to 
the newspaper industry and how it attempted to exploit interactive technologies. 
Bucy’s work underscores the acceptance of this approach in terms of defining 
interactivity:  
Limiting the concept to exchanges that are in some way mediated 
by technology begins to distinguish the term from any form of 
communication and discourages its wanton application as a 
universal descriptor of all forms of dialogue.55 
  
 In this context, however, technology becomes the means of distribution for 
the media. In other words, the technology links the end user to the media and by that 
very act influences the user’s experience—interactive or otherwise. At the dawn of 
the personal computer era, Ihde speculated about technology becoming so advanced 
that it would become “transparent” to the user.56 He contended, “We have now 
recognized that for a technology to function well, it must itself ‘withdraw’ so that 
the human action that is embodied through the technology can stand out.”57 If Idhe’s 
vision of total transparency ever becomes a reality, then perhaps the divide in the 
study of interactivity as described by Stromer-Galley would no longer be relevant. 
Until then, it is necessary to view interactivity in a media context very much in 
relationship to an embodying technology. 
 With that caveat, the following is a selection of explanations of interactivity 
drawn from the review of literature. They are useful in helping to narrow the scope 
of interactivity to a concept applicable to the study of interactive media. These 
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explanations provide a basis for understanding a later discussion of interactivity as it 
applied to approaches taken by newspaper companies in their online media projects. 
• “Interactivity is best (though not exclusively) understood as a 
perceptual variable that involves communication mediated by 
technology.” (Bucy, 2004)58 
•  “The degree to which participants in a communications process 
have control over, and can exchange roles in, their mutual 
discourse is called interactivity.” (Williams, Rogers & Rice, 
1988)59 
• Interactivity describes “… the extent to which users can 
participate in modifying the form and content of a mediated 
environment in real-time.” (Steuer, 1992)60 
• Interactivity is “… a measure of a media’s potential ability to let 
the user exert an influence on the content and/or form of the    
mediated communication.” (Jensen, 1998)61 
• Interactivity is “… the degree to which a communication 
technology can create a mediated environment in which 
participants can communicate (one-to-one, one-to-many, and 
many-to-many), both synchronously and asynchronously, and 
participate in reciprocal message exchanges.…With regard to 
human users, it additionally refers to their ability to perceive the 
experience as a simulation of interpersonal communication and 
increase their awareness of telepresence.” (Kiousis, 2002)62 
 
Throughout the passages quoted above are the themes of mediation, participation, 
control and influence, all attributes of interactivity that can be applied to its 
construct within a media framework. A number of scholars have created systems for 
studying the attributes of interactivity, which is the subject of the following section 
of this chapter. 
 
Typologies, Taxonomies, and Attributes of Interactivity  
Researchers, in their quest for conceptual meaning, have presented typologies, 
taxonomies, and rich dimensional models and in doing so made progress in helping 
show how various definitions of interactivity can be organized and applied to 
different processes. For example, McMillan placed interactivity into a “crisp 
typology,”63 one that organized the concept based on the direction of communication 
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such as “user-to-user, user-to-system, and user-to-documents.”64 McMillan 
developed “a four-part model of cyber-interactivity,”65 which drew from 
communication models introduced by Bordewijk and Van Kaam,66 McQuail,67 and 
Grunig and Grunig.68 Using this model, McMillan identified “direction of 
communication” and “level of receiver control” as the two key dimensions of the 
model.69 Within the model, McMillan defined four types of communications 
processes: 
1. “Monologue”… primarily one-way control and relatively 
little receiver control over the communication process.…70 
2. “Feedback”… primarily one-way communication, but it 
allows receivers to have limited participation in the 
communication process.71 
3. “Responsive Dialogue” enables two-way communication, but 
the sender retains primary control over communication.72 
4. “Mutual Discourse” enables two-way communication and 
gives receivers a great deal of control over the communication 
experience.… A key … is that all participants have the 
opportunity to send and receive messages.73 
 
The following diagram, reproduced from McMillan’s work, illustrates this model: 
74
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 Aoki’s taxonomy of interactivity is useful in its depiction of two types of 
interaction. This framework separates interaction into two distinct dimensions: 
interaction with a communication system and interaction that is channelled through a 
communication system.75 In discussing the taxonomy as it applied to the web, Aoki 
wrote: 
The categorization proposed identifies two major categories of 
interactivity on the Web: interacting with the Web and interacting 
through the Web. Interaction with the Web is enabled by rich media 
aspects of the Web and personalization of the information offered 
by a website…. Interaction through the Web includes interaction 
between the publisher of … content and users of the website and 
interaction among the users of a website.76  
 
Aoki’s taxonomy was written within the specific context of studying interactivity of 
websites, but it is important in that it underscores the overall concept of interacting 
with a system and interacting with the creators and/or users of the content present on 
a system. 
 The definitions presented above, as well as the taxonomies and models put 
forth by McMillan and Aoki, all share common ground in that people involved in an 
interactive communication process must be afforded the possibility of control. On 
this point, Aoki was specific when writing about the ability to personalize content, 
explaining, “This interaction exemplifies the user control aspect of interactivity.”77 
While an element of user control may be necessary in defining interactivity, there 
are also levels of such control. Aoki discussed control in terms of altering content to 
personalize it; other researchers, however, have argued that merely providing choice 
is, in effect, transferring control. Rice wrote: 
… new media provide many more ways to choose content, which 
increases the influence of structural and cultural [factors] on 
people’s notion of choice. Providing multiple forms of access to 
content which is freed from its linkage to particular physical 
distribution forms … frees us from constraints on allocation and 
transformation.78 
 
 Although control is an important attribute, understanding the concept also 
requires an appreciation for time and the role it plays in delivering interactivity in 
degrees. Steuer was explicit in his explanations of interactivity, stating that “Speed 
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of interaction, or response time, is one important characteristic of an interactive 
media system.”79 And within the context of his research about virtual reality 
systems, Steuer understood that time is not an absolute attribute. He added that 
“Real-time interaction clearly represents the highest possible value for this 
variable.”80 Others also have addressed the role time plays in defining interactivity. 
Kiousis, for example, chose to address the issue with the phraseology 
“synchronously and asynchronously.”81 With these terms, he acknowledged that 
time was a necessary component of interactivity, but accepted time as a variable 
ranging from simultaneous to minutes, hours, even days or weeks.  
 In a qualitative study that used interviews with elite experts, Downes and 
McMillan reported that “as some respondents talked about interactivity they 
suggested that the closer to ‘real-time’ an interchange, the more interactive it 
becomes.”82 Nevertheless, they concluded that the “… importance of timing seems 
to be its level of flexibility to the demands of the situation rather than its 
immediacy.”83 Kiousis also pointed out that it is difficult to define time in any 
practical way given that the concept is so intertwined with user perceptions of 
speeds that are constantly evolving. “Thus, communicating on the internet with a 
28,800bps modem by today’s standards might be perceived as slow, but just a few 
years ago, this seemed brisk,” he wrote. “The point here is that objective standards 
of speed … might not change, but users’ perceptions do.”84 In other words, 
something that may have been considered to be occurring in real-time in 1999 would 
not be considered such in 2006 given the faster connection speeds to the Internet.  
 Also noteworthy is that email communication is considered by most to be an 
interactive process, even though it may take hours or days for a communications 
process using this method to be completed, given time zone variations and the 
frequency participants check inboxes or add to a message board thread. Overall, the 
time variable and its relationship to interactivity have deep roots within computer 
science, as engineers within the discipline have studied what Auger described as 
“the concept of response time,” 85 adding that it “has long been regarded as a critical 
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design principle in computer and electronic environments.”  
 Therefore, as media is more often distributed in electronic form through 
computer-based technologies, the media attribute of interactivity becomes 
intertwined with the degrees of interactivity allowed by the underlying technology. 
Perhaps this is best viewed as a natural state. After all, much of the scholarly 
literature describes interactivity as an attribute of media that cannot be defined in 
absolute terms. For example, Schultz referred to “the continuum of interactivity.”86 
Rafaeli and Sudweeks maintained that “… interactivity is a continuum, a variable, 
not just a condition.”87 And McMillan observed that “some cyber-places seem to be 
more interactive than others.”88 Therefore, interactivity is not an absolute media 
attribute; there are a multitude of factors that influence the degree of interactivity. 
  These factors include information design, the physical speed at which 
computer systems deliver information to a user or between users, and perhaps most 
important, the cognitive perception of the user or users of a system. McMillan noted 
that a “body of literature addresses the concept of interactivity from the perspective 
of media features,”89 adding that this line of scholarly research builds on the work of 
Heeter. “Researchers in this tradition define interactivity based on how many, and 
what types of features allow for interactive communication.”90 
  
 At the core of Heeter’s contribution to the body of work in this area is a 
straightforward statement that delineates media types: 
Communication research has traditionally distinguished among 
intrapersonal, interpersonal and mass communication. Older media 
systems tend to perform a single communication function, while 
some new media systems integrate two or all three functions.91 
 
 Heeter continued by proposing a structure in which media systems are 
assigned to one of four functional categories: information retrieval media systems 
(deliver “information from a person or group to a mass of users”), messaging media 
systems (“allow interpersonal communication by permitting users to send messages 
to one or a small number of particular other users”), information processing media 
systems (“extend the concept of intrapersonal communication, allowing a user to 
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extend thought and perform transactions by providing information that the media 
system acts upon in some way”), and integrated media systems (“can perform 
multiple functions” of the type listed above). 92 Heeter’s categorization schema has 
held up well in nearly two decades since it was published. However, the messaging 
category definition could use a minor refinement to remove the word “small,” given 
that current systems enable this type of communication to a theoretically infinite 
number of users. 
 Heeter also presented a schema that outlined “six dimensions of 
interactivity” in support of her argument that “interactivity as it relates to 
communication technologies is a multidimensional concept.”93 The six dimensions 
derived from Heeter’s article include complexity of choice available, effort users 
must exert, responsiveness to the user, monitoring information use, ease of adding 
information, and facilitation of interpersonal communication. Heeter’s set of 
dimensions was written in 1989, well before wide consumer adoption of the Internet. 
Her work drew from research that, at the time, focused on the emergence of 
electronic bulletin boards and other early forms of online media. Heeter was among 
the researchers who applied the concept of interactivity to computer-based media 
delivery systems long before such research turned to this subject as it applies to 
Internet-based media systems.  
Indeed, Heeter’s work served as a guide for scholars when the study of 
interactivity turned to the Internet. One such example is work by Massey and Levy, 
published a decade after Heeter’s article, in which the authors applied her 
dimensions in the context of online journalism. The authors found her six 
dimensions useful and built upon her work by adding a seventh dimension to 
account for the degree that a media system makes information available 
immediately. “A fuller portrait of online journalism can be developed by applying a 
more unified conception of interactivity to news-making on the Web….The 
dimensions of interactivity adapted from Heeter, coupled with one that measures 
immediacy of information, tease out the finer details of the phenomenon.”94 
In subsequent chapters, this thesis will discuss how newspaper publishers—
as they presented content in electronic formats—focused on expediency to market, 
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but through mechanisms and constrained procedures that failed to take full 
advantage of immediacy and, therefore, diminished the level of interactivity that was 
available to them. 
 Ha and James presented their own set of dimensions of interactivity that was 
drawn from research on early business-based websites. The researchers maintained 
that “interactivity should be defined in terms of the extent to which the 
communicator and the audience respond to, or are willing to facilitate, each other’s 
communication needs,” and acknowledged that users expect different levels of 
engagement depending on the type of communication. The article presents five 
dimensions of interactivity: playfulness, choice, connectedness, information 
collection, and reciprocal communication, which are explained below.95   
 Ha and James wrote that “play is an inner talk or conversation within oneself 
that provides pleasure for an individual,” adding that the dimension is illustrated on 
the web by interactive games and quizzes. The choice dimension is reflected in the 
“unrestrained navigation in the cyberspace,” while connectedness is derived from 
“being able to link to the outside world and to broaden one’s experience easily.”96 
 The sense of connectedness enters into the information collection dimension, 
which Ha and James said “consists of the audience’s willingness to provide 
information.” A website soliciting information and the user providing it is part of the 
reciprocal communication dimension. For such two-way conversation to happen, Ha 
and James said a website has to “be perceived as an invitation for visitors to do 
something.” In other words, a call to action can facilitate interactive response.”97 
 Ha and James’s first three dimensions depend heavily on the users’ 
perceptions, while the last two are functional dimensions. A discussion of how these 
dimensions—as well as those put forth by Heeter (such as the complexity of user 
choices and the level of effort required)—are actually constructed in the physical 
world leads to research that approaches the subject of interactivity in more 
pragmatic terms. Rather than attempting to define and model interactivity, this 
branch of research into interactivity focuses on the subjective role of design and 
usability. Steward et al. argued, “One of the most important aspects of employing 
interactivity in online information involves understanding that the format itself 
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typically dictates the type and amount of user interaction.”98 The authors argued that 
everyone understands intuitively how to use a book (this relates to the notion of 
artefacts previously attributed to Rice), but only some of that intuition carries over to 
an online experience: 
Without the actual text object in our hands, without the actual book, 
a user often has a great deal of trouble understanding the scope of 
the information…. The book is a finished product, it is a final piece 
of work…. In an online environment, text isn’t permanent.… In a 
single session, a user can create and edit text, manipulate graphics, 
view prepared material, research distant information resources, play 
games and participate in office gossip. To accommodate such a 
wide range of activities, most online environments have no sense of 
finality and no established limits. Where our prepared text ends and 
the user’s text begins can sometimes be difficult for the user to 
adequately comprehend.99 
 
 Research into design and formatting has led scholars to explore 
“hypermedia” and “hypertext” as it relates to information design and how it 
contributes to the degrees of interactivity.100 Stromer-Galley asserted that, in online 
media, “interactivity is technical in origin,”101 and it is necessary to understand that 
technologies such as hypertext mark up language (HTML), Java programming, and 
PERL scripts enable interactivity to happen. While Stromer-Galley noted that 
technology enables interactivity, she maintained that the degree to which an online 
site is interactive is exclusively up to human choice, clarifying that the “functionality 
the web site enables is up to the designers of the site and depends on the goals 
intended by the sponsor.”102  
 Through this statement, Stromer-Galley provides the perspective that 
interactivity is present or absent based solely on the decisions of the media’s creator. 
And if present, the degree to which interactivity is allowed is also dependent on the 
creator’s decisions. This perspective is important in the context of this thesis given 
that later chapters will provide a critical analysis of how newspaper companies 
chose to enable interactivity in their products as they created online versions of 
printed editions. The following section will complete the exploration of interactivity 
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from a definitional perspective. 
   
Interactivity and a Computer-based Interface 
The preceding sections of this chapter explained interactivity within an academic 
framework and provided the rationale for categorizing interactive media within the 
broader study of computer-mediated communication. Implicit within this 
categorization of interactive media is the requirement that computer technology be 
directly present within the interface the consumer or audience uses to access the 
medium. It is this link to a computer interface that truly differentiates “interactive 
media” from “traditional media.” Williams, Rice, and Rogers wrote that the 
presence of computing technology factors into “allowing content to be more 
independent of physical contact than … traditional channels,” adding, “Computer 
technologies allow users to process communication by altering the structure of 
interactions….”103 Later in their work, these researchers were more emphatic in 
making a connection between computing and communications: 
The computer is as much a communication technology as it is 
computational in that it facilitates the movement, storage, and 
reproduction of messages. But whereas communication 
technologies typically only change the energy form of messages for 
purpose of transmission, computers can change the messages 
themselves.104  
 
 To be clear, a computer interface is not limited to a personal computer; it 
includes wireless handheld devices, cell phones, and digital, two-way cable 
television boxes. Yet, if it were not for this link to computer technology, one could 
argue that a talk radio host soliciting calls from listeners makes radio an interactive 
medium. One could also argue that listing email addresses for reporters in a 
newspaper and inviting comments on a story transforms newspapers into an 
interactive medium as well.  
 Indeed, Schultz addressed this point when he studied the use of email by The 
New York Times. He called email “a tool for increasing interactivity,” suggesting, “it 
can serve as a fast and direct channel between readers and editors or reporters.”105 
Similarly, McMillan asserted that a type of interactivity occurs when “telephone  
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calls to radio stations allow for audience participation in the creation of content.”106  
 However, if interactivity is viewed in terms of degrees as previously 
discussed, then traditional media do not fare well in comparison to other forms. As 
Kiousis noted in regards to interactivity, “Traditional media (e.g., television, radio 
and newspapers) rank low because their capacity for feedback is limited.”107External 
technologies can make a traditional medium easier to engage. Email, for example, 
may be simpler and faster than writing and mailing a letter to the editor of 
newspaper and a telephone call to a radio station may result in a song request being 
played on the air faster than other forms of request. However, interactivity within 
media systems, as Kiousis noted, is now more often associated with technology that 
is integral to the medium not apart from it. “Perhaps the most concrete term 
embracing interactivity is technology. In recent years, interactivity has become more 
and more allied to the personal computer,” he wrote.108 
 Traditional media, presented in its original form, must use external 
technology, such as email or the telephone, to solicit feedback. Interactive media, on 
the other hand, have embedded or integrated technologies that enable feedback to 
happen within its system. Therefore, the phrase “interactive media” as it is used in 
this thesis describes media where a computer interface is integral to the medium. 
The presence of this computer interface differentiates “interactive media” from 
“traditional media.” However, the discussion cannot end there. In contemporary 
lexicon, the phrase “new media” is widely used to describe a subset of the media 
industry. In some cases, “new media” is synonymous with “interactive media.” 
More recently, however, “new media” is most often used to define media delivered 
only through the Internet. Such usage  ignores the historical record by failing to 
include in its meaning computer-based media platforms such as videotext and 
proprietary online systems like Prodigy and America Online. The following section 
explores these aspects of “new media” as part of its conceptual framework. 
 
New Media 
Perhaps the preceding sections concerning interactivity prompts one to ask: why not 
avoid addressing the nuances of what is meant by “interactive media” and simply 
                                                          
106.  McMillan, “Exploring Models of Interactivity from Multiple Research Traditions: Users,  
         Documents and Systems,” 170. 
107.  Kiousis, “Interactivity: A Concept Explication,” 370. 
108.  Ibid., 369-370. 
 46 
use the phrase “new media?” That phrase has become ubiquitous. And, as noted, the 
terms “interactive media” and “new media” often are used interchangeably in 
scholarly writing as well as the popular press. This section explores a variety of 
attempts to define new media. It examines how various scholars came to 
differentiate “new media” and “interactive media” using a variety of criteria—be 
they relative to time or technology for example—on which to base definitions of 
“new media.” These criteria provide a way to organize a discussion of such 
scholarship. 
 Mayer wrote that “new media” should be considered as a phrase “relative” to 
the time of its usage. “At one time, the printing press would have been considered a 
new medium,” he wrote, adding that radio and television also were considered new 
media when they debuted.109 Mayer wrote that the phrase “in its most recent 
incarnation” had been “adopted to refer to a series of scientific and technological 
innovations … that led to the development of a considerable number of new 
methods for creating, transmitting, and storing information and to the large-scale 
transformation of many of the more traditional media.”110  
 Rice, writing during the consumer Internet explosion in 1999, defined new 
media in terms of combining the following elements: 
“… (1) computing (which allows processing of content, such as a 
retrieval through associations of words or other indices, and 
structuring of communications, such as conversational threads in 
newsgroups), (2) telecommunication networks (which allow access 
and connectibility to diverse and otherwise distant other people and 
content), and (3) digitization of content as data, and integration and 
presentation of multiple modes such as text, audio and video).111 
 
 
 
Factors that Make Media “New” 
Rice’s definition encompasses several ideas, but two that mostly are discussed as 
part of new media are the notion of multimedia and digitization. The idea that media 
is defined as “new” because of its reliance on digitized content is a common theme 
in the research literature. Manovich presented five factors that make media “new.” 
His work offered a succinct and simple definition: “On one level new media is old 
media that has been digitized….”112 However, he further explored the concept at a 
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much deeper level, presenting five criteria that defined media as “new”: 
 
1. Numerical representation: “All new media objects … are 
composed of digital code … [and are] subject to algorithmic 
manipulation…. In short, media becomes programmable.”113  
2. Modularity: Assembling the numerical data into “objects” gives 
new media a modular structure, which is a framework of 
building blocks that is analogous to computer programming.114 
3. Automation: The first two factors make possible the ability to 
automate much of the production processes associated with new 
media. “Thus human intentionality can be removed from the 
creative process, at least in part.”115 
4. Variability: “A new media object is not something fixed once 
and for all, but something that exists in different, potentially 
infinite versions.”116 
5. Transcoding: “Because new media is created on computers, 
distributed via computers and stored and archived on computers, 
the logic of a computer can be expected to significantly 
influence the traditional cultural logic of media….”117 
 
 Manovich’s work was influential in furthering the study of how computer 
technology affected media as it emerged in digital form. Manovich’s inclusion of 
transcoding is an important underlying factor in understanding “new media” in 
relationships to audience and content. He succinctly stated, “the computer layer will 
affect the cultural layer,” adding that “what can be called the computer’s ontology, 
epistemology and pragmatics—influence the cultural layer of new media, its 
organization, its emerging genres, its content.”118  
While these are but a few examples of definitions found in a review of 
literature, they represent widely accepted and established concepts that 
contemporary new media are digital and rely on computer technology for 
distribution or dissemination. Therefore, as noted previously, it could be argued that 
“interactive media” and “new media” are synonymous phrases. However, the 
practical evolution in the meaning of “new media” would make it inappropriate to 
use them interchangeably. In its contemporary usage, “new media” has evolved to 
be associated closely only with Internet-based media. 
 In 2004, Lievrouw summarized the biggest change in new media in recent 
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years as its “mainstreaming.”119 She stated that “A variety of media technologies, 
forms, and content, often lumped together under the single (and misleadingly 
homogenizing) rubric of ‘the internet,’ have become a commonplace part of work, 
education, leisure, culture, and politics.”120 Perhaps it is this “‘ubiquity’ of new 
media,”121 that has intertwined contemporary usage of the phrase new media and an 
association with the Internet. In contemporary lexicon, when someone uses the 
phrase “new media,” it is mostly in connection with media delivered through some 
type of connection to the Internet. 
 
“New” Is Relative 
The concept of “new” has survived even though the consumer era of the Internet, 
launched by the creation of the World Wide Web, has been with us for more than a 
decade. Koziol wrote: “New media is not so new anymore. In fact it is not new at 
all.” But he concluded that the word “new” remained relevant because “perhaps it is 
‘young’ relative to more traditional media such as television, print and radio….”122 
 Cabrera-Balleza espoused the same basic attributes when describing “new 
media.” She wrote: 
Media used to mean only one thing—public institutions that report 
the news, such as newspapers, magazines, radio and television, as 
well as those that provide entertainment. While there are several 
forms such as print, broadcast, audio-visual, popular and folk 
media, the word still meant one thing when we spoke about it. 
Today, however, we cannot speak about media without dividing it 
into “old” and “new.” The old is associated with analogue form, 
while the cool new corresponds to media available via digital 
technology.123 
 
 
Cabrera-Balleza further defined “new media” as “the generic term for the many 
different forms of electronic communication made possible through the use of 
computer technology.” However, her examples of such media included “websites, 
audio and video streaming, chat rooms, chain e-mail and online communities….”124 
Such a list emphasizes the close association “new media” has with the Internet today 
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and underscores how contemporary usage of the phrase has evolved into a descriptor 
for Internet-based media delivery. 
 Setting aside for a moment the contemporary Internet-based meaning of new 
media, it is necessary to understand that the phrase has been used for several decades 
in communication studies. This usage was largely in connection with the emergence 
of the personal computer and its role in delivering media content, as stated 
previously. Rice described the microprocessor as a “crucial part of new media,”125 
adding that its invention by Intel’s Dr. Ted Hoff was “a key event setting off the 
Information Revolution; it made possible the microcomputer.”126 
 Rice understood that what the “new” in new media described was relative to 
the time period under discussion: “Newness, of course, is in the eye of the 
cohort.”127 In his 1984 work, Rice noted that new media was seen “to include 
personal computers, videotext and teletext, interactive cable, videodiscs, electronic 
mail and computer conferencing, communication satellites, office information 
systems and the like.”128 Some of those items have been rendered obsolete by 
subsequent technologies, making the statement he later penned with co-author 
Williams especially prescient: “… these media are new only to the generation first 
experiencing them.”129   
Rice discussed many issues that remain relevant when attempting to discern 
the semantic nuances between “new media” and “interactive media,” such as “time 
and space,” “active versus passive control,” and “transmission versus reception.”130 
It is through the following statement that Rice becomes connected to contemporary 
research: 
New ways of encoding, transmitting, distributing, and displaying 
information appear most overtly in the form of new communication 
technologies … digital, as compared to analog, encoding 
dramatically increases the speed, accuracy, and volume of 
information that can be exchanged.131 
 
The work of Rice and others underscores the connection between digitization 
and media forms delivered via a computer interface. This leads one to question how 
the phrase “new media” gained such wide acceptance at the expense of other more 
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specific descriptors such as “digital media” or “computer-mediated 
communication.”132 The authors of New Media: A Critical Introduction addressed 
this specifically, writing that the phrase “new media” is "very seductive in its 
historical simplicity; there was ‘old media’ and now there is ‘new.’ We use it to 
make a break with history.”133 They added that the phrase gained “… currency as a 
term because of its useful inclusiveness…. It is a term with broad cultural resonance 
rather than a narrow technocist or specialist application…. It is a term that offers to 
recognise some big changes, technological, ideological and experimental, which 
actually underpin a range of different phenomena.”134 
 It could be argued that much of the credence given to the term “new media” 
was due to the hype surrounding the emergence of the consumer Internet, which was 
the period the phrase’s contemporary usage achieved popularity. The very notion 
that something was “new” contributed to the excitement surrounding it. Given that 
more than a dozen years have passed since the Internet moved into the mainstream, 
it is perhaps no longer appropriate in terms of semantics to associate the Internet 
with “new media.”  
 Nevertheless, the phrase continues to maintain its currency in many 
academic settings within the names of academic organizations (The New Media 
Institute at the University of Georgia) and as part of the names of scholarly journals 
(New Media & Society). It continues to denote a distinction from traditional media, 
remains a descriptor for digital, computerized, or network-based media, and is 
becoming a phrase that also includes wireless networks. For those reasons, this 
thesis seeks to provide clarity through a pragmatic delineation in the way certain 
phrases are used. “Interactive media” will refer to all computer-based media systems 
that generally offer users some degree of control and feedback. This includes, for 
example, videotext platforms that pre-date the Internet. In contrast, “new media” 
will be used in deference to its contemporary meaning and will be used to when 
referencing the subset of “interactive media” that are Internet-based.  
Moreover, this thesis explores in subsequent chapters how traditional 
media—specifically newspapers—attempted to exploit computer technology to 
create alternative experiences more than a decade before the consumer Internet era 
began. Electronic bulletin boards, news retrieval systems, videotext, and proprietary 
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online systems are discussed. Therefore, “interactive media” as used in the title 
provides a more accurate umbrella label for those types of products and services as 
well as Internet-based media. When viewed in this context, “interactive media” 
becomes a more inclusive term that describes computer-based media services pre- 
and post-Internet. 
 As the newspaper industry sought ways to deploy “interactive media,” in 
both eras, its leaders were keenly aware of the importance of the underlying network 
provided by the telecommunications industry. While newspaper publishers believed 
they had relevant content, they understood that ownership of a press was irrelevant 
for electronic distribution. The newspaper industry, which had always relied on its 
own distribution infrastructure from product creation to delivery, found that 
deploying interactive media required the use of infrastructure outside of its 
immediate control. Newspapers had to participate in a new ecosystem created 
through interlocking business relationships among content providers, computer 
manufacturers, and network providers. Conceptually, the process of creating this 
new ecosystem became known as “media convergence” and will be explored more 
in the following section. 
 
Media Convergence 
Numerous scholars have considered the subject of “media convergence,” and in 
most cases, have wrapped the concept with the emergence of “new media,” which 
makes the previous discussion all the more relevant. The scholarly focus on 
convergence has been around for many years, but the volume of research focused on 
the subject increased exponentially once the Internet became a consumer platform. 
Media convergence is a melding, or a marriage, of existing forms of media and 
communications technology. There is wide acceptance among scholars of the 
premise that convergence happens due to a shift in technology from analog delivery 
to digital delivery. By that association, the discussion of convergence and “new 
media” has been inextricably linked. 
 Hartley wrote, for example, that “it is possible to identify the late twentieth 
century as an era passing from analogue to digital.… Even forms of larceny shifted 
from 'analogue' (stealing books or magazines from retailers, for instance) to ‘digital’ 
(downloading music or pictures via Napster….)135 The most common concept of 
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media convergence is that as content becomes available in digital form, devices that 
deliver the digital content such as television, computers and telephony morph into a 
common platform. Convergence: Integrating Media, Information and 
Communication addresses the subject as a discussion of delivery methods. This 
work defines convergence as “a dynamic meld of technology—drawing upon the 
telephone, cable and computer industries—and substance—drawing on television 
and information industries.”136  
 Dominick sorted convergence into three types: corporate convergence, 
operational convergence and device convergence. He wrote that corporate 
convergence expresses “a vision of one company delivering every service 
imaginable,”137 while operational convergence describes what happens “when 
owners of several media properties in one market combine their separate operations 
into a single effort.”138 Dominick defined device convergence as the result of 
“combining the functions of two or three devices into one mechanism.”139 His notion 
of device convergence is closely aligned with other definitions that emphasize 
distribution methods as a major consideration.  Dominick noted, for example, that 
“all media seem to be converging on the Internet as a major channel of 
distribution.”140 Dominick’s three categories of convergence provide useful 
shorthand for discussing how the newspaper industry viewed convergence and they 
will be referred to again in subsequent chapters.  Meanwhile, the intricate 
complexities of convergence inherent in its many forms will be explored further in 
the following sections of this chapter. 
  
Convergence as Process 
While several of the phrases discussed previously (traditional media, interactive 
media, and new media) are used to describe something perceived as tangible, the 
phrase “media convergence” is quite different in that it seeks to describe an 
intangible process. Scholars, lawyers, and industry pundits have turned their 
attention to the process’s components in trying to explain how and why, and even 
when, convergence happens.  
 For example, an entertainment industry trade journal defined convergence as 
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a process occurring when media forms coalesce at the point of distribution.141 
Maherzi focused on the conditions necessary for the process to occur, suggesting 
that convergence is only inevitable with the proper regulatory, political, and 
consumer environment.142 Adoni and Nossek explored how the emergence of new 
media affected existing media, proposing that there were three possible outcomes: 
existing media are replaced outright; existing media coexist with new media or 
existing media merge with new media and create a new form.143 This last possible 
outcome addresses a core facet of the convergence concept, which is that through 
convergence existing media will shed their weaknesses and replace them with 
attributes associated with newer technologies.  
To this last point, some researchers, including Jenkins, held that convergence 
had its limits however. Jenkins, for example, did not support a view that “one box” 
would eventually supplant all other media.144 But he did accept that convergence 
was a process—one that is affected by multiple forces. He explained convergence as 
an “ongoing process, occurring at various intersections of media technologies, 
industries, content and audiences.…”145 Jenkins wrote that there are five 
perspectives from which to view convergence: technological, economic, social or 
organic, cultural, and global.146 He elaborated on the intersections of these areas of 
convergence in a later work and distilled a definition of the concept into a single 
paragraph: 
 
Convergence: A word that describes technological, industrial, 
cultural and social changes in the ways media circulates within our 
culture. Some common ideas referenced by the term include the 
flow of content across multiple media platforms, the cooperation 
between multiple media industries, the search for new structures of 
media financing that fall at the interstices between old and new 
media, and the migratory behavior of media audiences who would 
go almost anywhere in search of the kind of entertainment 
experiences they want. Perhaps most broadly, media convergence 
refers to a situation in which multiple media systems coexist and 
where media content flows fluidly across them. Convergence is 
understood here as an ongoing process or series of intersections 
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between different media systems, not a fixed relationship.”147 
 
 Although Jenkins has contributed much to the scholarly understanding of 
convergence, he credits de Sola Pool, a political scientist, as the first scholar to apply 
the concept as a way to explain changes occurring within the media industry.148 De 
Sola Pool wrote of a process called the “convergence of modes” and described it as 
“blurring the lines between media.”149 De Sola Pool continued: 
A single physical means—be it wires, cables or airwaves—may 
carry services that in the past were provided in separate ways. 
Conversely, a service that was provided in the past by any one 
medium—be it broadcasting, the press, or telephony—can now be 
provided in several different physical ways. So the one-to-one 
relationship that used to exist between a medium and its use is 
eroding.”150  
 
Although de Sola Pool was interested in the effects of technology on political 
discourse, his concepts as they related to media resonated at that time given that 
online technology had emerged to the point where such a concept seemed tangible 
and less futuristic. Cable television companies were experimenting with interactive 
networks and newspapers were rushing their content onto videotext platforms. Such 
convergence efforts became known in industry parlance by the term “extension,” 
according to Jenkins, who said the word referred “to their efforts to expand the 
potential markets by moving content across different delivery systems.”151  
 
Additionally, the word “repurpose” began creeping into the lexicon of 
traditional media as the term came to be used when describing the process of taking 
material used in the traditional media product and posting it online.152 Although 
Jenkins’ contemporary work has taken the concept of media convergence beyond a 
technology construct and into the cultural realm, his most important contribution to 
understanding convergence as relates to this thesis is found in a rather pragmatic 
assertion: “Convergence involves both a change in the way media is produced and a 
change in the way media is consumed.”153  
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Pragmatic Convergence 
Subsequent chapters of this thesis will explore how the newspaper industry 
approached creating its interactive media products and how its audience consumed 
those interactive products. The thesis will attempt to gauge if newspapers placed too 
much emphasis on the production process and too little on understanding how the 
audience wanted to use interactive media. Toward that end, it makes sense to look at 
how some traditional media businesses and interactive media businesses decided to 
work together. The thesis also will examine whether the newspaper industry’s 
approach to convergence recognized the immense technological transition taking 
place.  
Lawson-Borders wrote that perhaps the “most simplistic definition” of media 
convergence “is the combining of old (traditional) media with new media for the 
dissemination of news, information, and entertainment.”154 She reported that an 
official of the American Press Institute “defined convergence as ‘the strategic, 
operational, product and cultural union of print, audio, video and interactive digital 
information services.”155 These definitions and many of the others presented 
previously perpetuate the notion that convergence is a technological process and that 
convergence can be achieved merely through the consolidation of distribution 
channels. Traditional media—especially newspapers—bought into that way of 
thinking. That narrow view elevated the production side of the equation and lowered 
the importance placed on providing a new experience to consumers. Newspapers 
invested heavily in technology during the period covered in this thesis, but the 
spending was primarily on new computer systems and reorganized production 
platforms.  
It can be argued that interactivity should have been an important attribute 
that defined the convergence process. But even after the Internet emerged, 
newspapers and other traditional media found it difficult to generate original content 
that offered interactive features. Lievrouw described the result as follows:  
The current mainstream quality of new media is at least partly due 
to the increased control of new media content, ownership, and 
policy debates by conventional mass media industries … a large and 
expanding proportion of online content now flows to and from 
conventional publishing, broadcast and cable television, radio, 
motion pictures, recorded music, and so forth. As traditional media 
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interests control more of the content of, and access to, new media 
services, the new genres tend to look more like the old.156 
 
Newspaper companies treated online media as a new delivery channel, an extension 
of existing business rather than as a standalone new medium. Therefore, the content 
distributed through these new systems often was indistinguishable from the material 
offered in the printed newspaper version. Although this led to diminished 
enthusiasm among the early adopters of online media, it can be viewed as part of the 
natural media evolution process as is explored in the following section. 
 
Convergence as Remediation 
Lievrouw’s observations of sameness—or perhaps a lack of newness—would come 
as no surprise to Bolter and Grusin who wrote that “convergence is remediation 
under another name….”157 Bolter and Grusin proposed remediation as a natural 
process that occurs as traditional media repurpose their content into newer media 
and the newer media respond to the action of repurposing. They wrote: “What is 
new about new media comes from the particular ways in which they refashion older 
media and the ways in which older media refashion themselves to answer the 
challenges of new media.”158 
 Central to their concept is an almost symbiotic relationship that must exist 
between traditional media and what they call digital media: 
... digital media cannot be significant until they make a radical 
break with the past. However, like their precursors, digital media 
can never reach this state of transcendence, but will instead function 
in a constant dialectic with earlier media, precisely as each earlier 
medium functioned when it was introduced. Once again, what is 
new about digital media lies in their particular strategies for 
remediating…. Repurposing as remediation is both what is “unique 
to digital worlds” and what denies the possibility of that 
uniqueness.159 
 
Without uniqueness, then, what is the catalyst for convergence or 
remediation? Bolter and Grusin argued that remediation occurs largely as a repair 
process as media assimilate technology in the quest to achieve immediacy: 
Each new medium is justified because it fills a lack or repairs a fault 
in its predecessor, because it fulfills the unkept promise of an older 
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medium.…The supposed virtue of virtual reality, of 
videoconferencing and interactive television, and of the World 
Wide Web is that each of these technologies repairs the inadequacy 
of the medium or media that it now supersedes. In each case that 
inadequacy is represented as a lack of immediacy....160 
 
Bolter and Grusin’s remediation concept is interesting in the context of this 
discussion because of the importance it places on immediacy. Immediacy, as an 
attribute, resonated with traditional media executives more than interactivity. For 
example, Belo Corporation, which at that time operated both newspapers and 
television stations, claimed its new media mission was to provide the “immediacy of 
television, the urgency of the Internet and the depth of newspapers.”161 However, the 
attribute of immediacy challenged the newspaper industry, where many editors felt 
that publishing material in online forms before it had appeared in print was a form of 
self-competition. This topic is explored in more detail in subsequent chapters.  
 Bolter and Grusin did not give printed media much consideration in their 
work, writing that “convergence is the mutual remediation of at least three important 
technologies—telephone, television, and computer—each of which is a hybrid of 
technical, social and economic practice and of which offers its own path to 
immediacy.”162 Nevertheless, Bolter and Grusin’s conceptual construct is important 
to understand as a foundation to this thesis, and their most salient observation is that 
immediacy manifests itself in new media “through interactivity—the fact that these 
media can change their point of view in response to the viewer or user.”163 The 
newspaper industry understood this aspect of electronic delivery, and the thesis in 
subsequent chapters examines how newspapers’ online products reflected such 
attributes. 
 The constructs of remediation were echoed in the work of Lehman-Wilzig 
and Cohen-Avigdor. These researchers constructed an analysis called “the natural 
life cycle of new media evolution” and defined it through a six-stage model: “birth 
(technical invention), penetration, growth, maturity, self-defense and adaptation, 
convergence or obsolescence.”164 They described their work as placing “special 
emphasis ... on older media in their struggle to survive.”165 An essential element in 
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their model is “media constructionism,” which they defined as “constant interaction 
between new and older media” and “a key factor in the successful or unsuccessful 
evolution and specific direction of the new medium.”166 
 Given that this thesis represents a journey through an approximate quarter-
century of newspaper industry history, the work of these researchers provides yet 
another academic lens through which to view the research. They wrote: “Older 
media may recognize early on that the new medium presents a potential threat and 
respond by narrowing the ‘performance gap’ between their traditionally limited 
offering and the new medium’s ‘better’ service.”167  
 The thesis explores this premise as it relates to how the newspaper industry’s 
attempts to exploit interactive media may have been, at least in part, a reaction to 
perceived threats. Lehman-Wilzig and Cohen-Avigdor also observed that “the 
decline of the older medium may not occur immediately; under competitive pressure 
the traditional medium can squeeze more out of its arsenal—even actually increasing 
revenues for a period of time.” The thesis examines how this phenomenon occurred 
within the newspaper industry during the time period studied. Lehman-Wilzig and 
Cohen-Avigdor also noted that “older media, especially if financially sound, have 
the luxury of purchasing or jumping on the new medium’s bandwagon, and placing 
a few eggs in the new basket.”168 They were careful to note that “this does not 
guarantee older medium survival, but it does enable the use of new media revenues 
to ‘subsidize’ the adaptation changes.…”169 In considering this premise, the thesis 
explores how the financial success of newspapers—especially during the majority of 
this time period studied—contributed to the speed and degree of the newspaper 
industry’s competitive responses. 
 
Conclusion 
Interactivity has been examined from the perspective of multiple disciplines. As it 
applies to this thesis, however, interactivity is viewed through Rafaeli’s description 
as “quintessentially a communication concept.”170 More specifically, interactivity is 
considered as an attribute of media that defines and differentiates one type of media 
from another. Within this context, the concept of interactivity is used to explain the  
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pragmatic two-way communication characteristics inherent in the phrase “interactive 
media.” This phrase describes media delivered through a computer or device 
connected to a network capable of such two-way communication. The network 
could be either closed or proprietary, such as the original America Online, or an 
open network such as the Internet. The degree of interactivity allowed is not 
important within this definition; only that a network allowing two-way 
communication exists. 
 The degree to which interactivity occurs, however, is very important in terms 
of a medium’s relationship with its user. Bryant wrote that the extensive choice 
associated with the Information Age changed the dynamic between media and 
audience, creating what he described as the “sovereign consumer.”171 That the 
newspaper industry embraced electronic delivery is given, but this thesis critically 
explores how newspapers responded to their consumers’ expectations regarding 
interactivity as electronic services proliferated.  
 As for the term “new media,” its contemporary usage is most closely 
associated with the Internet and the World Wide Web. While the term has been used 
interchangeably with interactive media or digital media in numerous books and 
articles that far pre-date the consumer Internet, its most frequent contemporary 
usage is within the context of the Internet. The currency of the term grew in the mid-
1990s in response to the exploding use of the Internet by consumers. It may be 
viewed by some as awkward to continue referring to something as “new” even 
though consumer use of the Internet is well into its second decade. Subsequent 
chapters will strive to adhere to a hierarchical structure that defines “interactive 
media” as all forms of computer and network-based media. The following chapters 
also will refer to “new media” only when discussing the subset of media that is 
delivered through the Internet connection or when quoting others who may have 
used the term more broadly. 
 The notion that convergence describes an evolutionary, transformative 
process is widely understood. Within the media industry, convergence came to be 
viewed as the process for exploiting technology to deliver a greater level of 
interactivity. From the perspective of the newspaper industry, convergence became 
associated with the pragmatic details of production. In other words, how content was 
repurposed from its printed form for use in an interactive media platform received 
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more attention than the concept itself. 
 Quinn noted that the newspaper industry eventually adopted the phrase 
“multiple-platform publishing” in place of “the more nebulous term ‘convergence’” 
and also referred to “structural convergence” when describing new positions within 
organizations designed to facilitate the flow of content to media partners.172 Even as 
newspapers expanded their online presence, the practical discussion of convergence 
within the newspaper industry also included partnerships with television stations. 
Quinn observed that these partnerships were part of “tactical convergence” as 
defined by Gordon, and that newspapers were more likely to have such partnerships 
with local television stations than with other types of media companies.173  
Such partnerships became so intertwined with the discussion of convergence 
and newspapers that Lawson-Borders added a broadcast element to her definition of 
convergence for the purpose of identifying case studies for inclusion in a book. She 
wrote: 
I define convergence as the realm of possibilities when cooperation 
occurs between print and broadcast for the delivery of multimedia 
content through the use of computers and the Internet.174 
 
Gordon suggested, however, that most newspaper/television alliances were 
promotional in nature and not overly strategic.175 If they were not strategic, it could 
be argued that such alliances were never part of the convergence process and, in 
effect, distracted newspaper executives from considering the larger meaning and 
ramifications of convergence. 
 Considering this larger picture is an ideal launching point for the material 
that follows. Beginning with an exploration of the newspaper industry’s earliest 
online endeavours, Chapter Two shows how the 1980s began as a hopeful and 
exciting time for the newspaper industry as it seemed determined to charter a course 
toward an electronic future that would ensure its rightful place at the forefront of the 
Information Society. Chapter Two examines how this vision was manifested in the 
deployment of several videotext projects, but it also addresses how the failure of 
many of these high-profile ventures dampened the industry’s enthusiasm for taking 
risk in the face of rapidly changing technology. 
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Chapter Two: 
Videotext and the Birth of Online Newspapers 
 
Hyping the Internet in the late 1990s was commonplace. Media critics, Wall Street 
analysts, and technology pundits all proclaimed the Internet as the next big thing. 
The punditry predicted how the Internet would change everything by destroying 
some markets, while creating new ones. Such hyperbole, however, was not new. A 
decade earlier—long before anyone except maybe a few dedicated researchers even 
contemplated the possibilities of a commercial, consumer-oriented Internet—
newspaper executives extolled the virtues of network-based technologies they were 
about to unleash. 
  Consider the words from an executive with Knight-Ridder Inc. in 1983 
published in connection with the launch of the company’s Viewtron project: 
Welcome to the future! Tomorrow has arrived. A historic moment in 
the United States is upon us…. How many of us were fortunate 
enough to be there when the first television set showed its first 
program, when the first radio crackled its first sounds, when the first 
talkie movie was shown, when the first words came through Bell’s 
telephone, or when the first U.S. newspaper came off the press? Few 
of us actually can say that we were there when history was being 
made—until now. A new communications medium is making its 
commercial debut in the United States. A medium that combines 
space age technology with your everyday television and telephone 
line to bring you a new world of information and services.1 
 
This material exemplifies the hype surrounding interactive media as its earliest forms 
debuted in the United States. This chapter provides examples from the newspaper 
industry’s dozens of early forays into electronic publishing—projects such as 
StarText, Viewtron, and Gateway—and will compare and contrast theses examples. 
The expectations, costs and, in some cases, anxiety associated with these initiatives 
affected how they were launched and their ability to succeed.  Reviewing the 
partnerships and the underlying technologies that gave life to these projects as well 
as the attitudes of consumers and industry leaders provides an understanding of the 
gap that developed between the hype and what actually happened. Through the 
exploration of Knight-Ridder’s Viewtron project and others, this analysis establishes 
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the historical foundation for the newspaper industry’s early role in developing 
interactive media. Kyrish wrote that videotext, especially in the United States, “is 
often perceived as a major market failure that should have been easy to foresee.”2 
This observation underscores the importance of examining the newspaper industry 
and its relationship with videotext for it provides historical context relevant to 
understanding subsequent chapters when this thesis examines how this industry 
reacted and responded to the emergence of the Internet.3 
 
The Videotext Market 
When Knight-Ridder’s Viewdata Corporation formally launched Viewtron in 1983 
after two years of field testing, the service was hailed as “the first commercial 
videotex service in America.”4 Leveraging technology developed in Europe and 
Canada, Viewdata sought to bring interactive media to U.S. consumers by deploying 
videotext.5 Teletext represented another method available at that time for 
transmitting and displaying text on to a television screen, but teletext was regarded as 
a passive technology. An audience could read teletext, but the engagement 
experience was limited. The excitement associated with videotext, by comparison, 
stemmed from its connection to a telephone, which allowed a system to serve 
specific content requested by a user.6  
Videotext represented the first real merger of media (newspapers and 
television) and communications (the telephone) for the consumer market. Combining 
media forms in this manner is associated with the concept of convergence, which 
was addressed in Chapter One and will be explored further in Chapter Six. While the 
term convergence is rarely applied in historical discussions of videotext, the concept 
it represents was important in the early adoption of videotext. 
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 Proponents recognized the potential for linking media content to consumers 
through a telecommunications network. Kyrish wrote that “Expectations for videotex 
were strongly driven by the fact that it was technologically possible.”7 She added: 
Although the architecture of videotex may now seem simplistic, the 
primary sources from the time show that the technology was as 
fascinating and cutting-edge as today’s technologies appear to us. 
‘Convergence’ is only a new term, not a new concept: articles and 
books about videotex positioned it as the natural result of combining 
the television, the telephone and computing power into a new and 
powerful alloy.8 
 
Kyrish reported that several independent research firms made very positive forecasts 
regarding the future of videotext. The Institute of the Future said in 1982 that 
videotext would be in 30 to 40 percent of U.S. households by 2000. Strategic Inc. 
projected in 1981 that the consumer videotext market by 1990 would be worth $19 
billion in equipment sales supported by another $16 billion in additional spending, 
while Booz-Allen forecasted the market would be worth $30 billion in revenue by 
the mid 1990s.9 International Resource Development said in 1981 that “electronic 
newspapers”—a sub-market within the universe of videotext offerings—would 
generate $500 million in annual revenue by 1990.10 
 Such huge financial numbers emanating from prestigious market research 
firms contributed to the strategic planning undertaken by newspapers. Nevertheless, 
those revenue forecasts were tempered by the results of other studies conducted in 
the early 1980s in an attempt to gauge consumer receptiveness to online technologies 
and their relationship to newspaper consumption. One study conducted by the 
Register & Tribune in Des Moines, Iowa, found that only a fourth of the 1,022 
respondents from its market were interested in such a service, while 59 percent 
expressed no interest at all. 11 A study by University of Florida researchers in March 
1982 asked consumers in the Gainesville, Florida market if they “would stop buying 
a newspaper if they could get its contents on a TV screen?” Sixty-five percent of the 
373 respondents said “no.”12 Studies such as these confirmed for the industry that 
only a small portion of its audience was interested in online media services in the 
early 1980s. Newspaper companies moved forward with investments in videotext 
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projects even though they believed there was little consumer demand for such 
services in these early years. In the absence of perceived consumer demand, this 
thesis explores other factors that motivated newspaper companies to enter the market 
for videotext services. 
 
Competition Effect  
Udell wrote in 1978 that the “so-called experts have predicted the demise of 
newspapers as we know them since the 1930s.”13 Radio and later television presented 
formidable competitive threats, but after surviving—and thriving—against the 
electronic media throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the newspaper industry 
had no reason to believe it could not coexist with computer-based competition. For 
the most part, industry leaders were confident that a significant competitive threat to 
its core printed newspaper products from computer-based media remained in the 
distant future. But this outward air of industry confidence was buffeted by a nagging 
suspicion that such thinking could be wrong—that doing nothing would leave the 
newspaper industry vulnerable to competitors that acted unlike other electronic 
media.  
Computers of earlier generations were understood to be text-based devices, 
which allowed them to be closely associated with print competition. There was 
concern that computers connected to a content provider 24 hours a day would upset 
the traditional news cycle, which had favoured morning newspapers.  
Kyrish maintained that it was the need to keep up with potential competitors 
that motivated the spending on early videotext endeavours by Knight-Ridder and 
other newspaper companies. She wrote that such “spending was based on concern 
that new technologies would reorganize existing structures and that companies that 
did not invest would be trampled.”14 These projects were, in essence, the result of 
risk management rather than a strategic desire to be innovative. In the early 1980s, 
newspaper companies were concerned about the expanding market for cable 
television. Publishers were aware that cable television represented a network conduit 
into the home that someday could offer an interactive experience. Warner Cable had 
attracted significant attention in the late 1970s when it introduced its own version of 
an interactive system in Columbus, Ohio, called QUBE.15 While some critics viewed 
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it as “a novelty,” others saw it “as a major innovation in marketing research and 
segmented communications,” which “offers substantial advantages for added 
flexibility in programming and advertising.”16 
Newspaper executives felt they had no choice but to pay attention to the 
burgeoning market for cable television and the medium’s potential for ancillary 
services. How newspapers became intertwined in the cable television industry is 
explored in greater detail in Chapter Three. The purpose of this chapter is to explore 
the newspaper industry’s involvement in videotext in the early 1980s and the factors 
influencing those projects. As explained in the introduction, the early 1980s was a 
time of much rhetoric regarding the Information Society and the coming information-
based upheaval in industry that would rival the Industrial Revolution. As such, the 
thesis explores the notion that the newspaper industry pursued videotext projects not 
only because of concerns over competition, but also from a desire to be seen as a 
leader in the information revolution.  
 
Technological Determinism 
The early 1980s marked the emergence of the computer as a consumer tool and 
provided the impetus for much concern about the future of media—especially in 
printed form. By 1983, the personal computer had made such an impact on society 
that Time magazine recognized the device as its “Machine of the Year,” which 
replaced its usual “Man of the Year” feature.17 In looking back over the evolution of 
media, Bagdikian wrote that “the history and subsequent emergence of the computer 
into the modern media scene is as significant as the invention of high-speed presses 
was to the history and social effects of newspapers and magazines.”18 Therefore, it is 
important for a project of this nature to examine how videotext came to represent, 
especially for the newspaper industry, the method in which the promises of computer 
technology would be fulfilled. As the newspaper industry became enamoured with 
the role it could play in bringing new technologies to market, many in the industry 
viewed the development of online media as inevitable; that newspaper companies 
had no alternative other than to participate. Flichy described this as succumbing to a 
“totally deterministic perception of technology.”19 Boczkowski wrote that the 
development of videotext technology within the cultural climate of the early 1980s 
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allowed for it to become symbolic of the “‘information society’ rhetoric [that] was 
popular in both the press and scholarly works.”20 He noted that the culture was 
primed to accept “these new technologies” as “symbol of an epochal change.…”21 
 
Clarifying Terms 
To achieve the objectives of this thesis requires defining the common terms 
associated with these early forms of online media as well as understanding their 
background by studying primary and scholarly sources. Knight-Ridder’s Viewdata 
Corporation traced the origin of videotext to Sam Fedida, a British researcher, whose 
work in the early 1970s led to the British Post Office’s deployment of a service 
known as Prestel in 1979.22 As British researchers were readying their system for 
commercial deployment, government-backed projects were also underway in France 
(Antiope and later Teletel), Canada (Telidon) and Japan (CAPTAIN).23 While the 
computer engineering in these systems may not be identical, they are universally 
discussed as videotext systems. 
The phrase “viewdata” was used interchangeably with the term “videotext” in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s,24 but “videotext” will serve in this thesis as the name 
for the generic system, to avoid confusion due to Knight-Ridder’s adoption of 
“viewdata” as the corporate name of its videotext subsidiary, Viewdata Corporation. 
Sigel’s definitions published in 1983 and often cited in the literature, provide the 
foundation for understanding the terms as they are used in this thesis. Sigel defined 
videotext as “a means of displaying words, numbers and pictures on a TV screen at 
the touch of the button.” Sigel explained that teletext—another platform deployed in 
the early 1980s—was “a broadcast system [that], involves the one-way sending of 
pages of information,” while videotext “involves the sending of information from a 
central computer to an individual terminal over telephone lines.”25  
Teletext was essentially a passive broadcast medium; offering its user nothing 
more than the ability to read text as it scrolled over a television screen. Videotext, 
however, offered a connection to a central server—a communication path to talk with 
                                                          
20. Boczkowski, “The Mutual Shaping of Technology and Society in Videotex Newspapers: Beyond 
the Diffusion and Social Shaping Perspectives,” 258. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Viewtron Magazine, “Viewtron’s Roots Traced; From Telephone to TV to Videotex,” 22. 
23. Sigel, The Future of Videotext: Worldwide Prospects for Home/Office Electronic Information 
Services, 2. 
24. Ibid., 1. [See footnote 3 for an explanation regarding spelling.] 
25. Ibid. 
 67
the content provider and interact with the content in new ways. This concept of 
interactivity—discussed in Chapter One—was inherent in how Sigel differentiated 
the two technologies. He wrote that teletext is one-way and offers no path for the 
user to select content, adding that although it affords the user the ability to 
“determine the timing of what he sees, teletext is not a truly interactive medium.” 
Videotext was the term that became primarily associated with early online systems 
that allowed for the “both the selection of information and the timing of its display 
[to be] determined by the recipient.”26  
Neustadt explained videotext in much the same way as Sigel. Neustadt 
described videotext as “two-way,” adding that in a videotext system: “The computer 
holds a large number of pages (a database), and the user sends a signal to it to request 
the desired page. The computer then transmits that particular page. Videotext sends 
different pages to different users and can handle multiple requests simultaneously.” 
He also defined teletext as a “one-way system, with signals flowing to the user.”27  
 Aumente also presented interactivity as the key attribute of videotext. His 
basic definition is similar to the others presented: “various computer-based 
interactive systems that electronically deliver screen text, numbers, and graphics via 
the telephone or two-way cable for display on a television set or video monitor.”28 
He explained that the interactive aspect of videotext involved multiple relationships: 
communicating with the system provider and others using the system as well as 
transacting business with service providers such as banks and airlines.29 He wrote: 
“Interactivity catapults existing media habits into an entirely new realm ….”30 
Because of this interactivity, the potential for videotext as a new communication 
medium was exciting to its early devotees. It was recognized as enabling a paradigm 
shift. 
 
An Extension of Electronic Publishing 
Early experiments with videotext captured the imagination of researchers and 
scientists who envisioned the power of computer-based information systems as a 
replacement for print-delivery systems. As Sigel wrote: “It is undeniable that 
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videotext has many advantages over print, among them speed, selectivity, 
personalization of information and the maintaining of wide-ranging, comprehensive 
collections of data.”31 Neustadt espoused that the technology developments were 
leading to “a new mass medium” he described as “electronic publishing.”32 He 
wrote: 
Until recently, mass distribution of information has been dominated 
by publishing and broadcasting. Now, technology is marrying these 
media to spawn a new one: electronic publishing. Print-type 
information—text and graphics—is being distributed over electronic 
channels: television, radio, cable TV and telephone wires. In the past 
four years, electronic publishing has changed from futuristic fantasy 
into a serious business.33 
 
In this explanation, electronic publishing is associated with electronic 
delivery, but this meaning evolved out of computer-based production processes. 
Researchers in the Internet era are likely to take the phrase “electronic publishing” 
for granted, but it was new in the late 1970s and represented an emerging construct 
for the publishing industry, especially newspapers. The earliest use of “electronic 
publishing” was attributed to a conference held in the spring of 1977 by the U.S. 
Institute of Graphic Communication.34 
Around that time, the phrase was generally understood to encompass two 
meanings: First, the use of computers to facilitate production of a printed product 
through photocomposition; and second, the use of computers and 
telecommunications systems to distribute data to users electronically.35 Lerner 
argued that electronic publishing represented a holistic concept that applied to both 
production and distribution of information.36 Other researchers such as Cuadra37 and 
Gurnsey38 echoed Lerner, concurring that the concept applied to electronic systems 
used to produce printed material as well as material distributed online. All of these 
early attempts to define electronic publishing illustrate the newness of computing in 
the publishing industry at that time. 
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Even before the phrase “electronic publishing” became an industry 
recognized term, the U.S. newspaper industry began deploying computer systems to 
improve the efficiency of its front-end production processes. These new systems 
included technology to scan text written on typewriters into computer production 
systems and later full-text entry systems with video display terminals (VDT).39 Word 
processing software and computer-based publishing systems are commonplace today, 
but they represented sweeping fundamental change when introduced. To understand 
how radical these systems must have seemed to the reporters and editors who were 
among the first to use them, consider Udell’s description: 
The reporter can read what he or she has written and can change it 
on the keyboard and screen as often as wished. When finally 
satisfied with a story, the reporter simply informs the appropriate 
editor who can ‘call up’ the story from the computer onto his own 
VDT screen and edit it as necessary. When all editing is completed, 
the story remains in electronic storage to be called up whenever 
wanted for virtually instantaneous electronic typesetting.40 
 
As newspapers came to rely on computers in the production process, an 
interesting phenomenon occurred. The industry, long in the technology shadow of 
television and radio, experienced a sense of competitive resurgence against its 
electronic competitors as the 1980s began. Given that computers were so new at 
assisting with editorial tasks, newspaper executives marvelled at their use. Indeed, 
many believed computers assisting with production processes signalled that 
newspapers had crossed the line into a form of electronic media, somewhat 
equivalent technologically with their television rivals. Compaine wrote: “The 
technology has brought newspapers into the electronic age, if not with the same 
immediacy as television or radio, then with many of their techniques for 
instantaneous and remote transmission of the news back to the waiting pressroom.”41 
Adopting computer technology in this manner seemed to provide the newspaper 
industry with a sense of new-age sophistication that had been lacking. Using 
computers to improve production process and enhance efficiency represented a break 
from the industry’s industrial, manufacturing roots and afforded the opportunity to be 
viewed as contemporary and relevant. The initiatives to integrate computer 
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technology into the production process were deemed successful as Compaine further 
observed:  
The new technology has breathed new life into this oldest of news 
media. Its speed, accuracy, and flexibility have helped newspapers 
hold down costs, brighten the product, and, in some cases, improve 
the editorial package.42 
 
In this context, it is easier to understand why newspaper companies were quick to 
adopt videotext. Online distribution was an extension of the electronic publishing 
efforts already underway and videotext was considered a natural extension of the 
computer-based tools they were using. Picard wrote: “Because the news processes 
associated with the technology captured keystrokes, it was now possible to reuse or 
easily alter content prepared for the newspaper for use in a videotext operation.”43 As 
such, electronic publishing evolved as a blending of the production process with the 
delivery process in such a way that a new media form emerged. It was, as Kist 
observed, a significant advancement, “not merely one more development along the 
continuum in the widespread dissemination of knowledge which began with the 
invention of moveable type.”44 
Kist also recognized that electronic publishing was not an invention in its 
own right, but an amalgamation of inventions that included such things as computers, 
telephony, and photography. With that construct in mind, he wrote that electronic 
publishing represents:  
… more than the transfer of characters to a screen or to a printer; it is 
more than faster and cheaper typesetting; it is also more than an 
efficient means of storing and retrieving documents. [Electronic 
publishing] offers the possibility of bringing a vast store of 
information and knowledge … directly to the user.…45 
 
This view of electronic publishing reflects many of the convergence concepts 
discussed in Chapter One and that will be explored further in subsequent chapters. At 
this point, however, it is suffice to understand that videotext became a pragmatic tool 
for those seeking a technology platform that would allow them to realize the 
potential of electronic publishing beyond enabling a printed form. In other words, 
videotext became the platform that first expanded the scope of electronic publishing.  
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Such themes were prevalent throughout numerous articles and books 
published in 1970s and 1980s, including one that noted that electronic publishing had 
become a “hot topic” largely because “it has been heralded as one of the portents of 
the impending information age which is expected to usher us into the lap of a 
postindustrial era.”46 Editor & Publisher, a leading newspaper industry trade journal, 
also called the transformation of its industry’s production processes a “technological 
revolution.”47 Even though such phraseology was used frequently when describing 
the Information Society at large, it was particularly pertinent when used within the 
newspaper industry. As Boczkowski explained, the specific use of such phraseology 
within the industry setting underscores its influence. He wrote: 
This “revolutionary” language points to an ideological trait that also 
contributed to create a context conducive for the appropriation of 
videotex by American dailies: the technologically deterministic 
belief that electronic publishing would drive the future of the 
industry.48  
 
The rise of electronic publishing and its association with Information Society 
rhetoric is an important element to consider when exploring the factors that 
motivated newspaper companies to take the actions they did in the early 1980s. 
 
The Influence of Rhetoric 
As videotext was deployed through commercial services aimed at consumers, it came 
to be seen as the tangible manifestation of the Information Society rhetoric. Many 
authors from industry and academia tended to approach electronic publishing and the 
videotext tool from a technology utopian perspective; “revolution” was a commonly 
used word. The following three examples illustrate this point. 
Smith believed that in terms of human communication, writing and printing 
represented two revolutions and suggested the electronic publishing era constituted a 
third revolution. He wrote: 
Today the computer, which was developed originally as a device for 
calculating, has now become a device for handling text in many 
forms, and this interconnection between computer and text is 
coming to exercise so transforming an influence upon the human 
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institutions that adapt to it that one may justifiably consider whether 
a third great turning point in information systems has come about.49 
 
Weingarten, in an article based on testimony to the United States Congress, 
summarized the climate of discussion this way: 
It has become common in the press and popular literature to speak 
about the new “Information Society” or “Information Age.” Whether 
or not such statements suffer from journalistic exaggeration, we are 
clearly in the middle of fundamental transformation of the way 
information is created, stored, transmitted and used.…50 
 
Alber, though generally conservative and dispassionate in his work on 
videotext and teletext, also opened his book by placing the subject within this heady, 
technology-revolution context: 
We live in a fast-paced and rapidly changing world, a time in which 
writers try to capture the essence of what is happening with phrases 
like The Wired Society, The Third Wave, and Megatrends. Videotex 
and teletext are the electronic children of this age. By 1995, they 
will have grown up to be an integral part of our lives.51  
 
Although popularized in the early 1980s by such commentary, the concepts 
that made up the construct of an Information Society were not new. They had been 
widely discussed in the 1970s, and the origin of the core concepts is even earlier. 
Beniger reported that economist Fritz Machlup, working in the 1950s, advanced the 
concept of information as the researcher “who first measured that sector of the U.S. 
economy associated with what he called “the production and distribution of 
knowledge.”52 In late 1950s, information concepts became more closely associated 
with computers. How these devices would allow for information to be processed 
more efficiently became an important topic of that time. An article by Leavitt and 
Whisler in a 1958 Harvard Business Review53, for example, represents one of the 
earliest documented uses of the phrase “information technology.”54 Subsequently, the 
transformation of information from an analogue to digital form has been described as 
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a key attribute of information technology.55 For traditional media companies—
especially those producing a printed medium—adopting information technology 
implied an acceptance of a new digitally-based future. In the case of newspapers, this 
required purging analogue-based production processes often rooted in decades—if 
not centuries—of tradition. It was no small undertaking.   
Bagdikian was among the early explorers of how this transition from analog 
to digital would apply to the media. He became very influential by expressing his 
Information Society views and how traditional media, especially newspapers, would 
be affected by electronic publishing. Bagdikian’s prescient work, published in 1971, 
discussed electronic media and computing and the potential for technology to change 
what he considered a print-centric media landscape. 
Bagdikian’s work did not achieve the level of popular notoriety of the more 
futurist-type works by authors such as Toffler56 and Naisbitt57, but his contribution to 
explaining the effects of technology on media cannot be understated. Bagdikian 
explored many of the concepts that would later inform the definitions of electronic 
publishing and contribute to the work by other authors and researchers. Bagdikian 
drew from the commentary of McLuhan who had espoused the notion that that 
“printed words are an invention contrary to the inherent nature of man.”58 Bagdikian 
expanded on this school of thought: 
The new electronic media represent a return to a richer and more 
natural way for man to participate in his environment, engaging 
more of the senses and more levels of the brain than those used for 
abstract reasoning. As new generations respond to this multisensory 
medium, there will be a revival of the dominance of preprint 
communications—sight, sound, smell, touch, taste—and a 
disappearance of the ‘tyranny of print.’59 
 
 Bagdikian stopped well short of agreeing with McLuhan’s assertion that 
printed media was a dying artefact—in fact, arguing just the opposite.60 But 
Bagdikian’s work is seminal for it acknowledged the influence of such ideas. He 
contributed to an understanding of the historical context in which decisions were 
made by traditional media including newspaper companies. Bagdikian wrote: “The 
McLuhan influence has been more dramatic and, in our time, more influential 
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creating not only a popular dogma, but a significant body of belief among some 
scientists, scholars, academics, and operators of the mass media.”61  Although 
Bagdikian did not believe that print would die as a result of new technology, he was 
convinced that computing would alter the way printed media would function:  
In the long run, the more powerful substitute for print will be the 
routine storage of information in computers…. The computer can 
store enormous quantities of information … if these words, ideas, 
subject references, paragraphs and whole documents are indexed and 
coded as they are introduced into the computer’s memory, the 
memory can be searched for particular parts of its content and they 
can be extracted quickly.62 
 
And, in what may pass as one of the earliest descriptions of what we now know as a 
search engine, Bagdikian wrote about the coming power of information on demand: 
The human reader may ask the machine to use its enormous speed to 
search its memory for those items the reader is interested in and 
present only selected information.63 
 
 In other words, Bagdikian recognized that the consumer would have new 
control over information, and would be newly empowered because of that control. 
By the end of the 1970s traditional media companies—especially newspaper 
publishers—had generally accepted that idea. Newspaper companies understood that 
technology would continue to alter the media marketplace even though the personal 
computer was a hobbyist activity. Newspapers had arrived at this understanding, in 
part, due to the success of electronic information services sold to businesses. How 
these commercial services influenced developments in the media market place is the 
topic of the following section.  
 
The Influence of Commercial Services 
Large electronic databases of information targeted at businesses and libraries were 
commonplace by the early 1980s. Mowshowitz observed that computer databases of 
information had been in existence for years, noting that services such as Medlars 
developed by the National Library of Medicine traced its origin to the mid 1960s.64 
He wrote that there were “thousands of databases accessible through various 
computer networks,”65 including DIALOG, a commercial system that contained 
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more than 35 million records.66 Services such as Orbit and DIALOG provide 
examples of commercial databases that carved out market niches for specific types of 
information, and in doing so, established an electronic information marketplace.67  
Online magazine described the year 1977 as “arguably the dawn of the 
commercial online world,”68 but the article noted that at the time users were “limited 
to people directly involved in academia, defense, government research agencies, 
computer systems development, and a few brave customers scattered among leading 
organizations.”69 Nevertheless, the growth of these commercial services in the late 
1970s and early 1980s was significant. The number of such services increased to 
more than 1,000 by 1983 from only 300 in 1975.70  
The role these commercial database companies played in influencing the 
marketplace was exceptional. They proved that a marketplace existed for text-based 
information and data in the absence of a printed form. As researchers at the time 
studied the commercial market, they began to consider the possibilities of similar 
information depositories becoming available to consumers. In doing so, videotext 
was heralded as the way to deliver the same vast amounts of information to 
consumers at home in a cost-effective way that had not been accomplished.  
Mowshowitz observed that the significant social shift occurring in the early 
1980s was the ability to deliver information databases to consumers at home.71 
Through videotext, the technology was deemed to be in place to deliver the 
connected, integrated electronic experience required of an Information Society. 
Mowshowitz wrote:  
The social significance of computer-communications is hard to 
exaggerate. In the near future most homes will be equipped with 
computer terminals linked by telephone, cable, satellite or other 
means to regional and national networks offering a variety of 
databases and information processing services. A decade ago this 
projection might have been dismissed as visionary; now the only 
questions are how fast terminals will be introduced and what factors 
will determine the rate of diffusion.72 
 
 One example from this period illustrates how some commercial services 
began to bridge the gap between the business and consumer markets. CompuServe 
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was created by H&R Block in the early 1970s to provide computer time-sharing 
services to companies that needed such resources, but did not want to invest the 
capital in systems of their own. As its business grew to more than 700 clients, 
including 120 of the Fortune 500, CompuServe began to add data services such as 
financial information to its product offering.73 When personal computers entered the 
consumer market, CompuServe decided to market its services to users who were 
initially identified as computer hobbyists. In 1980, CompuServe charged these 
consumers $22.50 per hour to access its system during the day, or $5 per hour, after 6 
p.m. when most of its business clients had shut down for the day. CompuServe 
provided consumers with an array of information and services, including stock 
quotes, commodity news, electronic mail, a bulletin board service, tests of electronic 
games that could be played between computer users, and content from Better Homes 
and Gardens magazine.74  
 CompuServe’s most formidable competition in the consumer market did not 
come from other commercial services or the newspaper industry, but rather from the 
magazine industry. Reader’s Digest created a service known as The Source, which 
offered similar information services. Additionally, both CompuServe and The Source 
appealed to home computer users as a marketplace for downloading software.75 By 
1985, CompuServe and The Source were serving 325,000 subscribers.76 Although 
this number reflected a core audience among the growing number of home computer 
users, it was too small to impress the owners of the nation’s large regional daily 
newspapers. Most of the regional daily newspapers had more subscribers than that in 
a single market.  
 Meanwhile, the commercial services market had its most influence on the 
newspaper business following 1980 when services marketed as electronic libraries 
began to proliferate. Many newspaper companies discovered in the early 1980s that it 
was easy to provide access to electronic content archives given that the raw material 
had been converted into digital form for the computer production processes that were 
used.  
Dow Jones launched its Dow Jones News/Retrieval system in 1980, 
providing online access to its Dow Jones newswire and selected content from its 
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financial newspaper, The Wall Street Journal.77 That same year, The New York Times 
began offering access to its stories in full-text form through a service it called 
Infobank.78 By 1985, about 50 newspapers were making full-text versions of their 
content available either directly through their own services or through a number of 
third-party electronic library services offered by Nexis, Vu/Text, DIALOG, and Data 
Times.79  
The electronic library services were targeted at information professionals, 
especially research librarians, but newspaper companies were interested in using the 
platforms to learn more about managing electronic information. As the president of 
The Los Angeles Times, stated in an industry essay, “With electronic libraries that are 
coming into use, we are developing knowledge in data-base management….”80 That 
sentiment summarizes the influence commercial databases and electronic libraries 
had on the newspaper industry in the early 1980s. Many newspaper companies came 
to see their operations within this context—keepers of vast databases of information 
that could be marketed as ancillary services.  
But an industry consensus failed to emerge regarding how to translate 
experience with electronic libraries into a business model that held long-term 
promise for selling content online. Knight-Ridder, for example, seemed buoyed by 
the prospects of electronic libraries and continued to invest in the business at the 
same time it was rolling out its consumer-focused Viewtron service. However, The 
New York Times Co. in 1983 sold its Infobank service to Mead Data Central, then 
the parent company of the Nexis database.81  
This opposite approach to one facet of the electronic information market by 
two of the industry’s most prominent companies underscored the uncertainty of the 
time. It illustrated how newspaper executives at different companies were looking at 
the same underlying strategic issues, but arriving at different actions. This thesis next 
examines several factors that were important to newspaper executives as they sought 
business models that would support electronic distribution of their content. 
 
 
                                                          
77. Shedden, “New Media Timeline (1980).” 
78. Ibid. 
79. Shedden, “New Media Timeline (1985).”  
80. Wright, “Electronic Publishing: How to Use It and Why,” 25. [Donald Wright was the president 
and chief operating officer of The Los Angeles Times.] 
81. Shedden, “New Media Timeline (1983).”   
 78 
Business Considerations 
Even though some of the shrill rhetoric of the time predicted the imminent demise of 
printed newspapers, few, if any, newspaper industry leaders believed it. Some 
expressed concern that videotext or other forms of electronic delivery posed a short-
term competitive threat, but any doomsday scenario was couched in terms of far-off 
years. A special trade publication report, for example, offered one prognostication 
that “newspapers, as we know them in 1980, will be non-existent in 2030.”82 A 50-
year horizon was no death sentence at all; the leaders at that time would all be retired 
by 2030 and they had confidence that leadership emerging from the next generation 
would be equipped to deal with industry changes as they evolved. In searching for a 
business model, therefore, the threat to the core printed product became a secondary 
concern. The issue at hand was determining how videotext services could provide a 
return on the investment required to create them.  
In critically assessing the business climate of the time, talk of leading a 
revolution may have appealed to the ego of some industry leaders and cannot be 
dismissed as a factor that led to some of the projects. But newspaper companies were 
conservatively managed businesses, and a review of trade publication material from 
this period shows that newspaper companies appeared genuinely concerned about 
finding a business model that would support online endeavours as the market 
developed.  
As explained earlier, newspaper executives understood that several 
companies had found success selling information databases—including news 
services—to businesses and libraries, but they were uncertain if that model could be 
translated into the consumer market. Consider the comments from Burns: 
We have to distinguish between the consumer market and the 
business market. The business market is real and it is growing. 
Businesses can convert the news to profit if the news product is 
timely, relevant and accurate. So, up to a point, the more appropriate 
the news they buy, the more money they can make…. [The 
consumer] is not likely to buy more news, even more specialized 
news, if there is only cost and no benefit. He would buy it if he 
absolutely needed to know more. But it is not clear that he wants to 
know more.”83 
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 Newspaper executives considered business models that would expand their 
reach beyond news and information; they wanted to accommodate interactivity and 
offer interactive shopping services and online banking.84 As these discussions moved 
from the theoretical possibilities of online technology to deploying actual 
experiments, newspaper companies embraced videotext and ordained the technology 
as the platform that would deliver an Information Society and all that entails. From a 
business model perspective, the decision to deploy videotext was rooted in risk 
management. Newspaper executives had no appetite for spending to develop their 
own technology when videotext was available and had been deemed an acceptable 
platform by numerous experts.  
Neustadt and Alber, for example, studied videotext holistically and 
considered its functionality to be extremely versatile. They considered videotext 
capable of delivering an array of applications that are more in line with what we 
think of today as e-business or e-commerce solutions. Alber wrote that “videotex 
applications may be grouped into six application classes: information retrieval, 
commercial transactions, electronic messaging, educational services and personal 
transactions, computations and gaming and teleservices.85 That videotext could do all 
of these things appealed to newspaper managers who believed a common platform 
would be easier to manage, but in practice, newspaper companies were most 
interested in the information retrieval aspect of the technology. They wanted to know 
whether videotext represented the next wave in development toward a paperless 
society. 
As computers became more closely associated with information processing, 
speculation increased about how they would transform print-based publishing. 
Lancaster, for example, wrote that the promise of computers and their abilities in the 
manipulation of text led many in the 1970s to consider the possibilities of “paperless 
information systems.”86 He noted that increasing productivity concerns led the 
National Science Foundation in 1975 to recognize the “need for a replacement for 
paper.”87 Lancaster concluded that the shift from print-based communication to 
electronic-based communication was inevitable because of the rapidly increasing 
amounts of information and the human labour required for producing and distributing 
it. He wrote: “Computer processing offers the only possibility for coping with the 
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situation because substantial improvements in manual productivity are infeasible.”88 
Newspaper executives seemed eager to discern how far down the paperless path they 
could travel by deploying videotext. Newspaper companies did not believe that 
turning on a videotext system one day would mean shutting down the presses the 
next day, but the possibilities of electronic distribution were exhilarating given what 
had taken place regarding newsprint costs in the 1970s. 
Publishers were dealing with steep price increases in newsprint—the basic 
raw commodity needed for production. “After years of plentiful supply and almost 
constant price, newsprint demand exceeded supply and higher costs for pulp and 
energy forced a rapid escalation in newsprint prices between 1973 and 1979,” wrote 
Compaine.89 To manage costs, publishers cut the size of their papers and 
implemented strict waste controls in the pressroom. Faced with the increasing 
newsprint expenses as well as increases affecting labour and delivery, newspaper 
executives seemed attracted to videotext as a technology that would help them 
reduce production costs.90  
When considered in the historical context, the idea of replacing paper entered 
into the strategic planning discussions taking place within the newspaper industry 
regarding electronic publishing and distribution. An almost romantic notion emerged 
that new technologies would not only save on commodities, but also cure some of the 
shortcomings associated with the print products by allowing them to be updated 
continuously and by reporting the stories unconstrained by space limitations.91  
By adopting videotext, the newspaper industry would be part of creating a 
medium distinct from other media, one that deployed databases on demand and 
interactive services melded to create a new kind of information experience. In this 
new world, newspaper executives envisioned information delivery not based on a 
story or a narrative found in television, radio or print, but on something akin to the 
encyclopaedia. It would be a syntactic resource not linked to temporality, but 
available for constant exploration. Radio and television had added sound and motion 
to the story form, but it remained linear, passive, and temporary. The new form of 
delivery would be interactive, passing an element of control to the user and thereby 
empowering the individual.  
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This concept of user control and empowerment, which were at the core of 
Information Society rhetoric, began to make their way into business model 
discussions as well. Newspaper executives, for example, wanted to know whether 
users were willing to pay a premium for interactive services such as message boards 
and electronic mail. They wanted to know whether certain types of content would be 
worth more than other types of content. 
As the newspaper industry considered how it would deploy new online 
technologies, these types of concerns involving the financial ramifications of content 
offerings were always an undercurrent in the discussions. Some observers, however, 
believed that editorial concerns had taken over the debate.  
Russell, an advertising scholar, observed that much of the traditional media 
industry’s angst about providing electronic distribution focused on content and 
societal concerns surrounding a free press, rather than financial matters. “Lost in 
much of the debate is the long term effect on financial support of the media and, of 
course, the future role of advertising,” he wrote in 1978.92 Russell understood, even 
then, that interactive technology would inherently change the way advertising 
worked by placing the end-user in a position of having more control over the media 
experience. 
The role of advertising in such a system largely remains to be 
worked out. However, it is obvious that the system differs in 
fundamental ways from present advertising delivery through the 
mass media. Here it is the consumer that controls the type of 
information ordered rather than having a potpourri of advertising 
included in the mass media. Consequently, the advertiser has the 
advantage of dealing only with prospects, but has fewer 
opportunities to gain new customers who may be unfamiliar with a 
specific product or brand. Such a system also blurs the differences 
between advertising and editorial information. For instance, if the 
airlines underwrite a service to provide airline schedules … is this 
advertising or not?93  
 
When advertising issues did bubble into the public discussion, the industry 
appeared to be most interested in how to best protect its classified advertising 
franchise. This type of advertising was all-text and organized by product categories, 
which made it vulnerable to electronic competitors who could put the advertising 
into a database and make it searchable. Newspaper industry leaders understood that 
computers connected to databases of classified advertising could threaten their long 
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held classified advertising franchise—text-based advertising that formed the 
industry’s economic foundation. Heretofore, newspapers had shared very little of the 
classified advertising pie with its radio or television competitors. As Compaine 
noted: “Classified advertising … does lend itself more to these futuristic delivery 
modes,” and he warned “this would appear to be one area in which newspapers may 
well have to take the lead, before … others usurp this function.”94  
The Newspaper Advertising Bureau in October 1980 launched a task force 
called “Classified and the New Technology” to investigate the technical 
requirements for offering classified advertising online as well explore competitive 
threats from companies outside the newspaper industry.95 Kauffman wrote that that 
the potential existed to “make the electronic database into an extension of the 
newspaper,” but he added that the technology “can also whet the appetite of the 
broadcast media—or others—for a share of the attractive classified advertising 
business.”96  
Examples from the early 1980s illustrate that advertisers and their agencies 
approached the new online platforms as an opportunity to marry content and 
advertising more closely than had been accomplished with other media through 
sponsorship models or even through product-placement.  
Young & Rubicam, in one early videotext-based campaign, created an online 
tea catalogue for its Lipton client. It combined the catalogue with editorial content 
such as serving suggestions and recipes and distributed the package to Knight-
Ridder’s Viewtron system, which had 1,600 users at the time.97 The agency also 
developed an online guide for baby care on behalf of client Johnson & Johnson and 
one on home repair for Olympic Stain. By the end of 1983, Young & Rubicam had 
nine full-time employees engaged with experimental videotext systems. In discussing 
the importance of integrating advertising closely with content in the new medium, an 
executive with the agency said: “The most effective way to sell products is to get the 
consumer involved.”98  
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Ogilvy & Mather is an example of another prominent advertising agency that 
was producing online specialty content for advertisers to distribute on upstart 
videotext systems. Executives with both agencies were open about the experimental 
nature of their endeavours, but once again there was a sense that they were 
responding to forces out of their control. As the director of new electronic media at 
Young & Rubicam, stated: “We’re operating on the premise that this is inevitable. 
We don’t know where or when, but it’s inevitable.”99 This statement reflects the 
technological determinism prevalent in media thinking at this time. 
In reflecting upon the myriad list of influences and business considerations 
that led newspaper companies to embark on electronic distribution using videotext, 
Boczkowski concluded that no one factor can be singled out above another. He 
asserted that it was the combination of several cultural and economic factors that led 
the newspaper industry on its quest to deliver videotext services.100 
To make sense out of these influences and to understand why they were 
influences at all, however, requires an understanding of the industry’s economic 
context—the business climate in which newspapers operated within during the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The details of the industry’s economic circumstances were 
provided in the Introduction, but it is important to recall one salient aspect of that 
discussion. Although a financially robust industry during this period, many leaders 
expressed a sense of vulnerability that could be traced to the industry’s failure to 
increase its audience relative to the nation’s growth. 
Udell’s work, generally an optimistic text on the newspaper industry’s 
prospects, acknowledged that “circulation growth has lagged the expansion of 
population.”101 The declining penetration rates represented a potential long-term 
problem in terms of retaining and attracting advertisers. If newspapers were losing 
audience relative to population, advertisers could assume that newspapers would also 
lose audience share relative to competitive media. And erosion in advertising dollars 
would not bode well for the industry’s long-term trend given that its costs were rising 
significantly. 
Against that backdrop, Boczkowski said it becomes easier to understand how 
electronic delivery became such an important issue in the early 1980s even though 
newspapers were very profitable and did not require any immediate relief. 
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Boczkowski wrote that the industry at the time became focused on electronic 
distribution as an opportunity to remake itself so that it could improve the industry’s 
long-term viability.102 He summarized the business climate this way:  
… there was a perception among many analysts and actors that 
trends such as decreasing penetration, rising newsprint and 
distribution costs, readers moving to the suburbs and getting news 
on the radio while driving to work, less homogenized consumer 
tastes challenging mass advertising, and difficulties in attracting and 
retaining younger readers seemed to compromise the long-term 
viability of print as an information platform.103 
 
 Boczkowski’s succinct summary explains the newspaper industry’s collective 
motivation. The long-term macroeconomic concerns represented huge problems for 
an industry that had no immediate solutions to them. How these issues were 
addressed by the various newspaper companies influenced the business models that 
were deployed in relation to their online endeavours. For example, companies that 
emphasized cost control tended to take a “wait and see” approach to electronic 
distribution and videotext. Some of these more cost-influenced companies adopted 
projects based on low-cost bulletin board systems. Companies that were more 
concerned by broad competitive implications or intrigued by the strategic 
possibilities tended to invest more aggressively in electronic distribution. In the 
following section, the thesis will explore examples of several types of newspaper 
videotext initiatives. 
 
 
Newspaper Videotext Initiatives 
In Europe and Japan, videotext was largely the purview of government-sponsored 
initiatives. In the United States, Boczkowski contended that—in the absence of 
government subsidies—videotext floundered until the newspaper industry stepped 
forward and took a leadership role in its development.104 Boczkowski wrote that “a 
mix of a changing economic environment, a massive computerization of the industry, 
and a technologically deterministic ideology paved the way for this interest in 
consumer-oriented videotext by American dailies.”105 This statement underscores the 
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factors discussed in the previous section as motivation for the newspaper industry 
taking action with videotext. 
 Although the newspaper industry emerged as a leader in videotext 
development, this industry was not alone in the early market development. Many 
others were represented in the early marketplace including television, magazines, 
commercial database vendors and an array of technology companies. This mix of 
entities—including newspapers—created a trade association known as the Videotex 
Industry Association (VIA) to represent those involved in the market. The newspaper 
industry’s involvement in videotext, however, stirred mixed emotions among the 
association’s membership. Newspapers expressed interest in the market and 
represented a large source of capital to expand the market. But sceptical observers 
doubted that the newspaper industry had critically assessed the market opportunity, 
concluding that most newspaper executives held unrealistic expectations for what 
could be accomplished in the short-term. 
 When Belo Corp., publisher of The Dallas Morning News in Texas, shut 
down an early project, leadership in the Videotex Industry Association called on 
newspaper companies to proceed with caution. They were concerned that newspapers 
not committed to the long-term growth of videotext would end up creating a negative 
image for all involved. The group’s chairman pointedly told newspaper publishers in 
the summer of 1982 “not to get romanced or stampeded into getting into the 
business. If you don’t have the economic staying power, you almost are going to 
guarantee a failure.”106  
 Those words turned out to be prophetic as the newspaper industry continued 
its rush into videotext with numerous high-profile projects and partnerships only to 
retreat from the market by the middle of the decade. The experiences of individual 
companies within the newspaper industry varied considerably during this period. 
However, exploring several prominent examples provides insights into what 
transpired and helps to explain the aftermath. The following sections look deeper into 
the industry’s first online initiative followed by a discussion of StarText, Viewtron, 
and Gateway. 
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The First Newspaper Online  
The first newspaper content delivered to consumers via a computer occurred on July 
1, 1980 when the Dispatch of Columbus, Ohio, transmitted several articles through a 
system created with its partners CompuServe and the Associated Press.107 The launch 
culminated four months of planning and about 300 hours of programming time 
required to link the newspaper’s computers with CompuServe’s computers that were 
also based in Columbus.108 The newspaper and its partners called the project an 
experiment and launched with little fanfare. At the time of this experiment, there 
were only about 3,000 home computers in the entire country, and only about 250 of 
them were in Columbus and could access the newspaper’s content.109 Nevertheless, 
the newspaper’s general manager said that the Dispatch “had proved to itself that it 
can be done.”110 For that reason alone, this early experiment is seen as historically 
significant. Merely proving that the newspaper could link its computers to an online 
service and transmit the content was viewed as major leap forward. But as soon as 
that milestone was achieved, the discussion quickly turned to the prospect of 
customer acceptance.  
 Rittenhouse had observed that much of the effort surrounding computer-
based communication technology directed at the consumer market “assumes the 
demand exists with little or no justification for this claim.”111 The president of the 
Associated Press at the time of the Dispatch/CompuServe experiment acknowledged 
as much: “Our board has heard two views: One that electronic delivery is the future 
knocking at the door, and the other that electronic delivery to the home is a disaster 
hunting a victim. We intend to find out which is the case.”112  
 Laakaniemi referred to this issue as the “Chicken or Egg Syndrome,” noting 
that for the project to be successful there needed to be more users with computers 
capable of accessing the content, but there needed to be more content to attract 
users.113 The president of CompuServe viewed the prospects for the nascent market 
in terms of personal computer adoption, stating that it “was not a question of whether 
a market exists for an electronic [newspaper] edition, but when.” He added: “The 
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question is whether the computer in the home is a 1980s business or one for the year 
2000.”114 
While still experimenting with the Dispatch, CompuServe expanded 
distribution to include the QUBE interactive television system, which was also 
operating its experiment in Columbus. Through its partnership with the Associated 
Press, CompuServe also signed on several other newspapers to participate.115 The 
project attracted the national elite newspapers—The Washington Post, The New York 
Times, and the Los Angeles Times—and several influential regional dailies, including 
the Minneapolis Star Tribune, the San Francisco Chronicle, the San Francisco 
Examiner, the Virginia-Pilot, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution.116  
Even though the project had strong industry participation, expectations were 
muted. Consider this comment an editor at the Atlanta Journal-Constitution: “If 
response is small, it could mean the advances in electronic information processing 
have, for the moment, outstripped consumer demand for 21st century gadgetry.”117 
Indeed, the CompuServe project with the Associated Press and its member 
newspapers ended in June 1982—about two years after it started—as publishers lost 
interest in a system where so few users accessed their content. According to Hecht, 
news contributed by either the Associated Press or the newspapers generated only 5 
percent of the system’s traffic.118 Independent research of system users conducted by 
RMH Research on behalf of the providers of news content found little interest in 
journalistic news content, preferring instead such material as sports scores, movie 
reviews, and games. A newspaper executive participating in the project from The 
Virginian-Pilot and The Ledger-Star in Norfolk, Virginia said users were “not 
looking for a newspaper on the system.”119  
 Even so, the CompuServe project pioneered the way for dozens of other 
online newspaper projects in the early 1980s, creating a sense that urgent and 
important activity was underway. Said one industry consultant in 1984: “We are 
seeing a technological watershed—a sweeping away of long-established traditions 
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and the opening of enormous business opportunity.”120 It is important to understand, 
however, that no one model was accepted as the way to proceed. The CompuServe 
initiative proved that such efforts were technologically feasible, but it provided little 
in the way of guidance about how much a company should invest in its own project. 
In the following examples, a dichotomy emerges in terms of capital requirements. 
StarText represented a low-end technical approach, while Viewtron and Gateway are 
examples of multimillion dollar initiatives.  
 
StarText 
The StarText project captured the attention of many within the newspaper industry—
largely because of its simplicity. As much of the industry fixated on the pilot test 
underway for Viewtron (which will be examined next), StartText appeared as an 
alternative approach. The Star-Telegram in Forth Worth, Texas, partnered with 
Tandy Corporation to launch the online bulletin board system on May 3, 1982.121 
Although StarText insiders referred to their platform as videotext, it differed 
significantly from systems that touted graphics. StarText presented its content in a 
simple text format found in presentations known as Bulletin Board Systems or BBS. 
Unlike other bulletin board systems emerging at that time, StarText decided to forgo 
the commonly used pay-by-the minute plan, opting instead to charge $5 per month 
for unlimited use. The service launched with a marketing campaign that promised 
immediacy and interactivity. The campaign featured the slogan, “The news you want 
when you want it.”122  
Nevertheless, six months after its debut, StarText had signed up only 50 
users, largely due to major technical shortcomings. Its partnership with Tandy meant 
that users of other popular computers at the time such as Commodore, Apple, and 
Atari, could not access the system.123 And, as one of its early architects explained, 
StarText “wasn’t truly an online system. You called the host computer and entered 
up to four requests; the host computer delivered the information, then hung up. If you 
wanted more, you had to call back.”124  
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The Star-Telegram opted to keep the StarText project alive even with so few 
users, investing in the platform as a research and development project. In 1983, it 
ended the Tandy partnership and opened the service up to all comers. StarText 
continued to experiment with a variety of content offerings and improved its 
technical underpinning. By March of 1986, the service had 2,200 subscribers willing 
to pay a flat rate of $9.95 per month, which covered the expenses for a staff of seven 
and allowed the service to break even financially. The capital invested in StarText 
through March 1986 had totalled $210,000, while operating losses before reaching 
the break-even point were $129,000.125 
The types of financial numbers were insignificant when compared to the 
millions of dollars invested in the much higher profile projects such as Knight-
Ridder’s Viewtron. As result, StarText inspired many in the industry to pursue a low-
cost approach as a way to mitigate risk.  
 The “Electronic Editions” of the Spokesman-Review in Spokane, Washington 
is another example of this low-cost approach. Rather than install any new computer 
equipment, the newspaper transferred data to an existing back-up computer system 
and allowed users to dial-in directly to this system. By using existing resources that 
did not require re-entering data, the newspaper said the system operated “for virtually 
nothing.”126  
By 1992, the StarText platform itself was licensed to other newspapers 
interested in deploying a low-cost bulletin board system.127 But the market was about 
to change rapidly—events that will be chronicled in later chapters. StarText 
succumbed to the market forces of the Internet in March 1997—by then rechristened 
StarText Classic.128 At its end, one of its editors eulogized the service, describing 
why StarText can be viewed as important milestone in the development of online 
media: 
Online systems come and go, but this one was special … there 
weren’t any fancy graphics, colors, or sounds; just plain old text and 
information and a “warmth” that will never be duplicated again 
anywhere. We were a small community of three or four thousand but 
we all knew what was going on with everyone. We were neighbors 
and we were concerned about each other…. We couldn’t rely on 
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fancy graphics or colors, we had to have content. Content was 
king!129  
 
 StarText survived to reach the cusp of the Internet era not only because its 
operating costs were low, but also because the expectations for it by its owners were 
never couched in grandiose terms. The executives and editors responsible for 
StarText never seemed to invest in it the hopes and dreams of an entire industry. 
They saw it as an experiment, an interesting way to engage in an ancillary market 
during a time of long-term uncertainty. From that perspective, StarText is rarely 
viewed as a failure. The same is not true of the next two examples presented. 
Viewtron and Gateway were the subjects of significant press coverage and were 
allowed by their owners to become the standard bearers for the newspaper industry’s 
future. 
 
Viewtron 
When considered either by the notoriety achieved during its time or through the 
significance afforded it in historical retrospectives, Knight-Ridder’s Viewtron system 
is an iconic element of the early 1980s. As Boczkowski wrote: “no other 
development in this period illustrates the extent and character of videotex initiatives 
better than” Viewtron.130 Knight-Ridder’s management, convinced that the 
newspaper industry had to take a leadership role in determining the viability of 
electronic information delivery to consumers, launched a field test of the videotext 
system in July 1980, only a few days after the Dispatch/CompuServe test began.131  
The company had begun developing its version of the British Prestel system a 
year earlier in partnership with AT&T, then the monopoly provider of telephone 
service in the United States.132 In November 1983, Viewtron officially launched 
following an investment of $26 million and 14 months of field trials involving 204 
homes in Coral Cables, a Miami suburb.133 The significance the newspaper industry 
attached to Viewtron’s launch was underscored when a spokeswoman for the 
industry’s major trade association said: “There isn’t anybody who isn’t looking at it. 
In the minds of many people, if this doesn’t work, there may not be a market for 
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these kinds of services.”134 Viewtron’s managers understood the level of scrutiny 
was extremely high. As one of Viewtron’s vice presidents described it: “The whole 
world is watching South Florida. We are dancing naked on the stage of history.”135  
Knight-Ridder had not arrived at that point haphazardly. It had invested 
considerable resources testing the service before deciding to move forward with the 
project. Sigel reported that the households involved in the field testing leading up to 
the commercial launch represented 691 individual system users, a pool that provided 
enough positive data to prompt Knight-Ridder to move forward with the project.136 
He noted that Knight-Ridder kept much of its early market research proprietary, but 
was encouraged by several factors: 
• usage … was 30 to 60 minutes per day per household; 
• users weren’t intimidated by the hardware; 
• electronic messaging was a ‘key strength’ of the system; and 
• two-way shopping and banking had very strong appeal.137 
 
 At its launch, the graphic presentation was considered state-of-the-art for its 
time, and management appeared intent on selling the interactive functionality of the 
platform that had tested so well during the field trial. Features such as online 
banking, gaming and shopping were heavily promoted. Twelve banks and more than 
100 merchants participated in the initial roll-out.138 There was sophisticated 
computer integration with several retailers. For example, consider this description 
from Viewtron Magazine, a publication sent to the subscribers of the company’s 
Miami Herald newspaper to promote the new service: 
J.C. Penney replies quickly to orders from its catalogue because 
Viewtron connects you directly with Penney’s order-entry computer 
in Atlanta. If the item you want is not in stock, the computer 
suggests alternatives. Perhaps it is available in other colors—you’ll 
get a list of them.139 
 
The system allowed customers to order merchandise by entering a credit card 
number on the screen and select either home delivery or in-store pick-up. With 
shopping services as well as other interactive features, including message capability, 
calendars and bulletin boards, the Viewtron system reflected the application classes 
presented by Alber that were noted earlier in the chapter, and it offered—in 
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concept—much of what contemporary consumers have come to expect from the 
Internet. 
 Even if the services offered by Viewtron were prescient of the Internet, the 
execution in delivering those services was not. Relying on a rigid and proprietary 
infrastructure, Viewtron failed to connect with its audience. Despite all of the hype 
and high expectations, Knight-Ridder shut down Viewtron in 1986 after attracting 
only 15,000 customers and losing $50 million.140  
 A major issue contributing to Viewtron’s demise had nothing to do with 
content, but rather the system on which Viewtron was deployed. The system was 
developed in partnership with AT&T and initially relied on this company’s 
proprietary videotext terminals for access. At the dawn of the personal computer era, 
a system designed for a proprietary terminal had limited consumer appeal, especially 
one priced at $900 when the system launched.141 Ghosh noted that these terminals 
were later reduced in price to $600, but added that a major lesson from the Viewtron 
experiment and others like it “was that home consumers were unwilling to invest a 
large amount of money for special videotex terminals, that had limited functionality 
and power.”142  
When Viewtron attempted to expand the service outside of Florida, the 
AT&T terminals became a major point of contention with potential affiliates. An 
executive overseeing the affiliation for The Boston Globe’s parent, Affiliated 
Publications, expressed the issue bluntly in the industry trade press, stating that the 
terminal cost was “far too high,” adding, “There is no way you can have a home 
videotex system in which the cost of the terminal is $600.”143  
To offset consumer objections to the high terminal cost, Viewtron began 
offering a rental program that bundled equipment with 10 hours of service for $39.95 
per month. The new pricing model worked for a time, resulting in “hundreds” of new 
subscribers.144 However, consumers most likely to be interested in Viewtron were 
also those most likely to purchase a personal computer and they saw no reason to 
also purchase the proprietary AT&T terminal required for Viewtron access. Viewtron 
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eventually offered an access kit for the emerging personal computer market, but the 
efforts were too late to save the system, Ghosh wrote.145  
Knight-Ridder’s president tried to present Viewtron in a positive light even as 
he was announcing its closure. He claimed there had been “steady growth in the 
number of subscribers,” but added that the use of the system among its subscribers 
had “not kept pace.” He attempted to position Viewtron’s closing as one of market 
timing rather than an indictment over the service’s content offerings or the delivery 
execution. “Over time we might have been able to turn Viewtron into a viable 
business, but in weighing the continuing cost of investment against other competing 
uses for corporate funds, we decided it was in the best interest of shareholders not to 
continue,” he said.146  
 Although Viewtron received most of the attention regarding videotext 
projects of this era, Knight-Ridder was not alone in creating a high profile service 
only to close it due to lack of audience. The following section presents another 
example, Gateway, which was launched by Times Mirror, the parent company of The 
Los Angeles Times.  
 
Gateway 
Times Mirror launched Gateway as a system similar to Viewtron in 1984, expecting 
to showcase the service as an advertiser-supported medium. But Gateway could not 
gather enough audience to attract advertisers willing to pay enough to support the 
system. Times Mirror decided to close the venture in 1986.147  
Although officially launched in 1984, the project actually had begun in early 
1982 with pilot tests of 300 households in two suburbs near Los Angeles (Orange 
County and Palos Verdes) chosen for their “relatively large number of upscale, 
computer-hip Californians.”148 After the project officially launched, however, 
Gateway was unable to re-create its test market success across a broader market area. 
From the outset, Times Mirror was clear about its motivations; it saw 
Gateway as a means necessary to protect its local market franchise. As the Gateway 
project was getting underway, the president of The Los Angeles Times explained that 
his company believed “we should establish our newspapers as the foremost 
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information providers in our local markets…. We shouldn’t let others use our data 
bases before we consider how we could use it to our own advantage in future 
services that may develop.”149 He concluded with a familiar refrain among industry 
executive at the time; that doing something was better than doing nothing: 
 
We are on the threshold of electronic information delivery. On the 
other side lie great opportunities for someone, including newspapers 
if we choose, and great threats if we do the wrong things. In my 
opinion, one of the wrong things would be to do nothing.150 
 
But this executive was somewhat unique in that he asserted that newspaper 
companies may be unprepared for the work that was about to confront them, 
foreshadowing the problems that would bedevil Gateway and others. 
He warned that applying the relatively new concepts of electronic publishing 
to online media would not go far enough. “Except for the application of some new 
technology in very recent times, we are doing the same thing we’ve been doing for 
decades…. We’ve used computer technology and offset printing to make the 
operation more efficient, but that is a change in how we do it, not a change in what 
we do.” 151 This executive became one of the early proponents of creating new 
companies or new divisions within a newspaper organization to take on the 
responsibilities of the new online functions: 
Many of us could fall into the trap of trying to manage our entry into 
the electronic field with an effort that is underfunded, understaffed 
and managed by people without experience as entrepreneurs. 
There’s a lot to be said for establishing a separate group of people, 
adequately funded, with the single objective of developing a new 
line of business…. A separate organization could deal more 
effectively with potential partners on a basis that involves the 
newspaper only to the extent that it makes sense to the new 
enterprise, without forcing things into a shape that makes sense from 
a strict newspaper perspective.152 
 
Times Mirror largely followed this model by investing relatively huge sums in the 
test project and forming a separate company with a dedicated staff of 60 employees 
at its launch.153 Nevertheless, Gateway suffered from some of the same early 
technical shortcomings as Viewtron. The early Gateway project relied on customers 
                                                          
149.  Wright, “Electronic Publishing: How to Use It and Why,” 25. 
150.  Ibid. 
151.  Ibid. 
152.  Ibid. 
153.  Pryor, “The Videotex Debacle,” 41.  
 95
using a television set to display content. However, customers complained about an 
awkward keyboard arrangement and difficulty of connecting with the service using 
the telephone.  
The emergence of the personal computer led Times Mirror to abandon 
Gateway’s television interface in favour of a computer-based application by mid-
1985. But numerous other customer issues with the system plagued the project. 
Complaints included: complex billing that resulted in some customers incurring 
charges much higher than what they expected, slow connection speeds often were 
swamped by the system’s complex graphics, system outages and connections that 
tied up the subscribers’ telephone line while in use. Such problems contributed to “an 
enormous monthly turnover rate of roughly 60 percent [of subscribers].”154 When 
Times Mirror closed Gateway, the service had about 2,000 subscribers,155 but by then 
the project had cost $50 million.156  
The service’s managing editor lamented the customer service issues as 
contributing to Gateway’s failure, but he added: 
Our service was about as interactive as a Renaissance fresco. It’s not 
enough to put canned restaurant and movie reviews, encyclopedias 
and recipes into a database, add some news and call it interactive. 
Subscribers told us they wanted to have personal contact with 
experts.157 
 
He also said the Gateway experience held lessons regarding the size and type of 
audience necessary for conversation and community-building: 
The “critical mass” necessary to create an electronic village never 
materialized because the decoder boxes were difficult to use. Then, 
when we discarded the boxes and appealed exclusively to computer 
owners, we ended up with a subscriber base heavily populated by 
techies, not exactly a village that noncomputer types wanted to 
visit.”158 
 
As Gateway and Viewtron closed in 1986, the newspaper industry was left to 
explain its actions. Industry insiders as well as analysts and investors wanted to 
understand why collective investments of well over $100 million had failed to 
produce any meaningful audience. Even the publisher of The Star-Telegram—the 
newspaper that created StarText—acknowledged that the failure of those two high 
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profile ventures had cast a “pallor” over the newspaper industry’s videotext projects, 
but argued that that his own experience with StarText should encourage the 
marketplace to understand that “videotex has a future.”159 But few in the industry 
took solace in the low-budget approach even as they pursued it. An industry that had 
wanted to be seen as leading the Information Society revolution was now viewed by 
many as cowering in retreat. The following section explores more about the 
aftermath of these early 1980s events. 
 
The Videotext Aftermath 
Failures of videotext projects throughout the newspaper industry prompted 
executives who were expecting much larger audiences to question the viability of an 
online market in the early 1980s. Executives accustomed to newspapers that attracted 
hundreds of thousands of subscribers could not fathom a business that required 
investments in the millions for a large scale system, but produced consumer 
audiences in the low hundreds or thousands.  
Knight-Ridder’s Viewtron and Times Mirror’s Gateway were the high profile 
failures that prompted industrywide angst, but there were other examples that 
illustrate how quickly the industry launched these projects only to abandon them. 
KEYCOM, for example, was formed in 1982 as a joint venture of Chicago’s Field 
Enterprises (which then owned the Chicago Sun-Times and WFLD-TV), Honeywell, 
and Centel, an independent telephone company.160 KEYCOM, which was majority 
owned by Centel, spent nearly three years developing and testing a system at a cost 
of at least $11 million. But the project closed in 1985 only six months after its public 
launch. At the time of its closing, the service—called KEYFAX—had attracted only 
100 paying subscribers.161 
In another example, A.H. Belo Corporation., publisher of the Dallas Morning 
News in Texas, closed its videotext initiative after spending around $2 million on the 
project. The service had attracted only 200 subscribers. Belo said it closed the system 
because there were “just not enough terminals out there” to justify the continued 
operation, adding “when the terminals are there, we’ll just come back….”162 An 
executive at The Virginian-Pilot and The Ledger-Star in Norfolk, Va. cited the same 
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reasons when his company pulled out of the CompuServe project—too few 
computers in the market to justify the expense.163 
In the aftermath of the failed initiatives, Henke and Donahue described 
videotext as an “interim technology.”164 They wrote: 
Consumers are hesitant to invest upwards of $300 for a technology 
which is not truly interactive and whose future is unclear. 
Conversely, videotex originators are reluctant to underwrite the cost 
of initiating a service and maintaining viable offerings while there is 
no industry standard and consumer appear to be reluctant to 
purchase decoders. Thus, false starts, failures and constant 
innovation lead to uncertainty in the marketplace which translates 
into financial inaction for all parties.165 
 
Newspaper executives had ignored the lack of computing infrastructure in the U.S. 
during the rollout of these early experiments and they overestimated how much 
consumers would be willing to pay at that time to acquire the necessary 
infrastructure. 
  An industry consultant said the newspaper industry based its videotext 
initiatives on a false assumption: 
There was a grand vision created, and the implicit assumption was 
that everyone wanted it. They spent a lot of money creating services, 
only to find the market didn’t exist, and the thought of sticking 
around to develop them wasn’t appealing.166 
 
An article in The New York Times analysing the demise of the three most prominent 
videotext services—Viewtron, Gateway, and KEYFAX—asserted that they “tried to 
offer too much to too many people who were not overly interested.”167 An executive 
who managed the Viewtron project for Knight-Ridder concluded that “the market is 
thin and probably limited to the computer hobbyist,” adding “There’s no prospect for 
it being a mass medium in the foreseeable future.”168 The newspaper industry based 
many of its assumptions on the overall consumer reaction to videotext services 
without analysing the underlying dynamics of an emerging marketplace.  
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Raymond, however, discussed the failure of early videotext projects within a 
context of “mass market phenomena,” which he said involves “two phases: the 
aficionado phase and the trend phase.”169 He explained: 
The aficionado phase revolves around a group of people who share a 
common interest, activity or behaviour, which is facilitated by the 
use of a good or family of goods…. Aficionados are often 
individualistic, opinionated, and single-minded in devotion to their 
interest…. Aficionados often congregate in groups, and in doing so 
develop notions of status. The common interests of the group 
implicitly define goals or activities which are generally approved the 
aficionados, and which distinguish them from non-aficionados. 
Those who adhere most closely to the group’s goals and methods, 
and especially those who show uncommon creativity or endurance in 
doing so, are accorded special status within the group. Status is also 
conferred on specific goods or services which are deemed to 
incorporate or exemplify those characteristics which the group 
extols. The trend phase … begins when the status originally derived 
from the goals and activities of the aficionados becomes a 
characteristic of the goods and services they prefer. Status can then 
be obtained by merely acquiring the goods. In the trend phase, large 
numbers of non-aficionados attempt to obtain status by acquiring 
those goods the aficionados deem appropriate….170 
 
Raymond theorized that, based on these inner workings of human nature, 
developers of the early videotext systems not only failed to attract “aficionados,” but 
were “antagonistic” to them.171 He concluded: 
At every turn videotex developers made choices which would 
discourage aficionados…. Rather than enhancing their customers’ 
prowess by providing at least the appearance of power and 
complexity, videotex is boringly simple. Rather than provide 
variation and attendant status, videotex is the same vanilla flavour 
everywhere. Rather than permit rapid change and development, 
videotex concentrates on “standardization.” Rather than permit 
individualism and distributed control, videotex centralizes. In effect, 
videotex is an attempt to start a trend without aficionados.172 
 
While Raymond contended that videotext was too simple to attract enough 
early adopters, others found the technology too complicated to interest average 
consumers. A usability study of the Viewtron system conducted in 1984 concluded 
that “use of Viewtron proved to be fairly complex.”173 The researchers wrote of their 
                                                          
169.  Raymond, “Why Videotex is (still) a Failure,” 35. 
170.  Ibid. 
171.  Ibid., 36. 
172.  Ibid. 
173.  Atwater, et al., “Foreshadowing the Electronic Publishing Age: First Exposures to Viewtron,” 
  813. 
 99
findings: “Subjects with more computer experience had more positive experience 
with Viewtron and those indicating apprehension about computers in society on the 
pretest found Viewtron to be more confusing, irritating and complex.”174  
When newspaper companies began their quest for electronic distribution in 
the early 1980s, most of the comments regarding videotext as the underlying 
technology were positive. When issues began to surface regarding the lack of 
audience traction as early as 1984, critics began to question the videotext technology 
itself. A comment from an analyst with the respected Yankee Group, is 
representative of such sentiment: “The problem is that its technology is 10 years old. 
That first generation of videotext has the stench of death about it. It really does give 
boredom a new meaning.”175  
 In this way, the early videotext efforts clearly suffered from a market timing 
problem. The earliest forms of videotext were designed for proprietary hardware in 
part because the personal computer had yet to gain a significant foothold in the 
general consumer market. But when the computer started to gain traction, videotext 
services were slow to adapt. And when they did convert, the designs aimed at a 
mainstream audience did not hold enough fascination for the early computer 
adopters.  
The issue of market timing was a central theme addressed in a Viewtron 
retrospective produced by the Poynter Institute. On the twentieth anniversary of 
Viewtron’s commercial launch this newspaper industry research and educational 
organization convened an online roundtable discussion with several former members 
of the Viewtron staff in an attempt to put the project in historical perspective. The 
organizer of the event wrote of Viewtron’s timing: 
It was the right idea; wrong decade…. For all its faults, there were 
important lessons learned from Viewtron. It was a bold attempt to 
change the rules of getting information to the consumer. It provided 
a glimmer as to the changing nature of how consumers get and use 
information…. Ultimately, Viewtron was probably the wrong 
technology at the wrong time.176  
 
However, if Viewtron represented only a lesson in deploying the wrong 
technology at the wrong time, it likely would not have received the attention it has. 
The importance of Viewtron, as the Poynter event organizer noted, stems from “the 
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conversation it started in the newspaper industry about the future of the 
communications business.”177 From this perspective, the edited transcript of the 
roundtable discussion provides interesting insight directly from several key staff 
members involved in the management of Viewtron and its content offerings.  
For example, a journalism professor at the time of the roundtable earlier had 
served as Viewtron’s director of market research. He addressed the shortcoming of 
Viewtron’s centralized nature: 
We made the mistake of thinking in newspaper analogies. Thus the 
central computer was like a printing press in our minds, and 
telephone wires were the delivery trucks. We never foresaw 
anything as free and open as the Internet or grasped that there would 
be no central computer. As newspaper people, we were looking for a 
community-based natural monopoly, like a newspaper, but without 
the variable costs of paper, ink, and transportation.178 
 
 This observation echoes the theme from Raymond who had postulated that 
centralized control had contributed to the failure of videotext because it emphasized 
standards to the point of making the system unappealing to individuals who wanted 
some element of control.179 In the case of newspaper executives, however, that 
element of central control and standardization was a major reason videotext appealed 
to them as a technology. 
 The attempt to operate Viewtron with the central control model of a 
newspaper contributed to its problems, and represented a “failure to think farther 
outside the newspaper, local-monopoly box.”180 The retrospective discussion 
revealed that Viewtron subscribers spent 80 percent of their time online with 
interactive features such as e-mail, bulletin boards, and study guides. Because a large 
portion of the services revenues were derived from time-based online charges, this 
posed a business model dilemma. As one former editor stated: “Viewtron was 
spending about 80 percent of its budget to create news, which generated less than 20 
percent of the revenue. That’s when [Knight-Ridder] executives decided that this was 
not a news medium and they wanted to continue to be a news company.”181 
Viewtron’s top executive agreed that such assessments contributed to 
eventual decision to close the operation. He said that usage had not conformed to 
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company expectations, stating that “… Viewtron died from an excess of funding and 
expectation. Too much was invested in too specific a vision, and there was no 
appetite to change course…. The more closely we approached a viable service, the 
less it looked like a newspaper.”182 
Technical shortcomings of videotext as it was deployed and slow network 
connections available in the early 1980s contributed to Viewtron’s failure. However, 
the comments from key former employees participating in the retrospective 
discussion help explain its demise in ways that are less generally understood. 
Viewtron’s creators saw the potential of an array of consumer options, including 
auctions, educational courses, travel services, banking, online shopping, and games. 
These services were heavily promoted in Viewtron’s marketing. Therefore, one can 
see that, intellectually, Viewtron was built to showcase the capabilities of an 
interactive network. Emotionally, however, the company behind Viewtron was 
unable to shed the news bias associated with its newspaper roots. 
The comments of those involved reveal that resources to support interactive 
functions never reached the levels of the resources allocated to support news. 
Viewtron’s news and information components received the largest share of budget 
even though consumer usage patterns did not warrant it. The concept may have 
represented a paradigm shift, but the company attempting to exploit it could not 
adjust to a new way of organizing resources to take advantage of a new medium. 
Viewtron’s former managing editor said “we all had notions that Viewtron could be 
an extension of the newspapers.”183 
When that failed to materialize in the way the company wanted, the decision 
was made to close Viewtron rather than recast the resource allocation and build a 
new business around the interactive services. Its chief executive commented, “We 
should have started over, but that wasn’t an idea that we could sell.”184 The actions of 
Knight-Ridder, Times Mirror, and other newspaper companies at this time revealed 
an industry not as prepared to change as many observers thought at the beginning of 
the decade. Boczkowski, in studying the end of Viewtron and similar endeavours, 
concluded that newspaper companies lacked the “conviction” needed to embrace a 
new medium that would force changes to existing business models and processes. He 
wrote:   
                                                          
182.  Ibid., par. 21. [Statement attributed to Ashe.] 
183.  Ibid., par. 24. [Statement attributed to Bob Cochnar, Viewtron’s managing editor.] 
184.  Ibid., par. 13. [Statement attributed to Ashe.] 
 102 
… in a context marked by information society rhetoric, the ideology 
of technological determinism, and the preexisting computerization 
of the industry, newspapers appropriated videotex from the 
standpoint of a publishing mindset that had historically evolved over 
a couple of centuries of producing content for a large number of 
readers. Thus, they pursued videotex less out of a conviction that 
they needed to alter their production procedures and values to create 
an entirely different media artifact than because this was something 
they “had to do.”185 
 
 Knight-Ridder launched Viewtron in part because it wanted to maintain what 
it considered a leadership role in the information industry at the dawn of an era that 
would be defined by the emergence of electronic publishing. By closing Viewtron in 
the manner in which it did, Knight-Ridder was content to have its newspaper 
business remain closely associated with print rather that the broader information 
marketplace. Kyrish recognized the paradox represented by the newspaper industry’s 
foray into electronic distribution through videotext. She wrote: 
A repeated notion in the early and mid-1980s was that companies 
needed to keep pouring money into videotex development, to be 
‘ready’ when the market hit. Instead, a paradox occurred: early 
videotex spending was based in part on the expectation that 
interactive services would threaten the profits of traditional media 
companies. So companies created videotex in order not to be caught 
unprepared by videotex.186 
  
Viewtron, Gateway and similar projects of the early 1980s were recognized as media 
vastly different from the newspaper companies that spawned them. Their failures 
stemmed from a disconnection between the intellectual construction of these projects 
as interactive services and the emotional desire for them to become extensions of a 
newspaper. 
 
Conclusion 
Examining the newspaper industry’s reaction to the videotext era is important 
because of the influence this period had on future decision-making. The newspaper 
industry’s attempts to reconcile internal conflict regarding the nature of online 
newspapers will be examined further in subsequent chapters that explore the 
industry’s relationships with proprietary online services and the emergence of the 
Internet. Many of the issues that surfaced with the early videotext projects and 
discussed in this chapter such as the degree of interactivity offered and the transition 
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of classified advertising into a database driven model remained prevalent as 
newspapers confronted new technology platforms well into the 1990s. 
Initially, many newspaper industry leaders chose to view the closing of the 
early videotext projects not as an industry failure, but as a positive referendum on the 
future of printed newspapers. Boczkowski noted, for example, that the “commercial 
failure” of the high-profile videotext projects led many in the newspaper industry to 
become “reassured … about the viability of print.”187 Later, the financial losses 
incurred by these projects were recalled as excessive and contributed to the 
industry’s reluctance to take risks when confronting decisions regarding new 
technology. Both attitudes guided the industry toward a protectionist agenda and it 
spent considerable resources in the 1980s and early 1990s lobbying the government 
and regulators to keep potential competitors out of the online information business in 
local markets. This aspect of the newspaper industry’s relationship with online media 
will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
Before that exploration, however, Chapter Three examines the newspaper 
industry’s relationship with cable television in the early 1980s. Although the 
newspaper industry was engaged in videotext exploration, it was also enamoured 
with the distribution possibilities inherent in cable television. Newspaper companies 
were early proponents of the cable industry’s transformation from a rural delivery 
system to a national platform for programming diversity. An examination of the 
newspaper industry’s involvement in cable television in the early 1980s is important 
because it corroborates the experience with videotext. Newspaper companies were 
eager to invest in the promise of Information Society rhetoric at the outset, but were 
quick to abandon those investments when the market did not develop as they 
anticipated.  
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Chapter Three: 
The Newspaper Industry’s Brief Cable Television 
Strategy 
 
Leaders of the U.S. newspaper industry in the early 1980s were convinced that 
emerging technologies would alter the delivery of information, and in turn, change 
the nature of the marketplace in which their companies operated. But while there was 
consensus that new technology would bring significant change, a wide range of 
opinions existed about the form such technology would take and how the newspaper 
industry should respond.  
Chapter Two focuses on the newspaper industry’s videotext projects in the 
early 1980s and explored how those experiments represented important early 
attempts by the industry to exploit interactive media. Chapter Three also examines 
activity from the early 1980s, but focuses on the newspaper industry’s flirtation with 
cable television. A cable television trade association official described newspaper 
executives at this time as in “a panic about cable television.”1 Therefore, it is 
important to examine the influence a burgeoning cable television industry had on the 
decisions made by newspaper companies regarding technology and electronic 
distribution in the early 1980s.  
Collectively, newspaper companies spent more of their capital resources on 
cable television ventures than on any other form of emerging technology during this 
period. This chapter explores how the early development of cable television 
resonated with newspaper publishers who adopted the notion that a wire into every 
home could be a way to protect their interests in local markets. This chapter shows 
how the newspaper industry initially gravitated to cable television for several 
reasons: it had a more proven business model than videotext, early cable 
entrepreneurs were eager partners seeking access to newspaper content, and cable 
television companies were seen as a less threatening alternative to the established 
telecommunications monopoly. 
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 This chapter includes a brief review of cable television’s history including 
some relevant statistics that provide market context for the decisions newspaper 
publishers made in the early 1980s. The chapter includes examples of specific 
newspaper company involvement in cable television to illustrate the variety of 
projects undertaken and the range of investment involved. However, when these 
investments did not deliver the expected results, the exploration turns to the 
newspaper industry’s exit from its cable projects, discusses reasons for the market 
withdrawal and critically assesses the ramifications of those decisions. The 
newspaper industry’s direct involvement with cable television was relatively short 
when considering the overall quarter century that represents the period reviewed in 
this thesis, but the influence of this activity was substantial. The withdrawal from 
cable television combined with the high profile videotext failures discussed in 
Chapter Two resulted in a newspaper industry that was more insular—a trait that 
contributed to a protectionist stance and a political war with the telecommunications 
industry that is the subject of Chapter Four. 
 
Cable versus Computers 
There was much discussion in the nation’s popular press in the early 1980s about the 
coming “wired” society. But exactly how the nation would become wired was still 
open to considerable debate. The ubiquity of the personal computer that we take for 
granted today was still science fiction at that time. In 1978, only about 150,000 
personal computers had been sold for use in the home, primarily to electronics 
hobbyists.2 The Computer Industry Almanac reported that in 1980 there were only 10 
personal computers in use for every 1,000 people. IBM contributed to a sales surge 
when it launched its personal computer in 1981, but the penetration into society of 
the device remained relatively small. According to the Computer Industry Almanac, 
3.8 million personal computers based on an IBM standard were sold in the U.S. 
between 1981 and 1985.3 When also factoring in Apple sales, the per capita statistic 
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had climbed to 99 personal computers for every 1,000 people in 1985, but still 
represented slightly less than a 10 percent penetration of the U.S. market.4  
The newspaper industry tried to assess how the adoption of personal 
computers would affect local markets. A June 1984 study by the director of 
information technology at the Associated Press received considerable attention 
within the industry because it seemed to counteract the excited rhetoric surrounding 
the personal computer with a dose of statistical reality. The study estimated that, on 
average, only 1,900 personal computers were deployed per individual newspaper 
market.5 This figure led the researcher to remark, “There are probably papers who 
have more newsstands than that.”6 In reacting to the study, the newspaper industry’s 
leading trade association said that it understood personal computer deployment was 
mostly a business phenomenon, adding that the personal computer represented little 
opportunity for general-circulation newspapers.7 The videotext projects discussed in 
Chapter Two reflected this sentiment as most initially deployed on proprietary 
terminals rather than personal computers.  
In reflecting on this era in a critical analysis, it is important to understand the 
limited availability of personal computers in the consumer market. As Boczkowski 
observed:  
Although personal computers became the dominant alternative by 
the mid 1990s for reasons that seem quite logical from today’s 
standpoint, this knowledge should not be used to read history 
backwards: none of these delivery vehicles seemed an obvious 
choice for the actors struggling to make sense of an utterly complex 
and uncertain situation.8 
 
Given the historical context of personal computers, it is much easier to understand 
how the newspaper industry in the early 1980s was more enamoured with cable 
television as the platform destined to usher in the information age. Newspaper 
publishers had a familiarity with cable television that did not exist with computers. 
Although the notion of a wire to every home may have been a subject of the 
revolutionary rhetoric, cable television itself had been around for decades. 
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Newspaper publishers were comfortable with cable television as an established 
industry seeking to exploit market opportunity just as they were. The next section of 
this chapter recounts a brief history of cable television, which is important 
background for understanding how the business relationships with newspapers 
emerged. 
 
A Brief History of Cable Television 
Cable television originated as a mechanism to deliver television signals into areas 
that could not receive a clear picture through broadcast antennas. The business of 
delivering television over a wire began in the late 1940s, but researchers have 
disagreed as to where the first system launched. Some researchers attributed the 
birthplace of cable television to Astoria, Oregon in 1949, but others credited 
Lansford, Pennsylvania in 1950 or Mahoney City, Pennsylvania in 1948 as having 
the first cable television system.9 In any case, cable television had evolved into a 
respectable business over approximately 30 years, generating revenue of more than 
$1.5 billion by the late 1970s.10  
U.S. government statistics showed the industry grew significantly during the 
1970s, increasing from 2,639 systems serving 5.3 million subscribers in 1971 to 
4,225 systems serving 15.5 million subscribers in 1980.11 That number of subscribers 
represented 20 percent of the nation’s households at that time, and the industry was 
aggressively trying to sign up another 20 percent of the nation’s households that were 
not subscribers even though service was available to them.12  
Although the 1970s had seen significant growth for cable television, 
subscribers were mostly in rural areas because city dwellers lived close enough to 
broadcast transmission towers. They did not need a service to receive television that 
could be obtained through a quality antenna. Cable television operators realized, 
however, that future expansion required finding ways to attract interested urban and 
suburban customers that went far beyond the appeal of signal quality. The expansion 
of satellite technology provided the industry with the infrastructure necessary to 
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increase its programming and mount a strong push into metropolitan areas.13 Moss 
described the status of the cable television industry at this time: 
The emergence of new technologies, linking computer systems and 
communication satellites with the home, has made cable television 
more than a simple mechanism for improving the reception of 
broadcast television systems. Cable television can not only expand 
the number and type of television programs; it can also allow two-
way or interactive communication to occur. The interactive potential 
of cable has fostered much speculation about the public and private 
services that two-way systems could provide.14 
 
This notion that cable television systems could transform the television viewing 
experience through two-way communications was largely responsible for changing 
the way regulators viewed this new platform’s role in the media market.  
 Although the growth experienced by cable television in the 1970s was 
substantial, it could have been even greater. For most of the 1950s, federal regulators 
had taken a hands-off approach to the cable television industry because they felt it 
posed no competitive threat to the broadcasting television industry, but by the mid-
960s regulators saw cable television as having the potential to “seriously threaten the 
viability of the over-the-air television system.”15 As a result, cable television’s 
growth had been intentionally restrained in the 1970s through regulatory efforts of 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). By the 1980s, however, the FCC 
had reversed course and put in motion significant regulatory reforms that propelled 
cable television into significant new markets. The regulators had determined that it 
was no longer in the best interest of consumers to restrain a technology that promised 
programming diversity and interactive services. As the 1980s opened, the National 
Cable Television Association (NCTA) proclaimed: “We are a booming industry.”16  
 
Cable Television and Interactivity 
The cable television industry had been savvy enough to recognize that the climate for 
regulatory reform had been enhanced by the surge in Information Society rhetoric. 
Positioning its technology platform as one that could deliver on the promises of the 
                                               
13. Besen and Crandall, “The Deregulation of Cable Television,” 79. 
14. Moss, “Cable Television: A Technology for Citizens,” 701. 
15. Besen and Crandall, “The Deregulation of Cable Television,” 78. 
16. Genovese, “Newspapers Channel Interest in Cable TV,” 4. 
110 
 
rhetoric through interactive capability allowed the cable television industry to 
differentiate itself from traditional broadcast television. By establishing its 
technology as much more than a platform for retransmission, cable television 
elevated its standing beyond that of a traditional medium.  
Besen and Crandall agreed that much of the regulatory relief was due to the 
technological advancements cable television represented. They described cable 
television as “an excellent example of how difficult it is to restrict entry when 
technology is changing rapidly.” They acknowledged that some regulation was 
inevitable, but argued that the compelling nature of the technology available through 
cable television “made it extremely difficult for the [FCC] to continue to constrain 
cable growth.”17 Besen and Crandall concluded: 
This has occurred because new programming services, distributed by 
a new technology, are replacing imported broadcast signals as the 
most attractive offering of cable television in the larger markets. 
Cable television is no longer the enhancement of local broadcast 
signals…. It is now a service which offers a much wider array of 
services—an array which will increase during the 1980s.18 
 
The promise of two-way capability contributed to the emerging perception 
that cable television had “inherent advantages” in the media marketplace.19 The 
ability of viewers to communicate upstream with a cable system—to respond to 
programming choices and to make the decision to purchase programming on a pay-
per-view basis—was viewed as a powerful innovation. Noam wrote: 
In its commercial potential, two-way communications is a 
marketer’s dream come true, since consumers can respond to 
advertising messages instantaneously by pushing buttons to make an 
order and to transfer funds in payment…. Cable’s two-way 
capability also makes possible services which should be as useful to 
consumers as they are profitable to business enterprises: alarm 
systems, meter reading, electronic banking, video text information, 
classified ads, and many more. Consumers will therefore benefit 
from two-way cable as a communications medium quite apart from 
its entertainment content….20 
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With the potential for such a smorgasbord of services, investors saw multiple 
revenue streams that would allow them to generate the cash required to offset the 
capital investments needed to build cable television’s infrastructure.  
Companies quickly established systems and claimed specific geographic 
territories. A spokesman for the National Cable Television Association said, “People 
are running around looking for franchises and to get the cable systems they hold 
franchises for into operation.”21 The investment activity reached such fevered levels 
that some described it as a 1980s style “gold rush.”22 
 
Newspaper Companies and Cable Television 
Many newspaper companies were attracted to the cable “gold rush” for purely 
financial reasons. Cable television was viewed as a way for a business to make a 
sizeable return on a reasonable investment of capital. But some newspaper 
companies also were attracted to cable television for strategic reasons as well. They 
were impressed by a business model that had enticed millions of consumers to 
convert from free television to a subscription model. Radio and television was an 
advertiser-supported media, but the notion that consumers were willing to pay extra 
for specific television programming changed the way traditional media thought about 
electronic media delivery. An editor explained, “Cable enhances the amount of 
information, at a cost small enough to create a massive market.”23 Newspaper 
companies wanted to be part of such an ecosystem and were lured by the 
expectations of ancillary product offerings they could bring to the party. 
Text-based news services and classified advertising channels initially were 
thought to hold the most promise. Newspaper publishers believed that their existing 
news and sports content, along with their lucrative classified advertising business, 
could be redeployed to create text-based services. Cable operators thought these 
types of channels would be attractive to consumers interested in a source of local 
market information. In these early years, channel capacity was not an issue given that 
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systems had more programming needs than their limited video programming could 
fill.  
Initially, cable television companies encouraged newspaper companies to 
become partners. Time Inc.’s cable division, for example, sought out partnerships 
with newspapers “because of their established position in the community.”24 Time 
Inc. acknowledged that newspaper publishers were confronting decisions about 
where to allocate resources in the early 1980s as they contemplated electronic 
distribution and presented cable television as their best alternative. A Time Inc. vice 
president stated that “cable television is better positioned for text services than either 
the broadcaster or the telephone company.” The executive appealed to newspaper 
companies to become partners because he said they would bring “ideal journalistic 
and production skills for this medium.”25  
Newspaper publishers responded favourably to such deference as they turned 
to deals with the cable television industry as a preferred method for entering the era 
of electronic distribution. As the following section explores, newspaper companies 
invested millions of dollars in cable television arrangements, but some critics argued 
that newspaper companies did not drive the hardest bargain. 
 
Cable Television Deals 
The newspaper industry had dabbled in cable television since its beginning, and by 
the end of the 1970s, newspaper companies “had some degree of … ownership” in 
slightly more than 12 percent of the cable systems then in operation.26 However, the 
newspaper industry’s involvement with cable television escalated in the early 1980s 
as the two industries sought ways to exploit the strengths of the other party. Cable 
television executives initially wanted access to newspaper content, while newspapers 
envisioned that a cable system’s local market franchise could be exploited as an 
extension of their own local market monopolies. 
From 1981 through 1984, U.S. newspaper companies responding to industry 
surveys reported that they invested considerably more capital in cable television 
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ventures than in their initiatives with non-cable videotext. These U.S. newspapers 
said they invested $38.6 million to either purchase or lease cable television 
infrastructure from 1981 through 1984. In comparison, these newspapers said they 
invested slightly less than $13.5 million in non-cable electronic projects such as 
videotext during this same period.27  
 Cable television systems are highly dependent on capital investment to build 
the required infrastructure. This was especially true in the early 1980s when large 
portions of the country were yet to be wired. Trade association estimates during this 
period reported that it cost between $10,000 and $15,000 per mile to deploy cable 
television connectivity in typical areas. However, those costs could soar in large 
cities such as New York to as much as $150,000 per mile. The capital-intensive 
nature of the business tended to drive up prices for systems, which were typically 
selling in 1980 for between $500 and $700 per subscriber. The sale of some systems 
sales spiked to as high as $1,000 per subscriber.28 
Newspapers large and small were eager to participate in the burgeoning cable 
market, but those prices seemed steep to some publishers. That led many newspaper 
companies to lease channels on existing systems rather than purchase a direct 
ownership stake in a cable television company. In some cases, cable operators 
provided channel capacity to newspapers for free in exchange for content services.29 
The newspaper industry’s trade association reported that newspaper deals with cable 
television ranged from outright ownership of systems to channel leases that most 
often involved the creation of a profit-sharing joint-venture. However, the trade 
association’s legal counsel worried that some newspaper companies eager to join the 
cable television frenzy were not structuring their deals in the best way. In some 
arrangements the association’s legal counsel maintained that newspaper companies 
failed to negotiate a fair value for the content, opting to perform “almost a wire 
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service function for the cable operator in providing him with information that he in 
turn sells to his subscribers.”30 
Industry leaders worried that such arrangements would set the market value 
for newspaper content too low and diminish the influence newspapers could bring to 
this emerging market. The trade association advised its member companies to craft a 
strategic plan and proactively decide how they wanted to approach their cable 
television endeavours before engaging in negotiations with cable system operators.31 
As cable television embarked on a decade of remarkable expansion, its companies 
took the upper hand in its dealings with the newspaper industry. As one consultant 
described it, “Cable’s grade in conducting business with newspapers has typically 
been an ‘A;’ newspapers rarely have deserved more than a ‘C.”32  
Understanding how unbalanced relationships ensued from the negotiations 
between newspaper companies and cable television companies requires exploring 
more of the rationale for why newspaper companies entered into these deals. The 
following section more closely examines the many reasons newspaper company 
executives gave for entering the cable television market in the early 1980s. 
 
Newspaper Industry Rationale 
The publisher of a couple of small daily newspapers in Iowa is an example of an 
industry executive who pursued cable television opportunities by leasing channels on 
local cable systems. He used the channels to provide text-based local news and 
advertising services and his efforts were followed closely by other newspaper 
companies who hired him as a consultant. This publisher’s message to other 
newspaper companies was about warding off competitors: “I warn them if they don’t 
try to get involved, they sure as hell will look up one day and see that a competitor is 
in the driver’s seat.”33 Most publishers seemed to believe that newspapers and cable 
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television represented media that, if deployed properly, would complement each 
other rather than detract from either.  
A study by the newspaper industry’s principal trade organization found that 
69 newspapers in the U.S. were involved with commercial information services over 
local cable television systems at the end of 1981, representing a potential market of 
more than 1 million subscribers.34 This study concluded that “many other 
newspapers are exploring opportunities for similar ventures” because they were 
attracted to cable television over other forms of videotext applications. The reasons 
listed for favouring cable television included:  
1. Relatively low cost of entry. 
2. Higher likelihood that the services can operate at a profit. 
3. Built-in subscriber base meant the services were not 
marketed as a stand alone product. 
4. No special equipment beyond the cable box was required by 
the consumer. 
5. Services were included as part of the flat monthly cable fee 
(telephone-based textual information services at that time 
typically charged based on the time users spent with the 
service)35 
 
Another study by the same organization in 1983 found that newspaper 
companies were reacting to competitive fears, but also acting out of desire to learn 
about new technology. When participants were “asked to choose which of two 
reasons for getting involved in a cable venture was more important to their 
newspaper, 34 newspapers, or 49 percent indicated it was a defensive, competitive 
move, compared with 25 that indicated that it was because cable seemed like a good 
business opportunity.”36 When the study also asked participants about other reasons 
for entering the cable television market, “42 newspapers, or 60 percent, indicated that 
it was to prepare for future communications technologies such as teletext and 
videotex.…”37 The underlying notion of preparing for the future as expressed by 
these survey results played a significant role in how newspaper companies negotiated 
their agreements with cable television operators. However, the increasing sense that 
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cable television would become a major media force also influenced the relationship 
newspapers had with cable television. 
Becker, Dunwoody, and Rafaeli argued that the promise of cable television 
relied on “the notion of increased offerings of program content.” But they added that 
“despite the simplicity of this observation” no one had any clear understanding of 
how more programming would disrupt audience patterns and the consumption of 
other media.38 Nevertheless, they predicted that as cable television expanded, it 
would siphon away consumers and their financial resources from other media 
platforms. The researchers contended that media primarily compete on two fronts: 
“financial resources” and “time.”39 Given that cable television’s subscription-based 
business model would capture financial resources and its additional programming 
would divert time, the researchers concluded that cable television represented a very 
significant competitive force. Working within the context of media usage models 
presented by others (McCombs40, McCombs and Eyal41, Weiss42 and Robinson43), 
Becker, Dunwoody and Rafaeli stated: 
… cable ought to have an impact on other media use activities if for 
no other reason than that it provides content similar to what the other 
media are providing. In fact, cable technology has the capability to 
provide almost all of the content now being provided by the other 
media individually. The impact of cable ought to be the 
strongest.…44 
 
Newspaper executives in the early 1980s clearly recognized the same factors as the 
scholarly researchers who were studying media markets: cable television represented 
a new paradigm for media content distribution. However, newspaper executives also 
acknowledged that they did not fully understand how they would exploit the new 
paradigm. Until that could be determined, newspapers were reluctant to enter into 
short-term agreements with cable companies. There was a genuine fear by publishers 
that cable companies would extract value in the short-term only to shut them out over 
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the long-term. The result was a dogged pursuit of long-term, multi-decade 
agreements. 
For example, The Recorder in Amsterdam, New York, in 1980 signed a 10-
year lease with an option for another 10 years to lock up a channel on its 
community’s cable system. The newspaper’s publisher said: “The bottom line is that 
we have positioned ourselves for whatever is coming along regarding a tie-in 
between the newspaper and the electronic media. That’s really what it’s all about.”45 
The publisher of The Shawnee News-Star in Oklahoma echoed the same sentiments 
after locking his newspaper into a 13-year channel agreement with the local cable 
system: “We still don’t know where it is going. What we do know is that wherever it 
goes in Shawnee for the next 13 years, we’re going to be the owners of it.”46 There is 
no way to know whether these specific deals were among those that caused the 
newspaper trade association’s angst discussed earlier, but they are representative 
examples of how newspaper companies believed that long-term contracts were 
essential to protecting their investment in cable television operations. 
Essentially, newspaper executives traded away financial incentives that could 
have made such arrangements more lucrative in the short-term as they sought and 
won long-term agreements with cable television operators. The newspaper in 
Shawnee, Oklahoma agreed to an escalating payment scale in which the cable 
operator received 10 cents per subscriber in the first five years, 15 cents during the 
second five years of the agreement, and 20 cents during the last three years. The 
cable operator agreed to accept half of the pay as promotional advertising in the 
newspaper, which allowed the newspaper to mitigate its actual cash outlay.47 
Newspaper deals with cable companies varied widely, and while this is an actual 
example, it is not possible to characterize it as a typical deal. In many cases, neither 
party would agree to absolute dollar terms as was the case in the Oklahoma market 
example. Instead, they would agree to share in revenue generated on a percentage 
basis.48 Under revenue sharing arrangements, cable operators believed they were 
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better positioned to generate more revenue if newspaper-operated channels were 
successful and newspaper felt they were protected from being locked in to set 
payments should the channels fail.  
Even though the newspaper industry may have lacked long-term clarity about 
its plans for cable television, the agreements they signed in the early 1980s required 
immediate action. The following section focuses on several issues surrounding the 
execution of those agreements in the short-term, including a brief discussion about 
how the journalistic culture of newspapers influenced how these agreements 
unfolded.  
 
Short-term Execution 
Reflecting the names of other electronic information technologies of this period—
videotext and teletext—the textual display of information on cable television systems 
was called cabletext. The Time Inc. executive, who spoke about the opportunities for 
newspapers in cable television noted earlier, warned potential newspaper recruits that 
information displayed on a television represented a different medium. He told them 
that cabletext required skills to edit information tightly “since the small screen is not 
an ideal reading medium.”49  
Newspaper companies that ventured into the medium early quickly learned 
that the challenges of producing cabletext material were not exaggerated. Consider 
the following description from a newspaper editor assigned to a Knight-Ridder Inc. 
cable television project at the company’s Lexington Herald-Leader in Kentucky: 
In cabletext, we’re talking about a maximum of eight 32-character 
lines that will be on the screen no more than 17 seconds. Yet, this 
eight-line story that will be on the home screen for just 17 seconds 
must first attract the interest of the viewer and hold it long enough 
for the viewer to read and comprehend the message.50 
  
Such writing required skills were more closely aligned with advertising copywriting 
than news writing and culture debates soon erupted between editorial managers and  
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newspaper business executives. The editor at the Lexington Herald-Leader wrote that 
he was often asked of cabletext, “Is it newspapering?” adding that his answer was 
cabletext “can deliver only the ‘who, what, where and when’ of journalism, leaving 
the ‘why’ to the newspaper.”51 Actual content issues were only part of the reasons 
why newspaper editorial and business managers clashed over cable television 
ventures. The way newspaper publishers chose to staff these operations exacerbated 
the problem. 
Many newspaper companies that launched cable projects also were involved 
with videotext projects. They were allocating resources between these ventures as a 
hedge against an uncertain future, but they also wanted to at least break-even if not 
turn a profit in the short-term. The results were operations with very few employees. 
Writers and editors who handled news were also expected to produce and manage 
advertising content. This breached the time-honoured code of keeping advertising 
and editorial operations separate, referred to in the industry as the separation of 
church and state. 
Nevertheless, the Lexington Herald-Leader editor acknowledged that his 
cabletext news staff often contacted banks, for example, to update interest rates in 
advertising displays. They also coordinated advertising content directly with sales 
personnel. “Such details would drive many a newspaper copy editor up a wall. In 
cabletext, they’re just part of the job,” he said.52 Editors were concerned that the 
pressure for newspapers to find their way in with electronic information delivery had 
led publishers to forgo the industry’s journalistic principles too easily. These 
concerns spilled over into how the very deals themselves could jeopardize a 
newspaper’s journalistic integrity. 
Some of the journalistic concerns about newspaper and cable television deals 
involved the franchise process. In the early days of cable, companies were awarded 
franchises by local governments often following intense, politically tinged 
negotiations. Cable operators worried that a newspaper’s political coverage could 
affect its franchise status, while some newspaper editors were concerned that 
business pressure from a cable partner over such coverage could threaten the 
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newsroom’s independence. Moreover, many editors were concerned that providing 
content on cable systems that were operating as a franchise of a local government 
and regulated by the Federal Communications Commission opened newspapers up 
for new government scrutiny. There were editors who felt that providing content on 
such platforms was tantamount to inviting the government to intrude on the 
newspaper industry’s freedom. 
Others, however, saw the increasing use of electronic distribution as 
inevitable and believed that the newspaper industry had to exercise leadership to see 
that First Amendment concerns were protected.  Wicklein framed the journalism 
interest concerns: 
In this country, free flow of information is going to be determined 
by how the First Amendment is applied to the new technologies of 
communication. The First Amendment provides two things: the right 
to express ourselves freely, and, implicitly, the right to know. It 
encourages the widest diversity of ideas available to the listener or 
the reader…. The time is coming when both these rights will be 
exercised primarily through two-way, electronic communications.53  
 
Wicklein challenged the newspaper industry to call for revisions to communications 
laws specifically to include First Amendment protections. He concluded that “If we 
are to guarantee free flow of information in the new technologies, one further step is 
essential: Federal agencies, especially the FCC, have to be prevented from interfering 
with content.”54 Wicklein and others of a similar mindset wanted to ensure that cable 
television platforms were treated by regulators as common communications carriers. 
They wanted distribution technology to remain separate from the content it delivered 
similar to the way telephone systems were separated from the voice communication 
they transmitted.  
Newspaper industry leaders in these early years were much more concerned 
about the separation of content and technology in relationship to the nation’s 
telephone infrastructure than with cable television. Wicklein conceded that cable  
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television operators had established precedent early through a myriad of content 
services, noting that they would unlikely “give up their right to control program and 
information services easily.”55 This issue as its concerns telecommunications will be 
addressed more thoroughly in Chapter Four. It is important to note here, however, 
that the newspaper industry’s early views regarding how cable television should be 
regulated were tempered by its own companies entering into ownership deals and 
long-term leases with cable television companies. It appeared that many newspaper 
companies wanted to have it both ways—guaranteed access for newspapers to the 
cable systems, but also the ability to enter into exclusive deals to keep other 
competitors out of the business. Wicklein called access for newspapers to cable 
television systems “essential” to the free flow of information, but he noted that “this 
does not mean they should be allowed to negotiate exclusive contracts.”56 For all of 
the noble First Amendment rhetoric that accompanied the early discussions of 
newspapers and electronic distribution, the actions of newspaper companies 
underscored that they were businesses interested in protecting their own self-interest. 
 Cable television companies also were motivated by on their own self-interest 
and were intently interested in market expansion. Even though cable companies 
initially had sought out investment deals and other business partnerships with 
newspapers, the cable television industry’s interest in such partnerships changed 
significantly as technology advancements and new programming services allowed 
them to expand their television content. In the following section, this thesis explores 
how the rapidly evolving market affected the relationship between newspaper 
companies and cable television operators.  
 
A Rapidly Evolving Market 
Cable television operators began to replace their early systems that were limited to 
only 12 channels with more sophisticated technology capable of delivering dozens of 
channels (more than 100 in some advanced systems). As these new systems were 
unveiled, the nature of the market changed along with the underlying technology. 
Through the success of premium programming channels such as Home Box Office 
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and the favourable prospects of upstarts such as the Cable News Network and the 
Weather Channel, cable television had been transformed from merely a distribution 
platform into a recognized purveyor of original media content.   
As such, cable operators saw less need to give up valuable channels to text-
based services. By 1983, there were more than 100 cabletext services underway in 
connection with newspapers,57 but dozens of other newspapers had decided they 
wanted to enter the market. Those newspaper companies that wanted space on cable 
television systems in 1984 found a different negotiating climate given that cable 
television system owners were reluctant to lease a channel for textual purposes. They 
no longer wanted to enter deals that would encumber channel capacity at time when 
the long-term prospects for video programming appeared to be much more 
lucrative.58  
Moreover, cabletext services that had launched were having difficulty 
attracting an audience. Content scrolling on a television screen had failed to excite 
consumers who largely ignored those channels when they were offered. Consumer 
reaction to the services when they were offered free made it abundantly clear that 
there was little market, if any, for those services to be offered as premium channels 
for an additional fee. A trade association in the cable television industry reported that 
it was not optimistic regarding consumer interest in text-based services, adding that 
the organization’s leaders believed that less than 3 percent of the audience would be 
willing to pay for videotext services. A spokesman for the association stated: “I’m 
not saying the business won’t work. But what I’m saying is this isn’t the greatest 
thing since sliced bread.” 59  
As newspaper companies involved in cabletext began to accept the market 
reality, they were forced to rethink the approach to their cable projects. In order to 
make their cable channels more aesthetically pleasing, newspaper companies began 
supplementing cabletext with video programming. Some abandoned text-based  
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services in favour of video entirely. In October 1983, as much as half of the 
newspaper industry’s cable television channels included video programming. The 
ANPA reported that three newspaper cable ventures had closed in 1983 and an 
association official surmised that the “very definite trend” toward video 
programming “may be the key to success.”60 
An industry executive explained his company’s decision to incorporate video 
programming in the newspaper’s cable programming was in response to advertiser 
concerns. He stated: “Advertisers didn’t understand text television. Television to 
them (advertisers) was sound, sight and motion. Consequently, we decided that we 
needed some old-fashioned sound, sight and motion laced into the text to keep the 
cash flow going.”61 Cox Enterprises, which owned newspapers in several markets in 
the U.S. including Georgia, Florida, Ohio and Texas, embraced the idea of using 
video programming to create “a local television station” in its smaller markets that 
did not have a broadcast station. Even The  New York Times announced a deal in 
September 1983 to provide video programming as part of a joint venture with 
Warner Communications in which news employees would appear on camera.62 
The programming provided by The New York Times and other larger 
newspapers may have been relatively well produced, but newspaper companies 
overall struggled to create video content that measured up to the standards consumers 
had come to expect from television news organizations. In recounting this period, 
some observers blamed the newspaper industry’s lack of investment in the product 
that resulted in what was often described as amateurish. In recounting the video 
efforts of this period, a newspaper executive stated that “newspapers were nickel-
and-diming it to death.”63 The newspaper industry struggles with video were 
especially acute in small markets where resources and talent level did not result in 
compelling television content.  
A publisher of a small daily in Missouri recalled that his newspaper produced 
weather reports, election news, and local sporting events. “We had all kinds of fun,” 
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he said, but added that “We were amateurs…. People quickly found out (our 
newspaper reporters weren’t) Walter Cronkite.”64 A Tribune Co. executive later 
recalled that such video efforts “really didn’t take showmanship into account. You 
can’t just put a reporter up there and read.”65 Newspaper companies became 
uncomfortable with product offerings that were mocked and ridiculed. They had 
failed to understand that consumers’ expectations—even in small markets—were 
formed by what they experienced from other channels. As newspaper companies 
realized that their video content would not meet those expectations without 
significant investment, the industry’s collective interest in cable television 
diminished quickly. 
There were, of course, other business issues in play, but in looking back on 
this time it is clear that newspaper companies soured on the cable business as 
suddenly as it had earlier embraced it. Newspaper executives who had insisted on 
long-term deals with cable operators, even though they did not know where the 
market would lead, decided rather quickly that the market had turned in an 
unexpected direction requiring more investment than they were willing to make. The 
following section of the chapter explores the period when newspaper companies 
were extricating themselves from cable television projects and it discusses some of 
the rationale provided for the newspaper industry’s change of heart. 
 
Newspapers Exit the Cable Market 
The newspaper industry’s involvement with cable television peaked in the mid-1980s 
with at least 200 newspapers providing content, including local news and advertising, 
to cable systems. By the end of the decade, only two such projects remained in 
operation.66 Newspaper companies had entered into cable initiatives with extremely 
high expectations, but they became disenchanted with the prospects for cable 
television when those expectations were not met quickly. As one official from the 
industry trade association asserted, newspapers grew less enthusiastic about the 
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prospects for cable ventures because “there aren’t any really overwhelming success 
stories.”67 Market reality and expectations were not aligned and it resulted in many 
newspaper companies entering a market for which they were unprepared. 
Although newspaper cable activity did not reach its peak until the middle of 
the decade, 1983 marked a recognized shift in attitude. A newspaper trade 
association official observed: 
New products and services, like cable, seem to move through 
distinct cycles of expectations, similar to the business cycle. For 
cable, 1981-82 were years of unbounded, and unrealistic, optimism. 
1983 has brought a much more sober view of cable.68  
 
The perspective newspaper executives had about cable television at this time was 
shaped by the operating realities of their projects, such as the increasing expectations 
for video programming as noted previously. However, another issue influencing 
newspaper executives stemmed from cable television’s emerging financial structure 
that worried conservative newspaper managers. 
 Projections for a typical cable television system in 1982 called for it to make 
$275 million in profit over the 15-year life of a local franchise agreement. But a 
cable industry trade association official asserted “that if the … revenue projections 
are as little as 5 percent too high,” the cable system “stands to lose even more than 
that amount.”69 The narrow margin of error was due to the relatively high 
requirements for capital spending to build and maintain the cable infrastructure. 
Cable companies were borrowing heavily to fund their capital expansion. By the end 
of 1982, the cable television industry’s collective debt had reached nearly $4 
billion.70 Newspaper managers accustomed to balance sheets with far less debt were 
sceptical of the cable industry’s long-term ability to produce the profit margins 
newspaper owners had come to expect from their own operations. As a result, direct 
investment in cable television systems by newspaper companies peaked at about 16 
percent in 1985.71  
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Meanwhile, newspaper companies increasingly were concerned about the 
operating costs associated with their cable ventures whether or not they had an 
ownership position. A trade association official stated: “We want to be realistic about 
what it costs us; not deceiving ourselves about the business opportunities in this field 
by not knowing our true costs.”72 To provide its membership with operating 
guidelines for their cable ventures, the ANPA in 1983 calculated what it considered 
to be a plausible scenario. In a hypothetical market with 200,000 households and 
40,000 cable subscribers, the ANPA said a newspaper cable channel could take in 
$480,000 in revenue and generate a 27 percent profit. Nevertheless, an association 
official conceded that newspapers were not at the time generating that level of profit, 
but instead referred to the numbers “a worthy and realistic 3 to 5 year goal.”73 As 
newspaper companies attempted to find their way in this market, several of them 
followed ANPA advice to reduce resources allocated to information services and 
increase resources dedicated to generating advertising sales on the new platform.  
 The trade association official said the industry group had come to believe 
“that the business opportunities … for a newspaper in cable are largely in the area of 
advertising,” explaining that cable offers newspapers an outlet to “outflank” local 
television stations, which had emerged as the largest competitors to local market 
newspapers.74 In several instances, newspapers decided that the advertising 
opportunity had nothing to do with their own content. They opted instead to operate 
as brokers and representatives in local markets for advertising placed on channels 
carrying such exclusive cable programming as CNN or ESPN, a sports programming 
channel.75 These arrangements allowed for local cable operators and newspapers to 
remain allied against local market broadcast television stations in the battle for 
advertising dollars.  
Newspaper executives saw the expansion of cable television channels as a 
positive for their own business because they believed that a fragmented television 
audience made it more difficult for local broadcast television to maintain market  
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share of advertising. An executive explained that an advertiser a few years earlier 
could reach 90 percent of a typical market through one broadcast buy. That 
advertiser would struggle to reach 60 percent market coverage in the mid-1980s with 
only one broadcast buy, the executive said, attributing the difference to the audience 
fragmentation created by cable’s household penetration and channel expansion.76 
Such changes in local advertising markets led an executive with McClatchy 
Newspapers to state: “Cable television may turn out to be our best friend in the long 
run.”77 Publishers believed they could position their newspapers with advertisers as a 
cost effective way of increasing market coverage in areas of rapid audience 
fragmentation, thereby capitalizing on the market turmoil cable television had 
created. So despite the shifting relationship with cable television operators, 
newspaper companies continued to believe that cable television was more friend than 
foe. 
Advertising representation and brokerage deals may have salvaged some of 
the business relationships between cable television operators and newspaper 
companies, but those arrangements were far afield from the original vision of 
newspapers as the source of robust information services. In announcing the closure 
of its cable venture, The Florida Times-Union in Jacksonville, FL, was among the 
first newspaper companies to address publicly some of the shortcomings that 
prevented it from realizing the vision that had originally attracted the newspaper to 
cable television. The newspaper closed its cable channel after only three years of 
operation, blaming the failure on the passive nature of cabletext and various technical 
shortcomings. Why did this happen? 
The Florida Times-Union was an example of a newspaper that began with 
cabletext before supplementing its content with video-based news reports. An 
executive maintained that the simple cabletext service suffered from a lack of 
interactivity, making it unattractive “for classified advertising because it would 
require viewers to watch the screen until the advertising in which they were 
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interested in scrolled by.”78 The move to video failed to attract a viable audience in 
part due to unresolved technology issues, he said. For example, the executive said 
signal interference from a local broadcast station impaired the visual quality of the 
newspaper’s channel.79 As their interest in the cable television platform waned, 
newspaper companies had no shortage of reasons for explaining why the ventures 
had failed to meet the lofty goals envisioned only a few years earlier. From a timing 
perspective, however, the move away from cable in the mid-1980s coincided with 
the high-profile closings of Knight-Ridder’s Viewtron service and Times Mirror’s 
Gateway project. 
The proud newspaper industry had shifted backwards, from leader to laggard, 
in the marketplace for electronic distribution of media content. As an industry, its 
efforts to exploit electronic distribution were not keeping pace with overall market 
developments. But where the rhetoric surrounding those closed videotext projects 
had been tinged with failure, the newspaper industry positioned its exit from cable 
television as a strategic withdrawal. The pullback from cable television was 
described as a shift in how newspaper companies chose to allocate resources rather 
than as the failure of expectations that it actually was. In the following section, the 
thesis explores further how the newspaper industry positioned its retreat from cable 
television.  
 
Positioning the Exit 
The economic value of cable television systems soared in the mid-1980s as television 
viewers became more accustomed to receiving their programming through a wire 
rather than an antenna. By the end of 1985, cable television was available to nearly 
73 percent of homes with televisions.80 The gold rush description discussed earlier 
had proven to be an appropriate analogy given that cable television systems valued at 
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$200 to $300 per subscriber in the mid-1970s sold for $1,100 to $1,200 per 
subscriber in 1986.81 
Many newspaper companies that had invested in cable television in the early 
1980s were ready to cash in on those investments by 1986. “I think our timing has 
been rather fortuitous,” said a McClatchy Newspapers executive in referring to the 
escalation in value of cable television systems.82 McClatchy Newspapers is 
representative of its industry’s mid-decade retrenchment. “We flirted with 
diversification and decided we do better at newspapers,” said another one of its 
executives.83 As newspaper companies across the board sold off their cable 
ownership holdings or negotiated their way out of channel leases, executives echoed 
those sentiments and talked about focusing on their core product—printed 
newspapers.  
One industry analyst stated: “Newspaper companies are saying newspapers 
are going to be the backbone.”84 The change in strategy, which downplayed new 
ventures, was so significant that the industry’s own trade association publication, 
Presstime, published a special report about it. It stated in part: 
McClatchy’s narrowing focus reflects what observers detect as a 
recent trend in the newspaper business: that following a period in 
which they aggressively entered businesses not directly related to 
their traditional mission of disseminating news and advertising, 
many companies are going “back to basics.” In general, they are re-
emphasizing their role as print publishers—and, to a lesser extent, 
radio/TV broadcaster—and de-emphasizing their involvement in 
other enterprises.85 
 
The “back to basics” rhetoric was supported by other industry activity. For example, 
newspaper companies reduced their investments in the radio business as well. From 
1982 to 1985, the newspaper industry reduced its ownership of the country’s AM 
radio stations from 23 percent to 5.2 percent while its investments in FM stations 
declined from 37 percent of the total to 6 percent.86 
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 Tribune Co. sold its cable holdings, but kept most of its broadcast properties, 
while Dow Jones, Harte-Hanks, and Gannett are also examples of newspaper 
companies that either abandoned cable television or significantly reduced their stake 
in the industry during this period.87 Other newspaper companies such as Times 
Mirror and Cox Enterprises separated their cable television holdings and newspaper 
holdings into distinct subsidiaries, recognizing that the capital spending requirements 
of cable television was too great to share a balance sheet with newspaper activities. 
But for some enterprises, creating separate businesses under a common holding 
company did not go far enough.  
Executives with the Tribune Co., for example, said they made the strategic 
decision to withdraw from cable entirely because the capital required to become a 
major player in the industry was prohibitive given their desire to remain committed 
to the newspaper business and to expand its broadcast holdings. It would have 
required “much more than we wanted to spend,” according to a company 
spokesman.88 Although newspaper companies were extremely profitable during this 
period relative to other businesses, the amount of investment required by the cable 
industry illustrated that the conservative newspaper business had its limits. Analyst 
comments from this period suggest that such limitations stemmed from owners who 
were reluctant to take on risks that could jeopardize profitability. Even at larger 
media conglomerates, newspapers were responsible for generating the most revenue 
and profit and executives had little incentive to put the newspaper franchise at risk.89   
 Taking advantage of the escalation in cable values, while at the same time 
positioning the cable retreat as a return to core products, resonated positively for the 
newspaper industry in the Wall Street investment community. Analysts believed that 
shareholder pressure to maintain the industry’s high profit margins contributed to the 
decisions to curtail ventures outside of the core product. This was especially true of 
the publicly traded companies such as Gannett and Times Mirror.90 An important 
aspect of this discussion, however, is that by characterizing the retreat from cable as 
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a re-deployment of assets, newspaper companies were allowed to downplay what 
was essentially failed execution. Newspapers had rushed into the cable television 
business without appreciating the complexities of the market and with no consumer 
research to support claims that a market for text-based information services on 
television could be developed.  
In looking back over this period, a Tribune executive said newspaper 
companies acted impulsively seeking “franchise protection (rather than) franchise 
extension.”91 And by acting impulsively, newspaper companies had not done enough 
diligence to be prepared for shifts in the market that would be inevitable—the 
requirement to add video programming to their news channels for example. A 
McClatchy Newspapers executive said that newspaper companies had 
underestimated what would be required to operate a cable television channel, stating 
that “it turned out not to be as easy to run” as newspapers had assumed it would be.92 
An article in Presstime summarized the issue, stating that newspaper companies had 
concluded that: “… cable television and other endeavors simply turned out to be 
more trouble than they were worth.”93 These comments underscore a line of thinking 
that newspaper companies were never invested in leading an electronic revolution, 
only in defending their local markets against one.  
 As was discussed in Chapter Two, the demise of several high-profile 
videotext projects left the industry scarred by the experience. The aftermath of those 
projects affected how newspaper companies approached subsequent online initiatives 
including the Internet era, which will be discussed in a later chapter. However, the 
newspaper industry’s involvement with cable television was not cast in the same 
light. Some observers even felt the newspaper industry had been bolstered rather than 
beaten down by its involvement with cable television.94 Wrote Patten: 
Newspaper ventures into cable ownership were harmless and in 
some cases instructive. They served to increase awareness of a 
changing media environment. And the newspapers learned a few 
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lessons about the problems of profitability in a new communications 
field.95 
 
This more positive reaction stemmed, at least partially, from cable television’s 
position within the media marketplace. Cable television had come to be viewed 
differently than other existing media. Finnegan and Viswanath asserted that “cable is 
not a medium per se, but rather a delivery system of channels of varied content.”96 
Therefore, newspaper companies were seen as backing away from a distribution 
platform rather than a full-fledged medium, which made strategic sense within the 
business and investment community. 
 The newspaper industry experience during this period also fostered a sense 
that the competitive effects of cable television had been overstated. One executive 
stated: “As it turns out, cable was not nearly as great a threat to newspapers as some 
people once thought it might be.”97 Another executive said that the initial interest 
newspaper companies had in cable television emanated from the belief that such 
systems would be a major distribution platform for newspaper content, but by the 
mid-1980s, he said “it’s become more and more apparent any impact cable is going 
to have on newspapers is a lot less than anybody imagined.”98 This perception that 
the newspaper industry had dodged a significant competitive threat from cable 
television was repeated by analysts who followed the industry for investment 
research. 
 These analysts generally concurred that the industry’s renewed emphasis on 
its core business was the correct strategy in 1987. One investment banker proclaimed 
that newspaper companies did not need to worry about investing in new endeavours 
because there was “no new media coming along” that promised them a better use for 
their capital.99 Another investment analyst proclaimed “… we can see that 
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newspapers will survive that [competitive] onslaught.”100 The newspaper industry 
was emboldened by the belief that its business model, largely dependent on a local 
market monopoly, was well-suited to fend off threats from newcomers. The 
economic fundamentals of daily newspapers posed a huge barrier to entry for 
competitors. While radio and television (including cable systems) had made inroads 
in local market advertising over the decades, the newspaper model had not cracked. 
Daily newspapers remained hugely profitable and were at the forefront of the local 
media economy.  
 Newspaper companies also began to assume that audience fragmentation 
brought on by cable television and other forms of technology-based media would 
benefit them over time. As one executive for Tribune Co. surmised, the local 
newspaper franchise would flourish as this fragmented audience sought an 
information “starting point” and “needs a single, reliable resource.”101 Even the 
physical form of the newspaper received newfound respect in the mid-1980s as 
cabletext was deemed too passive and videotext too slow and plodding. Said one 
newspaper broker: “the portable, clippable smorgasbord that (readers) get in their 
daily newspaper is a cost-effective package that will be very hard to improve 
upon.”102 The juxtaposition of these more positive views with those expressing 
failure in the wake of Viewtron’s demise as discussed in Chapter Two reflect the 
dichotomic nature of the newspaper business in the 1980s.  
 
Conclusion 
Newspaper companies were indeed successful businesses and the industry had 
weathered numerous competitive battles, but concern about the risk from new 
technologies influenced executive action more than any other business fundamental 
during this era. This led newspaper companies to embrace opportunities in the cable 
television market at the beginning of the 1980s with the same initial exuberance as 
they had demonstrated for videotext projects during this period. 
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 A significant underlying influence on the decisions to invest in cable 
television—although rarely addressed straightforwardly by newspaper industry 
executives—stemmed from the concern that emerging technology would alter a 
business model that, as noted earlier, had come to rely extensively on local monopoly 
control. Gomery, for example, asserted in a media economic analysis that “some sort 
of dramatic technological breakthrough” would be the most likely occurrence that 
would break the newspaper industry’s local market monopoly.103 Newspaper 
industry leaders in the 1980s wanted to prevent that from happening. They wanted to 
own such a breakthrough and were exploring emerging technologies to determine 
how effective they would be in allowing the industry to gain an even stronger 
position in local markets. They specifically were interested in regaining a portion of 
the advertising revenue that had gone to local market television and radio as the 
electronic era took hold, first in the 1930s with radio, and later in the 1950s and 
1960s with television. 
 When direct investments by newspaper companies in the emerging 
technologies did not provide the immediate payback that many newspaper executives 
expected, however, they were quick to withdraw from what they saw as expensive 
experiments. Many became comfortable with the notion that electronic distribution 
platforms had arrived, but were not close to supplanting the superiority of the printed 
newspaper. The prevalent industry sentiment was that since newspapers had not 
succeeded in either videotext or cable television, technology-based challenges were a 
distant threat at the very least. If newspaper companies themselves could not make a 
sustainable business case for videotext or cable television, this line of thinking went, 
then it was unlikely competitors would be successful in using those platforms against 
newspapers.   
 Nevertheless, the potential for what electronic distribution could become 
haunted the industry even as its members dismantled their electronic ventures. As a 
result of these ongoing concerns, the newspaper industry became fixated on making 
sure that if it did not exploit the potential of online media that no one else would 
either. The industry became especially adamant that a breakthrough in online media  
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would not come from the telecommunications industry, which was also a beneficiary 
of local market monopolies. Although newspaper companies had partnered with 
cable television operators as discussed in this chapter and had worked closely with 
telecommunications companies on videotext projects as was explored in Chapter 
Two, the aftermath of both sets of activities resulted in a more insular newspaper 
industry.  
 Newspaper companies had no interest in partnering with the 
telecommunications industry as it had done with cable television. Instead, concern 
over the potential competition from the telecommunications industry escalated into 
public hostility and became a significant influence on the newspaper industry’s 
activities in the 1980s. Despite the level of activity chronicled in this chapter and 
Chapter Two, it can be argued that the newspaper industry’s most determined effort 
during the 1980s was the lobbying mustered in defence of its local markets against 
the telecommunications industry. Chapter Four examines the story of this effort and 
the heated political battle that ensued.  
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Chapter Four: 
Newspapers React to Fear of 
 Telecommunication Dominance 
 
In 1979, AT&T—then the regulated monopoly provider of telephone service in the 
U.S.—conducted a “concept trial” for a service that would allow customers to “call a 
database to retrieve directory listings and other information such as sports results, 
time and weather.”1 The trial was held only in Albany, New York, and AT&T 
mentioned the project only briefly in its annual report to shareholders released in the 
spring of the following year. The description was rather innocuous, noting that 
“information was displayed on a TV-like screen” and that more tests of the system 
were planned.2 This event received little attention from consumers, but it sent shock 
waves through the newspaper industry’s executive ranks and contributed to what 
would be described later as “The AT&T ‘scare.’”3 Newspaper publishers feared 
regulators would free AT&T to “become a major information provider in the 
pioneering days of various new telecommunications technologies.”4 
 This chapter examines how the newspaper industry reacted to the possibility 
of direct electronic competition from the nation’s telecommunications industry. 
Newspaper publishers already viewed the phone companies’ Yellow Pages 
directories as advertising competition, but the prospect of those vast encyclopaedic 
listings ported into an online database seemed like an unfair advantage from the 
perspective of newspaper publishers. This chapter explains how the newspaper 
industry sought to derail that perceived threat, and in doing so, provides insight into 
the newspaper industry’s evolving perspective of its market and competition in the 
early years of online media. The chapter explains that the newspaper industry’s 
lobbying campaign was successful in thwarting many of the telecommunications 
industry’s plans in the 1980s and early 19990s, but the result was as an industry 
perceived by the mainstream as defensive and protectionistic; interested only in 
protecting its local market monopoly.  
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 A brief summary of the telecommunications industry regulatory environment 
that existed during the early 1980s opens the chapter to provide context for 
explaining the newspaper industry’s position. The chapter then explores the intense 
rhetoric that emanated from the newspaper industry’s lobbying effort designed to 
influence regulation that would restrict how the telecommunications industry could 
participate in the electronic information services market. The breakup of AT&T is 
discussed as a milestone event, including its aftermath when the regional Bell 
operating companies emerged as powerful forces in the telecommunications industry 
and emerged as new forms of competition for the newspaper industry. 
 In Chapter Two, this thesis examined the newspaper industry’s early 
videotext projects, while Chapter Three explored the industry’s investments in cable 
television. The decisions recounted in those chapters—to close Viewtron and similar 
electronic endeavours and to abandon cable television investments—combined with 
the regulatory stance against the telecommunication industry to frame the newspaper 
industry as in retreat. Without any clear victories in the electronic realm by the late 
1980s, the earlier optimism that newspaper companies would lead the way in online 
media had faded. Therefore, the events and issues discussed in this chapter are an 
important bridge in understanding how the newspaper industry evolved as it did in 
the years leading up to the Internet. 
 
Regulatory Background 
Due to several long-standing consent decrees and regulatory rulings by the U.S. 
Justice Department and the FCC, the nation’s telephone system as represented by 
AT&T was not allowed to expand into businesses outside the scope of its status as a 
common carrier of communications services.5 The effects of those restrictions were 
debated because many viewed the telephone wire leading into homes and businesses 
as the natural way to access the myriad of electronic information services that were 
looming on the horizon. Keeping the owner of those wires from profiting from such 
information services seemed counterproductive to those who believed the restrictions 
would stifle innovation. Others, however, believed AT&T and its Bell operating 
companies would use monopoly power to thwart competitive services, which would 
also undermine innovation. 
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 The emergence of cable television during this period was a major factor in 
shaping the debate surrounding the future of the country’s telecommunications 
infrastructure. As cable television expanded, it became another wire into the home 
and represented the possibility of real competition for the telecommunications 
industry in the delivery of information services. As Noam wrote in 1982: 
The entry of cable television into the American household was not 
planned as part of an alternative telecommunications system. But 
now that it is becoming a fact, one should make the most of it…. It 
will not be feasible to contain the possibilities of the technology and 
to deny their services to consumers. If technology is destiny, it spells 
out a future of integrated telecommunications.6  
 
Noam’s observation that cable television’s influence in the market was an unplanned 
event underscores how the spread of technology in the early 1980s confounded 
regulators and policymakers.7 It was the time when the clear boundaries that 
separated television and telecommunications began to disintegrate and new ideas 
about information services began to take shape. How the country should regulate 
within this new environment—especially as it concerned the future of AT&T—
became one of the most important policy issues of this era and is addressed in the 
following section. 
 
The AT&T Conundrum 
The most fundamental decision confronting the U.S. government regarding its 
policies toward media technology and information services related to the course of 
action to take with AT&T. One option was to preclude AT&T from directly 
participating in information services “on the grounds that a common carrier may not 
simultaneously act as a processor of data for public service.”8 Another option was to 
follow the lead of several Western Europe democracies, which had granted extensive 
authority to their telecommunications and postal monopolies to introduce new 
electronic information services. Smith noted that if the U.S. followed that model, it 
could “make AT&T the focal point of a vast expansion into the role of national data 
storage and disseminator.”9 Any change enacted by the government would alter the 
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telecommunications market that had operated under a consistent set of rules for more 
than two decades. 
 AT&T and the federal government had entered into an antitrust consent 
decree in 1956 that had defined AT&T as a common carrier and restricted it from 
providing information services directly to consumers. By the 1980s, however, 
Congress and the FCC understood that changing technology would make it necessary 
to revisit the nation’s telecommunication policies. In early 1980, for example, the 
FCC proposed rule changes to allow AT&T to offer data retrieval services through a 
subsidiary.10 It was proposals such as this that raised the ire of the newspaper 
industry, which argued that a regulated monopoly had an unfair advantage in the 
marketplace and that it would use that power to keep competition from developing. 
The argument that a separate subsidiary would create transparency and prevent 
AT&T from leveraging its telephone monopoly to its advantage in information 
services held little sway with newspaper publishers.  
 This chapter is not intended to recount all the regulatory and political 
machinations that led to a new consent decree that broke up the AT&T monopoly. 
Rather, its purpose is to explore how the newspaper industry reacted to the shifting 
telecommunications landscape that led to the break-up and paved the way for a major 
rewrite of the national telecommunications law. During this period, the newspaper 
industry became a powerful lobbying force in the public debate over 
telecommunications policy. The newspaper industry’s actions relating to 
telecommunications policy shaped its approach to the information marketplace and 
altered its public image during this period. What were AT&T’s positions that 
provoked the newspaper industry’s response?  
 
AT&T’s Stance 
Regardless of how regulations were changed, telecommunications industry observers 
were convinced that AT&T’s presence in the electronic marketplace would be huge. 
Given the monopoly’s power and position, it would have been unfathomable in the 
early 1980s to think the government would prevent AT&T from playing a leading 
role in developing information services. After all, the research and development 
capabilities of the company’s Bell Laboratories unit had achieved legendary status 
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and AT&T executives anticipated with excitement the possibilities of the emerging 
information marketplace. 
 In the letter to shareholders included in the AT&T 1980 Annual Report, 
company Chairman Charles Brown wrote that “no longer do we perceive that our 
business will be limited to telephony or, for that matter, telecommunications. Ours is 
the business of information handling, the knowledge business.” He stated that “it 
appears to be widely if not universally agreed that—in an era of intensifying 
competition—it no longer makes sense to deny the Bell Systems the opportunity to 
compete in unregulated markets.” He concluded, “The technology of the Information 
Age is ours. Indeed it was Bell System technology that very largely brought it into 
being. And it is Bell System technology that positions us to fulfill its 
opportunities.”11 
 Pontificating about the potential of new information services markets was 
easy, but Brown understood that capitalizing on those opportunities would require 
disarming potential adversaries and influencing key politicians and regulators. 
Brown knew that AT&T’s critics included the powerful newspaper industry, which 
prompted him to accept an invitation to address a gathering of influential newspaper 
executives. But rather than win over any converts from the ranks of the newspaper 
industry, the meeting is recognized as the opening salvo in a war of rhetoric. 
 
Newspapers, AT&T Launch War of Rhetoric 
When AT&T’s Brown stepped to the podium during the meeting of the newspaper 
trade association’s telecommunications committee in early 1980, he initially sought 
to calm a contentious atmosphere. Brown told the committee that the newspaper 
industry’s fears were unfounded and that publishers were “seeing ghosts under the 
bed.” He elaborated: “If what you’re concerned with is, ‘Are we going to provide a 
news bank?’ the answer is no. We’re not interested in that.” He said that AT&T had 
no plans to field its own newsgathering operation and that concerns over the 
company’s intentions were overblown. “I think you’ve reached quite a long way if 
you think we’re interfering with the freedom of the press,” he said.12 However, if 
Brown’s appearance before the publishers’ committee was designed to appease the 
newspaper industry as AT&T sought reductions in its regulatory restrictions, the 
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strategy did not work. During his remarks, Brown suggested that “a philosophical 
difference” existed if the newspaper industry felt that the restrictions on information 
dissemination placed on AT&T extended to such content as weather and sports 
scores.13 AT&T viewed such material as commodity data rather than news because it 
required no editorial judgment to collect and distribute. It was an early admission 
that AT&T was, in fact, interested in collecting and distributing information that 
newspaper companies felt went beyond its charter. But the difference—philosophical 
or otherwise—regarding the definition of news content was not the focus of the 
disagreement. The newspaper industry was more alarmed by AT&T’s plans in the 
area of advertising services. 
 Given the phone company’s enormous directory publishing business at that 
time, newspapers felt especially threatened by the possibility of those directory 
listings being used to populate online services that would compete directly with 
newspaper classified advertising. Brown was asked whether AT&T planned to enter 
the classified advertising arena through online services. Brown said AT&T did not 
want to be “excluded” from services that relied on technologies AT&T was actively 
developing.14 It was not the response the newspaper industry wanted to hear. 
Brown’s remarks—candid and delivered in person—galvanized the newspaper 
industry and unified its leadership in opposition to AT&T’s effort to reduce 
regulatory restrictions. The following section explores how the newspaper industry 
responded in the wake of Brown’s presentation. 
 
The Newspaper Industry Responds 
Before the meeting with Brown, newspaper publishers conceptualized information 
services in terms of some future technology. Following the meeting, however, 
newspaper publishers were more concerned about the immediate ramifications of 
AT&T’s actions. Brown’s comments had the unintended consequences of turning 
AT&T into a tangible threat. The general counsel for the newspaper industry’s trade 
association later mockingly referred to the event as the time “Charlie Brown came to 
dinner,” but seriously added how Brown’s appearance changed the newspaper 
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industry’s thinking about “the future electronic information marketplace.”15 He 
wrote: 
What became obvious … was that while AT&T said it had no plans 
to hire its own news staff, it clearly had designs on the electronic 
publishing of the future. This included aspects of the business in 
which AT&T’s control of monopoly telephone services and facilities 
could pose severe anticompetitive threats to future electronic 
publishing competitors.16 
 
The newspaper industry’s leading attorney recalled Brown’s presentation as the 
impetus for setting in motion the trade association’s unprecedented lobbying effort 
“to try and modify and, if necessary, oppose legislation … that would have given the 
green light to AT&T’s electronic publishing plans.”17 Despite the newspaper’s 
industry’s own hefty revenue and profits during this period, its first salvo in the 
lobbying effort portrayed AT&T as an even larger enterprise that could not be trusted 
to grow larger through new information services businesses. 
 Soon after the meeting with Brown, the chairman of the newspaper industry’s 
telecommunications committee issued a statement that summarized the newspaper 
industry’s position and called for Congressional action to prevent the FCC from 
easing the competitive restrictions on AT&T: 
AT&T has a revenue base that is larger than the sales of the 
newspaper, television and radio industries combined. Under federal 
protection, this giant company has developed an electronic 
distribution network that reaches more than 90 percent of the homes 
in its markets. The action by the FCC raises serious, unanswered 
questions concerning the ability of newspapers to be able to compete 
fairly in this environment. This focuses even greater attention on just 
how the Congress will deal with this issue.18 
 
The newspaper industry’s leadership was adamant in its rhetoric that an unleashed 
AT&T would be detrimental to the country’s free press. However, the industry’s 
collective decision to intervene in the legislative and regulatory rulemaking process 
through a lobbying effort carried out by its trade association was a radical departure 
in tactics. And, it was an effort not without critics. 
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 Fink recounted this period as a time when “incredibly, the newspaper 
industry blindly closed ranks” and “lobbied Congress and the public to keep 
telephone companies out of the information business.”19 Fink asserted that the 
newspaper industry had taken a position that ran counter to its historical role of 
supporting freedom of expression. He wrote: 
Newspapers, which since Colonial times demanded the right to free 
expression, positioned themselves in public perception as arguing 
that telephone companies should be denied that right. No industry in 
modern times has made a worse strategic error. Newspaper 
executives somehow decided they could lobby away new 
competitors and, with them, a new, exciting technology. It was as if 
horse ranchers and carriage makers had lobbied Congress to keep 
Henry Ford from building automobiles.20 
 
The following section of this chapter explores the issues that caused the newspaper 
industry to react so passionately and explains how that resulted in altering decades of 
industry behaviour as industry’s lobbying campaign unfolded.  
 
The Newspaper Industry and Political Lobbying 
As proposed legislation was debated in the Congress regarding the proper role for 
AT&T, the FCC agreed to a further review of its proposed regulatory changes. 
Therefore, the issue was active both in the legislative arena of Congress and in the 
regulatory forum of the FCC. The newspaper industry’s lobbying effort was aimed at 
both fronts and took on the intensity of a political campaign as industry leaders urged 
lawmakers to refrain from enacting legislation hastily that would affect 
telecommunications policy for decades to come. They also urged regulators to take a 
holistic view of the marketplace when deciding how to implement rule changes.  
 The executive leader of the newspaper industry’s trade association framed his 
group’s opposition to AT&T in the form of a question he posed to lawmakers and 
regulators: 
Should the nation’s largest company, AT&T, which has grown and 
operated under specially granted monopoly privileges, be permitted 
on any scale to involve itself actively not just in the common-carrier 
transmission of information but also in the selection, editing and 
vending of that information to the public in a mass-media or data-
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retrieval sort of structure which in the United States raises the most 
basic sorts of social, constitutional and anti-trust concerns?21  
 
The approach represented by such statements was risky politics for the newspaper 
industry. By discussing the size and scope of the telecommunications industry, the 
newspaper industry risked having its own profit levels scrutinized by the 
government. In discussing monopoly power, the newspaper industry also risked 
comparisons to its own position in local markets where a single newspaper company 
often dominated the advertising market during this period. Furthermore, by raising 
the spectre of antitrust concerns the newspaper industry risked legislative review of 
its own antitrust exemptions that allowed several companies to operate newspapers 
under joint operating agreements.22  
 The willingness to open the debate on so many fronts underscored how 
serious the newspaper industry believed the threat from AT&T to be; but as noted, 
the act of getting so involved in the law-making process marked a dramatic change 
for the newspaper industry. LeGates observed that prior to this period “the 
newspaper business has enjoyed a kind of moral aloofness from lobbying or 
pressuring the government on its own behalf,” but he added “We see this era drawing 
to a close.”23 LeGates wrote that such involvement stemmed from the newspaper 
industry’s recognition that its marketplace was changing: 
ANPA last year chose to intervene in the legislative process, not on 
a bill focused on the newspaper industry, but on one … whose 
intended thrust was telephone deregulation. This was but one of a 
string of interactions and confrontations with parts of the 
information industry newspapers never had to worry about before. 
That time is gone; newspapers today must adjust the perspective 
from which they long have viewed the information world.24 
 
It is important to understand that within the timeline of this thesis, the lobbying effort 
against the telecommunications industry’s entrance into information services 
occurred simultaneously with the newspaper industry’s own forays into videotext 
and cable television ventures that were discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. 
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Within this context, the initial lobbying effort also can be viewed as simply another 
early reaction to the changing marketplace; another attempt to regain footing in the 
shifting sands of technology change. By holding the telecommunications industry at 
bay, newspaper companies believed they would have more time to develop their own 
presence in electronic information services as the market evolved. 
 In any case, the newspaper industry’s actions on so many fronts contributed 
to confusion about its position and ultimate motives. In the stance against AT&T, the 
newspaper industry argued that electronic services were a threat, as LeGates 
observed.  However, the newspaper industry’s own investments in numerous early 
electronic information services illustrated how they “may be … not a threat but an 
opportunity.” The newspaper industry’s own relationship with the 
telecommunications industry as a customer—in some cases availing itself to 
controversial discounted rates—further complicated the rhetoric.25 Even as 
newspaper industry leaders were ramping up their war of words against AT&T, 
companies within the industry were extending their ties with the telecommunications 
company. As was discussed in Chapter Two, for example, AT&T was Knight-
Ridder’s technology partner in launching the Viewtron service. These arrangements 
between telecommunications companies and newspaper companies during this 
period demonstrate the complexity of the relationships and show that the exchanges 
were not always adversarial.  
 Even though much of the newspaper industry’s early rhetoric was cast in the 
semantics of keeping the flow of news and information out of the hands of a giant 
regulated monopoly, protecting advertising revenue was a central part of the 
newspaper industry’s agenda. Indeed, some 15 years later, the newspaper industry 
suffered deep erosions in its advertising revenue as it confronted numerous online 
competitors such Monster and Google, which underscores how the industry’s 
concerns about advertising revenue were well-placed. This issue will be discussed in 
later chapters as well given that advertising always played an important factor in how 
newspaper companies approached online media. At this juncture, however, 
newspapers were hearing dire warnings about the potential competition. LeGates, for 
example, stated that “One of the major challenges facing newspapers in the coming 
years will be to preserve the income stream from advertising.” LeGates specifically 
discussed the threat to classified advertising—which he called “one of the mainstays 
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of the newspaper income stream”—posed by the emerging telecommunications and 
computer technologies:  
This advertising is for all practical purposes a data base service, 
albeit one that is offered on paper. Other companies could easily 
offer it by computer. The advantages of computer readable classified 
advertising are quite convincing. It could be up-to-the-minute, 
searchable by the reader and contain other properties that may be 
indexed.26 
 
Nevertheless, the newspaper industry’s position refrained—for the most part—from 
discussing the advertising issues outright. Rather, the lobbying effort put forth a 
position that became known as “the diversity principle.”27 
 Newspaper leaders argued that if AT&T was allowed to enter the information 
services business unfettered, its control of the network over which the information 
flowed would lead to a reduction in competition because of the inherent advantages 
AT&T would have in the market. A newspaper industry lawyer created the phrase 
“diversity principle” to explain the industry’s view that there was a “need to separate 
content from conduit in emerging, telephone-based, electronic information 
systems.”28  
 Newspaper leaders described the information marketplace in the early 1980s 
as extremely diverse with more than 1,700 daily newspapers, 7,500 non-daily 
publications and more than 10,000 magazines. They claimed that such diversity of 
titles meant that competition was alive and well in the printed information market, 
but that landscape would be diminished “when AT&T, the world’s largest 
corporation, controlling over 80 percent of the telephones, decides to become an 
information provider over its own local exclusive distribution system.”29 The 
newspaper industry’s position was simple: Congress had to ensure that AT&T 
remained regulated at least to the extent to which it could use its own network for the 
dissemination of information services.30 
 The newspaper industry’s position attracted critics. Kinsley, for example, 
accused newspaper publishers of trying to protect their own local monopolies by 
keeping a national monopoly out of the business. He cited this statistic: “Of 1,560 
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American cities with newspapers, only 34 have true newspaper competition.”31 
Kinsley’s position was that the newspaper industry argument was not altruistic, but 
rather self-serving. He wrote: “The publishers don’t really fear an AT&T monopoly 
on the news. What they really fear is losing their own monopoly on local 
advertising.”32 Kinsley was critical of newspapers for using their own editorial pages 
to espouse the industry agenda. He said the industry’s position contained “complete 
inversions of meaning,” and concluded: 
The publishers want government restrictions on market entry, and 
call it promoting “diversity.” They want to protect their monopoly in 
the name of “competition.” They talk about the “marketplace of 
ideas” when they really mean the marketplace of advertising, and 
they warn of the “peril” of restricting commercial speech when they 
really want to restrict commercial and noncommercial speech.33  
 
Despite such criticism, the lobbying effort was deemed successful by newspaper 
industry leaders who believed their intervention prevented legislation from passing in 
the early 1980s. Moreover, the diversity principle, which the newspaper industry 
created, became an important tenet within the country’s ongoing telecommunications 
policy debate. With Congress lacking the votes to pass sweeping telecommunications 
reform in the early ‘80s, the fate of AT&T was left to the federal courts overseeing 
an antitrust suit brought by the government against the AT&T phone monopoly. 
 
The Breakup of AT&T 
In January 1982—about a year after an antitrust trial had begun—AT&T and the 
U.S. government entered into a new consent decree designed to settle the case. It was 
a sweeping agreement to break-up the monopoly phone system into a “new wholly 
competitive AT&T” and a collection of regulated Bell operating companies that 
would be owned by seven regional holding companies.34 The target date for the 
break-up was set for January 1, 1984. The agreement gave AT&T the freedom it had 
sought to explore some new telecommunications markets, but it barred the new 
AT&T from electronic publishing for at least seven years to give competition time to 
become established in what was considered a nascent market.35 The court also 
allowed the regional Bell companies to offer information gateway services and to 
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provide a unified billing methodology for them. In subsequent rulings a year later, 
the court said the regional Bell companies also could provide other information 
services such as voice storage and retrieval services as long as they did not include 
“content generation or content manipulation.”36  
 The newspaper industry trumpeted the AT&T breakup as a “victory” and 
applauded the ruling by Judge Harold C. Greene, which prevented AT&T’s 
immediate entry into the broad electronic publishing industry on grounds that it 
could undermine the “First Amendment principle of diversity.”37 The judge stated: 
“AT&T’s mere presence in the electronic publishing area would be likely to deter 
other potential competitors from even entering the market.” He added, “AT&T’s 
ability to use its control of the interexchange network to reduce or eliminate 
competition in the electronic publishing industry is the source of this threat.”38 While 
the fine print of Judge Greene’s order defined for the newspaper industry what would 
be considered commodity information going forward, the industry reveled in the 
notion that the diversity principle it put forth had become, in essence, the “law of the 
land.”39 AT&T was allowed to remain a provider of basic directory listings of name, 
addresses, and phone numbers as well as recorded time and weather information, but 
the newspaper industry had achieved a seven-year window in which to exploit the 
online information without competition from the telecommunications industry.40  
 During the time leading up to the historic consent decree, AT&T’s Brown 
had returned to the newspaper industry association again as a featured speaker. A 
trade journal’s account of the appearance said Brown “expressed amazement at the 
extent of the negative attitude toward AT&T within the newspaper industry” when 
he acknowledged that he had been identified “only half-jokingly … as the enemy.”41 
The overall nature of Brown’s remarks, however, was conciliatory. He told his 
audience that while a revamped AT&T did not want to be precluded from the 
electronic “Yellow Pages” business, the ownership structure supporting that business 
was less important. “We don’t care who owns the data base. We make our money on 
the transmission,” he said. He called proposed legislation to bar his company from 
the business of information services “protectionism,” but added that he had grown 
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“weary” and had “no stomach for argument over turf.”42 In a nod to the newspaper’s 
industry’s successful lobbying effort, he told the publishers you “can get pretty much 
whatever you want” in terms of new legislation, and encouraged them to think of the 
AT&T that would emerge as a potential partner: 
It is left largely to your own judgment as to how far you want to go 
to build fences around your primary communications supplier.… It 
is evident to me that what my business, telecommunications, and 
your business, publishing, should be debating is the prospect for 
collaboration.43  
 
In retrospect, Brown’s remarks foreshadowed his company’s decision to sign the 
new consent decree a few months later. AT&T executives understood the political 
climate made it unlikely for them to win any major concessions in Congress. The 
consent decree, therefore, became the most plausible way for the company to remove 
the cloud of the antitrust suit in order to move forward.  
 
The Aftermath of the Decree 
Initially, newspaper executives touted the virtues of the decree as fair to all parties 
involved. Marbut stated, “Nobody walked away with all the marbles, but everybody 
walked away with some of what they wanted for their own special interests.”44 
However, as details emerged regarding the practical application of the consent 
decree, it became clear that AT&T would have more opportunity to compete in the 
electronic marketplace than was originally thought to be the case by the newspaper 
industry. As Mowshowitz stated: “… AT&T’s newly won freedom to enter 
unregulated markets puts it in a position to compete with the publishing industry in 
providing information services.”45 As this became more and more evident during the 
two-year period between the announcement of the new consent decree and the actual 
break-up of AT&T, the newspaper industry’s language of “victory” turned more 
cautious with phrases such as “mixed blessing” and “tone of uncertainty” creeping 
into industry articles about the unfolding events.46  
 On the one hand, newspaper companies began to view AT&T as a potential 
customer for information services they could create. On the other, as the terms of the 
consent decree became more widely understood, newspapers began to feel that the 
                                               
42. Ibid. 
43. Ibid., 21-22. 
44. Rambo, “Court Approves AT&T Consent Decree,” 10. 
45. Mowshowitz, “Scholarship and Policy Making: The Case of Computer Communications,” 5. 
46. Rambo, “Divestiture: How Will Breakup of Ma Bell Affect Newspapers?” 10-11. 
151 
 
competitive threat from AT&T was far from neutralized. While the agreement 
precluded—until at least 1989—AT&T from offering electronic information services 
over the long-distance lines it would still control, there were no restrictions that 
prevented it from creating services that could use the lines of its new children, the 
regional Bell operating companies. There also was growing concern among 
publishers that their phone service rates were about to soar in a deregulated 
environment.47 
 Nevertheless, on the eve of the break-up, AT&T was engaged in numerous 
partnership discussions with a variety of newspaper companies and said it was 
optimistic that arrangements could be made for newspapers to provide AT&T with 
editing and newsgathering services as it expanded its product offerings.48 As one 
media consultant put it, “Deregulation has set in motion a series of events that 
newspapers can see either as a threat or opportunity.”49 When viewed in those terms, 
the newspaper industry was in the exact same position following the breakup of 
AT&T as it was before: pondering how to react to perceived threats while at the 
same time considering how to exploit the opportunities arising from the changing 
marketplace. 
 
A Period of Complacency 
As 1984 came to a close—the end of the first year of AT&T’s breakup—the 
newspaper industry decided that it was “quite clear that electronic publishing will not 
evolve as quickly as once predicted,” wrote Criner and Wilson, both 
telecommunications policy officials for ANPA.50 Many issues remained far from 
settled given the expectations that AT&T and the regional Bell companies would be 
petitioning the court for permission to penetrate the information services in ways the 
original agreement prevented. Nevertheless, Criner and Wilson wrote that due to the 
slower than anticipated pace of change “… interest has cooled, some publishers have 
grown complacent.”51 In a follow-up essay assessing the newspaper industry’s 
position at mid-decade, Criner was outwardly critical of the industry. She 
acknowledged the industry had experimented in a number of information services 
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ventures “with mixed results,” but she stated that “newspapers have relinquished 
their leadership role in electronic publishing.”52 She concluded the essay with a 
warning to her association’s membership: 
Newspapers that have adopted a “wait and see” posture toward 
electronic publishing may find someday that entry costs and the 
learning curve are steeper and longer than anticipated.… 
Telecommunications equals competition. As newspapers reflect on 
the next five years, they must look beyond their traditional industry 
boundaries at a host of competitors who are developing new 
products and services. In many cases, those products won’t compete 
directly with newspapers, but they may begin to nibble away at 
newspaper revenues.…53 
 
 Despite such cajoling from the leading trade association, newspaper 
publishers remained cautious and did not rush to back any significant electronic 
services initiatives. As noted in the previous chapters, newspapers around this same 
time had retreated from their cable television experiments and were winding down 
several videotext initiatives. The overall decline in electronic services activity 
reflected the refocus on the core printed product that was discussed in Chapter Two. 
However, when this retrenchment is juxtaposed with the lobbying against the 
telecommunications industry, the newspaper industry came across, according to 
Fink, as “self-serving, 20th century Luddites.”54 
 Nevertheless, newspapers began to deploy a wide array of voice services 
offered over the telephone in what became known as audiotex.55 Several newspapers, 
such as The Houston Chronicle, offered information including sports scores, stock 
quotes, and weather, through a phone service as part of a promotional effort without 
the intention of making money. Other voice projects were intended to be money-
makers, but one of the more ambitious examples undertaken by The Los Angeles 
Times was shutdown when expectations were not met after only seven months in 
operation.56 The ANPA reported that less than 20 newspaper companies were 
operating voice information services in 1987, which led one executive to observe that 
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most newspapers were merely “dabbling” with such technology.57 The number of 
papers involved with such services grew over the latter half of the decade. At least 75 
papers were offering free audio services, while about 600—nearly a third of all 
newspapers—were selling paid content through phone-based systems by 1991.58 
Newspaper executives viewed such projects as low-cost ways to explore alternate 
methods of information delivery, but they were never embraced by large but in large 
numbers by a public waiting for the promises of the Information Society rhetoric. 
 
A Period of Wary Cooperation 
The voice-based projects initially fostered an increased dialog between the 
telecommunications and newspaper industries in the mid-1980s. Executives from 
both industries held a series of meetings in an attempt “to cultivate common ground 
and nurture alliances.”59 In the summer of 1985, representatives of various 
newspapers and telephone companies espoused a goal of creating “an efficient 
national videotex network in which the Bell companies supply the transmission lines 
and newspaper-owning companies provide information.”60 Such a national platform 
never materialized, but the discussion of it contributed to pockets of regional 
cooperation. Once the Bell companies were cleared to provide information gateway 
services, several newspaper companies pursued partnerships with them. In one 
example, Cox Enterprises, the publisher of The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 
launched an information service in connection with BellSouth, then the regional Bell 
company responsible for providing telephony services in the Southeast.  
 The service initially focused on movie reviews, a content area devoid of 
much of the controversy surrounding the issue of defining news. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between the newspaper company and BellSouth soon became 
contentious. The newspaper company charged BellSouth with failure to live up to its 
promotional timetable and said BellSouth was unwilling to share pertinent market 
information. BellSouth denied the allegations, but the incident is an example of how 
distrustful the newspaper industry was of the telecommunications industry at this 
time. 
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 The president of Cox Newspapers testified before a congressional 
subcommittee that his experience convinced him that if allowed to enter the 
information services business directly, the telephone companies would use the 
control of the network to create “a home field advantage.” He added, “To hurt other 
players [regional Bell companies] can be just a little bit slow in handling service 
problems. They can drag their feet in sharing market data. In subtle ways, they can 
deploy their own advanced technology to favor their own services.”61 The notion that 
the telephone companies would use their own technology to their advantage, while 
creating a disadvantage for competitors was a recurring theme of the newspaper 
industry argument. However, it was usually theoretical posturing. The allegations 
were taken more seriously when the president of a large newspaper company 
testified that his company actually had experienced heavy-handed tactics by one of 
the Bell operating companies. 
 
Action vs. Inaction 
Judge Greene in 1987 reaffirmed his ruling that the “diversity principle” was an 
important construct to protect and continued to restrict the information services 
business in which AT&T and its offspring could engage.62 The ruling angered AT&T 
and Bell officials who “had launched a major campaign to be freed from the 
restrictions in the consent decree,” but newspaper executives again declared 
victory.63 This time, an industry executive from within trade association’s leadership 
argued the victory came with an obligation to invest in developing new services. 
Johnson wrote that “newspapers must take action or forever be prepared to live with 
the consequences of inaction.” He further explained his position:  
… both the court and perhaps Congress will also be looking to see if 
the proponents of the Diversity Principle are actually willing to 
invest in development of the information industry, or whether they 
are simply using policy arguments to protect their own vested 
interest.… The time for standing behind a policy position is over. 
Newspapers will be asked to put up or shut up.64 
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Johnson’s remarks reflected a personal passion, but he did not provide a convincing 
portrait of an industry about to be mobilized into action. Instead, the newspaper 
industry during this period drifted toward ambivalence regarding its role in the 
electronic services marketplace. 
 Johnson described the mindset of many within the industry as “dangerous, 
myopic and not in touch with what is truly happening in the marketplace.” He 
observed that court rulings favouring the newspaper industry’s position against 
AT&T had fostered complacency within the newspaper industry. Such 
complacency—when combined with the decisions of Knight-Ridder and Times 
Mirror to close their videotext projects—Johnson said resulted in a false sense of 
reality. He wrote that some: “… take comfort in the fact that electronic publishing 
seems to be a technology in search of a market. They conclude that there really was 
no threat to or opportunity for newspapers in the first place, making all the discussion 
surrounding Greene’s decision so much wasted energy.”65 Johnson’s activist rhetoric 
did little to sway the activities of the newspaper industry. Instead, industry leaders at 
the close of the 1980s positioned the newspaper industry’s competitive 
circumstances in much less dire terms.  
 An industry conference held in Chicago in 1989 provides an example. Rather 
than issuing a call for action, Blethen told attendees that threats to newspapers from 
electronic information services were long-term in nature. “Technology won’t replace 
us. Our readers aren’t about to start calling up electronic newspapers on their 
computer screens,” he said. “There is no single competitor that will crush us and no 
single bold stroke that can protect us.… To respond, every newspaper will have to 
take multiple steps. Solutions will vary from market to market.”66  
 In a later presentation, Blethen deployed a phrase that summarized the 
newspaper industry’s newfound approach to its telecommunications policy dilemma: 
“The threat is more imminent than the opportunity.”67 The phrase signalled that 
newspaper companies needed to continue to support the association’s lobbying effort 
to keep the telecommunications threat in check during the short-term, but that it was 
also understood that newspaper companies were not expected to invest too heavily in 
technology until profitable markets emerged.  
                                               
65. Ibid., 10. 
66. Presstime, “Telecommunications Technology Beckons, But Is It a Boon or a Bane?” 46. [Frank 
Blethen was president and chief executive officer of The Seattle Times and succeeded Johnson as 
chairman of the trade association’s telecommunications committee.] 
67. Presstime, “Voice-Information Services Provide Successful Newspaper Ventures,” 43. 
156 
 
 Therefore, as the 1980s came to a close the newspaper industry was in a 
holding pattern in regards to its next technology initiatives. Instead, attention shifted 
to fighting a new enemy. As the telecommunications industry evolved, the threat 
from AT&T diminished. But the size and scope of the regional Bell operating 
companies increased significantly, which shifted the focus of the debate. The 
following section of this chapter explores the rise of the Bell companies and how the 
newspaper industry responded to a scenario it had not envisioned when AT&T was 
dismantled.  
 
The Bell Uprising 
The end of the 1980s brought little in the way of resolution in the ongoing policy 
disputes between newspaper companies and the nation’s telecommunications 
industry. If anything, the war of rhetoric grew more intense as the focus shifted away 
from AT&T in favour of the regional Bell operating companies that were established 
in the aftermath of the AT&T divestiture in 1984. In 1989, Judge Greene issued new 
rulings that kept these regional Bell companies from directly participating in 
information services. He stated, “There cannot be the slightest doubt that, should the 
regional companies be permitted to engage in information services on a more 
substantial scale, they would in short order dominate the information services 
market.”68 AT&T had filed its own petition to be freed from the restrictions69 and 
eventually Greene relented in the case of AT&T, allowing that company into the 
electronic publishing arena. AT&T had already begun participation in a consortium 
along with Time Inc., Chemical Bank, and Bank of America on a proposed service 
built around home banking called Covidea.70 There also were mounting efforts in 
Congress to back legislative reform that would overturn at least some of Greene’s 
restrictions on the regional Bell companies.71  
 Once again, the newspaper industry’s trade association prepared its members 
for another intense legislative fight on Capitol Hill, framing the industry’s position 
again as a defence of the “diversity principle” that requires “a separation of content 
and conduit.”72 The regional Bell companies decided to take the fight directly to the 
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newspaper industry, filing briefs claiming that the court’s refusal to allow them into 
the information services business violated their First Amendment rights.73 An author 
specializing in the communications industry defined the two positions: 
The [regional Bell companies] say they’re being denied their First 
Amendment rights and should be allowed the freedom to publish 
electronically or otherwise as they see fit. ANPA argues that the 
First Amendment guarantees a diversity of free expression and that 
diversity would be subverted by allowing the [regional Bell 
companies] to the enter the field as the provider of both the content 
and conduit of electronic information.74 
 
It was essentially the same argument that had prevailed against AT&T earlier in the 
decade, but the evolution of the marketplace and advances in telecommunications 
technology caused judges to look at the situation differently. 
 In 1990, the U.S. Court of Appeals said Judge Greene was wrong in keeping 
the regional Bell companies out of the information services market and sent the issue 
back to his court for a retrial. Following nearly a year of additional legal wrangling, 
the regional Bell companies were free to enter the information services business 
using their own transmission lines in their own markets.75 This turn of events 
triggered another intense lobbying skirmish between the newspaper industry and the 
regional Bell companies as the newspaper industry once again sought legislative 
intervention. 
 The newspaper industry returned to its earlier tactics and attempted to portray 
its opponent as the telecommunications equivalent of Goliath. Entering 1990, the 
seven regional Bell companies combined for more than $77 billion in revenue, which 
included at least $6 billion in Yellow Pages advertising. The nation’s 1,600-plus 
daily newspapers had combined revenue of about $45 billion.76 Positioning itself as 
an industry that could be crushed by a giant, the newspaper industry launched an 
advertising campaign in many of the nation’s leading newspapers designed to sway 
public opinion. The newspaper industry was joined by other businesses and trade 
associations with similar interests, such as the National Cable Television Association 
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and Dialog Information Services, in a print campaign that featured the slogan: “Don’t 
baby the Bells. Keep Competition alive.”77 The ads read in part: 
If the regional Bell telephone companies are permitted to provide 
their own information services, they will have the ability—and the 
incentive—to compete unfairly with the companies they now serve. 
The Bells will deny competitors the latest technological advances. 
They will even find ways to make telephone ratepayers foot the 
information-services bill.78 
 
The regional Bell companies countered with their own ad campaign aimed squarely 
at the newspaper industry with the theme: “America’s Future. Too Important To 
Leave On Hold.” The campaign portrayed the newspaper industry as an obstacle to 
progress claiming that history revealed how newspapers tried to stop radio, then 
television ‘and now they’re trying to stop the benefits of the information age.”79 The 
Bell ads read in part: 
A revolutionary array of information services could be available to 
the American public through the regional Bell telephone companies. 
Americans could enjoy broad and affordable access to crucial 
information services in the worlds of education, medical services 
and entertainment. Many of these benefits are already available 
overseas. Yet America’s largest newspapers are fighting to deny 
them to the American people. Why? Because they fear the threat of 
competition. They are reacting as they historically have when new 
technologies offer people new information choices—radio, cable 
television and now, even new uses of the telephone.80 
 
 Despite such posturing and the introduction of several proposed bills, neither 
side could convince Congress to act in the early 1990s. This was largely due to the 
rapidly changing telecommunications landscape, which saw the emergence of new 
long distance carriers, local market telephone competition, data-specific networks 
and a rapidly expanding cellular industry. “Technology has superseded rules 
governing the industry broadly and the telephone companies specifically,” said a 
government affairs executive with U.S. West, then one of the regional Bell 
companies.81 By the early 1990s, the rapid changes in the telecommunications 
industry made the argument between regional Bell companies and the newspaper 
industry over “information services” look almost archaic if not irrelevant. 
Lawmakers and regulators struggled with how to regulate the new 
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telecommunications marketplace; so much so that it would take Congress until 1996 
to rewrite the nation’s principal telecommunications law. And by then the Internet 
had begun to influence the market, which will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
  
Discord Replaced with Partnerships 
As the newspaper industry took stock of its electronic publishing efforts as the ‘90s 
began, there were few tangible results following a decade that included periods of 
experimentation and investment and a relationship with the telecommunications 
industry that alternated between outright enmity and wary partnerships. A newspaper 
executive described the assortment of electronic publishing projects underway in the 
newspaper industry at this time as “augmentation media,” which he said included 
low-cost videotext, voice services and news summaries delivered by facsimile.82  
 Cabletext had fallen out of the mix. And in regard to videotext, the executive 
reiterated that it represented a medium “a lot of people in our industry are trying to 
forget.”83 Facsimile editions had limited consumer appeal because most facsimile, or 
fax, machines were located in businesses, which discouraged personal use such as 
receiving a “faxpaper.” Perhaps there was also a bias against a “new” medium that 
was not new at all, but one recycled from the pre-World War II era. As Light noted 
in a history of the facsimile, “from the 1920s through the 1940s … facsimile was one 
of the most exciting innovations of its day,”84 even attracting the participation of 
some of the nation’s leading newspapers including The New York Times.85 But more 
ironic than the return of facsimile-based newspaper editions was that much of the 
development of this “augmentation media” was undertaken through partnerships 
between newspaper companies and telephone companies. 
  At first, there was the perception that such arrangements were tantamount to 
breaking from the ranks and joining the enemy camp. For example, the publisher of 
the St. Louis Post-Dispatch said his company’s discussions about projects with one 
of the regional Bell companies upset some of his industry colleagues. “We wanted to 
be loyal members of the club, but our own business interests had to come first,” he 
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said.86 An executive with BellSouth, one of the regional operating companies, said 
other publishers expressed similar sentiments. “A lot of them believe there’s a way 
that we can work together,” he said, but with the lobbying battle that had taken place, 
“they don’t want to be the first or maybe even the second.”87 By late 1993, however, 
newspaper companies were largely over such concerns. Newspapers and the regional 
Bell companies had more than a dozen joint projects underway. 
 For example, the Chicago Sun-Times partnered with Ameritech to create a 
phone-based fantasy baseball service; The Rocky Mountain News in Denver created a 
health newsletter delivered via fax in cooperation with U.S. West; Newsday teamed 
up with Nynex to launch an audio news service that used voice mail and a group of 
newspapers in Utah formed a consortium to create a classified advertising network 
with U.S. West.88 Cox Newspapers, through its flagship paper The Atlanta Journal-
Constitution, teamed up with BellSouth to offer voice information through a 511 
service, a direct 3-digit dial number intended to boost usage of such services by 
providing an easier number for consumers to remember.89  
 Dow Jones & Co., the publisher of The Wall Street Journal, was perhaps the 
most prolific dealmaker with phone companies, even creating a “Telco Alliance” 
department.90 It had projects with at least four of the regional Bell companies, 
including a reader line service in partnership with BellSouth and a cell phone-based 
information service with Southwestern Bell.91 The Dow Jones manager of those 
alliances said the attitude regarding newspapers and telecommunications had evolved 
due to market realities: “The industry has matured. We have a better understanding 
now of what is involved with information services, and we’re better able to protect 
ourselves. The phone companies have gone through a similar maturation process. 
They realize they have to work with others.”92 A telecommunications executive 
concurred: “as companies explore new technologies, former adversaries sit down 
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together and find it’s in their interests to make a deal.”93 Newspaper companies had 
pursued their videotext projects of the early 1980s independently, while the 
industry’s short-lived incursion into the cable television business was largely through 
partnership deals as discussed in Chapter Three. The partnership model was carried 
forward in the latter half of the decade when newspapers set aside set aside their 
differences with the telephone companies to bring several information services 
projects to market. By this juncture in the evolution of online media, newspaper 
companies had settled on a strategy of risk management in terms of the financial 
investment and level of effort they were willing to put into online ventures. 
 A survey of 250 newspaper industry executives in 1992 found that 61 percent 
of the respondents felt that newspaper companies should enter joint ventures with 
telephone companies as a way to expand into electronic information services. 
Perhaps the more telling result, however, was that only 20 percent of respondents 
said they actually planned any such venture with a telephone company.94 The 
ANPA Chairman wrote in January 1992 that the association’s lobbying effort would 
continue as a way to protect the industry’s interests, but the focus of the rhetoric had 
shifted. He wrote: “The point is not to bar the Bells from information services 
forever.…”95 And in an act that was perhaps most illustrative of the changed 
environment, AT&T joined with the newspaper industry that year in signing a “unity 
statement” encouraging Congress to enact legislation that reflected the spirit of 
consent decree that had broken up the telephone monopoly.96 
 Bogart believed that the negative experiences of the newspaper industry’s 
own projects during the 1980s caused many executives to question the rhetoric 
regarding telephone companies as eventual competitors. He wrote that many 
publishers wondered: “If these all flopped, why should the phone companies have 
better luck?”97  However, if the telephone companies were to generate any market 
traction, newspaper executives figured that—at least in the short-term—it would be 
due to the fact that telephones were the entry point for online services. As personal 
computer adoption expanded, so did the adoption of modems used to connect home 
telephone lines to computer-based services. It was a technology trend the newspaper 
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industry could not ignore. As the ANPA Chairman stated at an industry technology 
meeting: “Telephones are tomorrow’s new medium. Wherever you look in the next 
few years … we’re going to see new uses of telephones.”98 The recognition of this 
market condition led the newspaper industry to soften its hard-line opposition to the 
telecommunications industry. 
 Given that the telephone technology had assumed this key role, the public 
mostly viewed the telephone industry as progressive, while the newspaper industry 
was perceived as defensive and technically deficient. Industry leaders began to 
address the negative perception proactively. During an industry address, one key 
leader stated bluntly that “if we become defensive and rigid in dealing with change, 
we will wither,” adding that newspaper companies “cannot direct all of our energy 
and resources into attempts to force the market to accept a medium that in some 
cases is simply not the best for its needs.”99 He explained, for example, that printed 
newspapers could not serve a businessman’s need for real-time stock information.  
 It was such tacit admissions of weakness that led to resurgence in activist 
rhetoric. The president of Cox Newspapers warned his industry brethren: 
“Newspapers that have not been investigating electronic avenues of information—
and that’s most of them—had better get on the ball now.”100 Nevertheless, the 
technologies mostly under consideration by newspapers at this time were described 
earlier as augmentation media such as fax services and inexpensive bulletin board 
systems. An industry executive explained that these technologies largely were 
considered “temporary platforms,” or transitional technologies that would help 
“prepare us for that new market,” but he admitted that few in the newspaper industry 
could envision what that new market would entail.101  
 
Conclusion 
Newspaper industry executives arrived in the early 1990s with an assortment of 
emotions. There was disappointment and frustration that a decade-plus of 
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experimentation and hundreds of millions of dollars in collective capital spending 
had failed to produce any significant breakthroughs in the electronic information 
arena. Nevertheless, a sense of relief also permeated the industry’s executive suites. 
Printed newspapers had survived—some would argue thrived—in the 1980s, a 
decade that was supposed to usher in an electronics-based Information Age. The 
ongoing financial success of the core product contributed to the disdain many 
newspaper executives had for projects such as electronic bulletin boards and 
facsimile editions that attracted users only in the hundreds and low thousands—far 
from the mass media numbers they were accustomed to selling to advertisers. 
 As the telecommunications landscape continued to evolve, the newspaper 
industry softened its lobbying stance against the telecommunications industry as it no 
longer considered the telephone companies to be as scary as they were previously 
perceived. Part of this change of attitude was due to recognizing the role telephone 
technology was playing as the entry point for online services. Newspaper executives 
also understood that their lobbying war with the telephone industry throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s had damaged the newspaper industry’s public reputation. The 
telephone industry’s rhetoric that positioned the newspaper industry as an obstacle to 
progress resonated far more deeply with the American public than did the newspaper 
industry’s characterization of the telephone companies as out-of-control monopolies. 
 The newspaper industry’s attitude shift following its decade-long dispute with 
the telephone companies forms the backdrop for the next chapter, which explores 
another attempt by the newspaper industry to exploit online media. Many in the 
newspaper industry were hungry for a breakthrough in electronic information 
services that had so far eluded them.  Therefore, when proprietary online systems 
began to accumulate a critical mass of subscribers, newspaper companies became 
very interested. They wanted to learn if a viable electronic distribution model had 
emerged. 
 Newspapers still were not interested in making huge financial investments in 
their own electronic services infrastructure, which made partnerships with the 
proprietary online companies an attractive alternative. Furthermore, publishers 
recognized a business model that made sense to them: centrally-controlled content 
partially subsidized by subscribers and supported by advertisers. Rather than turn 
adversarial as it had with the telephone companies, the U.S. newspaper industry 
almost seemed in a rush to embrace these systems even though some had the backing 
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of giants such as IBM. These services, including Prodigy, AOL, and a revamped 
CompuServe, appealed to newspapers by achieving momentum in the marketplace 
with a value proposition to consumers that eclipsed the earlier failed videotext 
projects. The newspaper industry’s relationship with these companies is the subject 
of Chapter Five. 
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Chapter Five: 
Newspapers Embrace Proprietary Online Services 
 
U.S. newspaper companies invested more than $100 million in online newspaper 
projects in the early 1980s,1 but the most ambitious efforts were closed by the middle 
of the decade. They had failed to generate a sufficient enough audience to sustain 
them. In subsequent years, newspaper companies deployed a disparate collection of 
experiments ranging from audiotex and fax services to online bulletin boards as the 
industry struggled to find its role in the electronic marketplace. Furthermore, the 
industry’s political lobbying against the telecommunications industry’s expansion 
into the electronic information services left the public with the impression that 
newspaper companies were obstructionists rather than innovators.  
Against this backdrop, Chapter Five explores a relatively brief period in 
newspaper history when newspaper publishers turned to a new group of partners they 
believed would help them capitalize on electronic information opportunities that had 
so far proved elusive. These companies became known as proprietary online 
services, and they sought to create an online mass consumer market where others had 
failed. Researchers said newspapers pursued partnerships with companies such as 
Prodigy and AOL because they were seen as mutually beneficial at a time of nascent 
market development:  
The Catch 22 of early electronic newspaper services was that 
consumers did not want to subscribe if a wide range of services was 
not available, but information providers did not want to spend 
development money on systems that had no subscribers. The linking 
of electronic newspapers with commercial information services 
bypasses this problem.2 
 
Still, the decisions by newspaper companies to partner with these companies were 
complex due, at least in part, to the uncertainties of technology direction and 
concerns over the financial stability of these newcomers.  
This chapter examines the newspaper industry as it confronted an array of  
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confusing choices during this period. A discussion of market and industry conditions 
provides context for the industry’s response and frames the exploration of business 
concerns that guided the complex decision-making process. The chapter principally 
deals with the relationships that emerged between newspaper companies and 
proprietary online services. The chapter discusses several companies that were active 
partners with the newspaper industry during this period with particular attention 
given to AOL and Prodigy. These two proprietary online services emerged as the 
most influential in their dealings with the newspaper industry. 
 This chapter contributes to the overall thesis in several important ways. By 
examining the newspaper industry’s rationale for partnering with proprietary online 
services rather than creating such services on its own, the industry’s conservative 
business culture is further revealed. The chapter illustrates that shifting attitudes 
regarding technology helped newspaper executives overcome the stigma of the failed 
Viewtron project, but not to the extent that they were willing to venture into the 
online media business on their own. In partnering with proprietary online services, 
newspaper companies found a comfortable alternative that allowed them to provide 
content while others worried about the technical infrastructure and the investment it 
required.  Finally, this chapter serves as a bridge within the overall thesis by focusing 
on a period that connects the newspaper industry’s videotext past and its Internet 
future. Newspaper executives had turned away from their protectionist rhetoric that 
had dominated the late 1980s and again were venturing into the online arena slowly 
and on their own terms. But their reliance on the new partnerships would be brief as 
the emergence of the Internet forced newspaper companies to confront a new 
marketplace once again.      
 
An Emerging Market 
When Knight-Ridder launched its Viewtron project in the early 1980s, the notion of 
a computer-based information service was still in the realm of science fiction to most 
Americans. Not only did Knight-Ridder have to develop and market the distribution 
technology, it also had to explain what exactly its service was for and what it did. 
But during the decade following the Viewtron failure, consumer exposure to 
computers had increased appreciably. The Washington Post wrote that “Americans 
are acquiring skills that the new services … require,” noting that “more and more 
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office workers and students use PCs; tens of millions of Americans have home video 
game units …, which make them comfortable interacting with a screen.”3 More 
importantly, the increased exposure to computers affected consumer attitudes 
regarding electronic information services, which The Post article reflected: 
“Americans’ attitudes toward information are changing in ways that will create 
demand. They are comfortable getting it off a screen. They want it in greater 
quantities and variety, delivered faster, at lower cost.”4 Newspaper publishers had 
invested heavily in new technologies to operate their own companies, so they could 
see firsthand how computers in the workplace influenced people’s general attitudes 
about technology. Publishers were also aware that the number of home computer 
users had grown beyond the hobbyists, which in turn provided a promising mass 
audience for online information services. 
 The Videotex Industry Association reported that by the late 1980s about 
700,000 homes were connected to at least one of the 40 “fee-based consumer 
videotex systems” known to be operating. The group said 500,000 homes also were 
using free electronic bulletin board systems. After accounting for crossover users 
between the fee-based and free services, the trade association concluded that 960,000 
households were tapping into information via online services. While this user base 
accounted for only about 1 percent of all households, the growth trend was 
encouraging. The trade group even forecasted that by 2000, 97 percent of the 
country’s households would be connected to such online services.5 Such lofty 
prognostications led to resurgence of the optimistic rhetoric surrounding the market 
for online information services. This time, however, the rhetoric regarding the 
prospects for an online information marketplace in the U.S. reflected the experiences 
of the early 1980s as illustrated by this example: 
Gingerly referring to the past failures of videotex in this country, 
[proponents of consumer videotext] say the industry has matured 
and learned valuable lessons about marketing and distribution. And 
they note that once skeptical lawmakers and regulators have begun 
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to see the need for videotex if the U.S. wishes to compete in the 21st 
century.6 
 
 The last point of this statement regarding U.S. competitiveness should not be 
overlooked when discussing the rhetoric surrounding the development of the 
country’s online services market. The failure of several early consumer-focused 
projects had stalled momentum in the U.S. causing some to question the country’s 
commitment to develop an electronic information market. Kinsley, for example, 
suggested that the U.S. was in danger of losing its “international competitiveness” 
because the market for online services had been slow to develop in comparison to 
Western Europe, especially France.7 Others argued that the market in Europe was not 
an accurate comparison because state-owned telephone monopolies there had 
subsidized online information services and provided consumers with incentives to 
use the systems. 
 Efforts to import and deploy technology from some of Europe’s successful 
systems such as France’s Minitel met with specific resistance in the U.S. market. For 
example, an executive from a U.S. telecommunications company said that borrowing 
business models or technology from elsewhere “is to have failed in the effort to be 
the world leader in technology.”8 In the face of such polarizing rhetoric, the 
emergence of U.S.-based services such as Prodigy and AOL was important. These 
companies diffused the discussion about American technology, clearing away 
another obstacle that some believed had contributed to slow market development. 
 Information Today, an industry trade publication, declared 1989 as the year 
when a concerted effort began to make online services “attractive to consumers.”9 
And in the early 1990s—the years immediately preceding the Internet—Prodigy, 
AOL, CompuServe, and a few smaller players represented the promise of the 
Information Society. Consumers could use home computers to connect affordably to 
a vast array of information databases and electronic services just as the pundits had 
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7. Kinsley, “America Is Losing the Information Revolution,” pars. 1-3. 
8. Booker, “Consumer Videotex,” par. 20. [Statement attributed to C. Sidney Boren, a vice president 
with BellSouth.] 
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predicted. AOL’s slogan “You’ve Got Mail” became symbolic of its time.10 
Collectively, these services attracted more than 3.5 million subscribers during this 
period.11 Kyrish reported that by 1993—five years after its official commercial 
launch—Prodigy had attracted about one million subscribers, while two other 
services—CompuServe and AOL—had 1.5 million and 285,000 subscribers, 
respectively.12 Kyrish wrote that “an historical review of the period between 1989 
and 1993 suggests steady but hardly explosive growth.”13 Nevertheless, the growth 
created an audience significant enough to cause newspaper publishers to take notice. 
 The emergence of these proprietary online services coincided with a period in 
the newspaper industry when publishers were especially introspective. Newspaper 
companies struggled during the economic recession of the early 1990s, but 
publishers were considering their next moves as business conditions showed signs of 
improving. As the newspaper industry’s interest in the electronic marketplace began 
to ramp up in the early 1990s, the American Journalism Review attempted to place 
the activities in a proper societal context: 
Certainly, there’s a bit of the “millennium syndrome” afoot, as the 
approaching turn of the century makes people feel they’re on the 
brink of a new age, with a Task Force 2000 forming in almost every 
industry. The problem is that no one really knows how newspapers 
will be read and distributed in the next 10 or 15 years, or even five 
years…. But the industry is in hot pursuit of the answer.14 
 
An industry executive said the opportunities presented by the propriety online 
systems created “exhilaration and enthusiasm” in the newspaper industry, adding that 
advertising prospects were favourable because “everyone has had their consciousness 
raised about the information highway.”15 In the following section, this thesis 
examines the status of the newspaper industry during this period and discusses the  
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electronic publishing for Newsday in New York.] 
170 
 
factors that led many newspaper companies to partner with proprietary online 
systems.  
 
Newspapers in the Early 1990s 
Even though profit margins in the newspaper industry remained strong relative to 
other industries, many issues had publishers rethinking their approach to the 
business. Declining circulation and eroding market share, combined with the 
lingering effects of economic recession that had depressed advertising revenue, 
forced publishers to consider that their industry was in the midst of fundamental 
change. 
 Underwood observed that “amid all the flailing about as newspapers prepare 
for an uncertain tomorrow, three general strategies” emerged: “effort[s] to save the 
newspaper as it is, efforts to augment the newspaper electronically, and efforts to 
look beyond the newspaper-on-print.”16 Several examples illustrate his first category, 
such as shorter stories, more graphics, and increased use of colour photography. He 
also cited Gannett Inc.’s “News 2000” program, which emphasized coverage of 
community issues, as an example of the efforts aimed at redefining content to 
improve readership.17 The “efforts to look beyond” print were deemed too futuristic 
and were pursued half heartedly by the industry. Underwood discussed Knight-
Ridder’s investment in researching and developing the prototype of a flat-panel 
electronic tablet with a touchscreen as an ambitious illustration of innovative 
thinking. A contemporary media commentator recalled that project as “an eerily 
prescient 1994 vision of” Apple’s iPad released in 2010.18 At the time, however, 
Knight-Ridder’s tablet concept was stymied by the technical shortcomings of its era 
and an industry culture that viewed such projects as science fiction. Most newspaper 
executives could not envision a future without the printed newspaper form at the 
forefront. Therefore, most activities undertaken by the newspaper industry during 
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this period took place within Underwood’s second category: “efforts to augment the 
newspaper electronically.”19 
 Within this category, newspapers began to think seriously again about an 
electronic future and how those activities could be integrated into existing 
operations. However, the desire to find business models that would prevent the 
financial disasters associated with the failed online efforts of a decade earlier was 
paramount. Despite the newspaper industry’s financial profitability during this period 
and the bravado it exhibited during the political battle with the telecommunications 
industry, newspaper publishers were scarred by the memory of financial losses from 
those early online projects. This aftermath influenced the decisions regarding how 
newspaper companies would proceed with electronic information services. 
 
Viewtron’s Lingering Effects 
Newspaper companies—wary of placing too much emphasis on the electronic 
information marketplace—preferred to take small steps rather than embark on bold 
moves. The Viewtron failure loomed large: as The New York Times put it, 
“[Viewtron] has been cited ever since by skeptical news executives as a warning that 
electronic ventures can be business disasters.”20 In monetary terms, the $50 million 
that Knight-Ridder had invested in Viewtron for no return had little material effect 
on the company’s financial position. However, in the conservatively managed 
newspaper industry any financial loss was difficult to accept, and over time, the 
Viewtron project became remembered—not as a pioneering effort—but as a financial 
boondoggle. 
 “The scars from Viewtron are still very vivid,” said an editor at a Knight-
Ridder newspaper. “It took a while to get it into people’s minds that we should get 
back into electronic distribution.”21 Another industry executive echoed those 
remarks: “That project poisoned the water for all of us. All people could see was the 
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red ink.”22 With such negative sentiment regarding the Viewtron experience so 
pervasive in the industry, proponents for new initiatives had to find ways to promote 
the potential for success rather than allow the industry to continue to dwell on the 
past failures. 
Some have suggested that the modest financial success of low-cost bulletin 
boards services such as StarText operated by The Fort Worth Star–Telegram (and 
discussed in Chapter Two) helped the newspaper industry to once again think about 
electronic distribution in broader terms. “Just because we built a few Edsels doesn’t 
mean the car is wrong,” said the StarText marketing director.23 By demonstrating 
that not all online projects were money losers, these bulletin board systems offered 
promises that more robust systems could be developed within a profitable cost 
structure. As the industry began to shake off the effects of the early 1990s economic 
recession, newspaper companies seriously began to explore again their options for 
returning to the electronic arena in a more meaningful way. The next section will 
show how these activities represented a significant shift in the newspaper industry’s 
approach to the online services market.  
 
Shifting Newspaper Industry Attitudes 
The newspaper industry’s reluctance to invest directly in electronic information 
services seemed to be even more pronounced during the most heated periods of the 
industry’s political battle with the telecommunications industry. The lingering effects 
of Viewtron may have been a contributing factor, but newspaper companies had 
evolved into defensive operators rather than strategic planners. As one industry 
executive stated: 
For a while there, newspapers were primarily identified with 
blocking the Baby Bells. It gradually dawned on newspapers that 
they couldn’t—and shouldn’t—depend on Judge Greene to save 
them from the future. That defensive kind of strategy was ridiculous. 
We should recognize these changes and go on.24 
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This statement underscored the shift in the industry’s approach. It represented a new 
way of thinking and marked a break with the latter half of the 1980s when the 
industry faced a lack of direction regarding the future of electronic information. 
Industry leaders were once again seeking an active role for newspapers in the 
development of the electronic information market.  
 Researchers had suggested that the industry’s historical approach had less to 
do with the emotions of its leaders and more do with the process-driven nature of the 
industry. An industry manufacturing and distributing a new product every day was 
by its nature internally focused. It had little intrinsic interest in long-term strategic 
planning.25 To alter the industry’s dynamics, Wilson and Igawa wrote that newspaper 
companies needed to embrace systemic change if they expected to succeed with new 
information services. They concluded: 
The hallmark of innovation and new ideas is ambiguity, asking 
upside down, inside-out questions, then shaping ideas in tandem 
with the people you want to serve. Overall, the rigid routine of a 
newspaper works against that process…. So newspapers adapt 
pragmatically, feeling their way, which accounts for the piecemeal 
response to the relentless tides of change.26 
 
The industry’s structure was also a factor contributing to the “piecemeal response.” 
The term “newspaper industry” is used throughout this thesis, but, as noted in the 
thesis introduction, its usage refers to a collective of newspapers that vary in size, 
format, financial strength, and corporate ownership. These newspaper companies 
rarely competed directly with each other in a local market, but their variety also 
made cooperation difficult to achieve. When newspaper companies did rally around a 
common technology initiative, it was recognized as another sign of the industry’s 
shifting attitude. 
 In May 1993, 17 companies, including Gannett Inc., Knight-Ridder Inc., 
Tribune Co., Hearst Newspapers, and Times Mirror Inc. founded a consortium called 
the “News in the Future” project at the Media Laboratory of the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT). Designed as a five-year project, the consortium 
planned to spend up to $2 million each year researching emerging electronic  
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technology for delivering news to consumers. Several interested parties outside the 
newspaper industry also joined the project, including computer manufacturer IBM, 
broadcaster Capital Cities/ABC, regional telephone provider BellSouth, and 
advertising agency McCann-Erikson.27 The participation of an advertising agency 
was seen as especially significant given that a goal of the project was to develop 
ways for news and advertising to form "a seamless information landscape that ranges 
from the most serendipitous to the most urgent information."28 
 An industry executive involved with the consortium said it was needed to 
bring the industry together and address technology development in a coordinated 
way. “There are a lot of ants running off in different directions. But I [now] see a 
different anthill being built … we all were going down separate streets … now it’s all 
sort of coming together and we need to sit down together to operate it properly.”29 
Boczkowski wrote that a consortium of newspaper companies collectively investing 
in research and development represented a fundamental shift in behaviour because it 
is “an industry not used to investing money in this type of activity.”30 He quoted an 
industry executive who noted how exceptional the MIT project was: “I don’t think 
anything like this has ever happened in the newspaper business before.”31 This 
activity represented a tangible example of the changes Wilson and Igawa had 
suggested was necessary for the industry to succeed in electronic services. 
 Nevertheless, the ongoing struggle between the industry’s recognized need 
for innovation and its deeply rooted conservative business practices was evident as 
the events unfolded in the early 1990s. In the following sub-section, the chapter 
examines the business discussions taking place during this period and how they 
pointed to partnerships with proprietary online services as the only logical conclusion 
to the collective thinking during this period. 
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Business Concerns 
The newspaper industry’s newfound approach—proactively researching the 
possibilities of electronic delivery—met with positive reactions from the financial 
and investment communities. The prevailing sentiment on Wall Street was that 
emerging electronic competitors could undermine the newspaper industry’s 
advertising pipeline, especially its long-established dominance in classified 
advertising. As one industry analyst stated: “The threat of these developments is 
reason enough for newspapers to invest in electronic publishing, especially now 
when they have the money to do it.”32 In fact, many newspaper companies—
especially those who were publicly traded businesses—felt pressured by investors to 
shore up their defences against a perceived onslaught of new electronic competition.  
 But how to accomplish that while also delivering the relatively high profit 
margins investors had come to expect from the industry left many executives 
exasperated. The comment from a senior executive with The New York Times Co. 
illustrated the frustration: “We’ve got the media on our backs, Wall Street on our 
backs … But I don’t know how to spend $1 billion [on electronic services] and make 
it pay out.”33 This comment also shows that even though newspaper executives in 
key positions at the major U.S. dailies were not immune to criticism, they also were 
not interested in investing heavily in new technology simply to silence their critics.  
 Newspaper publishers may have recognized the potential of a threat from new 
electronic competitors, but they did not consider the threat to be imminent. Spending 
too heavily—and possibly spending on the wrong technology—was a risk they were 
unwilling to take. One comment in particular summarizes how afraid the industry 
was of making the wrong investment: “If you can show me somebody who says, 
‘Yeah, I know exactly what the future holds,’ there’s a good chance he won’t be in 
business soon.”34 The comment indicated how little interest there was for pioneering. 
Instead, the newspaper industry remained committed first and foremost to its printed 
format. 
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  Even an executive charged with managing electronic information projects at 
a major daily expressed the prevailing opinion: “There’s nothing wrong with a 
mature business, if it’s managed properly. We in the newspaper business shouldn’t 
give up our day jobs.”35 These sentiments reflect Boczkowski’s observation that 
although newspaper companies wanted to participate in the electronic marketplace—
and even saw a competitive need to do so—the “pragmatic” approach took 
precedent. He wrote: “American dailies were often more interested in the short-term 
health of the core print business than, more idealistically, in projects that seemed 
more promising with comparatively higher payoffs that could only pan out in a 
longer term.”36 Financial analysts, industry commentators, and academic researchers 
realized that despite the creation of a research consortium and an increase in rhetoric 
about exploiting electronic information services, the U.S. newspaper industry had no 
appetite for grand innovation on its own. 
 The majority of newspaper companies seemed most comfortable with a 
partnering approach that limited capital investment, but positioned them to 
reconsider if market conditions changed. An executive with The Los Angeles Times 
described the strategy: “If there’s a big upside for newspapers on the so-called 
superhighways of the future, we intend to participate in it. If there’s a downside, we 
should, with these [partnering] programs, be able to cushion it.”37 Therefore, as the 
newspaper industry expanded in the area of electronic delivery, it did so in a way that 
mitigated risk. Boczkowski observed that “the bulk of activity in the period 1992–
1994” involving electronic or online newspapers “took place in relation to online 
services.”38 Most newspaper publishers liked an arrangement where the online 
companies would manage the technology infrastructure, while the newspaper 
companies would provide content and share in the advertising revenue. In the  
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following section, the thesis explores how this partnering strategy took shape. 
 
Partnership Strategy 
The decisions to pursue partnerships with the proprietary online systems were not 
without controversy and there was considerable tension within the newspaper 
industry regarding the best course of action to take. Newspaper companies were 
noted for their independence and moving forward with a strategy based on 
partnerships required a level of cooperation to which most of these companies were 
unaccustomed. One executive observed: “Those of us in a business in which we own 
the printing press have a certain level of discomfort about using somebody else’s.”39 
The realization that newspaper companies would have to give up—or at least share—
control led to concerns about how to structure the partnerships. For example, an 
executive advised his colleagues to enter such arrangements only if they understood 
that “issues of control and management can be so complex and divisive that the ties 
holding non-traditional partners together can snap if the match isn’t right.”40 The 
newspaper industry had been down this path before, however. The arrangements with 
cable television companies in the early 1980s, for example, involved partnerships 
that were just as complex, if not more so, than the deals contemplated with the 
proprietary online services. 
 Nevertheless, the harshest criticism came from those who believed that the 
industry’s direction was strategically short-sighted. For example, one outspoken 
critic charged that partnering with the proprietary online services was tantamount to 
“hauling your presses off to the dump and hiring your competition to print your 
paper,” adding that “the only way to protect ourselves from more of an invasion by 
electronic services is to start those services ourselves.”41 But this level of dislike was 
in the minority and did not deter the industry’s direction. There were no companies 
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within the newspaper industry at this time willing to invest the resources to either 
acquire a proprietary online service or to create one.  
 In most cases, partnering with the online proprietary services was viewed as 
the most prudent option available. One executive with The Tribune Co. said his 
company decided that a partnership would allow it to think differently about the role 
it plays: “Our role as a company wasn’t to develop technology but to take technology 
that others had developed and make it useful.”42 Newspaper companies strategically 
justified their partnership decisions with this line of thinking—one that separated 
concerns about production, distribution, and content. 
 Most of the deals that were signed during this period followed this pattern. 
The deals allowed newspaper companies to control the content they provided, while 
sharing production responsibilities. Distribution largely was the purview of the 
proprietary online services. The biggest issue, however, involved how the newspaper 
companies would be compensated for their content, which is explored in the 
following sub-section of this chapter. 
 
Deal Terms 
When asked by an industry trade publication why he had agreed to partner with one 
of the online services, the president of a large newspaper company said it was 
simple: “Greed. Because we’re going to make some nice money on this.”43 But 
newspaper executives understood that making money on these endeavours required 
striking the proper balance between the revenue they would receive and the 
investment they would be required to make in gathering and producing the content. 
 A sales executive for The Hartford Courant described the conundrum 
confronting newspapers this way: “How much to invest and what return to expect 
have never been more fuzzy. Newspapers aren’t going to receive the returns to which 
we are accustomed, and that makes everybody nervous.”44 Newspaper companies 
understood that partnerships designed to mitigate risk also meant some limit to the 
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upside of the market, but the challenge was to get the most favourable terms 
possible. Industry analysts, however, were concerned that some of the earliest 
negotiations favoured the online services rather than newspapers. 
Analysts feared that the newspaper companies were not doing enough to 
protect their franchises should the proprietary systems succeed as local information 
providers, supplanting newspapers in their own markets. “Don’t let on-line services 
cannibalize your readers,” one analyst warned.45 A business development executive 
at Gannett’s USA Today framed the question facing the industry this way: “Who 
owns the customer?” She added: “Newspaper publishers don’t want their products to 
be thought of as mere mastheads in someone else’s mall.”46 At the very least, 
industry analysts wanted the newspaper companies to be more aggressive in 
negotiating the split in subscription revenue. An analyst told publishers they should 
increase their share of subscription revenue from 10 to 20 percent common in the 
early deals to at least 50 percent, arguing that newspaper companies involved in the 
early deals “are getting undercompensated” for bringing new users to the electronic 
services.47 Subscriptions, however, were considered an ancillary source of revenue in 
the newspaper business and this was no different when publishers negotiated their 
online deals. Advertising was viewed as the most important revenue stream and 
executives wanted to get the best deal for this aspect of their online partnerships.  
One industry executive urged his colleagues to accept nothing less than a 50 
percent split of the advertising revenue in their online partnerships. He argued: 
“Advertising is one of our biggest advantages;” adding “Don’t make a bad business 
deal.”48 The newspaper industry’s efforts to negotiate favourable terms and avoid the 
bad deal were exacerbated by the selection of possible partners. Companies such as 
AOL, Prodigy, and CompuServe are remembered because they achieved the largest 
audiences during the early 1990s. But newspaper companies had numerous other 
potential partners to sort through, including such companies as Delphi, Interchange 
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Network, and General Electric’s GEnie. The following material examines the choices 
available to newspaper companies and how publishers went about selecting an online 
service partner. 
 
Confusing Choices 
The newspaper industry’s official trade publication observed that in the 10 years 
following the first wave of videotext projects online options available to newspaper 
companies had “exploded,” adding that “commercial online services are proliferating 
and starting to compete for newspaper content.”49 As newspaper companies began to 
reengage with the marketplace for online services, many executives found the 
assortment of options bewildering. Said one executive with Gannett: “Now there are 
more questions and fewer answers. The online landscape has not cleared up a bit but 
rather has gotten a lot more complicated.”50 In deciding on a potential partner, 
newspaper companies wanted answers to a myriad of questions: Would it be better to 
align with a company offering a familiar advertising model or with one 
demonstrating the promise of cutting-edge technology? Should the decision be based 
strictly on expenses or was the timing right to worry less about cash outlays and 
more about the potential to share in significant revenue? Would a better partner come 
from the computer industry or would it be one owned by a prominent global media 
company? 
It is not hyperbole to suggest that newspaper companies agonized over these 
choices. Executives formed partnership selection committees, attended conferences, 
met with multiple potential partners, assigned dedicated personnel to study the 
technical differences, and hired new executives and consultants to sort out the best 
possible partner choice. For its part, the industry’s trade association—the NAA—
promoted an educational agenda aimed at assisting newspaper managers who were 
wrestling with these partnership decisions.  
The following descriptions of five services were derived from a Presstime 
planning guide published in late 1994. These descriptions—presented  
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alphabetically—illustrate the range of proprietary online services from which 
newspapers could choose a partner. These description excerpts are included because 
they also provide insight into how these services were viewed by the newspapers 
industry’s trade association, including some of the attributes that were deemed to be 
most important: 
 AOL: 
Its mind-boggling expansion during the past 12 months—
quintupling its membership with more than a million new 
subscribers—has made AOL the darling of both Wall Street and 
Infobahn newbies. The simplicity of its point-and-click interface … 
lured many new users and convinced several newspaper companies 
to cast their lots with AOL.51 
 
CompuServe: 
Newspapers desiring an inexpensive experiment with online 
publishing through a commercial service that still reaches millions 
of people worldwide should consider CompuServe … newspapers 
on CompuServe are probably the only ones partnering with a 
commercial service that already make a profit.52 
 
Delphi: 
Fans of “Beverly Hills 90210”—exactly the young consumers 
newspapers long to attract—have been following their TV idols 
lately to an information-highway address that is seeking newspaper 
partners: Delphi Internet Services Corp. On several November 
episodes of the popular Fox TV network show, the college-age 
characters took to their PCs to dial into Delphi, the online service 
that Fox owner Rupert Murdoch bought in 1993, and the Delphi 
logo was repeatedly conspicuous on their computer screens. Such 
tie-ins with other media suggest the advantage of linking with a 
global information company like Murdoch’s News Corp.53 
 
Interchange Network: 
Interchange Network Co., designed by former computer-magazine 
magnate Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., is gaining partners by being the 
first commercial service to offer content providers “third generation” 
publishing tools … a software platform that offers powerful 
searching capabilities, hypertext links and other state-of-the-art 
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features.… The risk in partnering with Interchange, however, is the 
uncertainty that surrounds the … company’s future.54 
 
Prodigy: 
Prodigy is the only service that sends ads to customers along with 
any information they request. The ads take up the bottom portion of 
the user’s computer screen, much as newspaper ads traditionally run 
at the bottom of pages. Also, until the past few months, when most 
commercial services began upgrading their software platforms, 
newspapers considered Prodigy’s graphics and color-heavy interface 
the best bet for attracting advertisers to online ads.55 
  
 These brief excerpts highlight the issues that ranked highest in terms of 
publisher concerns: audience size, profitability, promotional opportunities, financial 
stability, and commitment to developing the advertising market. Newspaper 
companies, in their final analysis, gravitated toward AOL, CompuServe, and 
Prodigy. CompuServe was the choice of many middle market newspaper companies 
where the requirement for the lowest cost option ruled the process. A Gannett 
executive explained this rationale: “Some markets simply won’t support online 
newspapers in any significant way. Under those circumstances, it makes sense to go 
with CompuServe and a very modest model.”56 A business development executive 
with The Los Angeles Times concurred: “If you’re a mid-sized market, then you can 
afford to be casual. But not if you’re in a large market with competition around you, 
with major players—cable companies, telephone companies—eyeing our revenue 
streams hungrily.”57 In these larger markets, however, there was not a consensus 
regarding a single best partner. The publishers who went with one of the major 
players were seen as aligning with market momentum in the case of AOL or 
advertiser acceptance in the case of Prodigy. 
Presstime published an extensive review of AOL and Prodigy, attempting to 
explain both services from the perspective of a consumer user for the trade 
publication’s audience of newspaper executive audience. The publication concluded 
that AOL’s ‘virtue is its greater ability to search databases.” Prodigy, however, had 
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several “virtues we newspaper people like” including “ease of use and bright color 
graphics and advertising.” The publication said that Prodigy’s “interface easy to 
navigate, the graphics fun and the advertisements useful and unobtrusive.”58 From a 
negative perspective, the reviewer found that AOL’s search features were limited, 
while Prodigy’s graphics-rich interface could be slow to render and that its software 
sometimes interfered with other computer programs.59 In the end, most partnering 
decisions were based on achieving a level of comfort with the online service and 
determining that the newspaper and the online partner could co-exist. To provide 
further insight into how these partnerships were developed, the thesis explores in 
more depth the newspaper industry’s relationships with the two companies that 
emerged as the most prominent partners: AOL and Prodigy. 
 
AOL 
Tribune Co., the parent company of the Chicago Tribune, led the newspaper 
industry’s relationship with AOL. Tribune had acquired a minority ownership stake 
of about 11 percent in AOL in its formative stage and aggressively pushed its 
services.60 Although AOL was creating a nationally branded service, Tribune 
embarked on a plan to use its newspapers to create local affiliates within the AOL 
service. Tribune later helped fund and establish Digital City as a separate jointly 
owned business intended to exploit local market opportunities.61 Tribune deployed 
classified advertising and online shopping services as part of its local affiliation 
strategy and worked to develop a transactional model in addition to news and 
information. American Journalism Review described Tribune’s approach: 
Tribune decided to focus on its local markets rather than chase the 
dream of national supremacy on some lane of the information 
highway. The company also decided it couldn’t compete with phone 
companies and other players in the big bucks efforts to build 
distribution systems on that highway. Instead, it saw its future in 
creating content and using technology to find new and profitable 
ways to sell that content to consumers.62 
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Tribune executives said they were attracted to AOL as a partner because of the vision 
it brought to the market. “We feel AOL is on the cutting edge as a marketing 
company in terms of how these services will develop,” said the Tribune executive in 
charge of managing the partnership.63 A key component of AOL’s marketing 
strategy was to convince consumers that the service was simple to use. Although this 
marketing message was directed at the service’s end-users, it also resonated with 
many of the newspaper executives responsible for selecting an online partner. 
For example, a key decision maker at the New York Times Co. said AOL 
offered newspapers the best access to the online services market because of its 
simple design. “It was the best and easiest because you didn’t need a manual to 
figure it out,” he said.64 For the newspaper companies engaged with AOL, the 
concept of simplicity also extended beyond its design to encompass broader issues. 
These companies were complimentary of AOL’s willingness to cooperate regarding 
the complex issues involved in launching newspaper services within the platform 
even as the company struggled with its own growth pains.65 
An executive with Knight-Ridder’s San Jose Mercury News, which reached 
an agreement to deliver a full-text version of this daily newspaper via AOL, said he 
was “very glad to have started with AOL,” adding that it had “taught us a lot about 
the online world.”66 Given its history with Viewtron, Knight-Ridder executives felt 
they had to choose an online service partner carefully and present the company’s 
return to the consumer online services market to investors in a way that reflected a 
methodical, long-term approach. According to the editor of The Mercury News, AOL 
represented the best platform to accomplish this goal.67 Careful to avoid industry 
criticism about unfounded expectations and a repeat of the Viewtron experience, this 
Knight-Ridder editor intentionally set the bar low for the endeavour with AOL: 
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We’re in a continuum of long, slow change and innovation. People 
aren’t going to flock to the electronic newspaper instantly. We need 
to use the printed newspaper to lead people into the new form, and 
this [agreement with AOL] is Step 1…. We don’t know what the 
economics are, but we created a low-enough cost structure that it 
won’t take very much to break even.68 
 
For the newspaper companies engaged with AOL, the platform represented a simple, 
straightforward approach to the electronic services market. The publishers also 
recognized value in a marketing effort that propelled the service to 3 million U.S. 
subscribers by 1995, which was a growth trajectory that allowed AOL to tout a year 
later that it had become the “first billion dollar interactive services company.”69 
However, many of the newspaper companies that did not affiliate with AOL 
indicated that they were seeking a partner with an approach that relied on advertising 
for the primary source of revenue. 
 AOL’s business model relied primarily on subscription revenue and was, as a 
Newsday executive described, “the reverse of the newspaper model.”70 Indeed, at this 
point in the business’ evolution AOL executives viewed advertising very differently 
than newspaper publishers. Advertising was treated as transactional content and 
relegated to a portion of the platform so that it would be “unobtrusive.” One of 
AOL’s key executives explained the company’s rationale: 
We don’t think advertising works in this new medium. Members are 
looking for information and a sense of community, and they want 
that in a safe and unobtrusive place. Typical advertising is designed 
to be intrusive.71  
 
Newspaper publishers were intrigued by the prospect of improving on the ratio of 
revenue derived from subscriptions as promised by the AOL model. But they were 
principally in the business of selling advertising, which translated into a lukewarm 
response to AOL’s advertising strategy.  
 By 1994 and into 1995, large newspaper companies were increasingly aware 
that advertiser interest in online media platforms was undergoing a transformation. A 
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senior executive with a large New York advertising agency described the shifting 
attitude by observing that in fall 1993 advertiser “interest in online was zero,” but 
less than two years later “on a scale of one to 100, we probably see interest at 120 
now.”72 As newspaper publishers sensed this shifting mood, their choice for an 
online service partner was influenced by the desire to capitalize on an emerging 
opportunity. 
 The next portion of this chapter explores how Prodigy attempted to exploit 
the market for online advertising during this period and, in the process, emerged as 
the principal online services partner for the newspaper industry. 
 
Prodigy 
Due in large part to its deep-pocketed corporate backers—IBM and Sears—Prodigy 
established credibility quickly in a marketplace full of lesser-funded competitors. 
Although Prodigy claimed to have officially launched in 1989, the business actually 
had its roots in a failed videotext project from 1984 known as Trintex.73 By 1990, 
however, its owners had invested more than $600 million in retooling the business 
and Prodigy was on its way to achieving status as an icon of its era.74 
 The Poynter Institute, a newspaper research and training organization, 
underscored the importance of Prodigy within the timeline of the newspaper 
industry’s involvement in electronic media by stating: “From an historical 
standpoint, Prodigy serves as a bridge from videotex to the new media projects of the 
1990s.”75 Within the context of this thesis, Prodigy is important because it emerged 
as a strategic partner to several newspaper companies who were attracted largely 
because of its stated commitment to develop a revenue model based on online 
advertising. This is significant, of course, because advertising - not subscriptions - 
was the primary source of newspaper industry revenue. Advertising was the basis for 
a business model newspaper publishers understood, and one they wanted to translate 
into an online model that would work for them as well. Prodigy was seen by many  
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within the newspaper industry as providing the best assistance in achieving that goal. 
  Soon after its launch, Prodigy had established relationships with more than 
200 national advertisers.76 Prodigy had made a concerted effort to appeal to these 
advertisers by embracing a radical departure from the technology norms of its day. 
Prodigy eschewed existing videotext technology in favour of a different presentation 
architecture designed to render colourful, graphical elements on the computer screen 
much more readily than previous systems. Prodigy sought to appeal to advertisers 
and consumers by going beyond the typical user experience that was common up to 
this point. Information Today described what Prodigy was attempting to accomplish:  
Being attractive to users is what consumer videotex is all about. 
Videotex for business users can be simply utilitarian, but for the 
general public, it must be more than that. When appropriate, it 
should provide quick answers or meet users’ immediate needs. But 
also, it should have some element of surprise, even fascination. 
Design elements have become all the more important now.77 
  
Prodigy’s efforts to create colourful, user-friendly designs were heavily influenced 
by its relationship with advertising agencies, especially the J. Walter Thompson 
agency. Prodigy realized that most advertisers would be uncomfortable developing 
material for online services and would seek assistance from established agencies they 
trusted with television, radio and print advertising.  
 J. Walter Thompson, a leading advertising agency at that time, had 
demonstrated a long commitment to working with potential new advertising delivery 
platforms. The agency even worked on advertising campaigns that had appeared on 
Viewtron and Gateway, but the failures of those services did not deter Thompson 
from an aggressive approach involving Prodigy. Working primarily with its auto 
industry clients, the agency opened an office in Detroit dedicated to creating 
campaigns for the online market, and it became “the first full-service agency for 
Prodigy.” The agency was responding, its managers said, to what Information Today 
described as “two important transitions” occurring with online services: “The visual 
impact of online material is greatly expanding, and the … the influence of advertisers 
in transforming videotex into something akin to another media.”78 Prodigy’s 
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relationship with Thompson and other agencies was not exclusive, but its leadership 
role in reaching out to the advertising community and actively catering to its needs is 
a major reason why it attracted the attention of the newspaper industry.  
 As AOL found early newspaper industry support from Tribune Co., Prodigy 
received an early and important endorsement from Cox Newspapers. Cox entered 
into a multi-newspaper deal and emerged as the industry evangelist for Prodigy, 
spearheading efforts to create a consortium for other newspaper companies to join 
the platform. Cox had a partnership underway with BellSouth’s online gateway 
service as was discussed in the previous chapter, but Cox’s president said he was 
attracted more to Prodigy because its approach so closely resembled a newspaper 
model. He specifically noted that Prodigy’s design, which featured “substantial 
display advertising,” was a close proxy for the format of a printed newspaper page.79  
 Cox deployed the Prodigy platform to put several of the company’s 
newspapers online, including The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, The Palm Beach 
Post in West Palm Beach, Florida, and The Austin American-Statesman in Texas. 
During this process, Cox touted the Prodigy platform as a low-cost way for 
publishers to enter the re-emerging online marketplace. The newspaper company also 
boasted that Prodigy offered a technologically superior network that would serve 
newspapers well in local markets because its 130 local dial-in numbers across the 
country reduced long distance access requirements.80  
 Prodigy initially launched with its own content staff, becoming the only one 
of the proprietary online services to promote original content as a service 
differentiator. Prodigy’s staffing initiatives rekindled the newspaper industry’s 
concerns that had surfaced in the 1980s debate with AT&T when newspaper 
executives fought to keep the telecommunications industry out of the news creation 
business. As recounted in Chapter Four, AT&T tried to appease newspaper 
executives with assurances that the telecommunications giant had no intentions of 
creating news content, but only wanted the ability to freely distribute such content. 
Prodigy made no such concessions at the outset, thereby stoking newspaper industry  
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concerns regarding a new breed of competition. Newspaper companies recognized 
the same kind of electronic threat that AT&T had represented, but Prodigy did not 
have the regulatory restraints imposed on the telecommunications industry.  
 Nevertheless, perceptions of competition gave way when both sides decided 
that cooperation represented a greater opportunity. As Prodigy embraced the notion 
of partnering with media companies, it abandoned its original content plans. After 
entering into deals with several media companies, including at least eight major 
newspapers by the end of 1994, Prodigy eliminated its internal content staff of at 
least 100 employees and turned solely to its new media partners for content. As part 
of this switch, Prodigy took steps to address some of the production issues and 
control concerns that newspaper companies had expressed.81 A Prodigy spokesman 
described the company’s transition as “moving toward an open-network strategy, 
allowing publishers to come on and maintain their brand identity, providing 
authoring tools to create the same look and feel as their newspapers.”82 Prodigy also 
teamed up with its partner newspapers and independent software companies to create 
new services and functionalities, including, for example, a tool that allowed users to 
select specific newspaper stories and assemble them into “personal on-line 
newspapers.”83 In addition to its advertising relationships, system functionality was 
also cited as significant reason why newspaper companies chose Prodigy as its online 
partner.  
The Los Angeles Times, for example, followed Cox onto the Prodigy 
platform,84 creating TimesLink, which was described by an executive as “a powerful, 
local, online gateway to commerce.” This executive maintained that it was the 
“functionalities” of online services including interactive chat and message boards, 
more so than content, which attracted users and created community. “By drilling 
deep, we can begin to move the needle beyond the high-tech audience” to a 
mainstream audience, he said.85 An executive with the Tampa Tribune also expressed 
the desire for pursuing a mainstream audience as a factor in selecting Prodigy. He 
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explained: “If we had wanted to go with strictly the techie market, we would have 
chosen CompuServe or America Online. But the feeling was that with Prodigy we 
could go get new people who had just purchased a computer for the first time.”86 It is 
difficult to grasp such basic concerns when viewing them through a contemporary 
lens, but consider that in 1993 less than 13 percent of U.S. households had a personal 
computer equipped with a modem capable of accessing an online service. Newspaper 
executives believed the market would expand rapidly, so aligning with an online 
partner was essentially placing a bet on the one considered to be the best horse in the 
race. 
 
Transition to the Internet 
Newspaper companies never had the chance to see how their bets with the 
proprietary online systems would pay out, because the unexpected emergence of the 
Internet disrupted the market. Even as newspaper companies were signing their deals 
with proprietary online service companies, the Internet was creeping into the market. 
The newspaper industry’s ability to adapt would be challenged again as consumers 
began to embrace the Internet in the mid-1990s.  
 Newspaper publishers can be excused for not appreciating in 1993 and 1994 
how disruptive the decentralized Internet would become. Although a few pioneering 
newspapers, including The News & Observer in Raleigh, North Carolina,87 
experimented with the Internet as early as 1994 most newspaper companies did not 
see the potential. They were not alone. Even the technology giant Microsoft is 
remembered as slow to grasp how transformative the Internet would become. As late 
as August 1995, Microsoft was just getting around to launching its own proprietary 
service, the Microsoft Network. Some newspaper executives fretted over Microsoft’s 
entry as a possible new competitor, but a newspaper in Microsoft’s backyard—The 
Seattle Times—announced that it would experiment with providing content on the 
new platform.88  
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 With the Internet looming and a potential powerful new proprietary service 
backed by Microsoft entering the market, newspaper companies were again 
confronting a confusing and unsettled time. They once again faced critical questions 
about strategic direction. One executive describing this period said that “if the new 
media landscape is Oz, we are about a half a step down the yellow brick road.”89 The 
comment was prescient as the media landscape changed rapidly in the mid- to late 
1990s, especially as the proprietary services morphed into Internet service providers 
before fading in importance.  
 In revisiting this period of transition, Reid noted that services such as 
Prodigy, AOL, and CompuServe “were flourishing” as the Internet appeared. Given 
the demonstrated popularity of these services, Reid questioned how the Internet was 
able to attract so many users so quickly. He wrote that the success of proprietary 
online systems “indicated an increasing interest in connecting and communicating 
among computer owners,” but he observed that “while the commercial services 
helped satisfy that urge, none ever attained the kind of content and user growth 
momentum that the Web generated.” 90 Reid’s conclusion as to the reason for the 
Internet’s ultimate success and the subsequent decline of the proprietary services is 
essential to understanding the conundrum facing newspaper executives as they 
contemplated their next moves. Reid wrote: 
… each commercial service’s subscribers and content were 
sequestered from the others’. Subscriber growth at CompuServe 
therefore did nothing to help Prodigy’s content reach more of its 
natural audience, and growth in America Online’s content did 
nothing to enrich the CompuServe or Prodigy experiences. 
Segregated and barricaded, the aggregate online population could 
never achieve the full benefits of mutual affiliation that open 
networks offer.91 
 
Newspaper executives who had worked hard to hammer out their partnerships with 
the proprietary online services were glad to have found a role in the electronic 
marketplace that made business sense. Providing content within the gated 
communities of the proprietary online systems was comfortable. The Internet was 
                                               
89. Carter, “Online Advertising,” 39. [Statement attributed to Eugene Quinn, general manager of 
Tribune Interactive Network Services.] 
90. Reid, Architects of the Web, 14. 
91. Ibid. 
192 
 
not. Many in the newspaper industry initially believed that the open network of the 
Internet would lead to information anarchy. Without central control how would 
consumers know where to turn? Without standards how would advertisers ever trust 
the medium? 
 The newspaper industry’s response to such questions is the focus of Chapter 
Six. But it is important to note that there was no clean transition for newspapers from 
the period of proprietary services to the Internet era—no date on a calendar that 
marked a seminal event. Until 1995, the American newspaper industry had largely 
responded to the renewed possibilities of online media by forming partnerships with 
proprietary online service companies. These companies also did not anticipate the 
revolutionary impact that the Internet – in the form of the World Wide Web – would 
have on their plans and expectations for online media. Even as late as May 1996 
when other services were migrating most services to the Internet, AOL said it would 
remain a proprietary service. “We have no plans to become a HTML shop anytime 
soon,” said its head of product marketing.92 Its newspaper partners continued to be an 
important source of content during the transition years, especially in areas that 
emphasized local, geographically-focused content. 
 Nevertheless, as newspaper executives realized the staggering rate at which 
the Internet was achieving household penetration, they began to take their content 
there as well. Boczkowski summarized the period covered so far by this thesis—the 
1980s to the mid 1990s—as a time that “American dailies tinkered with an array of 
alternatives to print.”93 He elaborated: 
… the 1980s was a decade of exploration of multiple technical, 
editorial and commercial options. While newspapers continued to 
explore these options during the first half of the 1990s, they 
progressively narrowed down their efforts around products delivered 
to personal computers connected to online services until they finally 
settled on the web circa 1995.94 
 
Boczkowski’s notion of an industry tinkering for a decade and a half perhaps implies 
that the efforts were half-hearted. Maybe they were in some cases, but that does not 
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diminish the influence these projects had on the collective industry thinking about 
electronic distribution of news, information, and advertising.  
 
Conclusion 
The brief period of concerted engagement with the proprietary online services can be 
viewed as the time when newspaper publishers turned away from their protectionist 
rhetoric of the late 1980s and became seriously engaged once again in efforts to 
exploit online media. Working with companies such as Prodigy and AOL gave 
newspaper companies a renewed sense of purpose in the electronic era and fostered 
optimism throughout the industry. While the earlier failures of Viewtron and 
Gateway had tarnished the industry’s reputation, the work with the proprietary online 
systems restored it.  
 The fact that newspapers were active again in pursuing new technology 
represented a seminal change for an industry that had spent the better part of the 
1980s fighting the telecommunications industry and allowing its reputation to be cast 
as a group of naysayers and obstructionists. The notion that the industry’s future 
success would require conquering and exploiting new technology was once again a 
commonly held belief.  
 By 1993, it was no longer considered optional for a serious daily newspaper 
to be involved in the online world. This attitude shift is corroborated in an influential 
textbook on newspaper management, which listed a key strategy for success as 
“joining high tech companies in jointly producing interactive electronic services or in 
other ways using new technology”95 The key part of the strategy involved 
partnerships. Despite the renewed optimism, the skittishness about the cost of 
electronic information services lingered over the industry. It fostered a climate where 
few newspaper companies wanted to invest in online services independently.  
 Even so, the recognized shortcomings of the new proprietary online 
services—unproven technology and business models—would have been more than 
enough to dissuade newspapers from teaming up with them only a few years earlier. 
But the underlying climate had changed. American Journalism Review called it “not  
                                               
95. Fink, Strategic Newspaper Management, 26. 
194 
 
a revolution, but an evolution,” adding that “recent shifts with the cable and 
telephone industries, the surge in popularity of personal computers, and a drawn-out 
economic recession that has sliced into advertising revenues have combined to force 
newspapers to look forward.”96 In looking forward, however, the newspaper industry 
envisioned an online marketplace that would largely resemble its offline world. In 
this market, large media companies centrally created the content, controlled its 
distribution and relied on advertisers to pay for it all. In this regard, newspaper 
companies understood the proprietary online services largely because they also relied 
on central control. 
 In Chapter Six, the thesis continues with an examination of the newspaper 
industry’s ongoing desire to participate in the online services market. The chapter 
tracks the newspaper industry as it transitioned from the proprietary services to the 
Internet. The next chapter explores the latter half of the 1990s as newspaper 
companies launched numerous Internet ventures and tried to adapt to an emerging 
media model that called for radical changes in the way newspaper companies 
preferred to operate. This thesis has shown that the newspaper industry often acted 
defensively and—after the early 1980s—with risk management concerns at the 
forefront of its strategies, but there was a résumé of online experience in place when 
the Internet arrived. Chapter Six examines how newspaper industry executives 
thought they could use that experience and their local market dominance to exploit 
the Internet to their advantage.  
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Chapter Six: 
The Emerging Internet Threatens Established 
Publishing Model 
 
Newspaper publishers contemplating their industry’s role in online media in the mid-
1990s were confounded by the accelerating pace of change. The emergence of the 
World Wide Web during the period when newspaper companies were aligning their 
future with proprietary online services was unexpected and unsettling. Wired 
magazine published an article in October 1994 under the headline: “The (Second 
Phase of the) Revolution Has Begun.” For any newspaper executive who may have 
read the article, the opening would have provided reason for pause: “Don’t look now, 
but Prodigy, AOL, and CompuServe are all suddenly obsolete—and Mosaic is well 
on its way to becoming the world’s standard interface.”1 Newspaper executives, just 
getting comfortable with their new online strategy and the ensuing partnerships, were 
forced to confront this new development.  
 Chapter Six explores the newspaper industry’s reaction to the World Wide 
Web as it established the Internet as a full-fledged content distribution platform. 
Initially, newspaper executives were sceptical. After all, the giant Microsoft was seen 
by the newspaper industry as a technology bellwether and its actions during this 
period did not portend the Internet to be as revolutionary as some commentators were 
suggesting. Microsoft, for instance, largely followed the proprietary model when it 
launched the Microsoft Network (MSN) in August 1995,2 which was ten months 
after the Wired article pronounced such endeavours as obsolete.  
 Once the movement to Internet began, however, the newspaper industry 
represented significant activity. This chapter examines several of the projects 
undertaken by the industry that illustrate its response during the period that led up to 
the Internet industry’s financial bubble collapse in 2000. In explaining how this 
profound transition unfolded, this chapter looks first at the development of Mosaic, 
which was critical to the overall acceptance of the Internet as a mainstream platform. 
The focus then turns to the newspaper industry’s migration to the web, and highlights 
the NCN initiative. The chapter examines the demise of NCN and includes 
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retrospective comments from participants and observers regarding what its failure 
represented in terms of the newspaper industry’s ability to exploit the changing 
marketplace. The chapter also addresses how the industry wrestled with numerous 
issues involving content, structure, and business models. There is particular emphasis 
given to the classified advertising component of the newspaper industry’s business 
model and how emerging businesses on the Internet began to alter the dynamics of 
that market. 
  
The Mainstream Internet 
When newspapers first encountered the Internet, wired households in the U.S. were 
far from ubiquitous. Only 11 percent of the country’s households owned modems in 
1994. The number grew to 26 percent by 1997 and to about 33 percent by the end of 
the decade.3 The overwhelming majority of households during this period did not 
own the equipment necessary to access the Internet. Therefore, newspaper executives 
were not reacting to the Internet’s market penetration, but rather to its growth 
trajectory. In looking back over the Internet’s development, many assume that its 
dominance was recognized as inevitable from the outset. For those with only the 
perspective of the mid-1990s, however, the future of the Internet was only 
speculation.  
AOL, Prodigy and CompuServe were attracting enough mainstream audience 
to entice Microsoft into the arena for proprietary online services, but none of these 
businesses contemplated an Internet-based service at this juncture. The conversations 
about the Internet during this period were found in the academic and technical 
communities and among some early adopters. As the conversations about the Internet 
gained momentum, they were joined by entrepreneurs and venture investors, which 
formed a collective that would become known as the digerati.4 The rhetoric 
emanating from these early conversations foreshadowed why the Internet would be 
different from the online information services that preceded it. 
Mitchell Kapor’s essay published by Wired in the summer of 1993 captured 
the sentiments of the digerati and explained why they believed the Internet would 
deliver on the promises of an Information Society where other systems had failed: 
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This dream has been promoted extensively, but until recently little 
visible progress has been made toward its realization. In the past, 
political gridlock has snarled telephone companies, newspaper 
publishers, cable television operators, and other potential players in 
lengthy and fruitless congressional and court battles. A justifiable 
cynicism developed to fill the gap between vision and reality. 
Meanwhile, the pioneers of the computer-mediated communication 
networks collectively referred to as cyberspace are not willing to 
wait. Employing whatever tools they can find, they are constantly 
pushing the techno-cultural envelope. Life in cyberspace is often 
conducted in primitive, frontier conditions, but it is a life which, at 
best, is more egalitarian than elitist, and more decentralized than 
hierarchical. It serves individuals and communities, not mass 
audience, and it is extraordinarily multi-faceted in the purposes to 
which it is put.5 
 
The essay reflects the notion that traditional media, including newspapers, had not 
done enough to develop electronic information services. The implication was that the 
established players had failed to exploit the technology available to them, and 
therefore, it was time to allow a new breed of businesses—those not wedded to 
models of control—to establish a new operating model.  
 Traditional media, however, saw no reason to simply step aside. The 
newspaper industry specifically forged ahead with plans based on its long-
established media model that relied on creating content centrally and distributing it 
en masse from the point of creation to multiple end-users. Newspaper industry 
executives believed their view of the electronic information market had been 
corroborated by the success of commercial databases, which operated on a similar 
model. In these services, data was collected in large central repositories and 
delivered through proprietary computer connections to customers who subscribed. In 
both the media model and this database model, centralized control of content and 
distribution was the fundamental element.  
 The Internet, however, was not conceived as a publishing tool in the 
traditional sense. Rather, its roots were in the research labs of the nation’s 
government, defence, and academic institutions. An original purpose was for 
researchers to collaborate more readily by sharing information; therefore, its design 
allowed content to flow from any point on the network. There was no central 
authority to control what was shared, how much was shared, or when it was shared. 
Based on the discussion of interactivity in Chapter One, therefore, it is possible to 
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understand that the Internet was inherently interactive because it was specifically 
designed to foster the sharing of data and to facilitate communication about the data 
that was being shared. Traditional publishing, on the other hand, was designed to 
empower the owners of content who intended to profit by controlling its 
dissemination.  
 This fundamental difference empowered the users of the Internet in ways that 
traditional publishing was not designed to do. It gave them control over the content 
they consumed, while traditional publishing restricted control. For years, however, 
the Internet’s users were limited to technically savvy individuals who understood 
how to write and communicate in complex computer languages. The Internet did not 
become a useful consumer platform until an application was developed that hid the 
computer complexity behind a simple graphical interface. In the following material, 
this chapter explores the significance of this development and examines the 
implications it had for increasing the popularity of the Internet and the ramifications 
for the newspaper industry and its traditional publishing model.  
 
The Game-changing Mosaic 
Online magazine explained that the mid-1990s represented a transformative point in 
media history because of the functionality unleashed by the World Wide Web: 
… it was the genius of linking pages and hyper-jumps in digital 
space that turned the trick. The next revolution was unleashed. The 
Internet became the computing infrastructure, the definitive 
metaphor for electronic information.… In 1987, online included the 
Internet. By 1997, online was the Internet.6 
 
There is little attempt in current discussion to distinguish the Internet from the World 
Wide Web, but at the outset there was a clearer understanding of the Internet as the 
network and the World Wide Web as its primary content layer. The distinction began 
to evaporate with the introduction of Mosaic, a software application that provided a 
graphical interface for finding and navigating through content using the Internet.  
 Hypertext had been around for years, but Mosaic brought its potential to life 
in a way that general computer users could understand and use. In doing so, the 
application triggered a rush to create content and fostered the notion of the Internet 
as a media platform. An early user of Mosaic recalled her experience as 
transformative: “For many of us involved in early online and interactive publishing 
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experiments, Mosaic, or as I liked to refer to it in a time of less potent bandwidth, 
‘The Little Browser That Could,’ changed our world.”7 In the case of Mosaic, 
descriptions such as revolutionary, world-changing and transformative were not 
hyperbole.  CNET News, for example, explained the significance of Mosaic: 
… the modern concept of the Internet would not exist if the browser 
had remained in the exclusive realm of academia.… Mosaic 
transformed the Internet from the esoteric province of researchers 
and technophiles to a household appliance, creating a multibillion-
dollar industry and changing the way society works, communicates 
and even falls in love—in short, affecting nearly every facet of life.8 
 
 Before the creation of Mosaic, the Internet and World Wide Web were not 
topics of mainstream discussion. The New York Times published its “first article 
about the Web” on December 8, 19939 and described Mosaic as “a map to the buried 
treasures of the Information Age.” The article explained that Mosaic did not provide 
connections to the Internet, only a more convenient way of finding information once 
a person was connected.10 Effusive in its praise, the article noted that Mosaic’s 
“many passionate proponents hail it as the first ‘killer app’ of network computing—
an applications program so different and so obviously useful that it can create a new 
industry from scratch.”11 Many would argue that Mosaic did just that. From the 
outset it was treated as an exciting new software application, but in less than two 
years it was a global sensation as it enabled the Internet—as we understand it 
today—to exist. 
  Its significance also stems from the role it played in igniting the Internet as 
business phenomenon. Mosaic’s success gave rise to rise to the Internet as a breeding 
ground for innovation and a lucrative place for venture capital investors to find 
opportunities. Tim Berners-Lee, a British researcher, is credited with establishing the 
technical protocols that created the World Wide Web as a way of organizing 
information. Mosaic, however, represented a “better way of displaying the 
information that the Web had so brilliantly organized.”12 Mosaic represented such a 
powerful innovation that its creator Marc Andreessen, a student at the University of 
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Illinois, used it as the foundation for launching Netscape.13 The company was also a 
game-changer, representing the first in a series of Internet-based start-ups that altered 
the face of American business during this period. 
 
A New Business Climate 
In less than two years from its creation, Netscape went public in August 1995 
through a landmark stock offering.14 Despite losses that had reached nearly $13 
million, Netscape soared to a market value of $2.7 billion on its first day of trading.15 
The unprecedented event on Wall Street touched off the investment frenzy 
surrounding Internet companies in the latter half of the 1990s. The losses 
notwithstanding, the success of Netscape’s stock offering was supported by the 
perceived potential of its flagship product, the graphical browser that had its roots in 
Mosaic. The exuberance investors showed for money-losing Internet start-up 
companies transformed the capital markets during this period. The events 
confounded executives in many industries, including the newspaper business. They 
were dismayed by the magnitude of capital investment that was flowing freely to 
companies that were unproven, had posted only losses, and were operating in a 
market with no established history. 
 One newspaper industry consultant observed that the financial markets were 
rewarding companies that brought innovative products to markets without regard to 
their business pedigree. The consultant stated: “Content kings are now vulnerable,” 
adding that “newspapers bring capability and capital … but they won’t be chosen 
over the kid down the street who knows how to make and use those tools. We need 
to get to know those kids.”16 The implication of the statement was that newspaper 
companies were unlikely to be innovative enough on their own to compete in the 
new Internet market. Previously, traditional media companies such as newspapers 
were thought to be important players in electronic information because of the 
inherent value of their existing content. The early developments of the Internet, 
however, demonstrated that functionality, interactivity and community building 
could perhaps trump the importance of content held by the traditional media. This 
chapter explores this topic later. Meanwhile, the newspaper industry was concerned 
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about other shifts in the media landscape beyond the emergence of the Internet 
during this period. 
Newspaper executives were forced to consider their strategic decisions in the 
context of an escalating pace of mergers occurring among their more traditional 
electronic rivals—radio, broadcast television, and cable television—as well as among 
the phone companies. Chan-Olmsted found that among those industries, the number 
of mergers and acquisitions—transactions valued at more than $5 million—soared 
from 68 deals in 1991 to 204 deals in 1996.17 The period was marked by a surge of 
activity in 1996 spurred on by new telecommunications legislation that sought to 
bring policy in line with the new technologies. The legislation brought the spectre of 
more wholesale changes to the media landscape. As Chan-Olmsted concluded: 
The sweeping changes in telecommunications regulation signed into 
law in 1996 by President Clinton set the stage for a new era of 
strategic alliances among communications services companies in the 
country. By striking down the rules that have prohibited cross-
ownership between telephone and cable companies, limited 
broadcast station ownership by a single entity, and separated local 
and long-distance telephone service providers, the new regulatory 
environment will likely foster the convergence of broadcasters, 
phone companies, and cable TV services.… Convergence through M 
& A seems to provide the best opportunity for companies to 
accelerate the implementation of new technologies and at the same 
time capture a developed customer base.18 
 
 The newspaper industry was at a crossroads. The emerging Internet had many 
executives questioning whether their alliances with the proprietary online services 
were sufficient. This new concern contributed once again to a fear of being left 
behind.  When combined with the concomitant changes in telecommunications 
regulation, the newspaper industry was compelled to do more in the electronic arena 
than it had since the early 1980s.  
 Boczkowski wrote that “caught in the middle of these rhetorical and policy 
developments, many newspaper people imagined the Internet and related 
technological changes to be tied to dramatic transformations in their own industry.”19 
As newspapers executives began to accept the Internet as a paradigm shift of 
immense proportion, the industry mobilized in ways that were unprecedented. The  
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newspaper industry committed to new investment in technology, new hiring, and a 
new industry-wide effort to collaborate as the industry collectively embraced the 
Internet as its path to the future. The remainder of this chapter critically examines 
specific aspects of the newspaper industry’s Internet effort during the latter half of 
the 1990s. 
 
Newspapers Mobilize for Changing Market 
Newspaper companies committed to their Internet efforts amid a sense of urgency 
that had been missing from the industry’s electronic endeavours for some time. As 
the head of the industry’s trade association put it: “if we sit back and [it] ends up 
becoming a major information channel, we’ll never catch up.”20 Many newspaper 
company leaders expressed confidence that the industry’s earlier shortcomings in 
online media could be overcome. An industry leader stated: “It is information 
processing that is newspapers’ greatest strength,” adding that “newspapers must 
understand that what they do best—gathering, packaging and distributing news and 
information—is much more than ink on paper.”21 Another executive’s comments 
also are illustrative of the strident views expressed about the ability of newspapers to 
become formidable competitors in the new arena: 
Without a doubt, newspapers are best positioned to thrive in the 
electronic future. We already have strong brand recognition, 
established credibility and strong relationships with our customers.22  
 
In using such attributes to describe the newspaper industry’s strengths, leaders were 
seeking to reaffirm the value in their existing franchises and explain how that should 
differentiate newspaper companies in a new media market where upstart competitors 
had no history to build upon. Throughout this early Internet period, industry leaders 
also wanted constituents—readers and advertisers—to view newspaper companies as 
being in control of the rapidly evolving events. 
 The industry’s trade association played an important role in developing this 
message. For example, when the association launched its own website in the summer 
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of 1995, a statement described newspaper companies as “in the vanguard, exploring 
how this new medium can help translate their information and community-building 
franchises to cyberspace.”23 The language used, such as “vanguard,” illustrates how 
the industry promoted its role as a leader in the emerging Internet-based media 
industry. Such efforts were effective in helping the newspaper industry shed the 
negative perceptions associated with its lobbying stance against the 
telecommunications industry and its early failed videotext projects.  
 As newspaper companies began to launch Internet editions, the industry 
received recognition for pioneering work. MediaWeek, for example, noted the 
newspaper industry’s tenacity for pursuing electronic media projects: 
Newspaper executives don’t give up easily. In the 1980s, many large 
dailies considered videotext a can’t-miss technology for an industry 
that was suffering from stagnating circulation and rising newsprint 
and distribution costs. A decade later, a confluence of those same 
problems, and the emergence of modem-equipped personal 
computers, has newspaper executives talking electronic delivery 
again, substituting the Internet for failed videotext experiments like 
Knight-Ridder’s Viewtron and Times Mirror’s Gateway.24 
 
The industry’s public relations efforts would have had little effect in changing 
perceptions had newspaper companies not responded to the Internet in a significant 
way. But industry statistics show that the rhetoric was supported by significant 
activity. 
 In February 1995, about 60 daily U.S. newspapers were publishing an online 
version of some kind, either via a website, a bulletin-board service, or through a 
proprietary service.25 By the end of that year, there were 175 papers online via the 
web,26 a number that would explode to 1,749 U.S. daily newspapers on the web by 
May 1998.27 Newspapers placed so much emphasis on their web presence that most 
other electronic publishing activities, such as audiotex, fax services, and partnerships 
with proprietary online services, were abandoned or curtailed during this period. 
Knight-Ridder also closed its information design laboratory in 1995, which had been 
working for three years to develop an electronic tablet newspaper. In announcing the 
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closure, the company said it planned “to concentrate our resources on Internet and 
online publishing.”28  
 Boczkowski observed the newspaper industry’s years of experimentation led 
to its adoption of the Internet in 1995 as its electronic platform of choice. As he 
surmised, had newspapers not experimented with earlier forms of electronic media, 
the transition to the web would have unfolded very differently than it actually did. 
The efforts newspaper companies had put into electronic distribution made it easier 
for them to accept the Internet as the next step in a development process that was 
already underway.29 One research team wrote that projects such as videotext and 
commercial online databases were all “early forms of online publishing” that “in 
some way shaped the path of Internet publishing.”30 These efforts, chronicled 
throughout the preceding chapters of this thesis, led many newspaper executives and 
researchers to believe that the industry’s experiences had produced knowledge that 
would be transferred to the Internet endeavours. 
 Lee, for example, observed that “early trials and offerings of electronic 
newspapers have provided some useful insights valuable to the development of 
newspapers on the Internet.”31 Lee said the advances in technology represented by 
the Internet over videotext limited any direct knowledge transfer, but he added that 
several overarching lessons should be applicable. For example, he wrote the early 
online projects taught newspaper that they should be concerned with audience critical 
mass, onscreen readability, intuitive navigation, and interactivity.32  
 Even though the newspaper industry entered the Internet era with this 
reservoir of online experience, its many critics contend most of the lessons learned 
went unheeded. In this chapter’s subsequent sections, the thesis critically examines 
how the newspaper industry approached a number of operating decisions related to 
the emerging Internet marketplace. These decisions included a range of issues such 
as business partnerships, production processes and competitive responses. 
  In the early going, newspaper companies were willing to experiment and 
approached the Internet as an opportunity. They entered business arrangements that 
were considered radical by the newspaper industry’s previous standards—creating 
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partnerships and making investments that challenged the industry’s cultural make-up. 
The most notable example is an industry consortium called the New Century 
Network (NCN) that at one time represented the industry’s best idea for achieving 
success in the Internet era. The thesis next explores the creation and eventual failure 
of this effort and discusses its role as the newspaper industry’s early response to the 
Internet. 
 
New Century Network: An Aggressive Move 
The newspaper industry’s most aggressive attempt to gain an upper hand at the outset 
of the Internet era was in creating NCN, a consortium of several major newspaper 
companies. Its mission was to lead the industry’s transition to the Internet, providing 
a framework for the nation’s daily newspapers to establish a consistent online 
presence. The consortium’s founders at its launch in April 1995 included Advance 
Publications Inc., Cox Newspapers Inc., the Gannett Co., Hearst Corp., Knight-
Ridder Inc., the Times Mirror Co., the Tribune Co., and the Washington Post Co.33 A 
few weeks later, The New York Times Co. joined, stating that once it had reviewed 
the membership proposal the consortium was determined to be “a good fit for the 
company.”34 With The New York Times Co. on board, the ownership of the 
consortium represented more than 200 daily newspapers, and it planned to have 75 of 
those papers operating within the framework of NCN within two years.35 The 
timeframe reflected a cautious and methodical approach, but one that underestimated 
the speed at which the Internet would develop.  
 A cornerstone of NCN’s mission was to bring order to the Internet, and by 
doing so, allow the newspaper industry to exercise significant control over the 
emerging platform. NCN was founded during a narrow window in the Internet 
timeline that came after the creation of Mosaic, but before there was a clear sense of 
the Internet’s development trajectory. How the Internet would develop was an 
unknown, but newspaper companies believed their local market presence and relative 
economic strength would give them enormous influence in determining how the 
technology would be deployed. In these early years, newspaper executives saw the 
emerging Internet as simply another electronic connection to the home. Although the 
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Internet’s presence in the media marketplace was unforeseen, newspaper companies 
did not react out fear in this case. Rather, than a defensive move, NCN represented a 
bold offensive strategy for a newspaper industry that was uncomfortable with the 
early anarchy of the web.  Instead of waiting for order to emerge, many executives 
within the newspaper industry believed NCN could translate the industry’s clout into 
standards regarding how the emerging Internet would operate as a media and 
advertising platform.  
 Newspaper executives especially wanted NCN to develop platform standards 
for advertising. Many newspaper companies were reluctant to move forward with 
Internet initiatives in the absence of known advertising standards, including things 
such as common sizes that would allow agencies to place the same advertising across 
multiple websites. In discussions about how to bring standards to market, NCN once 
considered developing its own browser software.36 While creating a new browser 
was deemed impractical, NCN was guided in its early months by its standards focus. 
One executive active in the NCN creation stated: “standards will allow newspapers 
to take precedence.”37 The newspaper industry’s belief that it could influence the 
direction of the Internet’s development through NCN underscores the importance of 
this initiative within the industry’s early Internet efforts.  
 The NCN initiative surprised some of the financial analysts who followed the 
newspaper industry, but the concept was generally well-received. An analyst stated: 
“It’s surprising, because the industry doesn’t often get together like this, but it makes 
a lot more sense than somebody trying to do something on their own.”38 The word 
“portal” had yet to be applied to the concept of an Internet destination intent on 
aggregating users, but that describes the early vision for what NCN could become. 
The initial business model was based on creating a newspaper industry hub, linking 
“member publications through common search, financial-transaction and advertising 
engines.”39 It also intended to provide a standard technical platform for delivering 
ancillary services such as home shopping, electronic mail, chat services and 
discussion boards.40 Nevertheless, The New York Times’ description of how the 
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consortium would operate seems quaint given an understanding of how the Internet 
evolved: 
Each newspaper would be able to create its own “look” on the 
Internet and retain its own reporting and editing staff for local news. 
But each would also be able to link with other newspapers, allowing, 
for example, a reader of the electronic Austin American-Statesman 
to buy a single copy of the electronic Des Moines Register, if he or 
she were particularly interested in news developments in Iowa that 
day, or to buy a subscription to the electronic Houston Chronicle.41  
 
NCN’s primary content activity was to aggregate news content from newspapers 
around the country, but to accomplish this in such a way that local branding 
remained intact. NCN’s model reflected a television model. NCN would operate as 
the national network, while each newspaper would serve as a local affiliate.  
 To pay for itself and to share revenue with its newspaper affiliates, NCN 
planned to establish an interactive advertising network that could leverage the 
capabilities of the medium. NCN’s interim chief executive explained: “On-line 
media are response-driven, and that means that the advertising content itself has to be 
entertaining and informative. This is the only medium that allows a user to make an 
immediate impulse request or purchase, so every package must have that 
capability.”42 NCN projected that advertisers would begin transitioning from print to 
the Internet when at least 25 percent of consumers—a critical mass—began regularly 
using the Internet. In 1995, NCN believed that threshold would be met by the end of 
the decade. The interim chief executive told his colleagues: “This means we have a 
five-year window, which is not long, to become competent in the intricacies of 
developing new interactive content and figuring out which advertising models best 
suit those new applications.”43 The sense of urgency implicit in these remarks 
illustrates that the industry was beginning to recognize the rapid pace of change the 
Internet had created. But agreeing on an approach to act on that recognition proved 
elusive for the newspaper industry. 
 Even though NCN had been created to embrace change, many newspaper 
executives remained ensconced in their risk-averse, conservative approach. 
Therefore, creating a vehicle for change did not immediately translate into support 
for action. NCN was created as an offensive organization with ambitious plans to 
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bring advertising standards and uniform media processes to the Internet, but 
translating that into an actual operating plan proved difficult to achieve. The New 
York Times wrote that “... a partnership of large newspaper companies formed [NCN] 
to bring the country’s dailies into the age of the Internet. Then they sat down to 
figure out what that meant.”44 The ensuing internal debate about how the goals for 
the consortium should translate into actual products and services lasted too long for 
many newspaper companies. The New York Times observed that “the project was 
quickly overtaken by the speed of Web development among papers.”45 Also, the 
overall pace of Internet development led many newspaper executives to concede that 
their industry’s ability to influence Internet standards was not as immense as 
originally thought. As this realization took hold, the original dream of NCN leading a 
united newspaper industry into the new Internet-based market began to fade.  
 In less than six months from its inception, the first major crack in the unified 
effort appeared. On October 17, 1995, six major U.S. dailies announced the founding 
of CareerPath.com, touting an ambition to “offer the most comprehensive listing of 
jobs on the global computer network.”46 The six papers—The Boston Globe, Chicago 
Tribune, Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, San Jose Mercury News, and The 
Washington Post—were owned by the companies who had been part of creating 
NCN. CareerPath said it intended to “coordinate” its activities with NCN, and an 
NCN statement described CareerPath “an example of the type of initiative we 
envisioned when NCN was formed,” adding that “our affiliate strength will give us 
the opportunity to create, promote and provide easy access to a uniquely powerful 
interactive employment marketplace.”47 Nevertheless, CareerPath represented a 
significant breach of industry solidarity that NCN was thought to have represented. 
Knight-Ridder Inc. also stepped outside the NCN boundaries to create a venture with 
Landmark Communications to provide Internet services for newspapers, an effort in 
which it hoped to attract 100 daily newspapers as clients. The joint venture said it 
intended “to complement—not compete with—NCN,” but it was not specific about 
how it intended to do that.48  
 By the end of 1995, NCN’s mission was muddled. NCN’s owners appeared 
uncomfortable casting their entire Internet lot with their industry brethren, but they 
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did not shut down the consortium at that time. Instead, NCN brought in new 
leadership from outside the newspaper industry in the person of Lee DeBoer, an 
entertainment industry executive most recently with Home Box Office (HBO).49 
Under DeBoer, NCN attempted to regroup by launching a content syndication 
product called NewsWorks, which was described by its editor as follows:  
Imagine having a personal news assistant who reads every word 
published every day in more than 125 newspapers … and then gives 
you exactly the news and information you need and want. That’s 
what NewsWorks does.50 
 
NewsWorks was positioned as network service and emphasized its role as a content 
aggregator. The service touted the scope of its offering by explaining that its content 
was drawn from newspapers across the country and represented the collective effort 
of more than 25,000 journalists.51 
CNET called NewsWorks one of the newspaper industry’s “most aggressive 
efforts” to counteract a “sleepy response to online advertising.”52 Although the size 
and scope of the offering was impressive, reviews of its execution were mixed. 
CNET explained that NewsWorks did not post news articles as stories broke, opting 
instead to aggregate them after they had appeared in the affiliate’s print edition. 
“That may make them too stale for some Netizens’ appetites,” CNET wrote.53 
Another analyst concurred, stating that NewsWorks represented “one more stage of 
recycling the same old news.”54 However, Information Today, which catered to 
research professionals, called NewsWorks “one of the most powerful news research 
instruments on the web.” The review favourably compared NewsWorks to 
commercial services such as DIALOG and NEXIS. Given that NewsWorks was 
advertiser-supported and free to users, the magazine said that choosing NewsWorks 
over an expensive commercial database was “a no-brainer,” adding that “nowhere 
are the peculiar economics of cyberspace demonstrated more sharply than with 
NewsWorks.”55 In NewsWorks, NCN had created a robust research tool, but it 
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reflected the newspaper industry experiences with commercial information business 
models more so than consumer experience. 
Knight-Ridder, for example, was a significant operator of commercial 
database services, and it had purchased DIALOG in 1988.56 Other newspaper 
companies had distribution agreements with commercial database companies as well. 
It was believed that such experience would be useful to newspaper companies as they 
moved electronic services to the Internet, but NewsWorks demonstrated how 
difficult it would be to translate the learning achieved in a commercial setting to the 
consumer Internet. 
Information Today wrote that NCN needed to deliver “highly attractive 
locally oriented services,” and “and convince local advertisers that local services are 
a legitimate media buy,” but the magazine concluded that the newspaper industry’s 
“dismal record of previous attempts” made success difficult to predict.57 NCN’s 
prospects were further diminished when key companies decided against the platform. 
Although the New York Times Co. and Gannett were NCN owners, neither of their 
flagship newspapers—The New York Times or USA Today—ever affiliated with 
NCN,58 rejecting the common platform in favour of creating their own web 
initiatives. 
By January 1998, NCN had all but abandoned its NewsWork site. It 
eliminated 10 percent of its staff and said it was shifting to a model of delivering 
content via HTML-based email on behalf of its affiliates.59 That effort never 
launched, however. In the following month, NCN withdrew from providing news 
content, stating in a press release that NCN would focus only on delivering 
advertising: “Our newspaper affiliates create a vast amount of rich interactive content 
every day. The network can add the most value by creating marketing solutions for 
national advertisers built around affiliate content,” the statement read.60 The repeated 
attempts to change strategy could not overcome a deeply divided ownership 
structure.  
Less than two weeks after abandoning NewsWorks, the entire NCN business 
was closed. The board of directors representing NCN’s newspaper ownership issued 
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a statement on March 10, 1998 stating that it had “voted to dissolve the partnership.” 
The statement added: “The challenge of concurrently finding a common strategy for 
NCN … has proved too daunting.61 The creation and ultimate demise of NCN may 
be only a footnote in the overall history of the Internet, but it was a watershed event 
when viewing the development of the Internet from the perspective of the newspaper 
industry. The creation of NCN underscored the newspaper industry’s recognition of 
the Internet as an important new development in the media landscape, but its failure 
reinforced the perception that the newspaper industry would struggle to compete in 
the new market.  
Therefore, examining its brief history provides insight into the industry’s 
collective thinking during this period. An industry executive observed that NCN 
marked a time when “a bunch of newspaper companies got together and imagined an 
online future in which newspapers would be key players,” believing that they could 
build “the definitive news resource on the Internet.”62 In retrospect, NCN illustrates 
how internal arrogance and naivety regarding external forces affected the newspaper 
industry’s early response to the emergence of the Internet.  
For example, 18 months lapsed before NCN launched NewsWorks, its first 
major product. The long delay demonstrated a failure to understand and react to the 
speed at which the Internet was developing. An industry participant recalled it as a 
time when “technology was evolving faster than anyone’s business vision.” He 
added: 
I remember seeing one of the early NCN definitions in the form of a 
request for proposals to provide infrastructure for the network. The 
idea was for a federation of closed, paid-access websites, where you 
could navigate from site to site on a single membership pass…. By 
the time the RFP made it through the fax machine (yes, it was faxed) 
the idea was obsolete. Switch gears: Open portal. Switch gears: 
search engine. Switch gears: ad network. None of it worked and 
some players were left angry and bitter.63 
 
By the time NewsWorks was in the marketplace, the industry support for the 
consortium had diminished. Newspapers were concentrating on their own 
independent websites and were openly questioning for the need of a national 
network. The following anecdote illustrates how indifferent the industry became of 
its own creation. 
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 In reporting on an NCN reception at a newspaper industry convention, 
BusinessWeek wrote: 
A thousand bottles of champagne emblazoned with “New Century 
Network: The Collective Intelligence of America’s Newspapers” 
awaited the hordes expected to come toast the watershed new-media 
joint venture…. When fewer than 100 people showed up, Chief 
Executive Lee [DeBoer] made an abbreviated speech before 
retreating.64 
 
BusinessWeek recalled the incident as NCN’s “first public humiliation,” but added 
that it was “only one in a series of blunders that culminated in the company’s abrupt 
shutdown.”65 The magazine quoted an advertising executive who summarized the 
NCN experience: “They built a business and nobody came.”66 The reasons behind 
NCN’s failure are multifaceted, and represent broader issues newspaper companies 
faced when deciding what to do about the Internet. 
In terms of content, newspaper companies highly valued the idea that NCN 
would provide a gateway to vast archives of content from newspapers across the 
country.  The regional nature of the newspaper business in the U.S. made it difficult 
to create a national network where that did not naturally exist.  There are a few 
newspapers such as The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, and The New York Times 
that have national distribution, but the daily newspaper business in the U.S. is largely 
based around metropolitan areas. NCN represented the attempt to address this market 
reality by allowing advertisers to use its national service to target advertising based 
on content from specific geographic regions.67 Analysts thought this idea had merit, 
but by the time NCN’s content feature was functioning there was competition from 
“about 30 sites such as those run by Yahoo, Netscape, Microsoft and a dozen big 
papers.”68 The newspaper industry was praised for creating NCN as an early 
response to the Internet, but it was criticized heavily when it did not turn the vision 
into action quickly enough to ward off such competition. 
 The failure of NCN is also remembered as a missed financial opportunity for 
the newspaper industry given that it was created during the period when investors 
were lavishing new Internet ventures with capital and their initial public stock 
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offerings were soaring in value. BusinessWeek reported that Cox Newspapers, one of 
NCN’s owners, wanted to bring the venture capital firm Kleiner Perkins Caufield & 
Byers into the NCN ownership structure. Cox wanted the venture capital firm to 
invest in NCN and then assist the consortium with a public stock offering of its 
own.69  
 The proceeds from such a plan during these heady days would have endowed 
NCN with enough working capital to free its newspaper owners from further capital 
investment, while providing a significant return on their initial investment. Gannett 
remained neutral on the proposal, while Cox was supported by Tribune and Hearst. 
The other owners argued, however, that NCN should remain a private company. 
They believed the newspaper industry was flush with enough capital to fund the 
consortium and wanted its profits distributed back to the newspaper owners rather 
than public shareholders. The final vote defeating the outside investment strategy 
was 5-4, setting the stage for more disagreement over ownership issues when the 
financial performance did not happen as expected.70  
 Each of the nine founding newspaper companies had seeded NCN with $1 
million, eventually investing more than $25 million total into the venture. However, 
NCN generated only $1 million in advertising revenue. More capital was needed to 
operate the business, but The New York Times Co. refused to invest, which forced 
the decision to close the business. The disagreements over how to capitalize NCN 
had resulted in deep rifts among the partners. Knight-Ridder’s representative said the 
trouble began with the earlier rejection of the plan to accept venture capital and take 
the venture public during the overheated stock market of 1996. “The fallout from that 
plagued New Century Network,” he said.71  
 Although newspaper industry leaders had done little to support the 
organization they created, the closing nevertheless was met with the rhetoric of 
failure similar to the sentiments expressed a decade earlier when Viewtron was shut 
down. An industry newsletter wrote: 
While the closure of the New Century Network was not completely 
unforeseen, the reaction of the newspaper business was. Sadness and 
disappointment reigned as word spread … that the on-line 
partnership of nine newspaper companies would end. The depth of 
feeling stemmed not only from a public failure, but also from a 
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concern that the newspaper business had missed the boat—once 
again.72 
 
The NCN closing was recognized as the industry’s tacit admission that competing in 
the Internet era would be more difficult than originally assumed. It once again cast 
doubt that a traditional media industry could adapt existing business models to new 
market realities.  
 Most of the post-mortem analysis blamed the failure of NCN on its 
organizational structure. An executive with Hearst observing how NCN operated 
said: “Organizations of a number of co-equals can’t turn on a dime.”73 The 
organizational structure was exacerbated by the diversity of the companies involved 
as expressed by a Los Angeles Times executive: “You had private companies and 
public companies and companies that were risk-averse and those that were risk-
tolerant. You had big city papers and small chains. We share a need. But it was 
frustrating trying to come together.”74 This executive believed NCN problems 
reflected the independent nature of the newspaper business in the U.S. and was 
allowed to fail because “we didn’t need it, and it was competitive.”75 Rather than 
invest in a common industry platform, most newspaper companies decided it was in 
their best interest to develop their own Internet operations. The businesses behind 
most newspapers decided that in the face of escalating value for Internet companies, 
it made more sense to own outright than to share. The question remained, however, if 
newspaper companies would invest to compete offensively in the emerging market or 
choose to react defensively.  
  Some executives viewed the failure of NCN as the industry’s inability to 
grasp the larger ramifications of the Internet. A key executive in NCN’s creation 
commented that its closure reflected that “Newspapers are reacting in very traditional 
ways to a very untraditional marketplace. And they’re being superseded fast.”76 
Nevertheless, there was a flurry of activity in the newspaper industry in the latter half 
of the 1990s as companies established websites and the production processes to 
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support them. The history of how newspaper companies in the U.S. approached the 
web aside from the NCN consortium forms the remainder of this chapter.  
 
 
Newspapers Independently Adopt the Internet 
The period in which NCN failed also was a time of intense development as 
newspaper companies moved on their own to place content on the web. There was no 
clear pattern to how newspaper companies approached the web during this period, 
but there was a lot of activity. The list of newspapers moving content to the web in 
the mid-1990s was a long one and included such early adopters as The St. Petersburg 
Times, USA Today, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Boston Globe, and The Arizona 
Republic.77 
Some newspaper companies that were part of media conglomerates joined 
forces with internal partners. Cox Newspapers, for example, joined with its sister 
media companies, Cox Television, Cox Communications (cable television), and Cox 
Radio, in 1996 to form a new entity called Cox Interactive Media. The new unit was 
charged with creating a local Internet experience in all the markets in which Cox 
operated, including its newspaper markets. The flagship effort was based in Atlanta 
and attempted to combine the resources of Cox’s media properties there, including 
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, WSB-TV, and WSB Radio AM 750.78 By early 
1997, Cox had announced plans for 30 online sites to be operational by year-end, 
prompting CNET to call Cox’s agenda one of the “most aggressive by any company 
to date.”79 Knight-Ridder created a network of its newspaper sites under the banner, 
Real Cities,80 and The New York Times emerged as an early Internet bellwether for 
the newspaper industry due to its national brand and distribution. 
 The New York Times debuted on the web January 22, 1996. The event was 
touted in a company press release as “part of a broad strategy to extend the 
newspaper’s reach and create new editorial and business opportunities in electronic 
media.”81 The newspaper’s publisher stated:  
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Our site is designed to take full advantage of the evolving 
capabilities offered by the Internet. At the same time, we see our 
role on the Web as being similar to our traditional print role—to act 
as a thoughtful, unbiased filter and to provide to our customers 
information they need and can trust.82 
 
The Times had tested the web the previous October when it posted content about the 
Pope’s visit to New York.83 The experiment drew criticism from financial executives 
of the newspaper who viewed it as an editorial exercise without any thought given 
about how to pay for it. An executive recalled the episode: 
… it was really an exercise of the publishing system more than 
anything…. The thing went up and we were very happy with it. And 
I got a call from the fellow who was running the company at the 
time, screaming at me about how it didn’t have any ads in it.84 
 
The episode is illustrative of many early endeavours when newspaper companies 
were more concerned about a content presence on the Internet than how to establish 
an advertising business model. When The New York Times formally launched its web 
presence, however, the advertising issue was addressed. A press release said the 
newspaper intended its website to become a money-making business, noting that 
“charter advertisers” included Toyota and Chemical Bank.85 The New York Times 
understood its national brand would allow the newspaper to compete online more 
broadly than other newspapers given that its printed newspaper was distributed 
nationally. Two years after its launch, the national market approach appeared to be 
working. Statistics discussed by Aikat revealed that the paper’s website had achieved 
4 million registered users by May 1998 with 83 percent of those registrants living 
outside metropolitan New York.86 The national—even global—reach of The New 
York Times allowed it to pursue a different Internet strategy than regional 
newspapers. 
 The Boston Globe, by contrast, provides an example of a newspaper that 
followed a regional approach. It created an electronic publishing division that 
pursued partnerships with other Boston area media to launch a regional Internet 
destination. The website was named “boston.com” and was marketed as “New 
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England’s first Megawebsite, a one-stop interactive resource on the Internet’s World 
Wide Web.” The newspaper’s content was featured alongside material from more 
than a dozen Boston television stations, radio stations, magazines, and other sources 
of content.87  
 The Boston Globe’s approach was considered a radical departure for the 
newspaper industry. A trade publication described boston.com as “not what you’d 
call a newspaper on the Web,” adding that it “breaks traditional rules of branding by 
partnering with broadcast and print competitors.” The article described the effort as 
an attempt to create “a cyberbrand with greater clout—a whole greater than the sum 
of its parts” by featuring content as the drawing card.88 The article illustrated that 
much of the newspaper industry held a narrow view of what an online newspaper 
should be, but companies continued to push the boundaries. The Washington Post, 
for example, partnered with competing media—Newsweek and ABC—to launch 
ElectionLine, a website focused on the 1996 elections.89 
 As noted earlier, Boczkowski wrote that years of online experimentation by 
the newspaper industry culminated in 1995 when most newspaper companies 
adopted the Internet and the World Wide Web as the electronic delivery platform. 
The implication was that by deciding on the web as a delivery platform, the 
newspaper industry’s online evolution had reached a conclusion. However, the 
variety of partnerships and types of websites newspaper companies developed in the 
early years of the Internet demonstrated that that an acceptable electronic publishing 
model had yet to be achieved.  
The latter half of the 1990s was a transitional period for newspaper 
companies and their online efforts. Some newspapers hedged their bets by investing 
in a web presence while also retaining other partnerships. The Houston Chronicle, 
for example, established a website, but continued to post content through its Prodigy 
affiliation and agreed to market Prodigy as the “preferred means” of accessing the 
Internet.90 Over time such alliances with proprietary services would give way to 
exclusive web-based operations, but the industry’s experimentation process was far 
from over and it was influenced by a myriad of business concerns. The following 
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sections of the chapter examine several pertinent business issues newspaper 
publishers and editors faced when deciding on content, access, and financial models.  
 
Newspaper Business versus Information Business 
Picard wrote that a business model reflects “the conception of how the business 
operates,” including “its underlying foundations, and the exchange activities and 
financial flows upon which it can be successful.”91 By this definition, most 
newspaper executives in the late 1990s did not view the business model of an online 
newspaper as being very different from the business model of a printed newspaper. 
In both cases, the fundamental objective was to produce content that attracted an 
audience of sufficient size that would, in turn, attract advertisers.  
 The emergence of the web, however, forced the newspaper industry to assess 
the fundamental nature of its business. The American Society of Newspaper Editors 
(ASNE) framed the issue in an essay that asked: “Are you an organization that 
supplies newspapers or are you an organization that supplies information?”92 In 
proposing to explain why the industry’s response was so important, the essayist 
wrote: “Remington and Underwood saw themselves as being in the typewriter 
business. IBM saw itself as being in the word-processing business. The rest is 
history.”93 In a similar vein, a speaker at an industry conference said newspaper 
companies should “be prepared to decouple from paper,” adding that “perhaps when 
I come back a few years from now, it’ll be the News Association of America,”94 
rather than the Newspaper Association of America.  
 Whether or not newspaper companies defined their product as news or 
information rather than by the physical product a newspaper was much more than a 
philosophical issue. How newspaper companies defined their business, also 
determined how they operated. In retrospect, the production process of a daily 
newspaper led to many-preconceived notions that influenced decisions about 
producing content in the online arena. Lapham recognized the difficult challenge 
newspapers faced in this regard. “Reinventing itself is a tall order for an industry that 
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works under constant deadline to produce a new product each day,” she wrote.95 
Newspaper companies had invested in computer-based production systems in the 
1980s and believed they should leverage those systems to also produce content for 
the Internet. A Knight-Ridder executive said of his operation: “we figured out a way 
to automate” the transfer of content from the printed newspaper to the online version 
“so that it didn’t cost a lot.”96 While efficient, the approach allowed the printed 
product to control the flow of information and reduced the online edition to ancillary 
status.  
 
Cultural Artefacts Take Precedent  
The process of transferring content from a printed newspaper to its online sibling 
became a ubiquitous practice in the newspaper industry. So much so, that the 
software applications developed to automate the process became known as 
“shovelware.”97 This example illustrates how business processes applied to the web 
echoed the cultural artefacts of the printed products and often became an obstacle 
that prevented newspaper websites from absorbing and reflecting what was 
happening elsewhere in Internet-based media.  
 Chyi and Sylvie described the production processes that relied on shovelware 
as “moving whatever is published in the newspaper onto the Web without further 
developing the information,” adding that it “requires a very small staff.”98 Keeping 
labour costs under control within their online versions was indeed a goal of 
newspaper managers who chose to deploy shovelware. In the early going, however, 
the motivation was less about expense control and more about leveraging what was 
perceived to be most valuable asset a newspaper company owned—its content. 
 
Anticipated Value of Content Influences Action 
A prevailing belief among newspaper publishers and editors at the outset of the 
Internet was that newspaper content was valuable and represented a competitive 
barrier to entry given the large staff of reporters, editors and photographers required 
to create it. The newspaper industry believed that placing its valuable content online  
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would make it more accessible and, in turn, even more valuable. This view 
influenced the efforts at many newspapers to move historical content into online 
archives, allowing consumers to access newspaper morgues—an industry term for 
libraries—for the first time. In many newspapers, the effort to create digital archives 
and online Internet versions became a co-mingled process.  
 How newspaper companies valued their content at this time is illustrated in 
an example from the industry’s trade press. A special report about online archives 
opened with a reference to the 1960s television sitcom, “The Beverly Hillbillies.” In 
the opening sequence to the show, the patriarch Jed discovered oil, which the theme 
song describes as “black gold.”99 The article made the connection as follows: 
Much like the pre-Beverly Hillbilly Jed, North American newspaper 
publishers sit on pools of wealth…. The black gold is information, 
potentially gigabytes of it, archived in digital form. Intelligence 
scribed by a room of smart, experienced reporters and editors. 
Images captured by talented photojournalists. Graphics created by 
savvy info-design specialists. Not to mention the display ad for 
Bernie’s Grocery or the classified for a cherry 1957 Chevy.100 
  
Through the Internet, newspaper executives saw new possibilities to extract value 
from their troves of data as one executive expressed: “Publishers can put material out 
for the whole world…. We’ll see the death of the middlemen.”101 Newspaper 
companies had relied on deals with commercial database companies to compile their 
material for sale in the secondary research market, often receiving only token 
royalties. 
 The lure of extracting more value from archived material and the relative 
simplicity of shovelware systems contributed to the rapid increase in the number of 
newspapers migrating to the web in the late 1990s. However, newspaper companies 
were more fixated on the process of transferring content than they were with what to 
do with their online content. In many cases, the result was a static presentation of the 
printed paper in electronic form, sparking a wave of criticism.  
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The Backlash against Shovelware 
A leading industry executive said one of the biggest lessons newspaper companies 
had learned from their earlier online efforts with videotext and propriety services was 
the need to provide consumers with an engaging experience. “Don’t just replicate the 
newspaper…. Text on screen isn’t enough,” this executive stated.102 Yet, that is 
precisely what most newspaper companies did with the Internet in the 1990s. Online 
editions were electronic renditions of the printed newspaper that reflected little of the 
functionality described in Chapter One as necessary for making a medium 
interactive. A more detailed discussion of interactivity as it relates to this period is 
included later in this chapter. Meanwhile, the discussion of online production 
processes illustrates that newspaper companies did not convince their critics they 
were heeding lessons learned from previous online experiences. 
 As one commentator asked and answered: “What will make you stand out on 
the Internet? Certainly not dumping the entire contents of your newspaper on the 
Web.” This criticism said newspaper companies had “to learn how to select material 
and package it in exciting ways,” adding that success depended on treating online 
content as more than an archive.103 Chyi and Sylvie found that reliance on 
shovelware resulted in online editions that failed to differentiate from the printed 
newspaper. They wrote: “Due to the almost inevitable relationship with—or 
dependence upon—their print counterparts, many electronic newspapers have not 
become an independent entity, not even conceptually.”104 
 Most online newspapers relied on repurposed printed material for the 
majority of their content because it was an efficient production process, but that 
“does not necessarily imply quality content,” according to Chyi and Sylvie who 
referred to the tactic as “folly.”105 They concluded that the practice undermined the 
newspaper industry’s ability to compete, stating that “online newspapers that lack 
original content do not appear to be engaging in successfully strategic behavior.” 
This lack of original content made it difficult to establish an independent brand 
identity for the online products, which they argued was necessary for long-term 
viability. “Newspapers are relying on the brand preference established by their print 
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versions, hoping that the print newspaper’s credibility and desirability will transfer to 
the new medium,” they wrote.106 Despite such observations, newspaper companies 
were unapologetic for attempting to build their online presence based on the brand 
recognition of their printed newspapers.  
 The publisher of The New York Times, for example, stated that one of his key 
strategies was “to take the brand we have today and to translate it for this new 
medium.” He acknowledged, however, that the online product would likely turn into 
something different over time. “Some of the parts will be shockingly familiar to all 
of us. Twenty and twenty-five years from now, other parts none of us can even 
imagine,” he said.107 The use of such a long time horizon, however, illustrated the 
newspaper industry’s belief that there was ample time to sort out operating issues. 
Newspaper companies seemed to operate their early websites on the premise that 
short-term decisions would have little effect on long-term strategic concerns. The 
most illustrative example of this notion was the practice of embargoing news 
coverage, preventing publication on a website until after the material had appeared in 
print. 
 
Online Embargos Echo Culture of Control 
Publishers and editors considered their printed newspapers preeminent over their 
online versions during the early days of the Internet. This favouritism was not only 
reflected in the repurposing of content, but also with the timing in which the 
repurposing occurred. In most cases, newspapers embargoed their own content until 
after it had appeared in print. The New York Times summarized such practices: 
Virtually all of the hundreds of Web sites set up by the nation’s 
newspapers still do not take full advantage of one of the Internet’s 
most compelling features: its immediacy. Instead, most newspapers, 
including The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times and The 
New York Times, rely on reports from news agencies to update their 
sites during the day, while holding back their crown jewels—what 
their own journalists have discovered—until the actual papers are 
nearly on the street.108 
 
Newspaper editors explained the rationale for content embargoes as an attempt to 
preserve the role of the printed product. The practice also revealed how newspaper 
journalists were deeply-rooted in competitive traditions. 
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 Journalists did not want material available that would alert local television 
and radio stations, and other newspapers in some cases, about exclusive material. 
Therefore, allowing their work to be read in advance of print publication was a 
concept many editors and reporters could not fathom. An editor involved in online 
operations stated: “The whole idea of scooping ourselves is troubling to a lot of 
people. There are grave concerns within the newspaper industry about the extent to 
which new media are going to cannibalize the existing services that we provide to 
our consumers.”109 As late as 2000, an industry survey found that 45 percent of its 
print respondents said they did not allow their websites to scoop their printed 
newspaper. While this represented a decline from 58 percent in the prior year, it still 
reflected widespread use of embargoes.110 The embargo issue underscored how 
complex the newspaper industry’s relationship with the web was during this period. 
The newspaper industry’s reliance on content repurposing reflected the notion of the 
web as an extension of the printed product, but at the same time, content embargos 
reflected the fears of the web as an emerging competitor.  
 The practice of using wire service material rather than original content to 
update online newspapers between print editions also may have contributed to 
consumers undervaluing the newspaper’s own content. Researchers, including 
Leckner111 and Lee,112 discussed a phenomenon described as the commoditization of 
news brought on by the Internet’s capability of aggregating large amounts of 
information from multiple sources and making it readily available to anyone who 
wants to receive it. As Lee stated: “The Internet … created a platform for easy 
distribution of news information.”113 By embargoing their own material and exposing 
readers to the extensive amount of generic information from services such as the 
Associated Press and Reuters, the newspaper industry perhaps contributed to the 
commoditization process, especially in the areas of national news, financial data, and 
sports coverage. 
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 On a more fundamental level, however, newspaper companies were being 
challenged to assess their position in the flow of information. A media critic wrote:  
Newspapers might begin to think about reversing their long-standing 
priorities, recognizing that everyone with electricity has access to 
more breaking news than they provide, faster than they provide it. 
They should, at last, accept that there is little of significance that 
they get to tell us for the first time.114 
 
The Internet represented another reminder that newspaper control over information 
had been declining in the face of electronic competition. Editors had believed that 
newspapers succeeded in the face of electronic competition because they provided 
more depth and perspective than television or radio. The Internet, however, 
challenged those assumptions with limitless storage, the capability of linking vast 
amounts of related material and by providing access to a diversity of sources.  
 Media critics said newspapers would be forced to change and, as one wrote, 
acknowledge that “they don’t get to tell us only what they think we should know,” 
adding that “they’ll also have to really listen to us, not just pretend.”115 This reflected 
the notion that newspapers could alter their relationship with their readers by using 
technology to foster a dialogue. The Internet was seen as an interactive medium, but 
the newspaper industry’s early websites were widely criticized for not taking 
advantage of this capability. The following section of the chapter examines the calls 
for newspaper websites to become interactive and how newspaper companies 
responded.  
  
A Call for Interactivity 
Interactivity was discussed in Chapter One to provide an understanding of its 
meaning in a broad conceptual context. In revisiting the topic as it applies to the 
Internet and newspaper websites, interactivity is explored as a pragmatic attribute. 
Newspaper companies were expected to use interactive functionality to create a two-
way communication system and establish dialogue with their constituencies. An 
executive who pioneered the use of the Internet in the newspaper industry wrote: 
Effectively used, an Internet presence can transform static 
information, whether articles or ads, into real-time interaction—
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between sources and the newsroom, between the newsroom and 
readers, and between readers and advertisers.116 
 
Just because the Internet could facilitate interaction, however, did not translate into 
why newspapers should want to solicit interaction. Therefore, it makes sense to 
explore how this concept was considered at a practical level in the early days of the 
Internet and how it affected what newspaper companies did. 
 The executive quoted above said interaction would allow newspapers “to 
cement relationships with customers.”117 Some called on the newspaper industry to 
embrace interactivity as a natural way to offset the effects of news commoditization 
and the diminished role of reporting on events as they happen. Hollander supported 
the notion that interactivity would foster community and allow newspapers to 
“recapture from talk radio the position of community forum.” He maintained that 
“people can easily find information if they want it,” but indicated that newspapers 
could differentiate themselves online by creating “the place where the community 
communicates with itself, where ideas are debated, policy is discussed, problems are 
confronted.118 Lapham also wrote of newspapers using online tools to become “a 
facilitator of public discussion.”119 Therefore, the Internet was seen as providing the 
tools newspapers could use to elevate their role far beyond soliciting feedback 
through letters to the editor.  
 It represented, as Pavlik noted, a dramatically altered content paradigm—one 
that had been at the core of newspaper content for decades.120 He wrote: “No longer 
can most journalists and editors be content merely to publish the news. Instead the 
process is becoming much more of a dialog between the press and the public.”121 But 
Pavlik recognized that “not all news organizations are comfortable with this 
emerging model” because they feared that interactivity would require sharing control 
of the message.122 Pavlik observed that a newspaper’s centralized control over its 
content gave it immense power in a particular market. Over time editors came to 
understand that such power allowed them to set the agenda for their market, a role 
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they viewed as key responsibility rooted in journalism history.123 Real-time feedback 
questioning news coverage decisions and challenging editorial authority was not an 
appealing proposition for most newsrooms.  
 However, if newspaper editors were uncomfortable supporting interaction of 
this nature, then newspapers were left to determine how they would take advantage 
of the Internet in other ways. Pavlik addressed this quandary in a rhetorical question 
directed at the industry, in which he asked if the Internet “is little more than another 
delivery system for “old media”—even if it’s a potentially better delivery system—
what’s all the fuss about?”124 Many of the newspaper industry’s early online efforts 
did not represent an answer to this question. They were content with using the 
Internet as a distribution system. But over time, the industry explored other aspects 
of Internet functionality and experimented with interactivity—not principally as a 
mechanism for dialogue and feedback—but for content selection and presentation.  
 Linking content with interactivity led to the construct of personalization, a 
term that described functionality for allowing users to select the information they 
wanted from a menu of choices.125 In the newspaper industry, personalization had 
been expressed as “The Daily Me,”126 which held particular fascination with editors. 
In this model, editors retained significant control given that content remained 
centrally produced. User interaction was limited to selecting the information they 
received, and in some cases, determining how the information was presented on the 
screen.  
 This model represented a step forward for newspapers in deploying Internet 
functionality and was adopted widely. Some newspapers—the Christian Science 
Monitor and The Wall Street Journal are two examples—thought of personalization 
as such an important functionality that it initially was sold to readers as a premium 
service.127 Critics cautioned that although personalization starts with the user’s 
selection process it was only partially interactive because it relies on “computerized 
‘butlers’ or ‘agents’’ that “are acting on the reader’s behalf,” to process the 
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information that is presented.128 As such, personalization became a tool of the 
Internet, but it was not a construct that defined the content relationship between an 
online publication and its audience. 
Kilker observed that personalization providing users with basic levels of 
control did not go far enough in using the functionality of the Internet and would not 
satisfy consumers who have “additional expectations.” Kilker concluded that “users 
expect to control their media consumption through not only filtering, but also time-
shifting, archiving, and reformulating content.”129 As the Internet unleashed 
increasing expectations, consumers expected traditional media companies to keep up  
with developments. Therefore, newspaper publishers were facing a marketplace very 
different from traditional media. These differences would affect publishers’ ability to 
transpose familiar business practices onto an online market that had spawned new 
competitors free of the newspaper industry conventions.  
 
New Competition 
Newspaper companies in the latter half of the 1990s faced an unsettled online 
environment. Proprietary online systems such as AOL and Prodigy still were adding 
subscribers and Microsoft had launched MSN, a proprietary system of its own. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, these proprietary systems had been allies of the 
newspaper industry. Even Microsoft had forged partnerships with several 
newspapers, including USA Today and The New York Times.130 However, 
Microsoft’s decision to target local markets with an extension of MSN called 
Sidewalk drew the newspaper industry’s ire. A trade article referred to Microsoft’s 
founder Bill Gates as the industry’s “favorite devil in a blue suit.”131 When trade 
articles reported that Microsoft planned to spend as much as $600 million developing 
online content—more than the entire newspaper industry would invest in online 
projects—publishers realized the investment needed to compete had been elevated to 
unexpected levels.132  
 Newspaper executives began to understand that online platforms provided 
friends and adversaries new ways to compete. As online morphed into only the  
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Internet, the speed at which it developed also led to new competition eager to exploit 
what many saw as the newspaper industry’s myopic view of the media landscape. An 
executive with Yahoo!, one of the emerging competitors, observed that newspapers 
have “killer, killer content, but too much pride in their own distribution.”133 The 
implication of that remark was that newspaper companies were too enamoured with 
their own way of operating. The result was a slow response to market changes 
shaped by new competition. 
 Only two years into the Internet era, a trade association report identified “as 
many as 40” new online content companies and several more online classified 
advertising businesses that could be deemed as competitive to newspapers.134 A 
technology writer with The New York Times wrote the newspaper industry found that 
by taking “its revenue model online, it becomes vulnerable to a phalanx of new 
competitors,” because “geography no longer matters.”135 An industry analyst later 
described the result of this activity when he wrote that “the components of what we 
historically know as the newspaper have become unbundled.”136 In considering these 
effects of the new online competition, this chapter next examines the portal 
phenomena followed by a section exploring the emergence of online classified 
companies.    
 
Portals Threaten Using Familiar Model 
Newspapers were accustomed to competing in local markets against other print 
publications, television and radio. The Internet, however, led to national competitors 
with plans to siphon away advertising from local markets as well. As these 
companies quickly evolved from their roots as search engines or content aggregators, 
they became known as portals.  These portals represented a significant early effort by 
non-media companies—for the most part—to apply media-like business models to 
the Internet. The business objective was to aggregate an audience through a variety 
of services and then monetize that audience through advertising supplemented with 
subscriptions and other transactional revenue.  
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According to Hinton, the term “portal” surfaced in industry and trade sources 
in late 1997 and became a mainstream topic for discussion in early 1998.137 Shaw 
defined a portal as website with “at least five core features,” which were listed as 
search, news, reference tools, online shopping, and communications (such as e-mail, 
chat, or message boards).138 The portal construct emerged out of a design “to perform 
two functions.” The first function was to provide utility through the types of features 
just listed, while the second was “to concentrate users and create large audiences, 
thereby generating revenue, typically through advertising.”139 Despite business 
models that relied on advertising support, early portals were not described by 
analysts as media companies. Traditional media and telecommunications companies 
were not involved in creating the portal phenomenon, but as Mansell observed they 
did not “move aggressively into the portal market despite the market potential and 
their existing strengths.”140 In effect, portals were seen as developing independent of 
traditional media, which did little to mount a competitive resistance.  
 AOL and MSN launched portals on the Internet using their roots as 
proprietary online services. But the portal companies attracting the most attention 
were those that evolved from Internet search engines such as Yahoo! and Excite. As 
the market developed, traditional media—especially newspaper companies—were 
seen as in danger of being outflanked by portal competitors that were not so much 
defining a new market as they were redefining an old one. 
 For example, publishers and editors maintained that newspapers would be 
best at translating to the Internet their ability to filter and organize content. However, 
Shaw noted that organizing content was a major strong suit of the portal companies: 
Portals have also taken on the equally important role of aggregators 
of Web-based content, a role that many Web surfers wholeheartedly 
welcome. A good number of Internet users believe portals are 
helping to tame the Internet by organizing its abundant resources 
and helping users better focus their surfing time.141 
 
The acceptance of this functionality by consumers further enhanced the portals’ 
media-type business model and allowed them to occupy a position many newspaper 
publishers thought would be theirs.  
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 Damsgaard said the successful portals went beyond content organization and 
also captured audience by using their own search engines and proprietary e-mail and 
messaging platforms to make their websites destinations on the Internet rather than 
portals to outside content. Damsgaard described this as “closed self-referring systems 
or wall-gardens.”142 Mansell referred to these efforts as “supplier monopolization 
strategies” and credited many of the portal companies with achieving a perception of 
exclusivity or product scarcity through the “balkanization of service offerings.”143 It 
was a market achievement newspaper companies had originally sought, but failed to 
achieve, through their partnerships with the proprietary online services. 
 The success of the portal companies and the business models that supported 
them reflected a market that had come full circle in a short time. Consider Hinton’s 
conclusion: 
By establishing centralised points of access—the construction of 
transactional spaces to mediate users’ interaction with the medium—
portal sites effectively re-establish the structure of power and control 
that early proponents of the Internet hoped would be rendered 
useless and archaic in the distributed, anarchic medium of the 
Internet.144  
 
In essence, the portal companies established a media business model on the Internet 
at the expense of newspaper companies and other traditional media companies. As 
the chief executive officer of Yahoo! Stated: “I don’t think old media is what people 
are going to spend most of their time doing on the Internet. This paradigm needs its 
own inventions, its own methods, its own way to go forward.”145 Traditional media 
had been too slow to react, giving credence to the description of these upstart 
companies as the “new” media.  
 Meisel and Sullivan were among the researchers to study and write about 
portal companies as new forms of media companies. They wrote that portals became 
media in that they deployed familiar media business models, but were “new” in that 
they operated on the Internet and were not tethered to any traditional medium. These 
“new media’ companies, they wrote, emerged from technology innovation, but also 
were often collections of smaller businesses brought together through mergers and 
acquisitions. But Meisel and Sullivan also observed that the emergence of these 
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portal companies was aided, at least in part, by the mistakes of competitors.146 Even 
if the newspaper industry was complicit in allowing the emergence of new media 
competition, publishers had to confront the new reality in moving forward.  
 The Internet had reduced barriers to entry (large capital outlays, economies of 
scale) that had protected newspapers from many forms of direct competition in the 
past.147 Not only did reduced barrier to entry facilitate the rise of news competition, it 
also contributed to the development of businesses taking aim at niche markets. These 
new competitors were focusing on “consumer decision” content that included such 
things as employment, real estate and automotive classified advertising, and 
entertainment listings, which were all areas “where new technology can replace static 
newspaper lists with searchable online-city guides, intelligent search agents and 
personal content.”148 The emergence of this type of competition was most 
threatening to newspaper classified advertising. The following section of the chapter 
explores how the newspaper industry reacted as it faced new electronic threats to its 
very important classified franchise. 
 
The Classified Advertising Threat 
In 1990, newspapers derived $11.5 billion, or 35 percent of overall advertising 
revenue, from classified advertising. By 2000, classified advertising had grown to 
$19.6 billion and represented 40 percent of total newspaper advertising—and an even 
greater percentage at some large metropolitan dailies.149 The growth, however, 
reflected in large measure the industry’s practice of raising rates to help offset 
declines in volume. In the first half of the 1990s for example, classified advertising 
rates “rose an average of nearly 8 percent per year,” outpacing the inflation rate of 3 
percent annually.150 An industry analyst commented that newspaper publishers 
“worry about preserving profits, and they ought to be worrying about preserving 
[the] franchise.”151 The remark suggested the rate increases had allowed newspaper 
companies to maintain revenue growth, but had obscured erosion of the industry’s 
share of classified advertising. 
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Therefore, within the context of this thesis it is important to understand that 
the arrival of Internet-based competition for classified advertising occurred when 
newspapers already were struggling with this category. By 1996 apartment guides 
printed by competitors, for example, were claiming $1 billion in annual revenue that 
at one time had been in newspaper classifieds.152 A study by an industry trade 
association found that employers were spending about 80 percent of their recruitment 
budgets in media other than newspapers, while about 58 percent of real estate 
classified advertising was spent elsewhere. The study prompted the association’s 
economist to warn: “The entire classified category should be considered at risk.” The 
economic importance of classified advertising was illustrated by an industry report 
that showed a newspaper with a typical operating margin of 14 percent would see 
that margin decline to nine percent with a 25 percent decline in classified advertising 
revenue. Should classified revenue fall by 50 percent, the study said operating 
margins would decline to three percent.153 
 Many newspaper companies believed early on that the Internet would be 
useful in mitigating their risk in classified advertising rather than spawn outright 
competition. As such, newspaper companies often provided online listings for free or 
at a reduced price as part of the print-based purchase.154 In doing so, however, 
newspapers devalued their online classifieds and contributed to a market climate 
where low-cost competitors could thrive. Newspapers had learned from the 
popularity of “buy-and-sell sites” on electronic bulletin boards and early videotext 
systems that classified advertising likely would perform well on the Internet.155 To its 
credit, the industry launched several classified advertising ventures and most online 
newspapers featured classified advertising sections. But the industry was criticized 
for failing to implement an effective online classified strategy. In terms of 
production, newspaper companies treated classified advertising in much the same 
way they treated news and information content. Automated systems were developed 
to transmit classified advertising from the printed newspaper to the online 
newspaper. 
 Although newspaper companies could claim their online editions had 
classified advertising, the presentation was often static, providing users limited 
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options for searching and interacting with the advertising. A trade publication 
summarized the newspaper industry’s approach to online classified advertising:  
 … although many newspapers have set up Web sites that include 
classified advertising sections, the strategies and functions of those 
sections are generally weak and ineffectual in comparison to the 
innovative systems deployed by the leading non-newspaper cyber-
classifieds companies.156 
 
Mings and White cited other industry sources that also concluded newspaper 
companies were outmanoeuvred by new Internet companies, including monster.com, 
hotjobs.com, and e-Bay.com in areas such as “immediacy; customizability; and 
special functions such as keyword search and retrieval.”157 A research company 
specializing in Internet-based businesses predicted in 1999 that newspapers would 
lose more than $3 billion in classified advertising revenue over five years to Internet 
competitors.158 Another research firm wrote that “newspapers are going to suffer in 
that they’re going to find an erosion in the big three classified categories—jobs, 
homes and automobiles—and that’s going to put pressure on their traditional 
business.”159 As the scope of the newspaper industry’s classified problem emerged, 
critics began expressing the issue in terms of losing newspapers losing the classified 
franchise.  
 For example, an industry consultant stated: “It is not going to be a matter of if 
they lose their classified lineage, but when and to whom.”160 One of the more critical 
essays accused newspaper publishers of forfeiting their classified advertising 
business without a fight: 
This loss of franchise is not the result of pitched battles between the 
traditional holders, the newspapers, and the new upstarts. Rather, it’s 
all happening very peacefully as the newspapers simply watch and 
study events from the sidelines. The upstarts aren’t “winning” 
market positions that someone else held online, rather, they are 
simply filling in a void that the newspapers as an industry have 
seemingly refused to value.161 
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Industry leaders acknowledged some of the criticism directed their way. For 
example, a trade association’s technology executive conceded that newspaper 
classifieds should be “more facile to work with,” indicating that improvements were 
needed in search and other interactive functionality.162 As for the overall strategic 
approach, however, industry executives continued to position their online classified 
advertising as complementary, not competitive, to their printed product. 
 An example of this approach was Classified Ventures, a partnership that 
included Times Mirror Co., Tribune Co., and the Washington Post Co. The venture 
launched online classified advertising sites, including cars.com and apartments.com, 
and structured distribution agreements through newspaper company websites. But as 
late as 1997, the head of the venture stated that over the next three year horizon, “we 
believe the Internet is not going to have much effect on the newspaper business.” 
Based on that outlook, he added, “we don’t want to do anything in any way to 
threaten the traditional print business.”163 The statement about timing reflected the 
newspaper industry’s attitude about technology—that is was something that would 
have greater impact in the future and that there would be time to figure it out. By not 
giving their own online classified businesses free reign in the market in the 
meantime, however, newspaper companies made themselves even more vulnerable to 
outside competitors.  
An industry commentator wrote that classified advertising had been the 
newspaper industry’s most profitable source of revenue, referring to it as the 
industry’s “secret weapon.”164 In the latter half of the 1990s, however, evidence 
mounted that erosion in the classified advertising segment was contributing to an 
overall slowing of total newspaper advertising growth. When the head of the 
industry’s trade association attributed some of the decline to the effects of Internet 
competition, the commentator wrote in 1999 “this may be the beginning of the 
end.”165 In dollar terms, he was prescient. Total advertising revenue, including 
classifieds, peaked at U.S. newspapers in 2000 at $48.7 billion.166 Nevertheless,  
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newspaper companies remained vigilant about their overall profitability, and 
maintaining profit margins was a key business driver at the end of the decade. The 
final section of this chapter examines the newspaper industry’s financial concerns 
and the influence they had on the industry’s Internet strategy.  
 
Profitability versus Viability 
The newspaper industry was in transition during the 1990s even though many of its 
executives did not fully appreciate at the time that long-term patterns were beginning 
to take shape. The industry’s overall advertising revenue grew 43 percent from 1990 
to 1999, but the nominal expansion masked that total advertising in the U.S. grew 
faster and newspapers lost ground against other media. 
 Nevertheless, newspapers were businesses in demand. Lacy and Martin 
reported that 856 U.S. daily newspapers were sold during the 1990s, including 153 
newspapers “that were sold more than once.” This level of activity meant that “sales 
of daily newspapers in the 1990s were higher than sales for the previous two 
decades,” the researchers wrote.167 The merger and acquisition activity underscored 
the view that newspapers during this period remained favourable businesses to own 
because they were generating significant cash flows and operating profits.168 At the 
end of the decade, newspaper companies averaged a 20 percent pre-tax operating 
profit, compared to 13 percent for all U.S. industries.169 The Tribune Co.’s deal to 
buy Times Mirror Co. for a 100 percent above its stock price demonstrated the 
industry’s conviction that newspaper companies held long-term value.170 
 However, the long-term erosion of advertising market share began to take a 
toll on the industry’s collective psyche in the latter half of the decade when 
newspaper companies lost their coveted advertising leadership position. Consider the 
1996 industry report from the trade association’s chief economist:  
Other media have been gnawing away at our dominance for a 
generation. Our declining performance was not a compelling issue 
before the last recession because all-media advertising growth 
continued to outpace general economic growth. This share erosion, 
though, became painfully apparent during the advertising 
recession.… Nothing in my forecast suggests a reversal of this trend. 
The best I can expect is a slower loss in our share. The long-term 
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implications are dramatic. Our claim as the No. 1 advertising 
medium may soon be history.171 
 
By the following year, the forecast had come true. Television—bolstered by the 
expansion of cable networks—surpassed newspapers in 1997 as the largest 
advertising medium. Television edged ahead that year with a 23.8 percent share of 
the market compared to newspapers’ 22.2 percent market share.172 For the first time 
in decades, the newspaper industry was forced to respond to financial numbers that 
indicated tangible changes in the media landscape.  
 It confronting their new reality newspaper publishers understood the Internet 
needed to be part of a comprehensive strategy, but the uncertainty about what to do 
and how to do it was unnerving. The difficulty in deciding an Internet strategy was 
exacerbated by financial concerns. As Boczkowski wrote “profitability was a 
particularly sensitive issue for online newspapers.” 173 For example, several 
prominent newspaper companies in 1998 reported sizeable losses from their online 
newspapers. Knight-Ridder estimated online losses at $23 million, while Tribune lost 
$35 million. The New York Times Co.’s loss was estimated at between $10 million 
and $15 million and Times Mirror’s loss was estimated at $20 million.174  
 The losses associated with Internet newspapers reminded many executives of 
their experiences with videotext projects a decade earlier and led to introspection 
about the newspaper industry’s ability to affect a different result. One commentator 
summarized the prevailing sentiment:  
… it appears that many people with financial responsibility for 
online news operations … are weary of hemorrhaging cash. After far 
too many years of talk about revenue and nary a peep about profit, 
they would very much like for someone, anyone, to show them the 
money … the questions that one would assume are most critical to 
news organizations online … “Where is the money?” and “How 
long will we have to wait to see it?”—should have been answered 
long before now. 
 
The industry’s frustration also resulted from years of experiments showing not where 
the money was, but where the money was not. For example, newspaper companies 
were generating a considerable amount of revenue for their printed papers from 
subscriptions. The industry averaged about 25 percent of total revenue from 
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subscriptions during this period. 175 In the early years of the Internet, however, 
newspaper companies learned they could not depend on subscriptions to provide any 
meaningful online revenue.  
 One group of researchers observed that “as far as subscription is concerned, 
the situation is not optimistic for online papers. The Internet culture is characterized 
by free information and very few online papers have actually started charging 
readers…. Those that tried to charge readers typically experienced a sharp drop in 
readership.”176 He acknowledged that publishers of large national newspapers such 
as The Wall Street Journal would find a portion of their audience willing to pay for 
an online subscription, but concluded that “for local dailies, charging readers is even 
less realistic as a source of revenue.”177 Lee also wrote that newspapers found their 
readers were unwilling to pay for content, adding that at “worse, the charging scares 
away the readers.”178 
 Some newspaper companies attempted to offset the inability to sell 
subscriptions to their online newspaper by selling access to the Internet itself.179 
These newspaper companies established their own Internet Service Provider (ISP) 
operations and attempted to compete directly with telecommunications providers in 
their markets. In other cases, they partnered with telecommunications providers to 
offer either a co-branded or private-labelled service. One prominent example comes 
from Landmark Communications Inc. and Knight-Ridder Inc. The two newspaper 
companies created a partnership known as InfiNet, which provided ISP services to its 
owners’ newspapers and also sold services to other newspaper companies.180  
 The industry’s trade association did not endorse newspaper companies’ foray 
into the ISP business. Instead, it urged newspaper companies to proceed with 
caution: 
… it’s only a matter of time before the profits from providing 
Internet access grow razor thin. Therefore, consider access as simply 
an entry strategy to leverage the cost of the on-line business and to 
forestall [competitors]. Remember: what customers really buy isn’t 
the pipe at all. It’s access to community, conversation and culture. 
Readers want to be where the pipe leads.181 
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The industry group was prophetic in its forecasts about the ISP business and, in a 
historical context, the newspaper industry’s brief flirtation with it can be summarized 
as inconsequential.  
With paid subscriptions ruled out as short-term revenue source, early online 
newspapers experimented with all types of advertising. In addition to classified 
advertising, online newspapers deployed banner advertising and sold sponsorships 
for specific sections of a website or e-mail delivery of a website’s content.182 As the 
Internet expanded, however, researchers warned that online marketing would allow 
advertisers to bypass newspapers and other traditional media. McMillan wrote that 
“advertisers have new ways of communicating directly with target audiences.”183 To 
counteract this effect, an advertising executive with The Los Angeles Times said 
newspapers should use the Internet as “a logical product expansion … to create a 
pipeline between consumers and advertisers.”184 To remain relevant in the online 
arena, therefore, traditional media—including newspapers—would have to deliver 
what they always had: audience.  
By 1999, online advertising had reached approximately $2.8 billion, which 
was about 1.3 percent of total advertising spending. The online newspaper share of 
the total was miniscule, however. And as the aforementioned losses attest, selling 
enough advertising to offset the cost of operations proved to be problematic. The 
industry’s combined revenue from online newspapers was so inconsequential, the 
trade association did not report the number until it passed the $1.2 billion mark in 
2003.185 By then, overall spending for online advertising was $7.2 billion.186 The 
newspaper industry had some online advertising success, but the verdict on a long-
term value proposition was unsettled at the end of the decade.  
 Boczkowski suggested that the newspaper industry collectively had reacted to 
its circumstances as would be expected of a mature industry—treating the changes in 
the marketplace as evolutionary and making slow and methodical adjustments. He 
wrote: “Newspapers have neither stood still in the midst of major technological 
changes, nor incorporated them from a blank slate, but appropriated novel 
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capabilities … from the starting point of print’s culture.”187 The late 1990s for the 
newspaper industry was as much about confronting its own culture as it was about 
confronting new competition. As Boczkowski wrote, its “actors have attempted to 
create a ‘new’ entity preserving the ‘old’ one.”188 He explained: 
That is, they have tried to transform a delivery vehicle that has 
remained unaltered for centuries, and whose permanence has 
anchored a complex ecology of information symbols, artifacts, and 
practices, while simultaneously aiming to leave the core of what 
they do, and are, untouched.189 
 
Even though the ties to print culture were strong, newspaper companies understood 
they had lost ground to their old nemesis, television, and attempts to exploit the 
Internet as a media platform were falling behind new competition. Newspaper 
executives faced a muddled concept of what their market should look like, but knew 
that audience consumption of news and advertising was changing and would 
continue to change at a rapid pace. It was a difficult period for those operating in a 
tradition-bound culture to grasp the requirements of change. 
 Nevertheless, many in the industry set aside doubts about the financial 
viability of online operations and continued to invest in them. For example, The 
Washington Post Co. in 1998 announced plans for $100 million in new Internet 
spending, while The New York Times Co. told its investors to expect losses from 
online operations to grow as the company continued to spend on development.190 
From an overall industry perspective, however, no coherent strategy emerged for 
exploiting online technologies. Readers defected in larger numbers, advertisers 
sought better solutions and the investment community wanted answers from 
newspaper companies about their plans for fixing their problems.  The cumulative 
effect of these issues will be addressed in Chapter Seven.   
 
Conclusion 
The newspaper industry during the 1990s had its critics; those who believed 
publishers were complicit in enabling the rise of new media companies by failing to 
mount an aggressive competitive response. These critics argued that newspaper 
companies erred in choosing not to invest in innovation at levels required to fend off 
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competition from the portal companies or the new purveyors of classified advertising 
services. 
 Clearly, the newspaper industry was surprised by the speed at which the 
Internet became a media platform for consumers.  As this chapter recalled, 
newspaper companies were just getting comfortable in their partnerships with 
proprietary online services when the Internet emerged. Once the Internet 
phenomenon was understood, however, newspapers were collectively interested in 
exploiting it. Collectively is the operative word given that the newspaper industry’s 
most aggressive action during this period led to the creation of NCN, a consortium 
intended to provide the newspaper industry with a competitive Internet platform. 
 The case study of NCN as presented in this thesis serves as an analogy for the 
broader perspective of the newspaper industry at the beginning of the Internet era. 
NCN represented the grandiose dreams of an industry that proved incapable of 
executing the details required for success in a rapidly changing market. Moreover, 
the demise of NCN revealed that the newspaper industry was less of an industry in 
the traditional sense and more of a disparate collection of companies with differing 
agendas and perspectives on the direction of the marketplace.  
 The developments recounted in this chapter – beginning with the debut of 
Mosaic through to the threats from new classified advertising competition - illustrate 
the fundamental shift away from the traditional media model. Operating within that 
traditional model, newspaper companies were central organizations that championed 
their role as agenda-setters and saw it as their mission to control when and how 
information would flow to readers. As was discussed in previous chapters, 
newspaper executives believed this industry’s model, which established control from 
the point of content creation through to its distribution, could be translated to a 
successful online model. This premise underpinned the industry’s partnerships with 
the proprietary online services. 
  However, newspaper companies found that operating on the Internet meant 
they could no longer control information flow; the distribution channel was no longer 
a one-to-many model. The Internet model was user-centric and embraced 
interactivity. Newspaper companies were forced to compete along with many other 
content providers as mere contributors to a vast, wide open network. While 
newspaper companies had no choice but to accept the new distribution realities—that 
was simply how the Internet worked—they struggled with relinquishing control over 
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their content. The discussion in this chapter surrounding the decisions to embargo 
content—preventing it from appearing online until after it had appeared in print—
demonstrated the seriousness of this issue to newspaper companies at that time. The 
tension surrounding such content decisions defined the newspaper industry’s 
relationship with the Internet in its early years. 
 The newspaper industry required much of the late 1990s and a portion of the 
early 2000s to address the many cultural and business model issues that hampered its 
Internet efforts. Many critics contend that by the time the industry understood that its 
model had to change, readers, advertisers and investors no longer cared. In Chapter 
Seven, this thesis examines the newspaper industry and its relationship with the 
Internet during the first half of the 2000s. Chapter Seven gives particular attention to 
the newspaper industry’s investment constituency. It examines the reaction of 
newspaper companies to the Internet sector’s investment bubble and subsequent 
crash and looks critically at how the newspaper industry viewed its own business 
model during this tumultuous period. In the early 2000s, investors demanded that 
public newspaper companies take action to validate their long-term viability. Chapter 
Seven first discusses the merger between AOL and Time Warner as a deal that 
reverberated throughout all sectors of traditional media and caused the newspaper 
industry to consider alliances with television stations as a pragmatic convergence 
strategy. Within this context, Chapter Seven discusses the ramifications of the 
newspaper industry’s strained relationship with the investment community and 
concludes with Knight-Ridder’s decision to sell its newspaper holdings and close the 
company as the ultimate referendum on the newspaper industry’s future.  
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Chapter Seven: 
Mergers, Convergence, and an Industry Under Siege 
 
AOL announced on January 10, 2000, that it planned to acquire Time Warner Inc. in 
a deal valued at $162 billion.1 The monetary size of the deal attested to its scope and 
significance, but the transaction reverberated through all segments of the media 
industry as it became recognized as a seminal event: a new media company was 
about to buy a venerable old media company. The timing of the announcement – 
only days into the year 2000 – served to amplify its cultural significance. The 
mainstream media, which had been rife with futuristic commentary surrounding the 
arrival of a new millennium, seized on AOL’s announcement as evidence of 
fundamental change. One commentator within that atmosphere of rhetoric said AOL 
acquiring Time Warner signalled “a new era in both the culture industries and the 
economy more broadly,” adding that the deal was “a rhetorical as well as financial 
watershed, the coronation” of the “new economy.”2 
Although the merger of AOL and Time Warner did not directly involve the 
newspaper industry, it represents an important milestone within the context of this 
thesis because it demonstrated on a large scale how much clout new media 
companies had achieved by 2000.  The AOL and Time Warner merger raised the 
stakes for traditional media companies trying to compete in the new marketplace.  
Many commentators described the merger as another development leading to the 
impending “death of the old media.”3 Newspaper industry executives were forced to 
react and to explain how their traditional media businesses could prosper in an era 
that was being defined by emerging new media brands.   
 The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the newspaper industry 
responded to the market challenges confronting it in the first few years of the twenty-
first century. This chapter establishes historical context through a discussion of the 
economic climate of the period, which was defined by the inflation and collapse of 
the investment bubble in Internet-related companies. The chapter explores the intense 
media merger activity that took place during the period and presents the combination 
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of Tribune Co. and Times Mirror Inc. as an example of the newspaper industry’s 
foray into the merger frenzy.  The chapter also looks at how the newspaper industry, 
which had been confounded by the rise of Internet company stock values, assumed 
the dot.com crash represented the end of competition from new media. During much 
of the early 2000s, newspaper companies sought strategic solutions through 
partnerships with old television rivals as both forms of traditional media attempted to 
navigate a way forward. These partnerships led to many “operational convergence” 
initiatives which can be understood in terms of the concepts presented in Chapter 
One. Media General’s convergence project in Tampa, Florida, is presented as a 
detailed example of this trend.  However, since these convergence projects usually 
failed to deliver tangible results, the chapter also explains how industry investors 
began to demand that newspaper companies articulate a long-term vision for their 
economic viability. 
 Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the newspaper industry believed that 
it would lead the media’s digital transformation or greatly influence those who 
would.  Yet the industry did not and, by the early 2000s, it was at risk of becoming 
marginalized as new companies transformed the Internet into a media platform.  The 
example of Knight-Ridder Inc. illustrates how the fortunes of the newspaper industry 
had changed. Once at the forefront of the newspaper industry’s online endeavours, 
Knight-Ridder faced intense pressure from investors who believed the company was 
underperforming. The investors urged the company to sell its newspaper holdings 
and shut down. When Knight-Ridder’s management capitulated, the episode became 
symbolic of an entire industry’s plight. Therefore, as part of the overall thesis, this 
chapter provides important insights into the critical period in media history when the 
U.S. newspaper industry first realized that its era of dominance had ended.   
 
The Internet Bubble and Collapse 
In the early 2000s, newspaper company decisions regarding an Internet strategy were 
made against the backdrop of a capital market that underwent dramatic changes in a 
short time period. A vast escalation in the value of Internet-based businesses that 
began in the late 1990s came to an abrupt end in mid-2000. A period now recognized 
as the Internet bubble gave way to the dot.com investment collapse. This thesis will 
not recount the complex investment issues of this period, but a brief description 
provides historical context.  Stocks in Internet-based companies soared in the late 
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1990s as investors speculated on the long-term potential of these businesses. As an 
investment class, Internet companies were not profitable and most had unproven 
business models and uncertain sources of revenue. Nevertheless, investors bid up the 
prices of shares in Internet companies in hopes that their business models would 
someday align with their potential. The index measuring the value of the market 
where most Internet stocks were listed peaked at over 5,100 points in March 2000,4 
which represented a remarkable increase from less than 800 points in early 1995.5 
This surge in stock value gave Internet companies currency to make acquisitions that 
their balance sheets otherwise would not have allowed.  
 Gershon and Alhassan observed that the fascination with the AOL and Time 
Warner deal—beyond the huge dollar value—was due to AOL’s role as the 
purchaser: 
What was particularly unique about the deal was that AOL with one 
fifth of the revenue and 15% of the workforce of Time Warner was 
planning to purchase the largest [media] company in the world. Such 
was the nature of Internet economics that allowed Wall Street to 
assign a monetary value to AOL well in excess of its actual value.6 
 
While Prodigy and CompuServe faded from prominence, AOL had exploited the 
Internet to its advantage in the late 1990s and built a subscriber base of more than 22 
million by 2000.7 The financial markets during this period of exuberance rewarded 
AOL by assigning an enormous value to the size of its audience. It was the market’s 
valuation of AOL—not the company’s underlying financial performance—that 
allowed it to acquire Time Warner. 
 
 Mergers Alter the Media Market 
Although the AOL and Time Warner merger is recalled as symbolic of its time, it 
was part of a series of significant mergers that altered the media landscape. General 
Electric had acquired NBC, Disney had taken over ABC, and Viacom had purchased 
CBS. Even Time Warner was the result of a merger of two media giants, which had 
subsequently purchased Turner Broadcasting and its flagship property, CNN.8 An 
industry analyst said the merger activity stemmed from the belief that consolidation  
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“should create media platforms with the leverage and scale to introduce [new] 
services widely and economically.”9 During this period, achieving economies of 
scale was viewed as a key business strategy within the media industry. Diversity of 
content was also seen as an important element that led media companies to acquire 
businesses involved in all types of media production.  
 Critics worried, however, that the level of consolidation would reduce the 
number of media owners to a point where the diversity of sources would limit 
consumer choice and threaten independent journalism by placing control of news 
organizations in the hands of only a few corporate owners. One analyst noted that 
some “now wonder how much more wheeling and dealing can go on before there are 
but one or two juggernauts controlling every image, syllable and sound of 
information and entertainment.”10 He concluded, however, that merger activity in the 
media industry had not run its course:  
Actually, the [media] industry has a long way to go yet before it 
reaches that point. There are more than 100 media companies 
worldwide, with more than $1 billion in revenues; and entertainment 
and media are still fragmented compared with other industries such 
as pharmaceuticals or aerospace.11 
 
 The issue was sensitive in the newspaper industry where recent merger and 
acquisition activity had ended decades of family ownership and local market control. 
Newspapers were bought and sold at a record pace during the 1990s and by the mid-
2000s consolidation had changed the fundamental nature of the industry. An industry 
report found “the 10 largest newspaper groups already control half of the nation’s 
daily circulation.”12 Nevertheless, industry analysts believed the newspaper industry 
needed more consolidation to achieve the economies of scale required to compete in 
the new media landscape. The circumstances confronting the newspaper industry 
prompted one analyst to observe:  
The rules have been changed by the globalization of business and, 
especially for media companies, the rise of the Internet. As 
uncomfortable as it might be for some, newspapers have no choice 
but to plunge in.13 
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The observation illustrates that, from the perspective of the investment community, 
the newspaper industry was not doing enough to remain viable. Newspaper 
executives were expected to take action. 
 The most significant response came in the form of a large internal industry 
merger. Tribune Co. announced that it would acquire Times Mirror,14 linking such 
stalwart newspapers as The Los Angeles Times and The Chicago Tribune under 
common ownership. Times Mirror owned no television stations (Tribune owned 22 
television stations at the time) and had relatively little investment in Internet 
businesses aside from websites affiliated with its newspapers.15 This meant that 
Tribune believed investing in additional newspapers was its best way to expand its 
geographic footprint.16 Tribune’s management said its acquisition of Times Mirror 
would give the merged company a sizeable presence in the nation’s top three media 
markets and would allow the company to expand Internet operations there. Tribune’s 
CEO stated:  
In the interactive market, we now have the spine of a national 
network. This should permit us to deal more effectively with 
whatever threats and opportunities arise. Tribune Interactive should 
now be a much more attractive candidate for partnership with any 
firm hoping to get a foothold on audience. And we should be far 
more attractive to the national advertisers that are the biggest players 
in the Internet.17  
 
Critics had argued that the regional nature of most newspaper companies made it 
difficult for them to operate on a scale large enough to compete with media that 
offered advertisers national reach. Tribune’s acquisition of Times Mirror was 
designed to address such market shortcomings. 
 However, the deal was criticized as a defensive move by old media 
businesses. For example, one critical assessment said that “the combined 
[newspaper] company looks more like an industrial age holdout than a 21st century 
media giant.” The commentator called it “not too surprising that” Tribune’s 
management “was spinning this deal as … a Web thing,” but called it a “ploy to 
appease certain investors.”18 Whether or not it was a “ploy” is open to interpretation,  
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but the fact that that Tribune’s management felt compelled to position the deal in 
terms of an Internet strategy reflected the underlying market changes. From an 
investment perspective, Internet companies had usurped power from traditional 
media businesses, which were forced to position their dealings in terms that this new 
market would accept.   
 Although newspaper industry executives were confounded by what they 
perceived as the market’s irrational behaviour, there nevertheless, was strong interest 
by many to cash in on the Internet boom as it transpired. As was noted in the 
previous chapter, for example, several newspaper companies wanted NCN to issue 
public stock. The disagreement over that issue was a factor in NCN’s demise. During 
this period, Cox Enterprises19 and The New York Times Co. also formulated plans to 
spin out their online operations as separate public companies.20 Newspaper 
companies continued to post sizeable profits with average operating margins of about 
20 percent during this period, and industry executives believed that such numbers 
should be rewarded by the market instead of Internet companies with enormous 
losses.21 However, the stock market collapsed before the newspaper industry reaped 
any direct benefit from the bubble.  
  
The Aftermath of the Bubble Collapse 
By the end of 2000, the index measuring the value of the market where most Internet 
stocks were listed had lost more than half of its value and stood at less than 2,500.22 
Bontis and Mill concluded in a “post-mortem” analysis of the market during this 
period that in the absence of business fundamentals investing in Internet stocks “was 
similar to gambling in a casino.”23 They found that investors acted more like 
speculators and assigned higher value to Internet metrics such as a website’s number 
of unique visitors than to underlying business fundamentals such as the ability to 
generate revenue and control expenses.24  
 Despite their own missed opportunities to capitalize on the stock market’s 
surge, newspaper executives collectively seemed relieved by the collapse of the 
Internet bubble. While no one embraced the recessionary economy that also affected 
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this period, the collapse of Internet investment speculation was viewed by many 
newspaper executives as vindication for businesses that were profitable. These 
executives understood the market collapse did not mean the Internet would go away 
entirely, but they felt the sudden end to market speculation had validated their 
industry’s cautious response. By not fully chasing the Internet based on investment 
speculation, the newspaper industry believed it had once again prevailed in saving its 
long-term franchise. 
 The following excerpt from the Columbia Journalism Review illustrates 
newspaper industry sentiment in 2001: “the rush to the Web was breathtaking. It 
began with bold proclamations that old media’s days were numbered, and ended with 
old media—and its established brands—still standing when the smoke cleared from 
the dot-com burnout.”25 Not only were these brands still standing, the industry was 
resolute in believing that it was poised to prosper in the next phase as illustrated by 
the comment from the head of Knight-Ridder’s Internet operations:  
We’re seeing in the Internet industry what a lot of reasoned people 
have expected for a long time. After a phase one of innovation and 
experimentation, we’re in a phase two of consolidation and seeing 
that some business models work and some don’t. That is leading to a 
third phase, in which those who survive the second phase reap the 
considerable benefits of the Internet’s growth.26 
 
The AOL and Time Warner merger, hailed as a sign of the new economy in 2000, 
was by 2003 seen as evidence of the ruinous result of speculative investment. The 
combined company was in disarray. It reported a $99 billion loss and a board of 
directors embarrassed by the outcome of the merger dropped AOL from the 
company’s name. Gershon and Alhassan observed that “the AOL Time Warner 
merger may well be remembered as one of the worst mergers in US corporate 
history.”27 Newspaper industry executives were relieved to have avoided such a 
debacle and were intent on demonstrating to the investment community the wisdom 
of pursing profits rather than betting on speculative ventures. The newspaper 
industry believed the end of the Internet investment bubble represented an 
opportunity to win back favour in the investment community. By embracing 
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profitability, newspaper executives wanted to show they knew how to create value 
where so many pure Internet companies had failed. 
 
Newspapers Emphasize Online Profits 
Against this backdrop, newspaper companies became headstrong in presenting their 
online editions to their shareholders as rational, profit-producing business units that 
enhanced the printed product. As the publisher of The Denver Post expressed: “The 
future is print. Electronic communications strengthen print.”28 This reflected the 
prevailing attitude of newspaper executives during the period immediately following 
the collapse of the Internet investment bubble. Executives believed that newspaper 
companies had survived the arrival of the Internet and its associated irrational 
business practices. As such, they were positioned to use their companies’ financial 
strength to exploit the Internet on their terms.  
 The cover of a summer 2002 issue of the industry’s official trade journal, 
Presstime, underscored how important the issue of online profitability had become to 
U.S. newspapers. The illustration featured a man in a press hat carrying a bag of cash 
under the headline: “You Made Money!” The graphic depiction demonstrated an 
industry out to prove to its members and to others that newspapers could make 
money on the Internet. The article concluded that success was there for the taking: 
“No one can make the lame excuse that ‘Nobody’s making money online’ 
anymore.”29 The amount of money being made, however, was a matter of 
interpretation. Some organizations claimed online profit margins of 40 percent or 
more. An industry analyst stated that “about a third of online newspapers broke even 
… a third were in the red and a third were profitable.”30 Nevertheless, the fact that 
two-thirds of the industry claimed to have figured out how not to lose money with 
their Internet operations was hailed as a significant accomplishment.  
 In looking back on this period, The New York Times Co. can be seen as 
having a significant influence on its industry’s perspective regarding Internet 
profitability. As noted earlier, the company had attempted to capitalize on the 
skyrocketing valuations with a plan to make its Internet operations into a new 
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company that would have gone public through an initial stock offering. When the 
market collapsed, those plans were shelved and a new strategy was adopted.  
 The New York Times Co. believed Internet operations had to become cash-
flow positive in their own right to prove that the projects were worth pursuing. As 
the executive in charge of Internet operations stated: “we knew that just getting to 
break-even was not enough.”31 Achieving profitability, however, was not possible 
through revenue growth alone. The New York Times Co. cut expenses, which 
included eliminating 116 positions. In about a year, the company’s digital operations 
went from posting a loss of $7 million to reporting a small operating profit of 
$200,000.32 The performance was considered a newspaper industry milestone—
Internet profitability had been achieved at one of its most stalwart companies. 
However, the industry’s focus on Internet profitability led to increased scrutiny from 
analysts and investors who were interested in how those profits were calculated. 
 One analysis, for example, speculated that it was “doubtful that The New 
York Times could survive separately as a web edition,” adding that “every profitable 
web news site of any significance depends on a non-web news organization, drawing 
on, but not paying for, its newsgathering resources.”33 The concern among industry 
analysts was that newspaper companies were not accurately reflecting the true costs 
of doing business on the Internet. The analysts were not as concerned with online 
profitability as the newspaper companies were, but they wanted public newspaper 
companies to be transparent in how they accounted for their online operations.  
 An executive with The New York Times Co. conceded that some newspaper 
“companies have a history of burying losses in new-media units—not deliberately, 
but just saying, ‘We won’t count this or we won’t count that.” But the executive said 
of his company: “we count everything,” pointing out that the online operation paid 
10 percent of its revenue, or at least $5 million annually, for the print content it 
used.34 How newspapers addressed this issue varied from company to company. It 
was determined by an operating philosophy of whether or not Internet operations 
were seen as an extension of the printed product or as a separate business. 
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 An executive of The San Diego Union-Tribune said “the fundamental idea is 
to carefully measure the incremental costs and revenues of the online operation,” not 
to determine how the Internet would perform as a standalone business, “but whether 
it is a profitable new edition of the newspaper.” The San Diego Union-Tribune 
attempted to assign most costs, but noted that some were not calculated as part of the 
online operations’ expenses such as employee medical benefits or the value of 
promotion the online version received from the printed paper.35 During this period, 
newspaper companies were comfortable in describing their online newspaper as an 
edition of the printed newspaper. It was a convenient metaphor for explaining 
organizational structure and the assignment of costs. 
 However, in only a couple of years from the collapse of the Internet bubble, 
concerns over the minutiae of online profitability gave way to a much bigger issue. 
The newspaper industry continued to experience advertising erosion and investors 
wanted to know when—or if—the online editions would produce enough revenue to 
offset this trend.  Despite the investment collapse in Internet stocks, the popular 
financial press continued to describe the Internet as a significant threat to the 
newspaper industry’s revenue. One article concluded that “over the horizon loom 
some of the toughest tests for the industry since the advent of television.”36 
Newspaper companies had prospered during the television era, but the financial 
community believed the Internet represented a new form of competition—one that 
would directly threaten sources of advertising revenue that television had not. Given 
the mounting pressure to find alternative ways to operate, newspaper companies once 
again turned to a partnership model. This time, however, they were joining forces 
with their old television rivals under the guise of an emerging buzzword—
convergence. 
 
Convergence as a Strategy 
Against the backdrop of media mergers in the early 2000s, Fallows stated that the 
activity “intensifies the impression that all media are part of one big octopus-like 
conglomerate.”37 The observation was part of the growing discussion in both 
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industry and academic journals during this period in which media mergers and the 
notion of convergence became entangled.  
 Dowling, Lechner, and Thielmann have defined convergence as “a process 
change in industry structures that combines markets through technological and 
economic dimensions to meet merging consumer needs,” adding that convergence 
“occurs either through competitive substitution or through the complementary 
merging of products or services or both at once.”38 Dowling and Thielmann also 
observed that such activity could “affect industry structures as well as firm-specific 
managerial creativity.”39 They wrote: 
… if convergence is the significant trend, the basic form can differ 
on a spectrum between competition and complementarity—leading 
either to a conglomerate market or to the emergence of a new market 
or market segment.40  
 
Within this framework of convergence, newspaper executives attempted to answer 
two important questions about their industry’s position in the market. First, could 
newspaper companies remain financially robust enough to be relevant in a market 
dominated by large conglomerates? Even executives of newspaper companies 
already part of large corporations believed their industry had to prove its relative 
worth. Second, could newspaper companies exploit partnerships so that such deals 
could achieve the scale required to be competitive in the emerging Internet market? 
Following the intense period of partnerships with proprietary services, most 
newspaper companies initially created an Internet presence on their own. But in the 
early 2000s, newspaper executives sought new partners they hoped would help them 
create richer online content and share the financial risk of broadening the product 
concept. The following section of the chapter explores how the newspaper industry 
attempted to answer those questions by partnering with television stations in local 
markets in a form of operational convergence, what Dominick had explained as 
occurring “when owners of several media properties in one market combine their 
separate operations into a single effort.”41  
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Newspapers and Television: Old Rivals Cooperate 
By 2000, nearly all of the nation’s 1,500 daily newspapers had a website.42 The 
question of whether a newspaper would have a website was no longer pertinent; that 
question had been answered by an overwhelming view that an “online presence is 
essential to their competitive success.”43 The issue was now one of execution and 
newspaper companies were seeking approaches that would create scale in the 
markets they served, but at a reasonable cost. In this effort, newspaper companies 
fixated on the possibilities of partnering with their one-time rivals—local market 
television stations.  
 Scott noted that a prevailing sentiment during this period was that news sites 
on the Internet were “a supplement and a complement to the dominant print and 
broadcast news media,” adding that a “considerable debate” existed “over whether 
the internet will prove to be a new medium at all or, rather, more simply serve as a 
better tool for distribution.”44 Traditional media companies understood, however, 
that the investment community valued the Internet products more than the core 
television or newspaper business in many cases. Therefore, until the market sorted 
itself out,  traditional media rivals—newspaper and television companies—set aside 
their competitive differences and pooled resources as they looked for ways to make 
their online efforts viable. Dominick explained the advantages they were seeking: 
It saves money because, rather than hiring a separate news staff for 
each medium, an operation can have the same reporters produce 
stories for the paper, Web site, and TV station. In addition, each 
medium can promote its partners. For instance, the TV newscast can 
encourage readers to visit the Web site or the print newspaper.45 
   
 Several researchers studied this convergence phenomenon and proffered 
explanations about why it was occurring. Scott concluded that during this period the 
term “convergence” described a “new strategy in the economic management of 
information production and distribution.”46 Singer was more explicit in defining this 
practical manifestation of convergence. She wrote that “it refers to what happens 
inside a newsroom, specifically to cooperation among print, television and online 
journalists to tell a story to as many audience members as possible through a variety 
                                               
42. Hickey, “Coping with Mega-Mergers,” 20. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Scott, “A Contemporary History of Digital Journalism,” 93. 
45. Dominick, The Dynamics of Mass Communication, 21. 
46. Scott, “A Contemporary History of Digital Journalism,” 101. 
255 
 
of delivery systems.”47 Singer also noted that this form of convergence relied on 
“some combination of technologies, products, staffs and geography among the 
previously distinct provinces of print, television and online media.”48 Lawson-
Borders wrote that it reflects “the realm of possibilities when cooperation occurs 
between print and broadcast for the delivery of multimedia content through the use of 
computers and the Internet.”49 The common theme that emerged from these 
researchers is that the term “convergence” was no longer restricted by industry 
participants to a theoretical construct reserved for defining the technical 
consolidation of media platforms. Rather, the term as used by industry practitioners 
during this period, represented the practical notion of removing expense and 
overhead from news operations by combining the newsrooms of newspapers and 
television stations and the creation of content distribution alliances over the Internet. 
 In this application, convergence was applied to the cooperative partnerships 
that were formed among media companies that had been long-term competitors, 
specifically newspapers and local television stations in the newspapers’ markets. To 
some these partnerships were unexpected, and viewed as hasty and imprudent 
reactions to Internet-based media.  Wirtz, however, observed that it was a natural 
market development for convergence to take place among existing market 
participants in this manner. He surmised that such convergence activity was to be 
expected “since the multimedia market does not have to be built up from scratch, but 
is much more a combination of extant elements and applications.”50 He believed that 
a variety of players serving different aspects of a media market would join together 
because it made economic sense to do so. Wirtz concluded:  
… it remains evident that hardly any single market participant can 
capture the multimedia market alone. An integration strategy 
minimizes risk within the process of capturing the market through an 
efficient bundling of resources and a dispersion of the capital raising 
responsibility among several market participants.51 
 
From this perspective, the participation of newspaper companies in convergence 
activity can be viewed not as a new strategy, but as a continuation of the risk 
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management approach that had led to earlier partnerships with cable television 
companies and proprietary online services. Newspaper companies had always 
wanted to exploit online media, but had long shown reluctance to pursue projects 
independently. Television affiliations appeared to give it the security to move in new 
directions. 
 In 2001 there were about 50 convergence projects fitting this new definition 
underway in this U.S., but the number was expected to increase.52 According to 
Gentry:  
This is all in its infancy and it’s happening because newspapers are 
seeing subscriptions declining and TV stations are watching viewers 
decline and they figure that if they can cross promote each other and 
share resources, they can attract new audiences and save money…. 
This is much more than a trend. It’s a movement.53  
 
Indeed, in April 2003, duPlessis and Li reviewed the content of the online 
newspapers associated with the largest 100 circulated U.S. newspapers. The 
researchers wanted to gain a greater understanding of the effects of what they 
referred to as cross-media partnerships, which they defined as providing content to 
newspaper websites through alliances with media such as television stations. This 
study found that 86 of the 100 newspapers studied had some form of cross-media 
partnership54, underscoring how widespread the practice had become.  
 With so many projects underway or planned, it is not possible to describe 
them all except to say that they broadly fit within the understanding of operational 
convergence. Singer, for example, wrote that convergent “processes and outcomes 
vary widely” from market to market.55 She observed:  
For some, convergence emphasizes information sharing. For others, 
it involves newspaper reporters taping a voiceover for a newscast, or 
television reporters phoning in breaking news details to update a 
website. In a few markets, journalists gather information that they 
turn into an immediate online story, a package for the evening news 
and an article for the next day’s paper. Convergence can mean 
working in separate buildings—or at adjacent desks.56 
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Singer believed that because of the diversity of such activity, the process would be 
fluid for a long period. She wrote that her “study indicates there are many different 
ways to converge, and models will evolve to suit unique organizations, markets and 
cultures.”57 Lawson-Borders shared this notion and wrote that “convergence is not 
static, but rather a continuum in which organizations must select the appropriate 
medium or combination thereof to reach their goals.”58  
 To gain further insight into what this type of convergence represented, it is 
useful to consider several examples of such activity underway during this period. 
Convergence projects during this period often included properties that were under 
common ownership. Belo Corp. in Dallas, TX, sought to foster partnerships among 
the properties it owned there including The Dallas Morning News, WFAA-TV, and 
TXCN, a statewide cable news operation.59 Tribune in Chicago teamed the news 
operations of The Chicago Tribune and its WGN-TV along with CLTV, a local cable 
news service.60 Media General’s project in Tampa, Florida, was the most often cited 
example convergence occurring under common ownership and will explored in more 
detail later in the chapter.  
 Such activity, however, was not limited to large metropolitan markets. The 
World Company in Lawrence, Kansas, for example, used its common ownership of 
the local newspaper, a television station, and the cable system to launch numerous 
cross-platform projects. The initiatives were so widespread that one critic described 
the small market as “the land that antitrust [law] forgot.”61 Projects also occurred 
outside of common ownership. For example, Gaylord’s Daily Oklahoman joined 
forces with Griffin Communications’ KWTV to produce news stories for use in print 
and on television. Three months after beginning their traditional media cooperation, 
the two Oklahoma City media entities joined their Internet sites to create a new entity 
called NewsOK.com.62  
 Most analysis of the convergence projects from the early 2000s focused on 
content creation and dissemination. There was little mention of the business issues 
aside from cross promotion. In Topeka, Kansas, the Capital-Journal and WIBW 
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radio, both owned by Morris Communications, partnered with KSNT-TV owned by 
Emmis Broadcasting, to not only share news resources, but to also sell “bundled 
advertising packages among the various media.”63 This partnership was one of the 
rare examples where advertising synergies were mentioned as part of the core 
strategy. As the general manager of NewsOK.com observed: “The editorial part was 
the easiest. In advertising and sales, no one really wants to share money.”64 
Therefore, most of these deals were designed around sharing expenses not revenue. 
The critical element driving this type of convergence was a fundamental assumption 
that leveraging resources among the various media entities involved would result in a 
competitive advantage.65 It was implicitly understood that revenue would follow if 
such advantages were achieved. 
 In keeping with this line of thinking, some media companies believed their 
convergence projects represented another step in an inevitable evolution of media 
that would one day eliminate the distinctions separating print from broadcast. They 
pursued these projects out of conviction that “breaking down barriers between media 
platforms, services and industries” was a transformative process that that would 
allow for once disparate industries to be “conceptualized under the umbrella of a new 
business sector, the information industries.”66 The following subsection of this 
chapter presents a more thorough examination of the most prominent operational 
convergence project of this period. 
 
Media General and its Tampa Model  
To understand this thinking more clearly, the thesis will now look in detail at one of 
the clearest examples of operational convergence in this period: the way Media 
General went about the business of convergence in Tampa, Florida. Although there 
were numerous convergence projects underway as noted previously, the initiative 
undertaken in Tampa by Media General attracted the most attention from industry 
press as well as academic researchers. This was due to the size and scope of the 
effort relative to other projects and was reflected in the significant amount of 
resources Media General dedicated to the initiative. This example is explored in 
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greater detail because it provides rich insights into how a traditional media company 
viewed its market during this period. Kolodzy had observed that if “convergence 
means cooperative relationships between television, online, and print media,” then 
success would depend on management’s ability “to play to the strengths of each 
medium, and to respect those strengths.”67 From the outset, executives at Media 
General expressed similar views, maintaining that convergence would work when 
traditional media took the best of their operations and combined those strengths with 
the efficiencies of Internet distribution. 
 Media General owned the Tampa Tribune, a 238,000-circulation newspaper; 
one of the market’s leading television stations, WFLA-TV; and Tampa Bay Online, 
which was on the Internet at www.tbo.com. In 2000, Media General moved all three 
of its Tampa media properties into a new facility—a 120,000 square foot building it 
called “The News Center.” But as word spread in the industry about how Media 
General planned to integrate its media holdings, some began calling the new facility 
a “temple of convergence.”68 The following excerpt from an article published by the 
Poynter Institute describes the operations:  
It sits on the banks of the Hillsborough River in Tampa, a gleaming 
new $34 million building that has become the poster child for one of 
the most powerful but controversial trends sweeping the news 
industry: Convergence…. From the Internet to new breakthroughs in 
digital imaging to a public that demands better, fresher and more 
diverse news, the converging of different journalistic disciplines is 
dramatically changing the landscape of American journalism. 
Nowhere is this more ingrained than what’s happening in Tampa…. 
TV reporters do their stand-ups and then write bylined newspaper 
stories. Newspaper reporters write their stories and then appear 
before TV cameras to do “talk-back” debriefings or their own stand-
ups. And everybody — reporters, editors, photographers — 
“repurpose” their work for the website.69 
 
Initially, management emphasized that although the news operations of the TV 
station, newspaper, and website shared a common physical location, they were 
continuing to operate as separate and distinct entities that “make news decisions 
independent of one another.”70 As the newspaper’s editor stated: “we are careful to 
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stress that there is no merger of the newsrooms, although the cooperation is 
unprecedented.”71 To many observers, however, the distinction between a “merger” 
of newsrooms and “unprecedented cooperation” was semantics. In practice, the 
centrepiece of the facility’s new newsroom was an area known as the “superdesk” 
where newspaper editors, television producers, and website managers came together 
to coordinate the activities of all news gathering personnel. 
 The superdesk was a tangible symbol of convergence. One trade journal 
stated that it “signals a change in the way journalists at all three media organizations 
will work.”72 Once the newsroom and its superdesk were operational, management 
conceded that there were many cultural issues that had to be adjudicated. This 
prompted the newspaper’s executive editor to state: “Convergence is a contact sport. 
It happens one staff collision at a time.”73 Singer’s research of convergence, which 
included the Tampa market, concluded that the cultural issues of combining 
operations would be difficult to overcome.  
 The independent and competitive culture of newspaper newsrooms made it 
difficult for those journalists to accept convergence. Singer’s study stated that print 
journalists especially expressed “being appalled when they learned they would be 
converging with their television counterparts.”74 Despite the concerns of many of his 
newsroom colleagues, the Tribune’s editor believed the goal of convergence was 
worth the pain associated with forcing cultural changes into the organizations. In an 
article he wrote for The American Editor, an ANSE journal, the editor described for 
journalists why he supported the practical manifestation of convergence: 
Our purpose is to serve the changing needs of readers and viewers. 
They are ahead of us in using a combination of print, broadcast and 
the Internet during the day. Our rationale: Be there with news and 
information whenever and however our customers need and want us 
to be. For breaking news, we aim to “publish” on the first available 
platform, usually television but sometimes online. On enterprise, we 
want to extend the work of our journalists across platforms in a 
natural way.75  
 
This comment was intended to help explain why a journalist would support 
convergence, but the editor also was aware that critics believed convergence was not  
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an altruistic strategy but one designed only for cutting costs in the face of 
increasing competition. Kolodzy summarized this perspective: “… critics equate 
convergence with a loss of jobs, heavier workloads for journalists, and monolithic 
news and opinion. They see it as the manifestation of the dark side of media 
consolidation.”76 The Tribune’s editor argued, however, that efficiencies associated 
with convergence would produce cost-savings that would be invested in expanding, 
not shrinking, news resources. He stated: “If convergence leads to fewer journalists 
reporting, producing and editing weaker journalism, we deserve to lose customers 
and public trust.”77 Many media companies approached convergence as an 
organizational approach to confronting new market realities, but the journalistic 
ramifications of such organizational structures received much of the attention.  
 The changes were most troublesome for the newspaper reporters who found 
themselves in front of a camera for the first time. The comments of a senior reporter 
at The Tampa Tribune reflect these concerns: “The very nature of going on TV is 
intimidating for those of us hiding behind the anonymity of the byline…. I like to put 
a lot of thought into what I write. So thinking quickly [on the air] concerns me.... If I 
screw up, I can’t backspace.”78 The experience of print reporters doing television 
reporting received significant attention in Tampa and led Media General to provide 
extensive cross-training through the University of South Florida.79 
 Lawson-Borders found that as editors and producers engaged in the 
converged process they became more comfortable in how to use content across 
multiple platforms. A news director from WFLA in Tampa stated: “one of the basic 
truths about convergence is that not every story … that excites one platform is 
suitable for another. Sometimes a good newspaper story is just that [and] not suitable 
for TV.”80 Lawson-Borders concluded that “convergence for the sake of convergence 
is not advisable,” adding that “the blending of media forms should be the strategy 
when the content and the delivery programs necessitate the arrangement.”81 The 
experience in Tampa, however, demonstrated that executive mandates were needed 
to force content sharing. Otherwise, the material was largely deployed exclusively in 
the medium that created it.   
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 Even though it was the emergence of the Internet that gave rise to this form of 
convergence in the first place, Media General’s Tampa initiative underscored how 
difficult it was for traditional media to integrate the Internet into their operations. 
The News Center in Tampa was supposed to have been organized around what was 
described as the triumvirate of newspapers, television, and Internet. However, an 
early report on the converged structure indicated the Internet operations were not on 
equal footing. The report stated that “the television and newspaper voices dominate 
the convergence conversation, with the online operation looking for a place to fit 
in.”82 The online operation believed that the converged structure eventually would 
provide more resources with an observer stating: “the TBO.com operation welcomes 
the opportunity to go beyond ‘shovelware,’” and develop “more creative news 
presentations.”83 An architect of the project said, “We want to place high value on 
experimental risk-taking, rather than on the tried and true journalism story.”84 
However, the cultural challenges of moving beyond content repurposing were 
daunting and resulted in little innovative activity during the first year of the 
converged structure. A key executive conceded: 
We have only scratched the surface of multimedia possibilities. 
Effective translation from one platform to another is an 
achievement. But we have to learn how to create unique content that 
stands apart from any existing medium. That’s the tantalizing 
prospect of multimedia work.85  
  
This executive said the purpose of the Internet in a converged structure is to provide 
a central platform from which newspapers and television can both operate. He 
asserted that “online is the common carrier between print and broadcast,” but said the 
purpose of the integration is to create something apart from what traditional 
newspapers and television already produce.86 For Media General, developing this 
new content form was seen as the quintessential factor in determining if its 
convergence effort would succeed or fail, but the breakthrough it hoped never came 
to fruition. Media General did not abandon its convergence approach, but the results 
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were far less than what it envisioned when the strategy was embraced in 2000.87 
Media General backed away from aggressive attempts to merge content and focused 
more attention on selling advertising across its three platforms.  The company 
reported in 2005 that $8 million in annual revenue could be attributed to cross-selling 
opportunities among the newspaper, television, and online properties. For a market 
the size of Tampa, however, the number was small relative to overall advertising 
spending, representing “one-half of a percent of market share.”88 
 
Operational Convergence Fails to Deliver  
This detailed examination of Media General’s experience in Tampa is important 
because the experience soon turned out to be common across the industry. 
Operational convergence partnerships did not produce any significant results that 
industry executives could point to as evidence that traditional media had figured out 
a strategy for the emerging online market. Newspapers and television stations 
struggled to find ways to share traditional content, while at the same time, the online 
component of these arrangements were relegated to repurposing material intended 
for the traditional outlet. The notion that combining newspapers and television 
stations would result in new and interesting multimedia content packages was never 
fully realized. 
  In most cases, newspapers and television stations did not adequately address 
the cultural differences between organizations and among the various roles that 
would be required to cooperate. As Scott noted: “Journalists have been resistant, and 
coordination has proven labor intensive.”89 Singer observed that within the 
operations of traditional media companies, innovators—“individuals interested in 
doing something new largely because it is new”—were found mostly in the online 
operations.90 But in the power struggles of converged television stations and 
newspaper companies, such individuals had little clout. Within the context of the 
Tampa model explored above, these individuals were referred to as internal 
“entrepreneurs,” but there was “an ongoing concern [about] ... how to integrate the 
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entrepreneur into a traditional culture.”91 Management’s inability to address the 
concerns of journalists, while also fostering an entrepreneurial environment 
undermined the convergence strategy.  
 In the absence of major success most of the newspaper and television 
partnerships forged in 2000 and 2001 were allowed to simply “fizzle” a few years 
later.92 For example, researchers studying a convergence project in Oklahoma City in 
July 2002 found little cooperation between the partners and “the scant amount that 
was observed … seemed to be poorly coordinated.”93 In some cases, the convergence 
partnerships were reduced to promotional deals where, for example, a television 
station would provide its newspaper partner a weather forecast in exchange for logo 
placement.94 
  Some media companies such as Cox Enterprises formally announced plans to 
abandon operational convergence initiatives. Cox Enterprises had been a pioneer of 
the concept, launching Cox Interactive Media in 1996 to manage centrally websites 
that represented the combined efforts of the company’s newspapers, radio stations, 
television stations, and cable systems. In markets where the company did not own 
multiple media properties, it formed alliances with outside companies. In early 2002, 
the company began to dismantle the central structure and return oversight of online 
operations to the traditional arms of business. Cox Interactive Media attempted to 
operate on the Internet as a separate business, but was dependent on content and 
advertising relationships provided by the traditional media businesses. A senior 
manager of the project said “it wasn't a financial model that worked.”95 He 
elaborated: “We still think there's a tremendous opportunity for advertising,” but 
added that “we need to have more participation from the local media companies to 
succeed.”96 Cox management believed that in separating its Internet operations into a 
separate unit, the company had failed to provide its traditional media businesses with 
the proper incentives to cooperate and build a base of online advertising revenue. In 
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allowing each traditional media to control its own Internet presence, the hope was 
that ownership would provide the business incentives needed for success.  
 With operational convergence projects largely discredited as a way forward—
and no clear replacement strategy on the horizon—media holding companies, 
including those that owned newspapers, began using a several new ways to describe 
their approaches. Some promoted a “portfolio” concept that referred to the core 
newspaper, its online edition and other niche products such as Spanish-language 
edition or commuter tabloid.97 Other newspaper companies used “integration” to 
describe how their online editions and print editions were closely aligned under 
common management.98  
 For example, The New York Times in August 2005 announced a merger of its 
print and online newsrooms and also said that advertising sales for the print and 
online editions would be managed jointly under a new “chief advertising officer.” 
The executive appointed to that role said the structure made it clear that “there’s no 
us and them. There’s no print and digital. We’re all The New York Times 
Company.”99 The close integration of digital and print operations was intended to 
show advertisers and investors that newspaper organizations recognized the 
importance of the Internet, but in a way that inextricably linked online to the core 
printed newspaper. However, they largely were seen as semantic exercises rather 
expressions of new strategic approaches. Operational convergence had at least 
represented the notion of reaching beyond a newspaper’s own resources to create 
something new for the Internet. These new approaches, however, represented a 
return to the newspaper industry’s reliance on its core printed product, with little 
sense of the novel opportunities that interactive media online might provide. 
 Lind has argued that the failure of convergence projects to produce business 
results was largely because they were born out of the rhetoric surrounding the 
Internet rather than from any conviction that they were needed or wanted. By 
searching newspaper databases for this period, Lind found that usage of the term 
convergence spiked in 1994, waned for a period, and then rebounded for “a second 
broader peak during the Internet bubble 1999–2001.” Lind said the usage patterns for 
convergence followed a model called the “Hype Cycle” developed by Gartner Inc. to 
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explain in part what happened during the Internet boom.100 Lind surmised that the 
use of convergence “gives few guidelines for concrete strategic action.”101 He 
concluded that convergence was “a general and rather vague term imbued with a lot 
of hype” and “seems to have been used as rhetoric and a residual argument, in lack of 
more concrete strategic arguments.”102 With this perspective, it is possible to 
understand how some newspaper executives and their television counterparts thought 
of convergence in nebulous terms that resulted in partnerships where goals and 
success measurements were ill-defined.  
 Other research found little business justification for cross-media partnerships. 
Jung studied product diversification at 26 large media companies during 1996 
through 2002 and determined that benefits assigned to media mergers, 
diversification, or integration were a myth. “The mantra of synergy does not work in 
the media industry at this point,” he wrote, adding that data showed the opposite in 
that “financial efficiency decreased as the firms expanded their businesses into 
unrelated media sectors.”103 Jung asserted that the operations of newspaper and 
broadcast companies were too different for any pooling of resources to be effective. 
He concluded:  
… relatively few opportunities to make better use of collective 
resources will arise directly from related diversification of these 
particular sectors of media. If economies of scope are non-existent 
and financial profits are generally difficult to achieve, few economic 
benefits can directly attributable to cross-ownership of television 
and newspapers….104  
 
Jung’s work shows there was little business rationale for the newspaper industry’s 
convergence projects with television stations. Therefore, when these convergence 
projects are considered within the historical timeline they are recognized as a part of 
the hyperbole associated with the Internet bubble. Advertising Age observed: “when 
the dot-com bust put the kibosh on so many media dreams—convergence became 
discredited.”105 Newspaper companies and other traditional media used convergence 
as a response to an investment community inflamed by the Internet investment 
mania. However, it was a response driven by wishful thinking that such partnerships 
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could produce a breakthrough. There was little, if any, strategic business planning 
undertaken to support that goal. 
 In the wake of the Internet investment bubble and collapse, newspaper 
executives believed they had the opportunity to use their profitable businesses to 
regain standing with the investment community. Strong profits from print operations 
were supposed to bolster the industry’s value while operational convergence 
initiatives demonstrated a path to a sustainable future. However, an economic 
recession in the early 2000s exposed weaknesses in the industry’s core product and 
the convergence shortcomings revealed a lack of long-term strategic planning. In the 
following section, the thesis explores how the newspaper industry’s emphasis on 
profitability affected its strategic decisions during this period. The thesis then 
examines the closing of Knight-Ridder Inc. as a milestone event that is recalled as 
signalling the beginning of the end of the newspaper industry’s long-established 
business model. 
 
 
Business Model Questioned 
Newspaper executives considered robust profits a key factor for evaluating 
performance in the tumultuous media market of the early 2000s. However, the 
emphasis on profitability created a conundrum for the newspaper industry. In 
delivering large profits, newspaper companies conditioned investors to expect them. 
But at the same time, the investment community expressed concerns that newspaper 
executives were focused on short-term thinking that kept the industry from doing 
more to compete against new and successful online companies that were siphoning 
away revenue. Some of the profitability attributed to online editions, for example, 
had been achieved through cutting staff and pooling resources with competitors 
rather than investing in new technologies and business models to increase revenue.  
 Some blamed the industry’s decisions to cut resources on its reaction to the 
end of the Internet investment surge. As an industry commentator wrote: “the burst 
of the dot-com bubble … made many think they had overestimated the impact of the 
Internet. But in retrospect, the news media might have completely underestimated the 
influence of this new medium.”106 This line of thinking gained currency in 2004 and 
2005 as the newspaper industry continued to post revenue declines in its print 
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business, while revenue from Internet editions fell far short of making up the 
difference. Newspaper companies were attracting a sizeable number of users to their 
websites, but they demonstrated no coherent strategy for generating revenue based 
on this audience.  
 Critics of the newspaper industry’s Internet efforts have often asserted that 
websites associated with newspapers were unappealing to consumers because they 
lacked the features and functions associated with pure online companies. By the mid-
2000s, however, newspaper companies had mitigated many of those shortcomings. 
An analyst with a leading audience measurement firm noted that “most, if not all, of 
the top newspaper websites offer interactivity such as blogs, podcasts and streaming 
video/audio.” The analyst said that such features, when added to the news content, 
“make newspaper websites an increasingly appealing choice.”107  
 Consumers responded to the improvements newspapers made to their 
websites. Nielsen/NetRatings reported in October 2005 that newspaper websites 
experienced double-digit audience growth from the previous year and reached 39.3 
million readers, which represented “26 percent of the total active American Internet 
population.” Websites associated with two national newspapers were attracting large 
audiences. For example, nytimes.com had more than 11 million monthly users, while 
usatoday.com tallied more than 10 million users.108 A media industry investment 
specialist also observed that newspaper companies were attracting enough online 
audience to be “the No. 1 or No. 2 local Web site” in a newspaper’s market.109  
 At this point in the newspaper industry’s relationship with online media, 
attracting audience on the web was much less of a problem than finding advertisers 
willing to buy that audience. As the newspaper industry’s overall business model 
came under increasingly intense investor scrutiny during this period, newspaper 
publishers were expected to reduce their dependency on the core printed newspaper 
and find ways to sell the online audience to advertisers. As the investment specialist 
summarised: “that’s part of the challenge, how do you capitalize on the assets you 
have?”110  
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A researcher who studied the newspaper industry’s reaction to the Internet as 
a disruptive technology stated that newspaper companies had not done enough to 
differentiate their products for advertisers. Gilbert said that “most companies 
aggressively ‘crammed’ the new business into the old business model and sales 
processes.” In terms of revenue generation, he found that “most newspapers tried to 
force their online sites to make money by selling the same types of advertising to 
their traditional print advertisers” without recognizing that “online advertisers were 
different and the type of advertising they sought was much more focused around the 
interactive and direct targeting attributes of the new media.”111 The result, as Gilbert 
concluded, was that “newspapers had spent a ton of money, with little to show for 
it.”112 This perspective illustrates another instance when newspaper companies did 
not understand interactivity in the way the market demanded interactivity. Although 
newspaper websites had improved their offering of interactive content after years of 
neglect, most newspaper websites did not extend that functionality to advertising 
where the market had moved.  
 Nevertheless, investors wanted newspaper companies to respond to their 
demands to fix the situation. They wanted to see tangible evidence that newspaper 
companies could attract online revenue in amounts large enough to offset the 
negative advertising trend in the printed newspaper. Newspaper publishers, therefore, 
were forced to accept online advertising revenue rather than overall profitability as 
the benchmark that mattered most.  By this point, investors in the newspaper industry 
had moved beyond evaluating companies on short-term profits. They were far more 
interested in the newspaper industry’s long-term prospects. 
  In 2005, the newspaper industry reported that Internet advertising generated 
by newspapers’ online editions collectively “topped $2 billion for the first time.”113 
Although this represented 31.5 percent growth from the previous year, it still meant 
that online advertising accounted for less than 4.5 percent of the industry’s overall 
advertising revenue.114 When Google, as a single entity reported $3.2 billion in 
online revenue115—$1 billion more than the entire newspaper industry produced 
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online—publishers began to realize how dramatic the shifts in the media market 
actually were. That realization—when combined with the long-term erosion of 
advertising and circulation in printed newspapers—created an atmosphere of failure. 
 The newspaper industry’s standing with investors suffered further as the 
veracity of its reported online revenue met with scepticism. Given that as much as 70 
percent of newspaper industry online revenue was attributed to classified 
advertising,116 analysts believed that most of the reported online revenue represented 
upsells from the printed product. The revenue was viewed as so closely tied to the 
printed newspaper, the industry was given little credit for creating any traction in the 
online advertising market. Instead, the newspaper industry was seen as losing ground 
to several Internet companies. Google’s introduction of simple text advertisements 
appearing alongside its search results was seen as an innovation that outflanked 
newspaper companies. Google had emerged as the best of the search engine category 
by deploying complex algorithms to answer specific user inquiries. Using targeted 
advertising to create value out of the seemingly endless number of search results 
represented a new form of advertising that was not in keeping with a media model. 
 A Google executive explained that traditional media companies approached 
online advertising with their offline model by “packaging content or advertising 
inventory.”117 This model, however, implies scarcity such as the limited number of 
pages in a newspaper or the finite amount of time in a television program. On the 
Internet, advertising opportunities are endless as they expand as audience increases. 
Therefore, Google did not approach solving the online advertising riddle by thinking 
in traditional terms. The executive stated: “We look at ads as commercial 
information,” and present them as part of “our core mission of organizing the world’s 
information. When people in the media world hear this, they say, ‘What are these 
guys talking about?’”118 The newspaper industry’s inability to understand Google 
approach as well the strategy of other newcomers made it difficult to mount a 
competitive response. The statements of one leading industry executive suggested 
that the industry’s predicament was rooted in complacency.   
 Speaking in 2000 about the emerging online competition in classified 
advertising, the chief executive officer of Times Mirror was very candid: “You’d 
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think we’d know everything about [classified advertising] because it’s so important, 
but we actually know remarkably little, because, I think, we as an industry have 
taken it for granted.”119 As this perspective became more understood in the financial 
community, investors became increasingly alarmed that the newspaper industry was 
unprepared to stave off the competitive threat posed, not only by Google and Yahoo!, 
but by Monster.com and other start-up companies that had taken direct aim at the 
newspaper industry’s vital revenue stream from classified advertising. 
 A 2001 academic study of online classifieds associated with 75 newspapers 
found that publishers “have not developed their online advertising classified sites to 
take advantage of existing technologies for delivering effective, interactive classified 
ads.”120 This lack of a technically competitive platform contributed to the newspaper 
industry’s failure to keep pace with new market entrants. An industry consulting 
study found that newspaper companies lost 5 percent of their classified market share 
to pure Internet companies such as Monster.com, Realtor.com, and Craigslist from 
2001 to 2004. The erosion represented nearly $2 billion in revenue.121  
 Gilbert compared the income statements of new start-up online businesses 
with the income statements of online newspaper businesses, revealing “that 
anywhere from 35 percent to 45 percent of the categories of revenue are missing 
from the online newspaper.” He cited Monster.com as an example of a start-up 
company finding new streams of revenue from employers placing recruitment 
advertising. He asserted that Monster.com was a direct threat to the newspaper 
industry’s core classified advertising market, noting that it had posted more than 
$100 million in net income during the period of his research. “There is real money 
being earned all around these [newspaper] guys, but they continue to insist that the 
market doesn’t exist.”122 Gilbert concluded that newspaper companies were missing 
the larger perspective by operating their online businesses as such close extensions of 
the printed newspaper. Newspaper companies, he argued, need to “to recognize that 
this is a new business. If you start and stay integrated, the online income statement 
will always look like the newspaper’s.”123 Internet-based competition soon 
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understood there was little to fear from a newspaper industry that showed no signs of 
mounting a serious strategic response. 
 The chief executive officer of Monster.com, for example, observed of the 
newspaper business: “You have a lot of jobs, a lot of ink, rolls of paper, unions, 
printing presses, trucks, offices, all of them being supported by the way the 
newspaper has run for 100 years.”124 The implication was that newspaper companies 
were too entrenched in established processes to separate their online and print 
products. Other observers echoed similar sentiments with one stating: “The 
newspaper and online in their minds are Siamese twins.”125 Once again, the lack of 
tangible financial results with online media opened up the newspaper industry for 
criticism about its approach to the market. Unlike earlier periods, however, the 
industry’s long-standing record of profitability in its core printed business failed to 
serve as a counter argument as investors began to abandon newspaper stocks as the 
questioned the industry’s viability.  
 A Wharton Business School professor put it bluntly, stating the newspaper 
“industry has matured to the point to where it has been a little lazy.”126 The Wall 
Street Journal stated during this period that newspaper companies “face an image 
problem,” in that “they seem slow and stodgy when compared with some of their 
media rivals—namely, cable [television] and the Web.”127 Newspaper companies 
were described as lacking the necessary economies of scale amid “a renewed push 
toward consolidation” and the industry was chided for becoming less relevant to 
advertisers.128 An advertising consultant summarized the circumstances facing 
newspapers: “The challenge for newspapers is … to figure out what they can provide 
that isn’t being provided by the Internet and CNN.”129 Some newspaper executives 
attempted to find strategic answers by acquiring Internet businesses, a process seen 
as a logical move for companies operating in the mature newspaper industry with the 
financial wherewithal to close such deals.  
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 Examples included: The New York Times Co. acquired About.com for $410 
million; Dow Jones & Co., publisher of The Wall Street Journal, bought 
MarketWatch for about $500 million; The Washington Post Co. purchased Slate, an 
online magazine, from Microsoft while Gannett Inc., The Tribune Co., and Knight-
Ridder Inc. each acquired a 25 percent interest in Topix.net, an online news 
aggregation service.130  
 Such acquisitions are representative of the “inter-media struggle for survival 
in the Internet age” as presented in a framework developed by Lehman-Wilzig and 
Cohn-Avigdor. The researchers found that acquisitions are part of “the natural life 
cycle of new media evolution” and are adaptive tactics for traditional media seeking 
to prolong their demise.131 They wrote that acquisitions can provide traditional media 
with new sources of revenue to “subsidize” their transition into new media, but they 
noted: “Of course, this does not guarantee older medium survival.”132 The examples 
cited are noteworthy given the strategic importance they represented for the 
acquiring newspaper companies. However, most newspaper companies did not 
embrace an acquisition strategy as part of a long-term Internet plan for a variety of 
reasons. 
 By this time, the problems with the AOL and Time Warner merger cast 
doubts on the viability of any merger between traditional media and new media 
companies. Also, the market value of newspaper companies were declining as 
investors turned away from newspaper industry stocks, which made it more 
expensive for newspaper companies to use stock to fund acquisitions. Furthermore, 
most Internet companies saw no reason to be acquired. Aided by Google’s successful 
initial public stock offering in 2004, Internet stocks were rebounding in value after 
the meltdown earlier in the decade.  The market perception had shifted again: 
newspaper companies needed the Internet, but the Internet did not need them.  
 
The Perspective Changes  
 Newspaper executives had assumed that the industry’s financial strength and 
market position would provide them with the means to compete against anyone. 
However, as long-term trends in the core printed product turned increasingly  
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negative and competitive threats from Internet competition intensified, investors 
became more demanding for change and more doubtful of the newspaper industry’s 
ability to deliver it. 
 Newspaper companies remained profitable in 2005, but margins were “still 
well off the peak of 1999 and 2000.”133 An industry participant, in discussing the 
changing economic structure, observed that newspaper executives “get it 
intellectually. But they struggle with the emotional issues and the financial dynamics. 
It’s really hard to cannibalize yourself and trade high-margin revenues for low-
margin revenues one second before you have to.”134 But the profit margin erosion of 
the early 2000s was enough to convince industry leaders that the market had shifted 
in dramatic ways. The president of Cox Newspapers, which published the Atlanta 
Journal-Constitution and 16 other daily newspapers, stated: 
I think we were slow to catch on. I think it’s perfectly natural to 
protect what you have; to think what you have is the only thing that 
people want. You look back to the year 2000, and I don’t know that 
newspapers ever had a better year financially. Those are the times 
that can lull you into a sense of complacency. What we’ve 
discovered … is that that world doesn’t exist anymore.135  
 
Understanding this new business reality, the newspaper industry’s trade group joined 
the chorus for reform. It issued a report titled “Why the Current Business Model 
Needs to Change,” in which the industry was challenged to find new ways of 
operating in order to absorb a projected 20 percent decline in advertising revenue 
over the next 5 to 10 years.136 The industry’s own projection for such advertising 
erosion was another reminder of the challenges confronting newspaper executives.   
 This thesis next uses the story of Knight-Ridder Inc. as an example that more 
fully explains the severity of the financial circumstances surrounding newspaper 
companies during this period. In November 2005, Knight-Ridder executives 
surprised their industry colleagues with an announcement that they were putting the 
company up for sale. As the American Journalism Review described it, “Wall 
Street’s dissatisfaction with newspapers boiled over” as frustrated money managers 
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and investors “forced” Knight-Ridder’s management to sell the business.137 The 
following material explores the circumstances surrounding this significant episode 
and explains the company’s willingness to give in to the dissident shareholders as 
symptomatic of the overall industry’s predicament. 
 
Knight-Ridder’s Demise 
 Tension between Knight-Ridder’s management and several investor groups 
had been building since April 2005. The investors were unhappy that Knight-
Ridder’s stock price did not, in their view, reflect the true value of the business, and 
they openly questioned the company’s ability to execute a strategy that would change 
its value proposition.138 A newspaper analyst reported that Knight-Ridder’s profits 
had failed to keep pace with an overall industry going through deep cuts. In 2004, 
Knight-Ridder’s operating margin was 19.4 percent, which was close to the industry 
average of 20.5 percent. In 2005, the industry average declined slightly to 19.2 
percent, but Knight-Ridder’s operating profit fell to 16.4 percent.139 
  With such performance as a backdrop, dissident shareholders believed the 
company’s parts were worth more than the entire company. In early November, the 
chief executive officer of an investment group that owned about 19 percent of 
Knight-Ridder’s stock issued a letter that called for the company’s sale because of 
the “significant and persistent disparity” in the price of the company’s stock and the 
investors’ perceived value of the company.140 
 Knight-Ridder’s managers had taken several actions to appease their unhappy 
investors. The company had “boosted its dividend, repurchased stock, cut jobs and 
sold the Detroit Free Press,” but those efforts fell short of making any impact on the 
stock price. The company’s shares fell about 14 percent between a July board 
meeting and the time the dissident shareholders issued their letter in November.141 
Less than two weeks after receiving the letter, Knight-Ridder’s management 
conceded. The company announced it would “explore strategic alternatives … 
including a possible sale.”142 Early the following year, Knight-Ridder was sold to 
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McClatchy Co. for about $4.5 billion, and McClatchy in turn sold a dozen of the 
newspapers it acquired to make the deal financially viable.143  
 Newspaper industry executives understood the investment climate 
confronting their industry and they were aware of the pressure being exerted on 
Knight-Ridder management by the dissident shareholders. Nevertheless, the demise 
of the venerable company stunned many of them and left an indelible mark on the 
industry. A former Knight-Ridder publisher summarized the questions everyone in 
the industry was asking in the aftermath of Knight-Ridder’s closure: 
Could anyone imagine 10 years ago saying that in 10 years, Knight-
Ridder would not exist? It was one of the strongest newspaper 
companies in America. How could you have a hand like that and 
play it in such a way that you would end up losing everything?144  
 
The irony of Knight-Ridder’s demise is that it was profitable and at the time of its 
closure was posting margins “higher that of many Fortune 500 companies, including 
ExxonMobil.”145 As such, Knight-Ridder’s management received much criticism for 
not fighting to keep the company intact. 
 In a letter to shareholders chief executive officer Anthony Ridder explained: 
“I wish the solutions, as some have suggested, were only as simple as strong 
operating results or even just producing more great journalism.”146 He later added 
that Knight-Ridder’s problems were linked to broader concerns about “what’s 
happened to the newspaper industry over the last couple of years” especially its lack 
of revenue growth.147 By the time Knight-Ridder was facing its group of activist 
shareholders, newspaper stocks were no longer priced based on short-term business 
fundamentals such as quarterly profits. The financial markets were ignoring the 
newspaper industry’s current profits and bidding down shares based on the prevailing 
sentiment that newspaper companies could not sustain those profits for the long-
term.  
 When McClatchy emerged as the buyer for most of the Knight-Ridder 
newspapers, its chief executive officer maintained that investors were wrong about  
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the newspaper business. He stated: “Pessimism about our industry is indeed 
widespread …, but we think it’s misinformed. Newspapers remain profitable 
businesses with strong audiences.”148 Industry analysts observed, however, that 
McClatchy “was the only newspaper company to submit a formal bid” to purchase 
any of the Knight-Ridder newspapers.149 One expert in media deals commented that 
“15 years ago, we would have seen 12 or 14 players bidding on these assets; the 
auction process would have been a frenzy.”150 The industry’s critics asserted that the 
lack of interest in Knight-Ridder’s newspapers shown by other newspaper companies 
was the greatest indictment against the future of the newspaper industry.   
 In retrospect, the other newspaper companies were correct in avoiding further 
investments in the industry. Subsequent to the deal, McClatchy’s management 
received more criticism for the purchase than Knight-Ridder management had 
received when the sale was announced. For example, one commentator called 
McClatchy’s purchase a “major error” and described it as “doubling down on the 
decaying industry.”151 Investors bid down McClatchy’s stock after the deal and its 
shares continued to decline as the overall newspaper industry sank as an investment 
sector. 
 
Industry Ramifications 
 The effects of the Knight-Ridder closure on the attitudes of newspaper 
executives were significant. One official described it as a “tragedy” and said it was 
the industry’s “real wake-up call” that prompted many executives to understand that 
“the wolf is closer to our heels than we thought.”152 A commentator wrote that “soul-
searching in the industry has intensified,”153 and another observed “the message is 
that newspaper organizations are going to have to change pretty drastically to hold 
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onto their franchise.”154 Much of the commentary associated with assessing Knight-
Ridder’s closure reflected this internally-focused rhetoric. But there were assertions 
that newspaper companies were not entirely at fault for their predicament. 
 This perspective emphasized Knight-Ridder’s profitability and blamed its 
demise on greedy investors. As one commentator stated: “Wall Street only knows 
one mantra: ‘More please, more.’” This observer said the case of Knight-Ridder 
illustrated that “we damn well have got severe problems with investors who in my 
opinion are completely unreasonable,” adding that “I do not see that pressure 
lessening.”155 The rhetoric supporting this perspective was prevalent among editors 
and journalists. They often blamed investors for ignoring the public trust role of 
newspapers and were angry at newspaper management for attempting to appease 
those investors through budget cuts and layoffs. 
 A former Knight-Ridder editor described this philosophy of newspaper 
management as “the notion that you can continue whittling and paring and reducing 
and degrading the quality of your product and not pay any price.”156 This line of 
thinking continued to place the printed newspaper at the centre of the industry’s 
economic issues. Those espousing this view had not grasped that the financial 
markets were no longer valuing newspaper companies in the present; they were 
devaluing them based on expectations of unfulfilled potential in the Internet era.  
 That investors even noticed the short-term financial results was the fault of an 
industry that provided nothing else upon which it could be valued. Picard asserted 
that the newspaper industry’s operating methods created a climate where “investors 
pressure them for short-term returns more than they do other types of companies” 
because those other businesses “are able to articulate a vision of a sustainable 
future.”157 Picard explained that, in the absence of a believable longer-term strategy, 
investors respond as investment rationale dictates: 
What these investors are looking for is a good return on their money; 
to get that they are willing to trade short-term profit for long-term 
growth and stability. But most publicly traded newspaper companies 
offer no credible plans (or vision) for anything beyond the delivery 
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of higher-than-average quarterly profits. With this mentality in 
place, investors pressure boards and management for high returns so 
that they can recoup their investment in a shorter period of time.158 
 
Once established between an industry and its capital markets, an investment pattern 
based on short-term results is difficult to bring to an end. Management becomes 
fixated on expense controls and ends up eliminating resources that could have been 
productive over a longer-term scenario.159  
 As this investment pattern played out in the newspaper industry, Rosen 
observed: “They won’t stop the gravy train even though the engine is broken. How 
does such a thing eventually stop? It crashes.”160 Rosen’s view of this “profitable 
demise”161 was corroborated in Picard’s economic analysis, which presented the 
construct as a downward spiral. Picard wrote that the newspaper industry’s history of 
chasing short-term profits: 
 … abets uninterested investors by draining resources from 
newspapers they believe have a limited (or no) future and leaves 
newspaper enterprises without sufficient resources to renew 
themselves. The prospect of demise, coupled with the lack of 
strategic vision, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.162 
 
To some observers Knight-Ridder’s closure represented a tangible example of this 
investment pattern reaching its ultimate conclusion. However, that is not an accurate 
representation given the company’s financial position at the time it was sold. 
 Despite several years of cost-cutting, Knight-Ridder was profitable and was 
positioned to remain so for many quarters. Therefore, this newspaper company did 
not “crash” as in Rosen’s vernacular. Rather, the case of Knight-Ridder is an 
example of capitulation. Knight-Ridder’s management could have continued its 
course until the company was indeed bankrupt. Management also could have 
attempted to break free of the investment cycle fuelled by cost-cutting demands 
through crafting and enacting a strategy for long-term viability.  
 An analyst with the investment banking firm Merrill Lynch said she had 
advised Knight-Ridder management to follow that course instead of selling the 
business: “I said, if you have the conviction that the news business and … online are 
a win, put up a ‘work in progress’ sign and say that margins are going to go down” 
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until a new strategy is in place.163 The company’s dissident investors would have 
fought such an attempt to wrestle back strategic control of the business, but the 
decision not to engage in such a fight positioned Knight-Ridder as weak. That 
perception was transferred to the entire newspaper industry. 
 Knight-Ridder’s chief executive officer responded to characterizations of his 
decision to sell the business as surrender by stating that “part of me would have 
loved to have had this fight,” but said he concluded that the ensuing “turmoil” would 
not have saved the company.164 Nevertheless, critics contended that Knight-Ridder 
gave up too easily and in the process harmed the newspaper industry by contributing 
to what Picard described as “a widespread sense that investors, as well as some 
newspaper owners, are giving up on the industry.”165 Therefore, Knight-Ridder’s 
demise came to symbolize the state of the newspaper industry in the mid-2000s. 
Despite the positive outlook espoused by its acquirer, Knight-Ridder’s inability—or 
unwillingness—to develop a strategy for long-term viability cemented the perception 
that the newspaper industry had squandered its opportunity to exploit the Internet and 
had passed into an era of long-term decline.  
 
Conclusion 
The AOL acquisition of Time Warner at the outset of the 2000s appeared to herald a 
new era in media economics. It both reflected and also exacerbated corporate rhetoric 
around the rise of new media and the demise of old media. In the wake of the deal, 
the concept of convergence gained renewed currency and traditional media 
companies began to see convergence as a strategy that might provide some means by 
which they could retain or improve profitability. Unsure of their position in the 
emerging new media market, newspaper companies sought alliances with their one-
time nemesis—local market television stations. In some cases, these were 
partnerships forged among companies with common ownership. In other cases, they 
were deals between media outlets that had been intense rivals. The hope was that in 
combining the resources of print with the immediacy of video these alliances would 
be able to craft a new media form for the Internet era.  
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 When the Internet investment bubble collapsed, many executives in the 
newspaper industry felt vindicated when their companies were still standing, but 
many of the Internet companies they thought represented competition were no longer 
in business. Emboldened by the return of rational markets, newspaper companies 
sought to make their online operations profitable as quickly as possible rather than 
invest in long-term research and development. However, newspaper executives had 
misread the turn of events. The end of Internet investment speculation did not 
represent the end of Internet innovation. 
 As a practical construct, however, operational convergence as represented by 
newspaper companies and television stations alliances did not meet the strategic 
demands of the Internet. In fact, most of those initiatives failed to produce any 
tangible benefits. Newspaper companies scaled back their convergence aspirations 
and most of the alliances were relegated to the same history that included the failed 
videotext projects of the 1980s and the unfulfilled partnerships with proprietary 
online services in the 1990s. 
 Newspaper companies were alone again to face resurgent portals and an 
upstart named Google. By 2005, most newspaper websites were recognized for 
attracting a sizeable audience, but newspaper companies were criticized for their 
inability to generate revenue based on this audience. Investors wanted newspaper 
companies to explain how they planned to compete; they wanted executives 
accustomed to producing a new product every day to step back long enough to see 
past immediate shortcomings and articulate a coherent plan that would demonstrate 
the industry held long-term viability. No one did. 
  With the ability to earn a respectable long-term return on an investment in 
the industry in doubt, the financial community hammered newspaper companies for 
short-term profits. The result was a downward spiral fed by budget cuts and layoffs 
that drained resources and made the prospect of long-term viability even more 
unattainable.  Within this framework, this chapter presented Knight-Ridder as a 
microcosm exhibiting all of the turmoil of the larger industry.  
 As dissident investors argued over the value of the company and its strategic 
direction, senior management capitulated. Rather than wage a contentious fight, 
senior management sold the company’s newspapers and closed the business. The 
events surrounding Knight-Ridder epitomized an industry in decline, one weakened 
to the point that one of its most stalwart companies chose going out of business as its 
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best strategic option. Gilbert’s observation presented in the chapter underscored how 
newspaper companies ignored calls to treat online as a new medium. Industry 
executives were stubborn and arrogant in failing to adapt although—as this thesis has 
illustrated—they had ample time to do so. 
 Newspaper companies had assumed, correctly, for some time that a large 
portion of the advertising revenue from printed newspapers would one day need to be 
replaced with online revenue. The strategic error was in misjudging how soon that 
would occur. Throughout its history with digital distribution, newspaper companies 
never elevated their online endeavours to the level of strategic importance that would 
prepare them to take over the role of leading revenue generator when the tipping 
point arrived.  The newspapers industry’s ability to produce strong profits for so long 
established a sense of complacency that was impossible to dislodge. 
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Chapter 8: 
Connecting the Lessons of History 
 
In August 2010, Gannett Co., a major publisher of U.S. daily newspapers, 
reorganized the operations of its flagship product, USA Today, as part of a plan to 
deemphasize the newspaper’s print edition and increase resources allocated to 
electronic distribution such as Apple’s iPad, other tablet devices, smartphones, and 
the web.1  To some observers, the plan was a long-awaited admission from a 
prominent newspaper company that print could no longer be the primary product 
focus if the industry was to survive.  To others, the reorganization was merely 
another round of expenses cuts—130 jobs were eliminated2—by a company in a 
dying industry couched in rhetoric to appease sceptical investors. Newspaper 
executives said many times before they knew what needed to be done to succeed in 
the digital era, but then changed little about how their companies operated.  
 However, the newspaper industry is confronting another technology shift 
similar to the mid-1990s when the Internet emerged as a media platform. The current 
array of tablet computers and smartphones provides newspaper companies the 
opportunity to re-establish their brands in an application marketplace that could 
distribute content to paying consumers in ways that eluded newspapers on the web. 
This thesis illustrated the seminal shift away from proprietary online services to the 
World Wide Web in Chapter Six by citing an October 1994 article from Wired that 
asserted the advent of the browser made services such as Prodigy and AOL obsolete.  
Nearly 16 years later, the same magazine proclaimed another major technology shift 
is underway. In its September 2010 cover story, Wired declared “The Web is dead”3 
in a marketplace increasingly reliant on “platforms that use the Internet for transport 
but not the browser for display.”4 This thesis has documented the failure of the 
newspaper industry to exploit the digital era to this point. Essentially, the potential 
for Internet applications has presented the newspaper companies with a chance at 
redemption.  
 The newspaper industry’s financial condition deteriorated severely in the 
latter half of the 2000s. Newspaper companies collected just $28.4 billion in 
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advertising revenue in 2009, which was nearly a 50 percent decline from the 
industry’s peak in 2000.5 This steep drop in advertising revenue and continuing 
circulation erosion resulted in closed newspapers, bankruptcy filings and continued 
layoffs throughout the industry. The example of Knight-Ridder’s demise presented in 
the previous chapter was indeed a harbinger of the turmoil to come. More recently, 
Gannett’s reorganization of USA Today combined with other activity throughout the 
industry—such as The New York Times’ links with social networking sites such as 
Facebook and Twitter and a preponderance of deals to distribute content through 
wireless applications—give credence to analysts who maintain that “major changes” 
in the industry were underway in 2010.6 But, as this thesis has demonstrated, 
newspaper companies have been engaged in the rhetoric and reality of such 
technology shifts as they attempted to accommodate interactive media for more than 
thirty years. How can we understand this most recent shift— undoubtedly the subject 
of analysis for media historians in years to come—in light of what we have already 
learned?  
 This chapter will present, therefore, a clear summation of the key themes 
which have emerged from 1980-2005, so as to demonstrate the persistence during 
that period in the way newspaper companies responded to the constantly changing, 
threatening, but also enticing, emergence of electronic information and 
communications networks. This review of key themes serves to explain the 
newspaper industry’s relationship with online media during this period and provides 
insights into why newspaper companies failed to exploit online media to their 
advantage. The section on key themes is followed by material that revisits several 
terms presented in Chapter One: new media, interactivity and convergence and 
reflects on how the newspaper industry interpreted these terms in practical usage and 
discusses the ramifications such interpretations had on the industry’s actions. 
Together, these sections address issues that relate to the newspaper industry’s 
internal culture and how that culture influenced its business model. These issues 
should be considered anew as newspaper companies confront another technological 
shift and contemplate actions that will determine whether they have a future.     
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Review of Key Themes 
At the outset of the online era in 1980, newspaper companies were pioneers. The 
newspaper industry approached the potential of an online market with the confidence 
that accompanied its standing as the country’s leading industrial employer and top 
advertising distributor. The industry’s economic clout allowed for it to relish its 
social responsibilities as the premier defender of the rights to free speech and a free 
press. Newspaper executives had no fear of the online market in early 1980s. They 
assumed their companies would adapt to new technology, continue their local market 
dominance and honour their implied contract with the American people under the 
First Amendment. 
 Over time, however, the newspaper industry lost its leadership position as this 
thesis has shown. The information marketplace changed dramatically in a relatively 
short period, and the newspaper industry struggled to adapt. The history of this 
period reveals seven key themes that can be seen, retrospectively, as having 
significant influence on newspaper companies and their collective decision making 
as their industry confronted the online market from its inception. These themes, as 
much as the historical story itself, are of critical importance in understanding what 
might be happening now in online media, and in foreseeing or even shaping future 
events. These key themes fall largely into two broad categories: the organisational 
and professional culture of the newspaper companies and the business models which 
sustained the newspaper industry.   The two categories are inextricably linked as the 
culture of the newspaper industry profoundly influenced its approach to business.  
 
Freedom of the Press and its Influence 
The first of the key themes to be addressed is instrumental in understanding how the 
newspaper industry collectively saw itself as being different and apart from other 
businesses. The newspaper industry historically viewed the First Amendment’s 
constitutional guarantee of a free press as a social contract with the American public. 
Udell argued that newspaper companies indeed occupy a unique position in 
American industry because they are dependent on the free enterprise system for their 
livelihood, but are protected by the free press provisions of the U.S. Constitution.7  
This status separated newspaper companies—in the view of their owners and 
employees—from other business and contributed to a cultural sense that newspapers 
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were a form of national institution sustained by private enterprise, but in business to 
serve a public need. For decades, newspaper publishers used their free speech 
responsibilities as justification for their large profit margins. Newspaper companies 
had to be exceptionally profitable, according to this position, so that they would not 
be beholden to any single advertiser or other outside party. Exceptional profits were 
believed to give newspaper companies the independence required to uphold their end 
of the social contract free of influence. 
 From the very outset of the electronic era, newspaper professionals were 
concerned that electronic distribution would alter their relationship with government 
authority. Newspaper publishers saw how their electronic rivals in television and 
radio had succumbed to intense regulatory control by the FCC because they relied on 
the public airwaves to distribute their content. Many newspaper people believed that 
distributing their content over regulated telephone wires would make them 
susceptible to government oversight and weaken the protection afforded by the First 
Amendment. This perspective weakened as electronic distribution grew more 
prevalent.  
 The newspaper industry turned the regulatory argument in a different 
direction when it lobbied legislators and regulators to limit the role the 
telecommunications industry could play in the distribution of electronic information 
(see Chapter Four). Newspaper leaders argued that the telephone industry—
originally a giant monopoly and later a collection of regional operating companies —
was so powerful that their unfettered entry into the market would force others out, 
thereby reducing the diversity of information sources.  Although the diversity 
argument swayed politicians and judges, mainstream consumers perceived 
newspapers as obstructing technological progress. Even some critics from within 
believed the newspaper industry’s argument ran counter to its values. These critics 
believed that newspapers should have championed the telecommunication industry’s 
right to free speech rather than using it against them. 
 More recently, the financial plight of newspapers have caused some to 
question the viability of the larger concept of journalism. This notion underscores 
how closely journalism has been associated with printed newspapers; if newspapers 
are failing then journalism must also be in peril. Many commentators and industry 
executives, Murdoch among them, now argue that journalism as content must be 
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compelling enough to transcend its product form.8 However, the newspaper industry 
has been defined by its journalism-centred culture, which historically has been 
reluctant to embrace change that threatened its print heritage.  
 
The Pre-eminence of Print  
The newspaper industry’s insistence on keeping the printed newspaper form at the 
forefront of its product offerings is a key theme that explains the industry’s 
relationship with online media throughout the period reviewed: printed newspapers 
were always the primary product focus while online endeavours were relegated to 
ancillary status. In Chapter Six, this thesis noted how the advent of online 
distribution, especially the emergence of the web, should have forced the industry to 
assess the underlying fundamental nature of its enterprise: were newspaper 
companies in the business of printing and distributing newspapers or were they in the 
business of supplying news and information? Throughout the digital era, the 
newspaper industry had many opportunities to adjust; to shift its focus and its 
economic dependence away from print, but the industry never fully committed to an 
electronic future.    
 Throughout the online era newspapers companies were told that they should 
lessen their dependence on print and reduce the expensive distribution overhead 
associated with it. At the outset newspaper companies were enamoured with the 
potential cost savings of videotext delivery, but, as recounted in Chapter Two, the 
enthusiasm for those projects waned when consumers gravitated to interactive 
functionality rather than newspaper content. Also in the early years of the digital era, 
the newspaper industry invested heavily in news delivery over cable television 
systems. Newspaper companies abandoned those projects, however, when they 
recognized that consumers had little interest in watching passive displays of text on 
television (see Chapter Three). The point behind both of those examples is that 
newspaper companies were looking to replicate their printed newspaper in digital 
form. When that did not materialize, newspaper companies withdrew. 
 The pre-eminence afforded the printed newspaper was especially acute in the 
early Internet period. Newspaper companies developed automated programs to 
transfer content from the printed product directly to the web, but investing little in 
original online content. Furthermore, newspaper companies in those early years 
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refused to allow news to appear online before it was published in print fearing their 
own internal competition (see Chapter 5). The result was a lukewarm entry into a red 
hot market that relegated the newspaper industry to a laggard position from which it 
never recovered.  As one exasperated commentator observed: the newspaper industry 
must “stop worrying about how the news is delivered.”9 When challenged to decide 
if they were in the business of selling newspapers or, more holistically, information, 
newspaper companies should have treated the question as more than a rhetorical 
exercise.  
 
A Culture of Information Control 
The newspaper industry’s desire to maintain its print-centric focus has roots in 
another key theme discerned from the history. This theme—control of news and 
information—was so engrained in newspaper culture that it transcended the business 
model; it was a tenet of journalism doctrine manifested in the newspaper’s agenda-
setting role (see Chapter Six). Most newspaper editors and executives took their 
journalistic responsibility seriously as part of the “democratic political and economic 
system.” As noted above newspaper companies saw their industry as “a unique social 
institution” within this system and believed they were fulfilling a social contract 
necessary for democracy to operate.10 However, newspaper companies operated from 
the premise that it was their job to define the news, the degree of its importance and 
when that information would be disseminated.  
 The entire newspaper process was rooted in control. Reporters had access to 
information, sources, and events the general public did not; editors determined what 
events would be featured and how the stories would be written and presented; the 
paper was printed and distributed in its entirety without regard for individual 
preferences. A consumer received the sports section, for example, even if that reader 
did not follow sports or wanted such content. A consumer held the choice whether to 
subscribe, but other feedback was limited to a letter to the editor, and the newspaper 
controlled which of those it would print. As Schonfeld observed, “historically, the 
most successful media companies have controlled both content and distribution.”11  
                                                            
9. Knowledge@Wharton, “All the News That’s Fit to … Aggregate, Download, Blog: Are 
Newspapers Yesterday’s News?” par. 39. [Statement attributed to Michele Weldon, an assistant 
professor at Northwestern University’s Medill School of Journalism.] 
10. Udell, The Economics of the American Newspaper, 24. 
11. Schonfeld, “Tuning Up Big Media: A Modest Proposal for Saving Time Warner and the Entire 
Industry from Themselves,” 62. 
289 
 
Until the online era began, this model operated mostly unchecked for more than two 
centuries. 
  To an extent, radio and television already had disrupted the dissemination 
process. Online media, however, was entirely different because it provided 
newspaper readers their own voice, a platform outside of the agenda-setting reach of 
organized newsrooms. Newspaper people reacted poorly to this developing trend. 
Rather than recognize an opportunity to organize community and foster discussion, 
newspapers acted as if their social contract had been violated. Journalists especially 
detested the notion of giving up control demanded by the Internet and they were not 
particularly enamoured with having to interact with readers either.  
 Perhaps the newspaper industry’s most blatant attempt to exert control over 
the emerging Internet occurred with the inception of NCN (see Chapter Five). As a 
case study, NCN is remembered as a significant failure because of infighting among 
the newspaper companies that owned it and their inability to find an effective 
business model for it. NCN was, in effect, an online portal for the newspaper 
industry’s entire collection of content before the portal construct actually emerged.  
From the moment it was created, however, most of NCN’s owners saw it as an 
enforcement device; an entity that could marshal the collective weight of the 
newspaper industry to bring order to the Internet’s perceived chaos. The newspaper 
companies believed that through NCN, they could influence everything from 
advertising sizes to browser compatibility issues. It was an impossible mission to 
fulfil, but the failure of NCN did not dissuade others in the industry from believing 
that the Internet could be controlled.   
 As noted above, newspaper companies were reluctant to distribute their 
content online before it had first appeared in print out of fear the overall franchise 
would be weakened through self-competition. But the culture of control manifested 
itself in other ways as well. When newspapers offered interactive functions such as 
message boards, for example, they were mostly moderated and censored. Even when 
printed newspapers included e-mail addresses for readers to contact reporters and 
editors, the public inquiries that ensued went largely unanswered. 
 The prospect of a newspaper facilitating discussion rather than controlling it 
was the antithesis of newspaper doctrine. Moreover, the repeated attempts to exert 
control over what was essentially an open platform kept newspaper companies from 
fully accepting the Internet as an inherently different medium. As such, newspaper 
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companies kept their online editions subservient to their print editions. The irony of 
this approach is that the more newspaper companies gave in to their culture of 
control, the more control they seemed to lose.  
 
Culture Trumps Innovation 
As discussed in the opening of this section, newspaper companies began the online 
era as pioneers. The development of the early videotext projects and the investments 
in cable television systems (as explored in Chapters Two and Three respectively) 
were extremely innovative in the early 1980s. However, a key theme that emerged 
from this history is that this early innovative spirit was quashed by a culture that was 
inherently risk averse. In the past three decades, as explained throughout this thesis, 
newspaper executives intellectually acknowledged that their industry needed to 
accept change in order to survive in the digital era. In Chapter Two, for example, the 
newspaper industry was the forefront of pioneering online delivery with early 
videotext projects.  Chapter Five recalls the ambitious attempt by the newspaper 
industry to fund a cooperative research and development effort based at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Chapter Six recounts the example of 
NCN as the newspaper industry’s initial aggressive push to exert its influence in the 
emerging Internet era. 
  Emotionally, however, the industry never embraced the depth of change 
required to prevent the economic calamity that led to the industry’s decimated 
condition in 2010.  Observers point to the underlying conservative nature of the 
industry’s business practices as fostering complacency. Chapter Seven’s discussion 
of operational convergence, for example, noted how employees interested in 
enabling change—internal entrepreneurs as they were described—were often 
assigned to online departments but afforded no real authority to implement policies 
that would have affected their larger organizations. Sequestering entrepreneurs, 
however, was only symptomatic of larger cultural issues that affected how the 
newspaper industry reacted to the challenges of online media.          
 As the newspaper industry confronted a series of unforseen shifts in 
technology, it grew increasingly uncomfortable with its surroundings. The newspaper 
industry entered the online market in the early 1980s from a position of power and 
influence, but the surprising surge of cable television and the power plays of the 
telecommunications industry forced the newspaper industry into a defensive posture 
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from which it never recovered.  After playing offence for several decades following 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, the newspaper industry found itself trying to 
protect its markets rather than expand beyond them. 
  Operating from this defensive position, newspaper companies essentially 
eschewed innovation. As discussed in Chapter Four, newspaper industry trade groups 
lobbied lawmakers and regulators to restrict the telecommunications industry’s 
ability to distribute electronic information. While those efforts were largely 
successful, the newspaper industry suffered from a protectionist stance that allowed 
it to farther and farther behind more technically savvy competitors. The efforts to 
fund research and development such as the one discussed in Chapter Five turned out 
to be too limited to affect the market. Rather than invest in new technologies at a 
level required to make a difference, newspaper companies allowed those funds to 
flow to the bottom line inflating current profits at the expense of long-term planning. 
Chapter Five includes a discussion about the newspaper industry’s apparent 
dismissal of innovation as the result of a short-term focus inherent in an industry 
required to produce an entirely new product every day.  Although this was referred to 
as a pragmatic approach, the culture it fostered led to risk management strategies that 
embraced partnerships and alliances instead of direct industry investment in 
innovation. While this strategy worked well in terms of preserving capital, it meant 
the newspaper industry was relegated to a role of content provider on someone else’s 
platform. When the market turned dramatically toward the Internet, the newspaper 
industry was unprepared to stand on its own in a marketplace driven by innovation. 
The newspaper industry’s dismissive attitude about innovation had roots in the 
failure of some of its earliest online efforts.  
 
The Lasting Effects of Early Online Failure 
One of the key themes that emerged from the overall study of this 25-year period is 
that the early videotext projects had negative, long-term implications for the 
newspaper industry’s approach to online media because of their characterization as 
failures. Newspaper executives had been heavily influenced by the prevailing 
Information Society rhetoric and, as shown in Chapter Two, moved to implement 
technology that would transform the rhetoric into reality. However, the early 
videotext technology did not appeal to consumers and newspaper projects built on 
that platform never achieved any audience traction. When Knight-Ridder closed its 
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Viewtron project followed closely by Times Mirror’s decision to shut down 
Gateway, the industry was chastened. There had been so much hyperbole 
surrounding these services and the role newspaper companies would play in ushering 
in a new era, the failure of these two projects left a scar on the industry that never 
healed.  More than a decade later, newspaper executives were still pointing to 
Viewtron and Gateway as reasons why the industry should approach electronic 
services with extreme caution (see Chapter Five).  
 By allowing projects such as these to be branded as failures rather than as 
risk-taking research and development, the industry began a descent into technology 
cynicism that fomented protectionism as examined in the Chapter Four discussion of 
the newspaper industry’s strident opposition to the telecommunications industry’s 
entry into electronic information delivery. Newspaper companies that were heralded 
as technology pioneers in the early 1980s were by the end of the decade seen in a 
completely different light. Had the newspaper industry considered its early videotext 
projects in the spirit of innovation and experimental learning rather than a means to 
an end, the setup to the Internet era likely would have been very different. 
  The early online projects demonstrated that consumers wanted more than a 
passive experience. When content was distributed through a networked computer, the 
natural instinct for a consumer was a desire to do something with it. Consumers 
wanted to respond, to share content with others, to alter it in ways that would give 
them ownership. In other words, the early projects pointed to the importance of 
interactivity as online attribute, an area that will be discussed more in the second 
section of this chapter. 
 From the outset, however, newspaper companies viewed their content as 
sacrosanct. In protecting what they viewed as an asset, newspaper companies used 
their online platforms to create electronic versions of printed newspapers. In the 
process, they ignored how consumers wanted to use online information. In recalling 
the Viewtron project, for example, Boczkowski found that Knight-Ridder “neglected 
its own usage data showing that adopters were more interested in communicating 
with each other than reading newsroom-generated content.”12 In Chapter Two, the 
thesis recalled how the discovery of this consumer behaviour contributed to the 
company’s decision to end the project. When consumers did not respond to Viewtron 
                                                            
12. Boczkowski, “The Mutual Shaping of Technology and Society in Videotex Newspapers: Beyond 
the Diffusion and Social Shaping Perspectives,” 263. 
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as a newspaper, the newspaper company that created it was not inclined to support its 
growth and development.   
 This is the first key example of a time when newspapers largely missed the 
significance of a turning point in the evolution of media and stubbornly clung to their 
print-centric publishing model. When consumers did not regard Viewtron or 
Gateway as newspapers per se, the newspaper industry shut them down rather than 
try to respond to the interactive services consumers wanted in an online experience. 
When the online market moved into the proprietary services era as recounted in 
Chapter Five, newspapers failed to grasp that consumers were turning to these 
services largely for their email and messaging platforms. Content was ancillary, but 
newspaper companies partnered with AOL and Prodigy because they afforded 
publishers some semblance of control. The proprietary model allowed newspaper 
companies the ability to organize and distribute their work supported by advertising. 
The close resemblance to the offline publishing model appealed to newspaper 
publishers, but the resulting gated communities as discussed in Chapter Five (content 
on Prodigy was not available to subscribers of AOL and vice versa) left these 
companies exposed when the open network of the Internet arrived.  
 The Internet did not conform to any control model, which explains why it 
represented such a disruptive technological shift for the newspaper industry. With the 
Internet, consumers could take control of content; they no longer needed a 
publisher’s consent.  As explored in Chapters Six and Seven, this fundamental 
difference in the Internet versus previous online platforms was ignored by newspaper 
companies at the outset and represented another significant period when they missed 
a significant turning point in the evolution of media technology.  
 The newspaper industry’s reaction to the Internet can now be seen as also 
having roots in issues discussed earlier in the themes of information control and a 
reliance on the print model. The outcome of the industry’s activities clearly indicates 
that they were an insufficient response to meet the competitive demands of the 
marketplace, especially in protecting vital revenue streams.  
 
Advertising Position Left Unprotected 
Throughout the digital era, the newspaper industry was warned that online 
distribution threatened its advertising revenue. However, a key theme that emerged 
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from the history was the newspaper industry’s failure to heed to those warnings 
thereby leaving its advertising position unprotected against many new competitors.  
The newspaper industry’s actions in the early part of the digital era—specifically 
investments in cable television (see Chapter Three), the protracted lobbying battle 
against the telecommunications industry (see Chapter Four), and alliances with 
proprietary online services (see Chapter Five)—were largely viewed as attempts to 
defend its advertising position. In the case of cable television, for example, 
newspapers saw cable franchises as direct competition in local markets. The 
newspaper industry’s lobbying to keep AT&T and the telecommunications industry 
out of the online information business—although framed as necessary to protect 
information diversity—was also aimed at stalling online competition with vast 
databases of Yellow Pages advertising. During the brief period when newspapers 
formed alliances with proprietary services, Prodigy emerged as the industry’s most-
preferred partner because its advertising model was seen to be the most closely-
related to the newspaper industry’s advertising model.       
 With so much attention given to advertising concerns during the pre-Internet 
portion of the online era, it is perplexing to see how vulnerable newspaper companies 
were when upstart companies targeted their markets as the Internet emerged. 
Google’s search-based advertising, eBay’s auction listings, and Monster.com’s 
online job postings are examples of online advertising that contributed to significant 
erosion in the newspaper advertising market, especially in the classified advertising 
category. The newspaper industry’s failure to protect its online market for classified 
advertising is especially problematic given the early and frequent warnings that this 
category of revenue was perhaps the most vulnerable to online competition. 
 Chapter Two, for example, presented Compaine’s observation from 1980 that 
“classified advertising … does lend itself more to these futuristic delivery modes,” 
adding that “this would appear to be one area in which newspapers may well have to 
take the lead, before … others usurp this function.”13 As noted in Chapter Seven, 
however, newspaper companies did not take the lead in developing online classified 
technologies and fell further and further behind their competition as the online era 
transformed into the Internet era.  Newspaper companies placed their classified 
advertising online through platforms that were not as interactive or sophisticated as 
                                                            
13. Compaine, The Newspaper Industry in the 1980s: An Assessment of Economics and Technology, 
213. 
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the competition. The industry tried to create scale and share risk through numerous 
joint ventures and investments in new companies, but had little success with those 
efforts.  From the perspective of industry analysts and consultants, the newspaper 
industry’s approach to advertising—especially classified advertising—was reflective 
of the overall pattern of operating without a coherent strategy.  Chapter Seven 
features a comment from the chief executive officer of Times Mirror in 2000 when 
he acknowledged that the newspaper industry had taken classified advertising for 
granted.  Newspaper company managers had allowed such complacency to control 
their industry’s destiny.  These executives had dismissed the need for innovation and 
the results underpin this key theme. The advertising position was exposed to an 
onslaught of new competitors born out of the very innovations and inventions 
newspaper companies chose not to exploit.  
 The complacency that underlies such decisions had its roots in profitability. 
The following material, which will complete this section of Chapter Eight, examines 
how the relentless pursuit of profits ultimately created an industry full of short-
sighted companies unprepared for dealing with the rapid shifting technologies of the 
digital era.  
 
Emphasis on Short-term Profitability over Long-term Planning 
The final key theme identified in this history—an emphasis on short-term 
profitability over long-term planning—can be seen as the unifying idea behind the 
overall thesis. The newspaper industry’s pursuit of profits above all else led to 
decisions that were detrimental to the long-term health of the industry.  In Chapter 
Seven, an industry observer noted the “emotional” issues newspaper executives had 
in accepting fundamental shifts in media revenue. He stated: “It’s really hard to 
cannibalize yourself and trade high-margin revenues for low-margin revenues one 
second before you have to.”14 Delaying that transition, however, proved to be a 
dangerous tactic as the industry mistimed its response. The market for printed 
newspapers deteriorated faster than publishers anticipated, and they had not 
developed their Internet operations to the extent that online revenue could offset the 
declines in print revenue. Throughout the 2000s, newspaper companies saw their 
Internet operations as supplemental to the core printed product and managed them as 
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Ventures, a company backed by newspaper industry investors that focused on online automotive 
and apartment advertising.] 
296 
 
an expense to be controlled. Newspaper executives never embraced their online 
editions as engines of growth worthy of long-term investment.  
 By the time newspaper executives understood their new reality, it was too late 
to make up the lost ground and affect their immediate economic circumstances. 
Rosen described it in Chapter Seven as a period of “profitable demise,” underscoring 
the notion that newspaper companies had maintained high profits only by 
jeopardizing long-term viability.15 Within this context, Knight-Ridder’s decision to 
sell its newspapers and shut down, also presented in Chapter Seven, can be viewed as 
the symbolic end of the traditional newspaper model.  
 As such, the newspaper industry continued to deteriorate in the latter half of 
the 2000s.  In many cases, those coveted profit margins turned to losses and the few 
remaining investors bid down the value of the stocks. Some newspaper companies 
lost 80 percent of their market value and the entire sector traded on financial markets 
at or near historic lows by the end of the decade.16  
 Some would argue that the condition of the newspaper industry in 2010 
should be expected of any mature industry at the end of a natural life cycle (see a 
discussion of Lehman-Wilzig and Cohen-Avigdor work in Chapter One).  In the case 
of the newspaper industry, however, its history presents a compelling argument 
against natural evolutionary forces. As a Wharton Business School report asserted: 
“newspapers themselves are to blame for a large part of the problem” indicating that 
a willingness to adopt a more long-term focus and make different strategic decisions 
could have altered the industry’s circumstances. 
 Chapter Two recounts how the newspaper industry cast the early videotext 
projects as failures and fixated on how much money had been lost. The industry 
could have cast that money as an investment in research and development. Chapter 
Four chronicles a decade of the newspaper industry waging a protectionist campaign 
against the telecommunications industry rather than investing in its own technology 
innovation. Chapter Six discusses the closing of NCN as the failure of leading 
newspaper companies to cooperate. Imagine the altered landscape if NCN had 
emerged as a well-funded portal rather than disintegrating amidst industry infighting.  
  As the history demonstrated, U.S. newspaper companies faced many 
decisions during the online era where conservative responses assigned the industry to 
                                                            
15. Rosen, “Laying the Newspaper Gently Down to Die,” par. 14. 
16. Kirchhoff, “The U.S. Newspaper Industry in Transition,” 7. 
297 
 
its predicament. With the loss of nearly $24 billion in advertising revenue this 
decade, the industry’s old business model has been discredited. But a completely 
new model has yet to emerge. Through employee layoffs and other budget cuts, most 
newspaper companies had by the end of the decade stopped the financial losses that 
had crippled them in the latter half of the 2000s. But even the most ardent supporters 
of the newspaper industry understand that media economics make it highly unlikely 
that newspaper companies will ever again be able to rely on printed products for 
long-term growth and sustainability. 
 Newspaper companies now speak of their operations as multiplatform, and 
the Gannett example of the changes at USA Today that opened this chapter could 
signal an effort at real operating reforms. Once again, the future of the newspaper 
industry rests on its ability to embrace new media products that are innovative and 
accept interactivity as a core attribute as media convergence becomes increasingly 
about devices. The intentional emphasis included in the previous sentence illustrates 
that the three key concepts that formed a foundation for this thesis continue to be 
relevant.  The following material reviews these concepts and suggests that 
understanding the newspaper industry’s relationship with them helps to explain how 
the industry must adapt going forward.  
  
Concepts Revisited 
This thesis presented three key terms in Chapter One that related to the development 
of online media, including the phrase “new media” and the concepts of interactivity 
and convergence. How newspaper executives came to understand what these terms 
represented for their own industry is reflected in their responses to development of 
online media. In relating to “new media,” for example, newspaper executives 
accepted “new” to mean online media and digital media. They did not appreciate, 
however, that when applied to Internet-based media, “new” truly represented a 
different paradigm that required new modes for operating.  In the following sub-
sections of this chapter, each of these three key terms is revisited in light of the 
history presented to more fully discuss their significance. 
 
“New Media” Misunderstood  
Newspaper executives believed from the outset that a key strength of their industry 
rested in its ability to organize information. It was expected that newspaper 
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companies would translate those organization skills to their online platforms. As 
quoted in Chapter Six, an industry leader stated: “It is information processing that is 
newspapers’ greatest strength,” adding that “newspapers must understand that what 
they do best—gathering, packaging and distributing news and information—is much 
more than ink on paper.”17 Newspaper executives clearly understood that electronic 
distribution represented a physical change in product form from paper to digital, but 
this understanding represented the limits of how newspaper executives defined “new 
media.”  
  For newspaper executives, the term new media was synonymous with digital 
distribution. But that simple definition, while not entirely incorrect, did not allow 
them to frame the broader implications that digital distribution represented. They did 
not grasp that all digital distribution would not be the same. As such, they did not 
recognize that Internet-based new media represented a new paradigm that destroyed 
the structure of content as they knew it. 
 Newspaper formats belonged to an era of linear information processing in the 
McLuhan vernacular and relied on the hierarchal concept of presenting information 
from most important to least important. The advent of hypertext allowed users to 
approach information from a multidimensional perspective. Readers could access 
information at any point in the continuum and could navigate from one point to 
another based on their own interests and desires. Furthermore, online users could 
choose content without advertising or advertising without content. And in some 
cases, Monster.com and eBay are examples, the advertising was the content. In 
Chapter Six, this thesis quoted an industry analyst who wrote that “the components 
of what we historically know as the newspaper have become unbundled.”18 In 
Chapter One, the thesis noted that Allen referred to this phenomenon as the 
emergence of “not media” when he explained that companies such as Google do not 
operate in the ways normally associated with media, but merely “trespass into the 
economic fiefdoms of media.”19  
 Newspaper people had no response for the unbundling process and the 
ensuing creations that did not fit neatly into their media definition. The newspaper 
                                                            
17. Presstime, “Putting it Together: The Las Vegas Trade Show Proved a Technological Oasis of 
Shared Ideas, Strategies and Solutions,” 31. [Statement attributed to Charles T. Brumback, 
chairman and chief executive officer of Tribune Co. and chairman of the NAA.] 
18. Fine, “The Daily Paper of Tomorrow: It Won’t Look the Same. But with Reimagining, the Local 
Daily Ain’t Dead Yet,” par. 2. [Statement attributed to Mark Colodny, managing director of 
Warburg Pincus.] 
19. Allen, “Old Media, New Media, Not Media?,” par. 2.  
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industry’s perspective relied on the tenet of content creation; that consumers 
responded to original content and, that in turn, created a healthy information 
exchange conducive to selling advertisement. In reality, however, consumers gave 
less credence to the original content of newspapers than executives and journalists 
were willing to believe. This became especially problematic for newspapers as the 
abundance of news available electronically gave such content the characteristics of a 
commodity and reduced its perceived value. Even so, consumers welcomed structure 
and they rewarded those companies that provided it in ways that enhanced rather 
than dictated an information experience.  
 Yahoo! and Google are examples of innovators that filled the structural void 
of the Internet with portals and robust search engines—models that relied on content 
aggregation rather than content creation. As quoted in Chapter Six, the chief 
executive officer of Yahoo! Stated:  “I don’t think old media is what people are 
going to spend most of their time doing on the Internet. This paradigm needs its own 
inventions, its own methods, its own way to go forward.”20 In that sense, “new 
media” became identified with breaking media tradition by enabling and 
empowering interactivity.  
 
Interactivity Defines the Paradigm Shift 
From the outset of their earliest online endeavours, newspaper companies learned 
about the inherent interactive nature of online media. However, newspaper 
companies mostly ignored the interactive capabilities of online systems. They used 
online as a form of distribution to push out news and information to consumers, but it 
was rarely considered as an opportunity for two-way communication with readers. 
Some interactive functionality was tolerated within the walled gardens of the 
proprietary systems such as Prodigy and AOL as discussed in Chapter Five, but 
newspaper companies reverted to their early videotext mentality when migrating to 
the Internet in the mid-1990s. There was gradual acceptance of interactive features 
throughout the first decade of the Internet, and online editions eventually featured 
full complements of interactive functionality such as blogs and message boards. But 
critics contended that newspaper companies never appreciated interactivity to the 
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point that would cause them to make interactivity the focal point of how their online 
editions operated.  
 Such criticism reflected the frustration of many industry commentators who 
saw the newspaper industry’s failure to embrace interactive functions as short 
sighted. When newspaper companies initially automated content repurposing, the 
practice was accepted as necessary for expediency to market. As the practice became 
commonplace, however, critics contended that newspaper companies were taking an 
easy route to the Internet, but one that failed to take advantage of either immediacy 
or interactivity. 
 As the Internet developed, interactivity emerged as the major reason a media 
paradigm shift occurred. The Internet was ideally suited for interactivity because its 
creation was rooted in the development of a communication platform that was 
deliberately designed to facilitate sharing of data and ideas. Entrepreneurs who were 
not wedded to the artefacts of media tradition embraced the Internet’s open platform 
and introduced new media products that empowered consumers. Newspaper 
companies did not understand what was taking place until after fully developed 
competition appeared.  Newspaper companies initially saw the Internet as just 
another wire and were sceptical of its long-term viability given that it had no 
ownership or governing body in the traditional sense. Its interactive nature, however, 
had, in effect, made all of its users de facto owners, which was a concept the 
newspaper industry did not appreciate. Furthermore, newspaper companies ignored 
interactivity because embracing it would have meant ceding control. Culturally, 
newspapers were aloof and detached from their readers. Interactivity, therefore, 
represented the antithesis of newspaper culture.         
 The reluctance of newspaper people to appreciate the Internet’s inherent 
interactivity was manifested in the tepid response mounted against Internet-enabled 
competitors. Whether or not this grew out of a risk averse business culture or a 
culture steeped in agenda-setting journalism can be debated, but the history 
demonstrates that newspaper companies only reacted to online media out of a 
perceived necessity. They never fully committed their operations to online media; 
and never embraced online media as their core business. It is difficult to win a war 
when the troops are not convinced of the cause.  In the case of the Internet, the 
newspaper industry simply did not believe in interactivity, and therefore, it could not 
muster the passion necessary to compete.    
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 If interactivity can be seen as the essence of online media as this line of 
thinking indicates, then convergence can be used to describe the media evolution 
taking place around it.  The many iterations of convergence have been discussed 
throughout this thesis. The material that follows discusses various perspectives of 
convergence and how the concept relates to the newspaper industry’s relationship 
with online media. 
    
Convergence: A Matter of Perspective 
Newspaper companies initially were fearful that electronic distribution would allow 
others to become newspapers. The early videotext experiments were seen, at least in 
part, as a response to commercial services such as CompuServe who were entering 
the consumer market. The newspaper industry’s political war with the telephone 
companies throughout much of the 1980s and early 1990s was aimed at preventing 
them from creating local news and information services. Later, as dozens of 
newspaper companies partnered with Prodigy, they bargained with the proprietary 
service to eliminate its own content staff and drop plans to create original content. 
 Newspaper companies approached the advent of electronic distribution from 
an industry-centric point of view. As such, the concept of convergence was 
considered rather narrowly. It was a technological construct that defined the process 
of computers connecting to the telephone infrastructure for the purpose of delivering 
information. Newspaper companies, therefore, understood convergence as a 
technology construct separate from a media construct. In this context, convergence 
was about enabling technology that would allow newspaper companies a new way to 
distribute their content.  
  Chapter One explained there is wide acceptance among scholars that 
convergence, as it is discussed in the context of new media, began as technology 
shifted from analogue to digital. But that discussion also noted that the digital 
transition represented only one aspect of understanding convergence and its 
ramifications. Jenkins, for example, wrote about convergence as a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon “occurring at various intersections of media technologies, industries, 
content and audiences….”21 Jenkins’ explanation of convergence allows for the 
construct to be understood more holistically including its role—not only in terms of 
information distribution—but also in terms of information production and 
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consumption. From this broader perspective, convergence encompasses many 
cultural considerations, especially as the Internet fostered user-generated content.  
The broader construct allows us to understand that media convergence is more than 
the melding of technology; it is also a cultural phenomenon where the creator of 
content and the consumer of content emerge as one; where producer and audience 
converge.  
 However, newspaper companies approached convergence as principally 
about enabling new production and distribution methods. As a result, they spent 
much of the online era looking at the media landscape through the lenses of mergers 
and acquisitions or strategic alliances and partnerships. As explained in Chapter One, 
Dominick referred to the former as “corporate convergence,” or what happened when 
a single corporate entity would form to offer multiple media products, and the latter 
as “operational convergence,” which occurred when competitive media outlets set 
aside their rivalry to cooperate on content creation often with the intent of jointly 
producing material for online distribution.22   
 As newspapers considered convergence in these pragmatic terms, they 
formed partnerships with television stations as explored through the example of 
Media General’s efforts in Tampa (see Chapter Seven). In the end, however, these 
types of initiatives were convergence in name only because they did not truly address 
the issue of creating content suited for the interactivity of new media.  A newspaper 
and television station cooperating to produce content for a website likely saved both 
parties money in terms of production, but it was not convergence in the broader spirit 
of contributing to the evolution of media by creating something new out of old parts. 
Essentially, these projects turned out to be nothing more than distractions. They gave 
the industry the allusion of pursuing productive courses of action, but in reality the 
partnerships and alliances allowed the industry to avoid engaging with the larger, 
fundamental shift that the Internet represented.       
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Conclusion 
 
The Internet often is described as a disruptive technology and many enterprises 
across all sectors of business and society, from telecommunications providers 
through to travel agencies, from software developers through to mainstream politics, 
have been transformed since the Internet emerged as a platform for citizens and 
consumers to communicate, consume and produce media content, to conduct 
transactions and to share themselves with others online. Yet the media has probably 
been more affected by (and also most challenged by) the Internet.  This thesis has 
provided a detailed examination of how a specific form of the media—newspaper 
publishing in the United States— has attempted to respond to the Internet and in 
doing so provides a deeper understanding of the condition of the newspaper industry 
itself. Perhaps more significantly, however, this thesis shows that the disruption for 
the newspaper industry had as much to do with its understanding of and reactions to 
the Internet as the actual technology itself. Technology is shown, inevitably, to be 
part of and not distinct from the human societies from which it emerges. 
 Clearly, the newspaper industry has been transformed—any industry that 
sheds half of its revenue in a decade would find its business model discredited and 
the notion of its survivability questioned. This thesis, however, has shown that the 
newspaper industry was not a passive bystander as Internet-based competition 
invaded its markets. It would be incorrect to characterize the newspaper industry as a 
victim of technology; that the disruption and subsequent transformation of the 
newspaper industry was out of its control. Although the newspaper industry had no 
influence on the timing of the Internet’s emergence, it was in complete control of its 
reaction to it. 
 This study found the newspaper industry had ample warning about the shifts 
occurring in its market. Newspaper companies learned early in the digital era about 
the vulnerability of their classified advertising franchise yet failed to protect them.  
Newspaper companies learned about the significance of interactivity yet ignored 
their audience’s pleas for a relationship. When a business knows of its weaknesses 
and realizes that its marketplace is changing, but does not have the conviction to 
address its problems forthrightly, its deteriorated condition is not the result of 
disruption. The newspaper industry arrived there on its own volition through the 
diluted choices made and the lacklustre competitive response that ensued.  
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 In some media histories of the newspaper industry’s relationship with digital 
media, the timeline begins with the emergence of the Internet as a consumer platform 
in the mid-1990s. However, this thesis began earlier with the advent of the broader 
online era and the creation of the first online newspapers in the early 1980s.  It is 
important to consider this earlier perspective because the newspaper industry in the 
1990s was not reacting to the Internet in a vacuum.  From the vantage point of the 
newspaper industry, the Internet was part of a technological continuum that began 
with videotext and progressed through the period of proprietary online systems. 
These earlier platforms had served to inform newspaper companies that online 
systems were first and foremost communication platforms.  Users of such systems 
felt empowered by a level of control that was missing in the realm of traditional 
media. This user empowerment was apparent even in the systems that preceded the 
Internet. However, the newspaper industry ignored this finding then and, again, more 
detrimentally, in the Internet era. 
 While the Internet may have been part of a continuum in online technology, 
its arrival—more specifically, the arrival of the content presentation layer known as 
the World Wide Web—represented a radical departure from earlier online systems. 
The Internet was far more decentralized, being an end-to-end network in which each 
computer attached to the Internet might be both a client and a server, and whose 
operations were governed by protocols that deliberately encouraged open 
interconnection rather than proprietary closure. The early online models were similar 
to publishing models with content created centrally and distributed to subscribers. 
Newspaper companies completely misunderstood the openness inherent in the 
Internet and stubbornly tried to force its control-based publishing model into a 
platform that fundamentally was designed to operate without central control. 
Ignoring the audience’s desire for interactivity and empowerment in 1985 led to a 
series of small online failures; ignoring those same wishes in 1995 created the 
conditions for the newspaper industry’s cataclysmic fall.     
 Nevertheless, a smaller and retrenched industry has survived to face yet 
another period where strategic decisions must be made in regards to a media industry 
inflection point: the emergence of wireless computing, including smartphones and 
tablet devices. However chastened the newspaper industry may be in the wake of its 
recent history, it has an opportunity to be resurrected as a content provider for these 
new platforms. Doing so, however, will require that newspaper companies accept 
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that the media landscape has changed inalterably. Once that fundamental concession 
is made, newspaper companies must then adapt in ways that have eluded them 
previously. 
 Although this thesis has reported on many of the activities undertaken by 
newspaper companies regarding online media, it essentially recounts that much of 
the effort was a fight against the natural forces of convergence that throughout 
history has allowed new forms of media to supplant older forms. Even though 
newspaper companies created online media throughout the period studied by this 
thesis, they never embraced the natural evolutionary process and refused to free their 
online products from the artefacts of a newspaper heritage. Mostly, they rejected 
interactivity, which emerged as the defining attribute of online media.  In doing so, 
the redemptive power of convergence was lost and newspaper companies ended up 
losing the one attribute that had mattered to them: control of the information they 
created and disseminated. 
 If newspaper companies are to find new life within the ecosystem of 
applications fostered by wireless devices, they will have to address a myriad of 
issues that led to their current predicament. Newspaper companies must be willing to 
acknowledge that their primary product can no longer be a printed edition.  The 
demise of Knight-Ridder Inc. in 2005 was the alarm sounding that the traditional 
business model for newspaper companies was finished. However, it took another few 
years of economic failure made worse by a deep economic recession for the majority 
of industry leaders to see Knight-Ridder as the bellwether it was. The Gannett 
restructuring example that provided an opening for Chapter Eight is an important, 
tangible sign of change. The announcement from an industry leader that print was no 
longer the primary product for its USA Today flagship newspaper was a radical 
admission. Given that newspaper companies have been so reluctant to renounce their 
print heritage, Gannett’s announcement was viewed by many observers as a cathartic 
step necessary to the overall industry’s resurgence.  
 For newspaper companies to revive their economic fortunes, however, there 
must be more than announcements; a cultural transformation that replaces naysayers 
with innovators and risk averse managers with those willing to abandon convention 
must occur.  The newspaper industry can no longer afford to talk about change; it 
must embody change. Newspapers have a long history of experimentation as this 
thesis has demonstrated.  The early videotext projects, alliances with Prodigy, the 
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formation of New Century Network and the creation of a 1990s-era prototype tablet 
are examples where the industry showed its ability to think about its future in new 
ways.  In these and other examples, however, the newspaper industry failed to 
convert experimentation into innovation. In the final analysis of these milestones, the 
newspaper industry’s conservative culture blocked new approaches from achieving 
significance. 
  The newspaper industry first engaged in new media activity because it felt an 
obligation to deliver the Information Society before someone else could.  The issue, 
however, quickly devolved into defining what the Information Society rhetoric meant 
in terms of practical product development. As the concept evolved to encompass 
much more than news and information, the gap between this market reality and the 
newspaper industry’s willingness to adapt grew increasingly wider. By the late 
2000s, the newspaper industry had accepted—albeit stubbornly—some of the tenants 
of the online era and provided functionality that should have been present all along. 
In any case, it was too late for those concessions to make any difference in the era of 
the World Wide Web.  The result in 2010 is a newspaper industry that is a mere 
shadow of the one that stood on the threshold of the digital era in 1980. Nevertheless, 
as noted above, the industry has a chance to rebound as technology shifts again. 
 The U.S. newspaper industry last faced such dire circumstances more than 70 
years ago. Radio had threatened as a new media phenomenon in the late 1920s and 
the Great Depression of the 1930s ravaged the newspaper industry. The newspaper 
industry was rescued in the 1940s in part due to a citizenry that wanted all the 
information it could get regarding the Second World War. Further bolstered by post-
war economic expansion, the newspaper industry rebounded from the Depression era 
and prospered for four decades. The contemporary economy is far more complex 
than it was in the 1940s and the roster of new media companies represents more 
formidable competition than radio did. Nevertheless, history suggests that it is 
possible for a turnaround to happen. Newspaper companies could find an economic 
model or a combination of several economic models to reverse their decline. Those 
models could be found in new forms of paid content or in new applications residing 
on the wireless communication devices and emerging electronic tablets. It is highly 
unlikely, however, that a rebound will occur in print. The future of newspaper 
companies—just as it did in 1995—rests with the degree to which they are willing to 
separate from paper and print and embrace new content distribution models. 
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